Free Will Is An Illusion

[hangnail]

Nope, I’ll just quote Plantinga’s refutation of Harris’ argument which you quoted in the OP:

Either determinism or indeterminism holds true. There are no other options. And Plantinga didn’t present anything that refutes that.

Either our decision-making process is a completely deterministic process or it is not. If it is a deterministic process, then every choice we make was predetermined by a prior cause and could not have been otherwise. If it is not a deterministic process, then it is an indeterministic process by default and the only reason why would could have chosen otherwise must ultimately reduce to a random or uncaused event.

 

[Tomdstone]

This is why free will is an illusion:

The error of Mr. Harris is the error of insufficient alternatives. Free will is not the product of chance, nor is it predestination or predetermination. Free will is something different. It is the ability to choose between different alternatives and it is something we perceive that we possess.

 

[Tomdstone]

If it is not a deterministic process, then it is an indeterministic process by default and the only reason why would could have chosen otherwise must ultimately reduce to a random or uncaused event.

It is not deterministic, and it is up to you to prove that the only reason why we could have chosen otherwise must ultimately reduce to a random or uncaused event. I would not accept this last statement, except in most general terms which would not touch upon the reality and my perception of free will.

 

[hangnail]

It is not deterministic, and it is up to you to prove that the only reason why we could have chosen otherwise must ultimately reduce to a random or uncaused event. I would not accept this last statement, except in most general terms which would not touch upon the reality and my perception of free will.

You have the burden of explaining to us how it is logically possible, given the same situation and circumstances, to choose otherwise without invoking some indeterministic element. Good luck with that endeavor. You’ll need it, because the only two logical possibilities are determinism and indeterminism. And no amount of intellectual dishonesty will change that.

 

[Estevao]

Either determinism or indeterminism holds true. There are no other options. And Plantinga didn’t present anything that refutes that.

Either our decision-making process is a completely deterministic process or it is not. If it is a deterministic process, then every choice we make was predetermined by a prior cause and could not have been otherwise. If it is not a deterministic process, then it is an indeterministic process by default and the only reason why would could have chosen otherwise must ultimately reduce to a random or uncaused event.

Nope, Plantinga refuted that. It was the part about us having reasons for doing things. This is indeterministic but it doesn’t boil down to chance or lack of free will, because Harris is operating on a notion of free-will that it appears he made up as a nice easy strawman to defeat and sell lots of books to people who are fine with getting their philosophy from someone with an undergraduate degree.
Alvin Plantinga:

Harris’ notion of freedom is really an idea of what we might call maximal autonomy. It’s obvious that we don’t have maximal autonomy; we aren’t free in that sense. Indeed, it isn’t so much as possible that we be free in that sense. That is because, as he thinks of it, I act freely on a given occasion only if I myself freely choose to have the desires and affections I then act on, and furthermore I myself freely bring it about that I do have them. But note that the action by which I bring about that I have those desires and affections must itself be free. That means that I must have freely brought it about that I had the desires and affections out of which I acted in bringing it about that I have the desires and affections I presently have. You can see where this is going: for every occasion on which I act freely, there must have been an earlier occasion in which I acted freely. This clearly involves an infinite regress (to use the charming phrase philosophers like): if Harris is right, it is possible that I act freely only if it is possible that I perform an infinite number of actions, each one a matter of bringing it about that I have a certain set of desires and affections. Clearly no one has time, these busy days, for that. Harris is certainly right that we don’t have that maximal autonomy; but nothing follows about our having freedom, i.e., the sort of freedom we ordinarily think we have, the sort required for moral responsibility.

What we have here looks like a classic bait and switch: announce that you will show that we don’t have freedom in the ordinary sense required by moral responsibility, and then proceed to argue that we don’t have freedom in the sense of maximal autonomy. It is certainly true that we don’t have freedom in that sense: not even God could have that kind of freedom. That is not because God could not have performed infinitely many actions—no doubt he could have—but because God is necessarily all-knowing, all-powerful, and perfectly good. This means that God has not freely chosen to have that character; there never was a time at which he had both the power to bring it about that he had that character, and also the power to bring it about that he did not have that character.

booksandculture.com/articles/2013/janfeb/bait-and-switch.html?paging=off

 

[hangnail]

Nope, Plantinga refuted that. It was the part about us having reasons for doing things. This is indeterministic but it doesn’t boil down to chance or lack of free will, because Harris is operating on a notion of free-will that it appears he made up as a nice easy strawman to defeat and sell lots of books to people who are fine with getting their philosophy from someone with an undergraduate degree.

“Reasons for doing something” is a DETERMINANT factor.

 

[Estevao]

“Reasons for doing something” is a DETERMINANT factor.

Well the idea behind free will is that we could have done otherwise if we had wanted. So we might have reasons for doing something, but we could have done otherwise (and we intuitively know that we often do otherwise when it comes to morally culpable actions that cause us feelings of guilt).

Moral culpability is one of the traditional arguments for free will, as Thomas Aquinas said:
Thomas Aquinas:

I answer that, Man has free-will: otherwise counsels, exhortations, commands, prohibitions, rewards, and punishments would be in vain. In order to make this evident, we must observe that some things act without judgment; as a stone moves downwards; and in like manner all things which lack knowledge. And some act from judgment, but not a free judgment; as brute animals. For the sheep, seeing the wolf, judges it a thing to be shunned, from a natural and not a free judgment, because it judges, not from reason, but from natural instinct. And the same thing is to be said of any judgment of brute animals. But man acts from judgment, because by his apprehensive power he judges that something should be avoided or sought. But because this judgment, in the case of some particular act, is not from a natural instinct, but from some act of comparison in the reason, therefore he acts from free judgment and retains the power of being inclined to various things. For reason in contingent matters may follow opposite courses, as we see in dialectic syllogisms and rhetorical arguments. Now particular operations are contingent, and therefore in such matters the judgment of reason may follow opposite courses, and is not determinate to one. And forasmuch as man is rational is it necessary that man have a free-will.

newadvent.org/summa/1083.htm#article1

I’m out for the evening.

 

[hangnail]

Well the idea behind free will is that we could have done otherwise if we had wanted. So we might have reasons for doing something, but we could have done otherwise (and we intuitively know that we often do otherwise when it comes to morally culpable actions that cause us feelings of guilt).

Given the same situation and circumstances your choice would have been exactly the same. Why? Because the reason for making that choice would have been exactly the same. (Your prior mental state is determining your present mental state.) That’s what you’re not comprehending. That you feel guilty simply demonstrates that you believe in the illusion of free will. (Why feel guilty about a choice that was either predetermined or reduces to chance? Learn from your past mistakes and the next time you face a similar circumstance in the future you will make a better choice. But don’t waste your time feeling guilty about the past. It serves no purpose but to cause you heartache and anxiety.)

 

[dmar198]

What are the other options?

Either determinism or indeterminism holds true. There are no other options.

I think there is a serious problem with this statement, because determinism means determined by previous events and indeterminism means not determined by anything at all. (At least, that’s my understanding of the two terms.) Don’t you see how both of those leave out the possibility that the will determines its own actions rather than prior events? Do you think it’s reasonable to exclude that alternative possibility?

That you feel guilty simply demonstrates that you believe in the illusion of free will. (Why feel guilty about a choice that was either predetermined or reduces to chance? Learn from your past mistakes… But don’t waste your time feeling guilty about [them].)

Why even assign moral value to actions that reduce to chance? How do you determine that something was a mistake if it was the result of chance? Is it any more a mistake if the deck of cards deals a hand full of red or a hand full of black?

 

[Tomdstone]

You have the burden of explaining to us how it is logically possible, given the same situation and circumstances, to choose otherwise without invoking some indeterministic element. Good luck with that endeavor. You’ll need it, because the only two logical possibilities are determinism and indeterminism. And no amount of intellectual dishonesty will change that.

Throwing in ad hominem arguments does nothing to advance your erroneous claims. There is some indeterministic element in free will, but that does not negate the reality of the experience of free will.

 

[Tomdstone]

Well the idea behind free will is that we could have done otherwise if we had wanted. So we might have reasons for doing something, but we could have done otherwise (and we intuitively know that we often do otherwise when it comes to morally culpable actions that cause us feelings of guilt).

Moral culpability is one of the traditional arguments for free will, as Thomas Aquinas said:

newadvent.org/summa/1083.htm#article1

I’m out for the evening.

Thanks for this reference and quote from St. Thomas.

 

[belorg]

Throwing in ad hominem arguments does nothing to advance your erroneous claims. There is some indeterministic element in free will, but that does not negate the reality of the experience of free will.

Nobody is negating the experience of free will. Experiences can be real although the thing experienced isn’t. That is because experiences have an subjective element in them.

 

[josh987654321]

You haven’t furnish me with any kind of counterargument.

Why do I need to? I believe such logic contradicts itself.

May I ask why you started this thread?

 

[Tomdstone]

Nobody is negating the experience of free will. Experiences can be real although the thing experienced isn’t. That is because experiences have an subjective element in them.

Although free will is subjective, it is nevertheless real.

 

[belorg]

Well the idea behind free will is that we could have done otherwise if we had wanted. So we might have reasons for doing something, but we could have done otherwise (and we intuitively know that we often do otherwise when it comes to morally culpable actions that cause us feelings of guilt).

Moral culpability is one of the traditional arguments for free will, as Thomas Aquinas said:

newadvent.org/summa/1083.htm#article1

I’m out for the evening.

That seems question-begging to me.

 

[belorg]

Although free will is subjective, it is nevertheless real.

Well, that is the question, isn’t it?

 

[Tomdstone]

Well, that is the question, isn’t it?

Actually, no. That is the answer to the question, not the question itself.

 

[josh987654321]

(Why feel guilty about a choice that was either predetermined or reduces to chance? Learn from your past mistakes and the next time you face a similar circumstance in the future you will make a better choice. But don’t waste your time feeling guilty about the past. It serves no purpose but to cause you heartache and anxiety.)

:sad_yes: Yup.

This I believe is the crux of it.

Deny free will and you deny any and all responsibility for your actions/choices. I believe people embrace this philosophy, not primarily because they believe it to be true, but rather because they see a way to appease their guilty consciences rather than seeking forgiveness.

 

[belorg]

Actually, no. That is the answer to the question, not the question itself.

Allow me to doubt that this is the correct answer.
I have no doubt that the experience of free will is real, but the arguments in favour of free will seem to be lacking.

 

[belorg]

:sad_yes: Yup.

This I believe is the crux of it.

Deny free will and you deny any and all responsibility for your actions/choices. I believe people embrace this philosophy, not primarily because they believe it to be true, but rather because they see a way to appease their guilty consciences rather than seeking forgiveness.

Maybe some people do this, but lots of people actually believe it’s true and there are pretty strong philosophical arguments for it.