Free Will, Determinism, Indetrminism, Moral Responsibility, and Salvation

[Counterpoint]

The failure to answer is highly significant…

Your question is not relevant. (I certainly have not made any argument concerning machines.)

 

[Dryden77]

If you really believe that the doctrine of aseity is incoherent, then you must believe the doctrine of God is incoherent. Because the doctrine of God is predicated on it. (Philosophical theology is based on divine simplicity.)

“Incoherent” allows for a wide range of meanings, including the modest “difficult to understand.” The word needn’t mean “logically self-defeating,” which I think you’ve assumed to be the meaning I had in mind. (It wasn’t my meaning, but I’ll take the blame for the misconception.)

I’ll be happy to drop the term, as a) it’s totally dispensable to my argument and b) I’d like to return to the main point of discussion.

So, with that in mind, I’ll ‘concede’ your point that aseity isn’t an incoherent (logically self-defeating) concept.

Let me try to restate my argument:

1. Compatibilism and libertarianism aren’t the only ways of thinking about free will.
2. Another way of thinking about free will is of a will that’s self-determined (rather than determined by chance or natural character).
3. A self-determined will (as opposed to simply a self-determined being, which would include a being with compatibilist free will) seems to suffer from the infinite-regress problem, as the will would have to be willed by another will inside the first one, which in turn would have to be willed by another will inside it, etc.
4. God’s existence would suffer from its own infinite-regress problem without aseity.
5. Since God’s existence is exempt from the infinite-regress problem, perhaps he can extend this exemption, in some form or another, to the human will and thus free the will from both nature and chance.

Note that my argument is speculative; it does not assert that a self-determined will must necessarily exist or even that its existence is probable. My argument says only that a self-determined will may not be impossible and that the dilemma you pose (compatibilism or libertarianism) may be a false one.

 

[Counterpoint]

1. A self-determined will (as opposed to simply a self-determined being, which would include a being with compatibilist free will) seems to suffer from the infinite-regress problem, as the will would have to be willed by another will inside the first one, which in turn would have to be willed by another will inside it, etc…

God does not determine his essence or existence.

“God is the only being whose essence is existence itself.” - St. Thomas Aquinas

And there is no “infinite regress” problem because God is not in time. So, his “will” is not something external to him. God IS his will. In fact, God is the “willer,” the “willing,” and the “willed” because all three are one.

 

[Dryden77]

God does not determine his essence or existence.

“God is the only being whose essence is existence itself.” - St. Thomas Aquinas

And there is no “infinite regress” problem because God is not in time. So, his “will” is not something external to him. God IS his will. In fact, God is the “willer,” the “willing,” and the “willed” because all three are one.

God is immune to the infinite-regress problem because he has aseity, not simply because he’s outside of time. Aquinas said that even an eternal object would be subject to the infinite-regress problem if his existence were contingent. Objects (including beings) are subject to the infinite-regress problem if a) they had a beginning or b) they had no beginning but are contingent. So to say, as you did, that God is immune from the infinite-regress problem because God is eternal is to overlook another source of the infinite-regress problem. Take away God’s aseity and you create an infinite-regress problem, even if you retain God’s eternality. And as for God’s will being outside himself, I don’t think either one of us is trying to make that case. I’m certainly not.

To return to the original point of this discussion, it is a form of aseity, hypothetically extended to humans, that I’m identifying as a possible explanation for human free will. I’m not arguing that God has free will, as if God’s will were separate from his nature – I’m saying that maybe we do. I’m arguing that aseity in God applies to being whereas in us (assuming it’s been extended to us) it applies to will.

 

[Richca]

There are only two options: determinism or indeterminism (If anyone here believes that there are any other options, then please share it with us.)

If determinism holds true, then every decision I make and action I take was predetermined and could not have been otherwise.

If indeterminism holds true, then every decision I make and action I take could only have been otherwise due to some element of pure randomness or chance.

There are only two types of free will: compatibilism and libertarianism. (If anyone here believes that there are any other types of free will, then please share it with us.)

“Compatibilist free will” presupposes determinism.

“Libertarian free will” presupposes indeterminism.

Why does this all matter? It matters, because it has implications for both moral responsibility and salvation.

What are the implications for moral responsibility? The implications for moral responsibility are the same regardless of whether determinism or indeterminism holds true. Why? Because I can be held no more responsible for a decision I make or an action I take that reduces to pure randomness or chance than I can for a decision I make or an action I take that was completely predetermined.

What are the implications for salvation? The implications for salvation are the same regardless of whether determinism or indeterminism holds true. Why? Because the implications for salvation are the same as for moral responsibility. I can be held no more responsible for my salvation (or damnation) for a decision I make or an action I take that ultimately reduces to pure randomness or chance than I can for a decision I make or an action I take that was completely predetermined.

Incidentally, “final causality” does not change anything. It is simply another determining factor.

I think your definition of indeterminism as applying to the free will or actions of human beings is not quite accurate. Human beings do things not only through their will but through their intellect as well. In fact, it is the intellect that provides the reasons why we should do or not do some action. Now, if we do some action because of some reason provided by the intellect, that is not doing some action out of pure randomness or chance but for some definite end or purpose.

 

[Counterpoint]

God is immune to the infinite-regress problem because he has aseity, not simply because he’s outside of time. Aquinas said that even an eternal object would be subject to the infinite-regress problem if his existence were contingent. Objects (including beings) are subject to the infinite-regress problem if a) they had a beginning or b) they had no beginning but are contingent.

There are two definitions of eternity: everlasting in time and timeless (not in time). God is eternal in the second second sense. He is timeless (not in time). (I believe that is what you are failing to understand.)

So to say, as you did, that God is immune from the infinite-regress problem because God is eternal is to overlook another source of the infinite-regress problem. Take away God’s aseity and you create an infinite-regress problem, even if you retain God’s eternality.

God’s is existence itself. There is nothing outside of God that causes God to exist. There cannot be any infinite-regress problem for something that “just is.” And something that “just is” is eternal (timeless).

And as for God’s will being outside himself, I don’t think either one of us is trying to make that case. I’m certainly not.

It doesn’t appear to me that you have any point.

To return to the original point of this discussion, it is a form of aseity, hypothetically extended to humans, that I’m identifying as a possible explanation for human free will. I’m not arguing that God has free will, as if God’s will were separate from his nature – I’m saying that maybe we do. I’m arguing that aseity in God applies to being whereas in us (assuming it’s been extended to us) it applies to will.

The bottom line is that you have failed to present us with any (intelligible) option for free will that does not entail either compatibilism (determinism) or liberatrianism (indeterminism).

 

[Counterpoint]

I think your definition of indeterminism as applying to the free will or actions of human beings is not quite accurate. Human beings do things not only through their will but through their intellect as well. In fact, it is the intellect that provides the reasons why we should do or not do some action. Now, if we do some action because of some reason provided by the intellect, that is not doing some action out of pure randomness or chance but for some definite end or purpose.

Final causality (teleology and/or purpose) is a determinant factor. In fact, God is the final cause. (Either everything that happens has a cause or it doesn’t. There are no other logical options here.)

 

[Dryden77]

There are two definitions of eternity: everlasting in time and timeless (not in time). God is eternal in the second second sense. He is timeless (not in time). (I believe that is what you are failing to understand.)

God’s is existence itself. There is nothing outside of God that causes God to exist. There cannot be any infinite-regress problem for something that “just is.” And something that “just is” is eternal (timeless).

It doesn’t appear to me that you have any point.

The bottom line is that you have failed to present us with any (intelligible) option for free will that does not entail either compatibilism (determinism) or liberatrianism (indeterminism).

I think I’ve made my argument unnecessarily complex – it’s reached the point where we’re now disagreeing over things we agree on (like the difference between eternality and everlastingness). Let me try this one last time.

1. God has a property known as aseity.
2. Aseity is “the property by which a being exists of and from itself”; it can also be described as a “property of absolute independence” (Catholic Encyclopedia).
3. Only God can possess this property.

but

1. If the human will were somehow linked to God in such a way that it – the human will – participated in God’s “property of absolute independence” without actually possessing it, the human will might thus be rendered truly free.

This is an exercise in speculation, I realize, but if no third option exists, and we’re stuck with your dilemma, Catholic doctrine is wrong. (“Unless man is really free, he cannot be justly held responsible for his actions, any more than for the date of his birth or the colour of his eyes” [Catholic Encyclopedia]). I don’t think either of is buying Rome’s intellect argument. (“In this capability of the intellect for conceiving the universal lies the root of our freedom” [Catholic Encyclopedia]). This isn’t a problem for me, a Protestant, but I imagine it must be troubling for you – your theologians have apparently made a huge blunder. As far-fetched as my third option may be, I think it’s less likely to be wrong than the intellect argument.

 

[Counterpoint]

1. If the human will were somehow linked to God in such a way that it – the human will – participated in God’s “property of absolute independence” without actually possessing it, the human will might thus be rendered truly free.

We have already discussed this. God either has compatibilist free will or libertarian free will. If we hold that the “creation” may not have been (which is the position of mainline Christianity - Protestant, Catholic, or Orthodox), then it logically follows that the choice to create or not to create was ultimately due to pure chance. (If there were a “chance” that it could have been otherwise, then it must ultimately be attributed to chance.)

This is an exercise in speculation, I realize, but if no third option exists, and we’re stuck with your dilemma, Catholic doctrine is wrong. (“Unless man is really free, he cannot be justly held responsible for his actions, any more than for the date of his birth or the colour of his eyes” [Catholic Encyclopedia]). I don’t think either of is buying Rome’s intellect argument. (“In this capability of the intellect for conceiving the universal lies the root of our freedom” [Catholic Encyclopedia]). This isn’t a problem for me, a Protestant, but I imagine it must be troubling for you – your theologians have apparently made a huge blunder. As far-fetched as my third option may be, I think it’s less likely to be wrong than the intellect argument.

I am not arguing against free will. I am arguing that libertarian free will doesn’t make anyone more morally responsible than compatibilist free will. Or, more to point. libertarian free will doesn’t make the doctrine of eternal damnation anymore palatable than compatibilist free will.

God is the final cause (telos or goal). Everyone is seeking the Good (God) whether he or she realizes it or not. In fact, it is impossible not to seek the Good. Why? Because it is impossible to act contrary to your nature and it is your nature to seek the Good.

Human beings cannot act contrary to their nature. God cannot act contrary to his nature. And it is the nature of Nature to seek the Good because it is the nature of God . Thank Goodness!

 

[tonyrey]

Your question is not relevant. (I certainly have not made any argument concerning machines.)

You seem to regard persons as biological machines. Otherwise you need to explain why our mental activity is not determined by natural causes…

 

[Dryden77]

We have already discussed this. God either has compatibilist free will or libertarian free will. If we hold that the “creation” may not have been (which is the position of mainline Christianity - Protestant, Catholic, or Orthodox), then it logically follows that the choice to create or not to create was ultimately due to pure chance. (If there were a “chance” that it could have been otherwise, then it must ultimately be attributed to chance.)

I am not arguing against free will. I am arguing that libertarian free will doesn’t make anyone more morally responsible than compatibilist free will. Or, more to point. libertarian free will doesn’t make the doctrine of eternal damnation anymore palatable than compatibilist free will.

God is the final cause (telos or goal). Everyone is seeking the Good (God) whether he or she realizes it or not. In fact, it is impossible not to seek the Good. Why? Because it is impossible to act contrary to your nature and it is your nature to seek the Good.

Human beings cannot act contrary to their nature. God cannot act contrary to his nature. And it is the nature of Nature to seek the Good because it is the nature of God . Thank Goodness!

I’ll take leave of my main argument as a) it’s a highly speculative one to begin with and b) I can see from your comments that I need to find another way of explaining it.

You say that it’s impossible not to seek the Good. Does this mean that you don’t believe we have a sinful nature as well as a good one? And if we do have a natural inclination for evil as well as good, wouldn’t it follow that it’s impossible for us not to seek both the good and the bad?

 

[Counterpoint]

You say that it’s impossible not to seek the Good. Does this mean that you don’t believe we have a sinful nature as well as a good one? And if we do have a natural inclination for evil as well as good, wouldn’t it follow that it’s impossible for us not to seek both the good and the bad?

You actually raise an interesting point. Schelling held that both God and God’s creatures experience a tension between a rational and nonrational princple within their being.

“Within God the rational principle always prevails, but within creatures the nonrational principle can get the upper hand and bring evil/sin into the world.” (source: pg. 186, "“Subjectivity, Objectivity, & Intersubjectivity: A New Paradigm for Religion and Science” by Joseph A. Bracken)

If we have *libertarian * free will, then we have a random or spontaneous element at play. That’s something that is nonrational. And that’s something that could be construed as chaotic or evil. Don’t we sometimes hear people say that he committed a random act of violence. This suggests that the act was senseless, irrational, evil. Right?

The “two-stage model of free will” explains how both of these elements (the rational and nonrational, or the determinate and indeterminate) interact with each other. Hopefully, that will clarify things for you.

 

[Dryden77]

You actually raise an interesting point. Schelling held that both God and God’s creatures experience a tension between a rational and nonrational princple within their being.

If we have *libertarian * free will, then we have a random or spontaneous element at play. That’s something that is nonrational. And that’s something that could be construed as chaotic or evil. Don’t we sometimes hear people say that he committed a random act of violence. This suggests that the act was senseless, irrational, evil. Right?

The “two-stage model of free will” explains how both of these elements (the rational and nonrational, or the determinate and indeterminate) interact with each other. Hopefully, that will clarify things for you.

I suppose chance could be responsible for a portion of human evil. But not all of it. Crime wouldn’t follow predictable patterns if wickedness came from a cosmic slot machine. Studies have shown links between crime and the environment around us. If we grow up rich we’re far less likely to steal or kill than if we grow up poor. Is it really chance that most of our prison population is less educated than the population outside of prison? Probably not. It’s far more reasonable to posit that humans have an innate propensity for crime and that this propensity can be made stronger or weaker by environment. If our natures were entirely good, and evil came from chance alone, the world around us would be a radically different place.

You seem to be a universalist, and your universalism seems to follow from your belief in the impossibility of free will. (God can’t punish us unless we’re true moral agents, and without free will we can’t be true moral agents. Thus hell doesn’t exist.) Hypothetical question: Let’s say someone is convicted of a horrible murder, and an angel from heaven appeared in the courtroom after the conviction and guaranteed us that the murderer would never again commit a crime, even if we let him walk away. Should the man go to prison, or do we welcome him back into society?

 

[tonyrey]

Counterpoint

No response!

 

[Counterpoint]

You seem to regard persons as biological machines. Otherwise you need to explain why our mental activity is not determined by natural causes…

No, I don’t. In fact, it is quite the contrary.

 

[fred_conty]

There are only two options: determinism or indeterminism (If anyone here believes that there are any other options, then please share it with us.)

If determinism holds true, then every decision I make and action I take was predetermined and could not have been otherwise.

If indeterminism holds true, then every decision I make and action I take could only have been otherwise due to some element of pure randomness or chance.

There are only two types of free will: compatibilism and libertarianism. (If anyone here believes that there are any other types of free will, then please share it with us.)

“Compatibilist free will” presupposes determinism.

“Libertarian free will” presupposes indeterminism.

Why does this all matter? It matters, because it has implications for both moral responsibility and salvation.

What are the implications for moral responsibility? The implications for moral responsibility are the same regardless of whether determinism or indeterminism holds true. Why? Because I can be held no more responsible for a decision I make or an action I take that reduces to pure randomness or chance than I can for a decision I make or an action I take that was completely predetermined.

What are the implications for salvation? The implications for salvation are the same regardless of whether determinism or indeterminism holds true. Why? Because the implications for salvation are the same as for moral responsibility. I can be held no more responsible for my salvation (or damnation) for a decision I make or an action I take that ultimately reduces to pure randomness or chance than I can for a decision I make or an action I take that was completely predetermined.

Incidentally, “final causality” does not change anything. It is simply another determining factor.

Indeterminism basically is choice caused by random chance.
Determinism basically is choice caused by events or laws.

I broke this down to make it simple and understandable.

I disagree with how indeterminism is defined, that is, random chance. Because it can’t be random chance, since choices are made for many different reasons. Besides, there is no such thing as random chance since everything has a cause for what it is, what it does, where it is, and why.

I would like it better to say determined and undetermined.
Undetermined basically is choice without force from laws and events from which choices are made.

May God bless and keep you. May God’s face shine on you. May God be kind to you and give you peace.

 

[Counterpoint]

Indeterminism basically is choice caused by random chance.
Determinism basically is choice caused by events or laws.

I broke this down to make it simple and understandable.

If determinism holds true, then every event or act that occurs could not have been otherwise. If determinism does not hold true, then indeterminism necessarily must hold true. And if indeterminism holds true, then some (not all) events or acts must occur randomly (uncaused).

I disagree with how indeterminism is defined, that is, random chance. Because it can’t be random chance, since choices are made for many different reasons. Besides, there is no such thing as random chance since everything has a cause for what it is, what it does, where it is, and why.

Several points:

1. The “two stage model of free will” explains how libertarian free will would work.
2. The standard interpretation quantum mechanics holds that nature is fundamentally indeterminate. IOW, we have scientific evidence that events really do occur randomly (i…e. without cause).

3). It would appear that Aquinas subscribed to indeterminism.

God does move the will, “since he moves every kind of thing according to the nature of the moveable thing…he also moves the will according to its condition, as indeterminately disposed to many things, not in a neccesary way” (QDM 6).

(pp. 149-150, “Aquinas: Beginner’s Guide” by Edward Feser)

1. If you truly believe that there are no random events, then you subscribe to determinism by default. Why? Because determinism and indeterminism are the only two logical possibilities.

I would like it better to say determined and undetermined.
Undetermined basically is choice without force from laws and events from which choices are made.

There are only two options here: either everything is determined or it is not. The former is called determinism; the latter is called indeterminism. (By the way, determinism is compatible with materialism, dualism, or idealism.)

 

[orang]

From the computer, never heard of this term before,

"Libertarian free will means that our choices are free from the determination or constraints of human nature and free from any predetermination by God "

continuing,

A theory cannot be built using a term which is relative to many different circumstances, conditions, individuals, groups, and is never an absolute reality as far as a possibility in many experience’s…

For example people are human and the definition asks the human express’s something which is in-human , no one can be some other nature then being a human.

So the term Libertarian Free Will, comes with all kinds of conditions and ‘must clause’s’ which forwards, 'an only relative finding with relative conditions ’ to whatever is being introduced and built for the explaining.

 

[GaryTaylor]

Philo of Alexandria, a philosopher known for his homocentrism, in holding that free will is a feature of a human’s soul, and thus that non-human animals lack free will.

Jewish philosophy stress that free will is a product of the intrinsic human soul, using the word neshama (from the Hebrew root n.sh.m. or .נ.ש.מ meaning “breath”), but the ability to make a free choice is through Yechida (from Hebrew word “yachid”, יחיד, singular), the part of the soul that is united with God, the only being that is not hindered by or dependent on cause and effect (thus, freedom of will does not belong to the realm of the physical reality, and inability of natural philosophy to account for it is expected).

Free will, according to Islamic doctrine is the main factor for man’s accountability in his/her actions throughout life. Actions taken by people exercising free will are counted on the Day of Judgement because they are their own, however the free will happens with the permission of God

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_will

Søren Kierkegaard claimed that divine omnipotence cannot be separated from divine goodness. As a truly omnipotent and good being, God could create beings with true freedom over God. Furthermore, God would voluntarily do so because “the greatest good … which can be done for a being, greater than anything else that one can do for it, is to be truly free.”

Alvin Plantinga’s “free will defense” is a contemporary expansion of this theme, adding how God, free will, and evil are consistent.

 

[Counterpoint]

Philo of Alexandria, a philosopher known for his homocentrism, in holding that free will is a feature of a human’s soul, and thus that non-human animals lack free will.

Jewish philosophy stress that free will is a product of the intrinsic human soul, using the word neshama (from the Hebrew root n.sh.m. or .נ.ש.מ meaning “breath”), but the ability to make a free choice is through Yechida (from Hebrew word “yachid”, יחיד, singular), the part of the soul that is united with God, the only being that is not hindered by or dependent on cause and effect (thus, freedom of will does not belong to the realm of the physical reality, and inability of natural philosophy to account for it is expected).

Free will, according to Islamic doctrine is the main factor for man’s accountability in his/her actions throughout life. Actions taken by people exercising free will are counted on the Day of Judgement because they are their own, however the free will happens with the permission of God

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_will

Søren Kierkegaard claimed that divine omnipotence cannot be separated from divine goodness. As a truly omnipotent and good being, God could create beings with true freedom over God. Furthermore, God would voluntarily do so because “the greatest good … which can be done for a being, greater than anything else that one can do for it, is to be truly free.”

Alvin Plantinga’s “free will defense” is a contemporary expansion of this theme, adding how God, free will, and evil are consistent.

There are only two options here: either everything is determined or it is not. The former is called determinism; the latter is called indeterminism. Whether you “choose” to acknowledge this fact or not doesn’t change it.