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Oreoracle
Guest
We have very different definitions of “free will”, then. To me, saying our will is free means that our actions cannot be predicted with perfect accuracy. For example, in the days when Newtonian physics dominated, it was believed that if one had complete knowledge of all momenta of every particle in the universe, one could predict the future in its entirety. This would obviously negate free will, because human decisions would be predictable in principle.Not at all. I’m saying that His knowledge doesn’t CAUSE you to freely choose what you choose.
Now I’m sure theologians have dreamed up a sufficiently nebulous definition of “free will” and sanitized it so the “free” part is meaningless. If you’re going to concede that our actions can be predicted but still insist they are free, what is the difference between “free will” and “regular will”, then?
It’s not a matter of premises, but of terminology. Metaphysical terminology is designed to be pedantic. But thank you for answering the question about God predicting my diet. I honestly didn’t expect a straight answer. As for his “modes” of knowing not being human, that’s irrelevant to me. I only care that he knows, not how he knows.So, in other words, the only premises that we can begin from are yours?
So let me see if I understand this. You’re saying that it’s okay to knowingly do something with *extremely negative consequences *as long as those consequences weren’t expressly your intention? I assume you’ve heard the saying “The road to Hell is paved with good intentions”? So a doctor can knowingly prescribe you medicine with horrible side effects (side effects that greatly outweigh the benefits) and still be morally in the clear because he didn’t mean to cause those side effects.Unless you created him for the express purpose of slaughtering millions, no.
Frankly, you surprised me. I anticipated that you would condemn the actions of the human. But no, apparently everything is permissible as long as you don’t “intend” to harm anyone.What do you mean by “special treatment”? It seems rather that you’re still assuming your conclusion.
Alright, so either way she has to admit what she’s done wrong. She then commits suicide because you forced her into a difficult situation. Well played. Or maybe she doesn’t commit suicide, but she and her husband spend years feuding whilst ruining their children’s lives. There are too many variables in play for you to reliably mitigate the suffering here.Your position is a false dichotomy. The third option, assuming that what you “know” about her is based on fact and not mere assumption, is to approach the wife with what you know and present her with the option of telling her husband first, or if she refuses then to inform her that you’ll tell him yourself. Her initial response will give away if she truly is committing adultery. And then once the truth is in the open the choice is hers; to save her marriage or to sin and abandon it.
It’s not an assumption, it’s a possibility. If we were certain about what would happen, it probably wouldn’t be considered a moral gray area.BTW, the assumption that the relationship would “repair itself” after the adultery which still lies hidden with her is based on what exactly?
In depends on whether you’re talking about paradoxes in the colloquial sense or paradoxes in the logical sense. The fact that women are more interested in men that act uninterested in them is a paradox in the colloquial sense. Russell’s paradox is a logical paradox. Paradoxes are not tolerated in logic; set theory had to be revised to eliminate Russell’s Paradox.Not at all. You seem rather to be conflating “contradiction” with a paradox. Contradictions are by their very definition, “sense-less”: like someone walking through a wall and at the same time that same person NOT walking through that same wall at that exact same time.