Free Will Is An Illusion

[Charlemagne_III]

It’s a real illusion even like a dream is a real illusion.

False analogy.

Free will is not in our dreams. We do things in our dreams we would never dream of doing in reality.

 

[hangnail]

:sad_yes: Yup.

This I believe is the crux of it.

Deny free will and you deny any and all responsibility for your actions/choices. I believe people embrace this philosophy, not primarily because they believe it to be true, but rather because they see a way to appease their guilty consciences rather than seeking forgiveness.

This doesn’t refute my argument.

 

[hangnail]

It’s a false dilemma like I said. Free-will originate in us, we’re the causa sui of some of our actions. We’re rational beings, and a very strong case made is that it is immaterial. We’re not rocks or dice.

An “uncaused cause” (that’s what “causa sui” implies) occurring in a *temporal *process is simply a euphemism for a random event or act.

By the way, all metaphysical systems (e.g. materialism, dualism or idealism) must entail either determinism or indeterminism because these are the only two logical possibilities.

 

[hangnail]

If we don’t have free will, then obedience has no significance.

That’s a side issue to the issue at hand. The issue at hand is whether free will is an illusion. I have argued that it is. Hitherto, no one has furnished me with a logical counterargument that refutes mine.

 

[hangnail]

Whether he ultimately had any real choice about being “doomed” is harder to prove, or disprove. We’d need to know how God thinks to answer that one, and I for one lack the neurological equipment to work out His thought processes.

If I can intellectually grasp the argument for the illusion of free will, then I will assume that God in his infinite wisdom can too.

What Harris is saying is that he is not responsible for writing the words themselves. Boy, that’s a stupid assertion! Apparently each and every letter of his sentence just fell into place by itself or sheer chance.

He’s not any more responsible for a choice or voluntary act that ultimately reduces to chance than for one that was completely predetermined by the causal nexus.

 

[CHRISTINE77]

This is why free will is an illusion:

In your opinion, does this statement mean that no one has any personal responsibility for their actions?

 

[ivebeenshown]

In your opinion, does this statement mean that no one has any personal responsibility for their actions?

i disagree with the OP too but this is no way to refute him. The argument at hand is about determinism, indeterminism, randomness, and whether the will of a rational agent is random, deterministically caused, or self-guided.

 

[hangnail]

I have a counter-argument against materialism. It is based on the fact that causality is not possible without consciousness.

That’s good, but I haven’t made an argument for materialism. I made an argument against free will. (Free will is not compatible in any metaphysical system - regardless of whether that metaphysical system entails materialism, dualism or idealism.)

 

[CHRISTINE77]

i disagree with the OP too but this is no way to refute him. The argument at hand is about determinism, indeterminism, randomness, and whether the will of a rational agent is random, deterministically caused, or self-guided.

I think that argument ultimately leads to my question. If everything is random or pre-determined, it means that there is no free will, and if there is no free will, there can be no personal responsibility for anything we do in our lives.

 

[ChainBreaker]

This is why free will is an illusion:

Or they are a product of my will, and my will is not a product of chance or deterministic physical events; but that does not leave much space for metaphysical naturalism and we can’t have that now can we.

So yes, according to the dogma of metaphysical naturalism I do not have freewill; in fact I do not even have the freedom to reason let alone understand your argument.

 

[Charlemagne_III]

i disagree with the OP too but this is no way to refute him. The argument at hand is about determinism, indeterminism, randomness, and whether the will of a rational agent is random, deterministically caused, or self-guided.

This issue cannot be resolved without addressing the universal sense that we act freely.

If that is a delusion, why is it a delusion? That question too must be addressed along with the question of whether physical determinism also necessitates psychological determinism.

The question of conscience also must be addressed. Why throughout the animal kingdom, is there apparently only one specie that feels itself obliged to choose between right and wrong, and that ponders the eternal consequences of such a choice?

 

[hangnail]

Here’s another problem with your argument: the hidden premises you’re not defending.

Hidden premise one: everything is determined and/or dictated by chance.

Hidden premise two: free-will from a rational creature is impossible.

your only clearly stated premise three: “Either our wills are determined by prior causes and we are not responsible for them, or they are the product of chance and we are not responsible for them.”

Conclusion: free-will is an illusion.

I don’t agree with hidden premise one which you are attributing to my argument. So, let me clarify: Every event or act is either determined by a prior cause or it is not. If it is not, then there are “some” (not “all”) events or acts that are uncaused and therefore random. (Your first premise seems to suggest that I am assuming that either all events or acts are determined by a prior cause or all events or acts are uncaused. I’m not. Clearly, our decision-making process is not a completely random process. But it may involve a random aspect.)

Free will is an illusions for reasons I have already stated. (I’m assuming some kind of rationality. So, rationality is not at issue here.)

You haven’t even defended or argued for one or two. And premise three is a materialist dilemma that must be defended (read premise one).

I haven’t argued for premsise one. That’s correct. So, I have no need to defend it. And I not arguing for materialism. I arguing against free will.

 

[Charlemagne_III]

I haven’t argued for premsise one. That’s correct. So, I have no need to defend it. And I not arguing for materialism. I arguing against free will.

You haven’t presented an argument that favors the illusory character of free will.

Why do men universally** feel **they are free? And why is that universal feeling an illusion?

 

[hangnail]

Saying that free will is an illusion supposes that something other than the soul moves the soul to choose one way or another. If the choice of the soul is in itself indeterministic, that is exactly what is meant by “free will.” You have yet to demonstrate that the choice of the soul is deterministic.

If the choice of the soul is completely indeterministic, then it is uncaused and random. (Whether consciousness is material or immaterial is…well…immaterial.)

Merriam-Webster defines “indeterminism” as “a theory that the will is free and that deliberate choice and actions are not determined by or predictable from antecedent causes” or “a theory that holds that not every event has a cause”

If a (temporary) choice or action is not determined by a prior cause, then it qualifies as an “uncaused cause.” A (temporary) uncaused cause is a euphemism for a random or spontaneous event. (God has been traditionally defined as the “uncaused cause.” But God’s act is a nontemporal one; ours is temporal. That’s the difference.)

 

[dmar198]

An “uncaused cause” (that’s what “causa sui” implies) occurring in a *temporal *process is simply a euphemism for a random event or act.

Why do you think causa sui is a euphemism for a random event? I think I can see a clear difference between the two: in a causa sui scenario, we cause our own actions, not random forces or prior events, but in a random scenario, random forces cause at least some of our actions, possibly in combination with determined prior events. Don’t you think that’s a big difference?

By the way, all metaphysical systems (e.g. materialism, dualism or idealism) must entail either determinism or indeterminism because these are the only two logical possibilities.

I was about to ask you how you define those two terms, because I don’t think their meanings are exact opposites of each other, but then I saw you describe the options this way:

let me clarify: Every event or act is either determined by a prior cause or it is not. If it is not, then there are “some” (not “all”) events or acts that are uncaused and therefore random.

This is why I think these are not the only options: the above descriptions don’t seem to be true opposites of one another. “Not caused by a prior event” does not seem to be the same thing as “uncaused.”

It seems to me that a true dichotomy has to use options that are true opposites of each other. In this case, that would seem to be: our will is either undetermined or determined. If it is determined, then it is either determined by itself or by things other than itself.

You see, this dichotomy uses options that are true opposites of each other, and therefore it is not a false dichotomy. But it does allow a free will to determine its own actions, which is one reason why I think free will is a real thing.

 

[DanAl]

An “uncaused cause” (that’s what “causa sui” implies) occurring in a *temporal *process is simply a euphemism for a random event or act.

First, I don’t know why you highlight temporal; it is obvious that actions take over time.

Second you’re confusing chance with free-will as I described it. It is a brute fact that some things are determined (heat heats). It is a brute fact that some things are undetermined (parts of quantum mechanics). It is a brute fact that free-will that is caused by an agent (the will wills.)

These are three types of brute facts and if you think the last sentence is an assertion, well… Free-will is self-evident and with no free-will there would not be morality and obligation. Conversely chance in many of our actions is not self-evident and it is incompatible with morality.

 

[DanAl]

I don’t agree with hidden premise one which you are attributing to my argument. So, let me clarify: Every event or act is either determined by a prior cause or it is not. If it is not, then there are “some” (not “all”) events or acts that are uncaused and therefore random. (Your first premise seems to suggest that I am assuming that either all events or acts are determined by a prior cause or all events or acts are uncaused. I’m not. Clearly, our decision-making process is not a completely random process. But it may involve a random aspect.)

I admit that it was a mistake to put and/or part of the post, but I also notice that you also say in your post “Every event or act is either determined by a prior cause…” we all are fallible humans.

Let me rephrase premise one: some/most/all things are determined or some/most things are random.

Premise two: free-will for a creature is impossible. (I removed rational so you don’t get sidetracked).
I have yet to see an answer to these questions and if you think determinism and indeterminism exhaust all possibilities read my previous post.

Free will is an illusions for reasons I have already stated. (I’m assuming some kind of rationality. So, rationality is not at issue here.)

Rationality is an issue since it is a necessary precondition for free-will.

 

[hangnail]

Okay, let me rephrase. It is my understanding that the determinist position re: free will is that our will is determined by prior events, while the indeterminist position re: free will is that our will makes choices only because of random forces along with determined prior events. Does that fit your understanding better?

Yes. But let me provide you with the “two-stage model of free will” that explains how these two components might work together.

A two-stage model of free will separates the free stage from the will stage.

In the first stage, alternative possibilities for thought and action are generated, in part indeterministically.
In the second stage, an adequately determined will evaluates the options that have been developed.

If, on deliberation, one option for action seems best, it is selected and chosen. If no option seems good enough, and time permitting, the process can return to the further generation of alternative possibilities (“second thoughts”) before a final decision.

A two-stage model can explain how an agent could choose to do otherwise in exactly the same circumstances that preceded the first stage of the overall free will process.

(source: Wikipedia: Two-stage model of free will)

Also, you seem to be defining self-determinism as “My previous mental state determines my present mental state.”

Yes. I would basically agree with that.

But I think my definition is different. I understand self-determinism to mean that, when your free will makes a choice, it is not determined by a prior mental state, nor is it random: it determines itself at that moment. I think that’s different from what you are saying. What do you think?

I think what you’re calling “self-determinism” implies a random choice. You’re simply asserting a “random choice” (and calling it a “self-determined” choice) into our decision-making process. Let me provide you with an example to illustrate this point.

Example:

We are going to play a gambling game. I will toss a coin into the air and before it hits the ground you will call “heads” or “tails.” If your call is correct, I will owe you $100. If your call is incorrect, you will owe me $100. Let’s play:
*
I toss the coin into the air and before it hits the ground you call out “heads.” The coin falls to the ground with “tails” facing up. I win; you lose.*

Me: Why did you choose heads?

You: Well, I knew the probabilities were 50-50, but I had to make some kind of choice. So, I decided to choose whatever popped into my mind first. “Heads” is what popped into my mind first.

Me: Interesting. Do you believe in ESP?

You: I don’t know. That’s a good question. It would appear that I might.

Me: You owe me $100.

Okay, now, let’s assume (for sake of argument) that we could back in time and replay the tape. Do you believe you could have chosen otherwise? If so, what exactly would have changed?

Well you certainly aren’t responsible for the random elements, right? And as for the nonrandom elements, do you think you could have made them any other way? If not, then how are you responsible for them, and what is left for us to be responsible for if we aren’t responsible for either of the things that determine our choices?

You’re making my argument. It doesn’t make a difference which holds true - determinism (compatibilist free will) or indeterminism (libertarian free will). Why? Because we cannot be held any more morally responsible for a voluntary act that ultimately reduces to chance than for one that was completely predetermined and could not have been otherwise.

 

[ThinkingSapien]

Either determinism is true or indeterminism is true. There are no other options. (The standard interpretation of QM simply holds that nature is fundamentally indeterministic. i.e. quantum events are uncaused or random.)

I thought in QM that there are events whose cause we cannot determine, not that those events are without cause (in other words, it has not been determined those events have no cause).

But if you are a theist, and in particular a Judeo-Christian theist, you have no choice but to believe in free will …]

Sounds like something Hitchens once said. I believe he was asked if he believed he had free will and his reply was something like “I have no choice but to believe so.”

I find both responses to be a bit amusing.

 

[DanAl]

Yes. But let me provide you with the “two-stage model of free will” that explains how these two components might work together

I think what you’re calling “self-determinism” implies a random choice. You’re simply asserting a “random choice” (and calling it a “self-determined” choice) into our decision-making process. Let me provide you with an example to illustrate this point.

I see that you’re still playing the self-determinism/chance game despite what you were told. Maybe you’re determined to be stuck in your views. Sad robot:crying: if you were only free to be open-minded.

BTW the two model stage link you provided collapses into reductionist/determinism if not outright eliminativism.