Free Will Is An Illusion

[hangnail]

Why do men universally** feel **they are free?

Because they are deluded.

And why is that universal feeling an illusion?

Read the OP of this thread.

 

[DanielJT]

How would the dichotomy of these two choices explain human creativity? The act of creating something new cannot come from a determinist life. The determinist only has the past to base things off of.

On the other hand, creativity needs a basic purpose, an end goal, something to spring off of. Indeterminism points to chaos, which is without base, without anything but mere chance.

To argue that the first men to draw on the cave walls were randomly putting colors about would be to consider them some sort of lunatics of their time, and yet look at what it lead to.

But to say that the first men to see that the materials they used, whatever mixture of dirt and water they happened to come across, were predetermined to draw the picture when drawing a picture was not something to ever even consider in the first place, drawing being a “non” thing at the time, would be to make yourself some sort of lunatic.

Creativity is an inspire generation of the new that involves purpose. It is not chance because it shows purpose (even if that goal is not completely understood). It is not pre-determined because it is completely new.

 

[dmar198]

Yes. But let me provide you with the “two-stage model of free will” that explains how these two components might work together.

I’ve read about the two-stage model before. I don’t agree that predetermined events + random events = freedom. I think the only realistic solution is that the free will causes its own actions.

I think what you’re calling “self-determinism” implies a random choice. You’re simply asserting a “random choice” (and calling it a “self-determined” choice) into our decision-making process. Let me provide you with an example to illustrate this point.

Example:

We are going to play a gambling game. I will toss a coin into the air and before it hits the ground you will call “heads” or “tails.” If your call is correct, I will owe you $100. If your call is incorrect, you will owe me $100. Let’s play:
*
I toss the coin into the air and before it hits the ground you call out “heads.” The coin falls to the ground with “tails” facing up. I win; you lose.*

Me: Why did you choose heads?

You: Well, I knew the probabilities were 50-50, but I had to make some kind of choice. So, I decided to choose whatever popped into my mind first. “Heads” is what popped into my mind first.

Me: Interesting. Do you believe in ESP?

You: I don’t know. That’s a good question. It would appear that I might.

Me: You owe me $100.

Okay, now, let’s assume (for sake of argument) that we could back in time and replay the tape. Do you believe you could have chosen otherwise?

Yes.

If so, what exactly would have changed?

Several things, I think. For one, even if nothing else changed in the replay, I would not have to decide that whatever popped into my head first would be my choice. I could decide that the opposite of whatever popped into my head would be my choice. And I wouldn’t have to choose based on temporal priority at all. If you are presented with an option, A or B, I think a free agent can choose A in your first scenario and B in the replay, all other things being the same. If you asked me why I chose A, I might just say, “No reason,” and give the same non-reason for B. I don’t think I need a reason unless I have to mull it over.

Also, since I don’t think anything determines our choices except ourselves, I don’t think it matters that you replayed the exact same scenario – the person could choose A or B in both the replay and in the original. This is because the prior events you are replaying don’t determine what choice you will make.

I also think you may be confusing “what you will do” with “what you can do.” Brutus was always going to kill Caesar. But he could have done otherwise. If you replayed the scenario a thousand times, I think he would kill Caesar each time. But in none of them did he have to.

You’re making my argument. It doesn’t make a difference which holds true - determinism (compatibilist free will) or indeterminism (libertarian free will). Why? Because we cannot be held any more morally responsible for a voluntary act that ultimately reduces to chance than for one that was completely predetermined and could not have been otherwise.

I’m glad you admit that that is what determinism and indeterminism lead to, under your definitions, and I hope you can see why I believe those aren’t the only options.

Since you seem to think that one is not responsible for his or her decisions, perhaps you can help me understand a moral difficulty I think your belief system may lead to. If we are not responsible for our actions, it would seem to follow that you think you aren’t responsible if you do bad stuff.

Correct me if I’m wrong, but if that is what you believe, then the only reasons not to do something that society thinks is evil is (A) because it doesn’t appeal to you and/or (B) because society may react negatively to such behavior in some way, and getting that reaction doesn’t appeal to you. Can you think of any other reasons not to do something evil, in your system?

I ask because it seems to me that that moral system breeds cowardice, apathy, and moral monstrosity. For one thing, if you wanted to do something bad and thought you could get away with it, the moral system outlined in the paragraph above this one seems to leave no reasons left not to do it. For another, if you were in Nazi Germany during WWII, where good behavior could get punished by the law (such as saving the Jews, building hiding places for them, etc.), and you followed the two principles I just mentioned, they would seem to exclude doing any good behavior that was annoying to you and/or that could get you in trouble.

If we are not responsible for our actions, then it seems to follow that we should just do whatever we want or whatever we think will help us in this life, whether that is helping Hitler or fighting against him. What do you think of that moral difficulty?

 

[hangnail]

This is why I think these are not the only options: the above descriptions don’t seem to be true opposites of one another. “Not caused by a prior event” does not seem to be the same thing as “uncaused.”

If a “self-determined” cause is a cause that has not been determined by a prior cause, then it qualifies as an “uncaused cause.” And any “uncaused cause” that occurs in a temporal process qualifies as a random event. (God has been traditionally defined in philosophical theology as the “uncaused cause.” But God is eternal. So. his decision is not necessarily a random event because the divine uncaused cause occurs outside of time.)

It seems to me that a true dichotomy has to use options that are true opposites of each other. In this case, that would seem to be: our will is either undetermined or determined. If it is determined, then it is either determined by itself or by things other than itself.

This doesn’t change anything. Either every event that occurs has a prior cause or there is a least one event that is occurring randomly.

Self-determined causes that occur in a temporal process are actually random events for reasons I have already explained above.

 

[dmar198]

If a “self-determined” cause is a cause that has not been determined by a prior cause, then it qualifies as an “uncaused cause.”

This is an assertion.

And any “uncaused cause” that occurs in a temporal process qualifies as a random event.

This is an assertion.

(God has been traditionally defined in philosophical theology as the “uncaused cause.” But God is eternal. So. his decision is not necessarily a random event because the divine uncaused cause occurs outside of time.)

Why would the location of the event relative to time determine whether it was random or not?

This doesn’t change anything. Either every event that occurs has a prior cause or there is a least one event that is occurring randomly.

Why can’t the will cause itself without being random?

Self-determined causes that occur in a temporal process are actually random events for reasons I have already explained above.

I’m not sure which post you are saying is the explanation, but if it’s one I’ve already responded to I’ve probably already expressed my disagreement. Can you link me to the explanation you are referring to?

 

[ivebeenshown]

God is eternal. So. his decision is not necessarily a random event because the divine uncaused cause occurs outside of time.

I second dmar198 here. What about temporality renders free will impossible?

 

[DanielJT]

You and I are playing a gambling game and you flip a coin and I make a random choice because you are flipping a random coin and I am playing a game of chance with you. This is chance because that is the game you determined we should play. And now you want to go back in time and wonder if I made a random and meaningless choice or if the choice was made for me based on meaningless cause-and-effect chains?

In reality, this is a meaningless thought experiment because, in it, we are playing a meaningless game of chance that holds no weight on reality. Have you considered the coin in all of this? Was it the coins destiny to land as it did? Or was the coin an innocent bystander in the whole thing, only giving way to the precarious whims of gravity and wind-resistance?

But the fact is life is a lot more complicated then playing “flip-the-coin”. Humans work within the ability to reason along with a whole range of emotions, not to mention any context of a given situation comes with degrees of habit, pressure to decide along with other possible outside influences, and interest in the consequences of said decision.

If you want to reduce the whole human experience down to a game of “flip-the-coin” then you need to take into account the whole human experience.

But when we look at reality we see two distinct things - an actor and setting. You are the actor and you must negotiate a path through your setting. You cannot completely manipulate your setting because you are not your setting, you are the actor. You have the ability to influence your setting in a limited amount of ways, and you will influence your setting whether you like to or not. And this is where a lack of choice truly comes into play: the fact that you have no choice but to choose.

You see, the question is not as you have stated it, if you allow me to paraphrase, “Is the choice made for us beforehand, or does it fall randomly from our selves like an infants spitting up its mothers milk?” The real question is, “Why must we be to always choose?” Every moment that passes is a new decision to be made. Do I continue on this path or abandon it wholeheartedly to walk about barefoot in grass? Either way, a choice must be made.

Your question claims a complete escape from self, but the reality of our lives, the always having to choose without repose, is a forced commitment to fully realize the self. It is said that a man truly knows himself when put into a difficult situation. Well, God has put us into a refinery of sorts where every second is begging you to reveal your true self.

Spending less time worrying about the coin and more time worrying about who you are would be a better use of the time spent. (because it will get spent)

 

[DanAl]

I am the only one here who has actually provided a model of how (libertarian) free will might work. However, for such a model to work, it must invoke some element of randomness - a randomness that is ultimately beyond our control.

You have not provided any libertarian system that might (love your hesitancy behind that word) word. The two stage model you provided is reductionist and hence its modality is diachronic; “freedom” in one direction only.

libertarian free-will is synchronic, two or more options are freely chosen without chance or determinism involved.

I am the only that has provided an explanation of libertarian free-will and it is that it is a brute fact, the will wills there’s no more explanation behind it and even gave reasons as to why this is a fact. I have yet to see a response to that post.

But that’s fine, it requires an open mind, and humility to choose the notion that one might be wrong, obviously wrong and admit that free-will is a self evident fact and needed for morality.

 

[hangnail]

First, I don’t know why you highlight temporal; it is obvious that actions take over time.

The divine act is not temporal. That’s why I am highlighting “temporal.” I am making a distinction between a temporal decision-making process (a human voluntary act) and a nontemporal decision-making process (a divine voluntary act).

Second you’re confusing chance with free-will as I described it. It is a brute fact that some things are determined (heat heats). It is a brute fact that some things are undetermined (parts of quantum mechanics). It is a brute fact that free-will that is caused by an agent (the will wills.)

These are three types of brute facts and if you think the last sentence is an assertion, well… Free-will is self-evident and with no free-will there would not be morality and obligation. Conversely chance in many of our actions is not self-evident and it is incompatible with morality.

You’re refusing to acknowledge that there are only two logical possibilities: determinism and indeterminism. That the “will wills” doesn’t change that fact.

“Man is free to do what he wills, but he cannot will what he wills” - Arthur Schopenhauer

 

[hangnail]

Let me rephrase premise one: some/most/all things are determined or some/most things are random.

Premise two: free-will for a creature is impossible. (I removed rational so you don’t get sidetracked).
I have yet to see an answer to these questions and if you think determinism and indeterminism exhaust all possibilities read my previous post.

I will agree to those two premises.

Let me ask you this. Do you believe that we have free will even if determinism holds true? (Most people don’t, but some people do.)

Rationality is an issue since it is a necessary precondition for free-will.

Agreed. You misunderstood my previous comment.

 

[Tomdstone]

I will agree to those two premises.

Let me ask you this. Do you believe that we have free will even if determinism holds true? (Most people don’t, but some people do.)

Agreed. You misunderstood my previous comment.

Our soul determines what we will choose, so there is determinism in that sense.

 

[hangnail]

I thought in QM that there are events whose cause we cannot determine, not that those events are without cause (in other words, it has not been determined those events have no cause).

According to the Copenhagen (or standard) interpretation, quantum events are random and therefore uncaused.

The Copenhagen interpretation - due largely to the Danish theoretical physicist Niels Bohr - remains the quantum mechanical formalism that is currently most widely accepted amongst physicists, some 75 years after its enunciation. According to this interpretation, the probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics is not a temporary feature which will eventually be replaced by a deterministic theory, but instead must be considered a final renunciation of the classical idea of “causality.”

(source: Wikipedia: Quantum mechanics)

“The central feature of the quantum theory is indeterminism. The old physics linked all events in a tight chain-mesh of cause and effect. But on the atomic scale the linkage turns out to be loose and imprecise. **Events occur without well-defined causes.”
**
(source: pg. 135, “The Myth Matter” by Paul Davies - physicist and noted writer on popular science)

 

[hangnail]

I believe I have.

Then we will have to agree to disagree.

 

[CHRISTINE77]

I will agree to those two premises.

Let me ask you this. Do you believe that we have free will even if determinism holds true? .

What if BOTH are true? Then we certainly have free will.

 

[hangnail]

Indeterministic events such as those in quantum mechanics are not altogether without cause. I may be wrong in my description but a quantum field would be a necessary cause of such disturbances.

According to the standard intepretation (a.k.a. the Copenhagen interpretation), quantum events are random and therefore uncaused.

The Copenhagen interpretation - due largely to the Danish theoretical physicist Niels Bohr - remains the quantum mechanical formalism that is currently most widely accepted amongst physicists, some 75 years after its enunciation. According to this interpretation, the probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics is not a temporary feature which will eventually be replaced by a deterministic theory, but instead must be considered a final renunciation of the classical idea of “causality.”

(source: Wikipedia: Quantum mechanics)

 

[hangnail]

It depends on what you mean by determinism.

Merriam-Webster’s defines “determinism” as “a theory or doctrine that acts of the will, occurrences in nature, or social or psychological phenomena are causally determined by preceding events or natural laws.”

 

[Tomdstone]

Merriam-Webster’s defines “determinism” as “a theory or doctrine that acts of the will, occurrences in nature, or social or psychological phenomena are causally determined by preceding events or natural laws.”

Our choices are causally determined by our free will.

 

[CHRISTINE77]

This may be cheating but I found this at this website:

informationphilosopher.com/freedom/requirements.html

The Randomness (Freedom) Requirement
Over the centuries the freedom requirement has been described in many ways. We must explicitly clarify those descriptions that are in many cases equivalent.

Chance exists.
Indeterminism is True.
Our Actions are Unpredictable (even to ourselves)
Our Actions are Up to Us
We have Alternative Possibilities
After the Fact, We Could Have Done Otherwise
We Start New Causal Chains
We Create New Information.

The Determinism (Will) Requirement
The will requirement has had many forms corresponding to the dogmatic forms of determinism.
Instead of a strict causal determinism, the world offers only adequate determinism and soft causality.

Adequate Determinism Is True
Chance Must Not Be The Direct Cause of Action
Our Will is Adequately Determined
Our Actions are Causally Determined by Our Will

The Moral Responsibility Requirement
The moral responsibility requirement is a joint consequence of randomness and adequate determinism.

Since we always have Alternative Possibilities
Since we can knowingly say , we Could Have Done Otherwise
Since our Actions are Causally Determined by Our Will and are Up to Us
We are Morally Responsible for our Actions

 

[DanAl]

The divine act is not temporal. That’s why I am highlighting “temporal.” I am making a distinction between a temporal decision-making process (a human voluntary act) and a nontemporal decision-making process (a divine voluntary act)./QUOTE]

Thought you were speaking of human actions. Why did you bring God when it was not mentioned in our little discussion?
hangnail;12518761:

You’re refusing to acknowledge that there are only two logical

possibilities: determinism and indeterminism. That the “will wills” doesn’t change that fact./QUOTE]

‘course I am refusing. Saying that the will wills or that we’re willing intellects are brute facts “does not change anything” is not an argument, it is an assertion. If anything you are the one refusing to acknowledge other alternatives and argue against them.

Free-will is self-evident and needed for morality. Determinism and indeterminism in our actions is not self-evident in many cases and it undermines morality and obligation.

 

[hangnail]

What is your definition of free will? If you leave it vague and undefined, there is a possibility that we are not talking about the same thing.

This is true. That’s why I have been asking some participants in this thread whether they believe free will is compatible with determinism. Most people do not. But some people do. Most people believe that free will is not compatible with determinism because it implies that all of our choices are predetermined and ultimately beyond our control. I am simply arguing that the alternative implies the same thing. However, for those who do believe that free will is compatible with determinism, then my argument doesn’t really apply.

Merriam-Webster makes a direct connection between free will and indeterminism. This is because most people believe in free will. But most people believe free will is incompatible with determinism.

free will : freedom of humans to make choices that are not determined by prior causes or by divine intervention

indeterminism : a theory that the will is free and that deliberate choice and actions are not determined by or predictable from antecedent causes