God passing over people

[thinkandmull]

The question whether God could but won’t save everyone is a valid question understanding what kind of a world we inhabit

 

[thinkandmull]

I found this today

youtube.com/watch?v=ZL5kZzA0yys

 

[Vico]

The question whether God could but won’t save everyone is a valid question understanding what kind of a world we inhabit

There is no possibility where “God could but won’t save” since He has granted free will so can’t go against it without revoking free will. This is in keeping with justice also, in that those that choose Him, will be granted merit.

 

[oldcelt]

You just haven’t had deeper spiritual thoughts yet in your journey

Really? Perhaps it is not I who is lacking in insight. If something is created with a pre-known (omniscience) destination and is still created by an omnipotent being who has chosen certain elect, then any “Free” decision made by that created individual is irrelevant. The story has already been written.
Even the Church Fathers could not arrive a one concise decision on this matter. That should be a sure sign that something doesn’t add up.

John

 

[fisherman_carl]

I don’t believe that God passes over people. The bible says that God desires everyone to be saved. I don’t really agree with Augustine or Aquinas in their view of predestination. I think that all these systems were created to explain why not everyone is saved. Yet, no one except God has the mind of God and can possibly know with any certainty how it all works. I think the Church affirms that God predestines people but also affirms that we have free will. They are like two things that contradict each other. Yet, the Church affirms them both without declaring how they both can be true without contradiction. This a very Jewish approach. There are some things we just don’t fully understand. Yet, we have to affirm because of Revelation. If Revelation was concocted by man’s philosophy it would be a lot easier for us to understand.

 

[Vico]

Really? Perhaps it is not I who is lacking in insight. If something is created with a pre-known (omniscience) destination and is still created by an omnipotent being who has chosen certain elect, then any “Free” decision made by that created individual is irrelevant. The story has already been written.
Even the Church Fathers could not arrive a one concise decision on this matter. That should be a sure sign that something doesn’t add up.

John

There are a few dogmas of faith that the Catholic Church holds are infallible, some are:

• By knowledge of vision (scientia visionis) God also foresees the free acts of the rational creatures with infallible certainty.
• There is a supernatural intervention of God in the faculties of the soul, which precedes the free act of the will.
• There is a supernatural influence of God in the faculties of the soul which coincides in time with man’s free act of will.
• The Human Will remains free under the influence of efficacious grace, which is not irresistible.

 

[oldcelt]

There are a few dogmas of faith that the Catholic Church holds are infallible, some are:

• By knowledge of vision (scientia visionis) God also foresees the free acts of the rational creatures with infallible certainty.
• There is a supernatural intervention of God in the faculties of the soul, which precedes the free act of the will.
• There is a supernatural influence of God in the faculties of the soul which coincides in time with man’s free act of will.
• The Human Will remains free under the influence of efficacious grace, which is not irresistible.

So, the Christian God knows all future events with infallible certainty, supernaturally interferes with the acts of free will both before and during the act, yet the act remain’s free?
I’m sorry, but the dogmas are self contradictory.

John

 

[Vico]

So, the Christian God knows all future events with infallible certainty, supernaturally interferes with the acts of free will both before and during the act, yet the act remain’s free?
I’m sorry, but the dogmas are self contradictory.

John

God makes it possible for humans, under the influence of the consequences of original sin, to avoid sin, by giving (supernatural) graces, but these graces are not irresistible. Each person has a free will choice to cooperate with God in order to avoid sin.

 

[oldcelt]

God makes it possible for humans, under the influence of the consequences of original sin, to avoid sin, by giving (supernatural) graces, but these graces are not irresistible. Each person has a free will choice to cooperate with God in order to avoid sin.

I fully understand the notion, however, your God’s omniscience, coupled with his creative power (causation), means that he creates knowing who will, or will not be saved. If we are created in such a manner, it is impossible for there to be free will.
Predestination is a reality in Christianity/Catholicism, because of the attributes given to God.
This is the primary issue that prompted my change in belief.

John

 

[Vico]

I fully understand the notion, however, your God’s omniscience, coupled with his creative power (causation), means that he creates knowing who will, or will not be saved. If we are created in such a manner, it is impossible for there to be free will.
Predestination is a reality in Christianity/Catholicism, because of the attributes given to God.
This is the primary issue that prompted my change in belief.

John

It is possible to freely choose although God has vision of all, since He makes it possible. There is no conflict when B-Theory of time is used. It is consistent with St. Thomas Aquinas who said:“God sees all things in His eternity, which, being simple, is present to all time, and embraces all time.” Summa Theologica, Q.57, A.3
And Now God knows all contingent things not only as they are in their causes, but also as each one of them is actually in itself. And although contingent things become actual successively, nevertheless God knows contingent things not successively, as they are in their own being, as we do; but simultaneously. The reason is because his knowledge is measured by eternity, as is also His being; and eternity being simultaneously whole comprises all time, as said above [Q. 10, A.2]. Hence, all things that are in time are present to God from eternity, not only because He has the types of things present within him, as some say; but because His glance is carried from eternity over all things as they are in their presentiality. Summa Theologica, Q.14, A.13

 

[oldcelt]

It is possible to freely choose although God has vision of all, since He makes it possible. There is no conflict when B-Theory of time is used. It is consistent with St. Thomas Aquinas who said:“God sees all things in His eternity, which, being simple, is present to all time, and embraces all time.” Summa Theologica, Q.57, A.3
And Now God knows all contingent things not only as they are in their causes, but also as each one of them is actually in itself. And although contingent things become actual successively, nevertheless God knows contingent things not successively, as they are in their own being, as we do; but simultaneously. The reason is because his knowledge is measured by eternity, as is also His being; and eternity being simultaneously whole comprises all time, as said above [Q. 10, A.2]. Hence, all things that are in time are present to God from eternity, not only because He has the types of things present within him, as some say; but because His glance is carried from eternity over all things as they are in their presentiality. Summa Theologica, Q.14, A.13

You, via Aquinas, have backed my belief. The Christian God knows all things at all times, and still created knowing how many would not pass his test. He created you and I knowing at the exact moment of our creation precisely how our lives would unfold. That is not free will, but fulfilling a mission that was ordered from all eternity (before, during and after in human terms) by an omnipotent force.

 

[PumpkinCookie]

You, via Aquinas, have backed my belief. The Christian God knows all things at all times, and still created knowing how many would not pass his test. He created you and I knowing at the exact moment of our creation precisely how our lives would unfold. That is not free will, but fulfilling a mission that was ordered from all eternity (before, during and after in human terms) by an omnipotent force.

Yes you are right. Libertarian freedom (which most people call “free will”) is incompatible with traditional theism, and everyone knows it. The mental gymnastics required to believe they are compatible are astounding in their complexity and obscurity. However, is it possible there might be some kind of limited freedom for us, in a sense?

Let’s say you will eat a sandwich. Almost lunchtime here. Anyway, isn’t it possible that both you and God will that you eat a sandwich, simultaneously? Yes, God has always known that you will do exactly everything that you will do, but that doesn’t have to mean that you don’t also choose to do what you will. Yes, this means God is responsible for our actions at the same time we are also responsible. Our wills and our responsibilities could maybe co-operate.

Now, this view is problematic if the final result of our co-operating wills is eternal damnation. This is a problem specifically because we did NOT “cooperatively” will to exist in the first place. Our existence in the first place is the result of God’s will acting upon us without our cooperation or consent, but our continued existence is the result of cooperation because we are each capable of committing suicide at any time. However, if there is no eternal punishment awaiting us, but merely the mutual decision that we go out of existence, God doesn’t seem so bad after all. We aren’t owed existence anyway, so if we had life at all it is all due to the generosity of God. Endless hell though, would turn that generosity into a sick joke, so I can agree with you there. It’s also a problem because it seems extraordinarily doubtful that anyone would cooperatively will eternal punishment for themselves, endlessly.

I’ve explained this at length in other threads and I don’t want to hijack yet another one. Many apologies.

 

[oldcelt]

Yes you are right. Libertarian freedom (which most people call “free will”) is incompatible with traditional theism, and everyone knows it. The mental gymnastics required to believe they are compatible are astounding in their complexity and obscurity. However, is it possible there might be some kind of limited freedom for us, in a sense?

Let’s say you will eat a sandwich. Almost lunchtime here. Anyway, isn’t it possible that both you and God will that you eat a sandwich, simultaneously? Yes, God has always known that you will do exactly everything that you will do, but that doesn’t have to mean that you don’t also choose to do what you will. Yes, this means God is responsible for our actions at the same time we are also responsible. Our wills and our responsibilities could maybe co-operate.

Now, this view is problematic if the final result of our co-operating wills is eternal damnation. This is a problem specifically because we did NOT “cooperatively” will to exist in the first place. Our existence in the first place is the result of God’s will acting upon us without our cooperation or consent, but our continued existence is the result of cooperation because we are each capable of committing suicide at any time. However, if there is no eternal punishment awaiting us, but merely the mutual decision that we go out of existence, God doesn’t seem so bad after all. We aren’t owed existence anyway, so if we had life at all it is all due to the generosity of God. Endless hell though, would turn that generosity into a sick joke, so I can agree with you there. It’s also a problem because it seems extraordinarily doubtful that anyone would cooperatively will eternal punishment for themselves, endlessly.

I’ve explained this at length in other threads and I don’t want to hijack yet another one. Many apologies.

I understand what you are saying, and in the world of an interventionist God, it may even be possible. As a Deist, I don’t believe in any intervention by the creator…therefore, I have total free will and total responsibility for my actions.

John

 

[Vico]

You, via Aquinas, have backed my belief. The Christian God knows all things at all times, and still created knowing how many would not pass his test. He created you and I knowing at the exact moment of our creation precisely how our lives would unfold. That is not free will, but fulfilling a mission that was ordered from all eternity (before, during and after in human terms) by an omnipotent force.

It was not determined what the free will would choose, only known.

 

[lmelahn]

St. Thomas Aquinas employs soft determinism so is a compatibilist: human beings are free in their actions but are determined to act by God.

I have been patiently trying to convice thinkandmull that St. Thomas Aquinas does not in fact think this . For Augustine, I think you could make a case for it.

For Aquinas, I think I can argue convincingly that Aquinas considers providence (and hence predestination) a first cause—a cause of being—which, in the realization of its effects, makes use of second causes—the causes of “becoming”—and does not interfere with them.

Among the second causes is, of course, the human will. And as I mentioned in my post describing how grace “functions,” what God does—according to Aquinas (and I agree with him )—is in essence to empower the will to do supernatural things (like repent of mortal sins, love God supernaturally, etc.), but in no way does He force it to do so.

That would go against what Aquinas repeatedly says about the will: that, by nature, it cannot be forced.

(Briefly, in Aquinas’ system, God is always the First Cause, and His effect is being or esse. His creatures are also capable of causing, in participation with His causality, but they are causes of becoming, or coming-to-be, or fieri. There is no conflict between the two, because God uses the second causes as instruments to produce the effects He wants. That does not mean, incidentally, that God determines the outcome—Aquinas actually deals with this topic when he discusses the knowledge of future contingents. In fact, having creatures that refuse to cooperate with God can enter prefectly into God’s providence. What He wants is for the creatures to choose Him freely, and in order to choose Him freely, they have to be really free; the possibility of abusing that freedom is a necessary “risk” that God must take in order to accomplish this.)

Hence, determinism (soft or otherwise) could not be further from Aquinas’ thought here.

 

[lmelahn]

To add to my post, I think there are a couple of “roadblocks” that have to be overcome when reading Aquinas.

The most important one is that, for Aquinas “cause” does not imply “determined effect.” Aquinas is not a mechanist.

Those used to the hard sciences are probably used to thinking “given cause C[sub]1[/sub], effect E[sub]1[/sub] will necessarily follow.” This is Cartesian-inspired mechanism.

But not Aquinas. He would say, “given cause C, either effect E[sub]1[/sub], or E[sub]2[/sub], or E[sub]3[/sub] (up to E[sub]n[/sub]) will follow (assuming C is not impeded), but we cannot know which one for certain until it actually happens.” (Of course, by “we,” we mean “we human beings.” God, of course, knows what will happen.) Why? Because a given cause, in general, can produce a variety of distinct effects, or it might even fail to produce any effect at all.

Hence, God can perfectly create a human being with a will that might choose to cooperate with Him, or else might not.

God can be the cause of the acts of our wills without determining those acts.

 

[Vico]

I have been patiently trying to convice thinkandmull that St. Thomas Aquinas does not in fact think this . For Augustine, I think you could make a case for it.

For Aquinas, I think I can argue convincingly that Aquinas considers providence (and hence predestination) a first cause—a cause of being—which, in the realization of its effects, makes use of second causes—the causes of “becoming”—and does not interfere with them.

Among the second causes is, of course, the human will. And as I mentioned in my post describing how grace “functions,” what God does—according to Aquinas (and I agree with him )—is in essence to empower the will to do supernatural things (like repent of mortal sins, love God supernaturally, etc.), but in no way does He force it to do so.

That would go against what Aquinas repeatedly says about the will: that, by nature, it cannot be forced.

(Briefly, in Aquinas’ system, God is always the First Cause, and His effect is being or esse. His creatures are also capable of causing, in participation with His causality, but they are causes of becoming, or coming-to-be, or fieri. There is no conflict between the two, because God uses the second causes as instruments to produce the effects He wants. That does not mean, incidentally, that God determines the outcome—Aquinas actually deals with this topic when he discusses the knowledge of future contingents. In fact, having creatures that refuse to cooperate with God can enter prefectly into God’s providence. What He wants is for the creatures to choose Him freely, and in order to choose Him freely, they have to be really free; the possibility of abusing that freedom is a necessary “risk” that God must take in order to accomplish this.)

Hence, determinism (soft or otherwise) could not be further from Aquinas’ thought here.

I have read different opinions on St. Thomas Aquinas, yet the traditional thought is consistent with Theory-B time. The earlier post showed this from St. Thomas Aquinas, which gives the idea:“God sees all things in His eternity, which, being simple, is present to all time, and embraces all time.” Summa Theologica, Q.57, A.3
And Now God knows all contingent things not only as they are in their causes, but also as each one of them is actually in itself. And although contingent things become actual successively, nevertheless God knows contingent things not successively, as they are in their own being, as we do; but simultaneously. The reason is because his knowledge is measured by eternity, as is also His being; and eternity being simultaneously whole comprises all time, as said above [Q. 10, A.2]. Hence, all things that are in time are present to God from eternity, not only because He has the types of things present within him, as some say; but because His glance is carried from eternity over all things as they are in their presentiality. Summa Theologica, Q.14, A.13

 

[Cybophonia]

If God already knows the future that means that the future is already a sealed deal(prophecies). If God already knows the future it means that the future is already consumed and past to God and cannot be changed(prophecies). A preposition about the future is a preposition about the present as well.

An excerpt from a very good article on plato.stanford.edu/entries/free-will-foreknowledge/#2.5 :

Dilemma of Foreknowledge and Modal Temporal Asymmetry

Again, let T = the proposition that you will answer the telephone tomorrow at 9 am.
(1f)
There is (and was before now) an essentially omniscient foreknower (EOF) [Assumption for dilemma]
(1f) and the Principle of the Necessity of the Past tells us that

(2f)
Either it is now-necessary that the EOF believed T before now or it is now-necessary that the EOF believed not T before now.
From (1f) and the definition of an EOF it follows that

(3f)
Necessarily (The EOF believed before now that T → T), and necessarily (The EOF believed before now that not T → not T) .
By the Transfer of Necessity Principle (TNP), (2f) and (3f) entail

(4f)
Either it is now-necessary that T or it is now-necessary that not T.
(4f) is logically equivalent to

(5f)
Either it is not now-possible that T or it is not now-possible that not T.
From the Principle of the Contingency of the Future we get

(6f)
It is now-possible that T and it is now-possible that not T.
But (6f) contradicts (5f).

The inconsistency shown in this argument has nothing to do with free will or fatalism. But the problem is even more general than this argument illustrates. The reason essential omniscience conflicts with temporal modality and the transfer principle is that the existence of an EOF requires that a proposition about the past entails a proposition about the future. But it straightforwardly follows from TNP that a proposition that is now-necessary cannot entail a proposition that is not now-necessary. So if the past is now-necessary and the future is not, a proposition about the past cannot entail a proposition about the future. The conclusion is that if asymmetrical temporal modality is coherent, it can obey TNP, or it can permit a proposition about the past to entail a proposition about the future, but not both.

The root of the problem, then, is that it is impossible for there to be a type of modality that has the following features:

(a)
The past and future are asymmetrical in that the past qua past is necessary with respect to this type of modality, whereas the future qua future is contingent with respect to this type of modality.
(b)
There are propositions about the past that entail propositions about the future.
(c)
TNP obtains.
So the problem of the alleged incompatibility of infallible foreknowledge and free will is a special case of a more general problem that has nothing to do with either foreknowledge or free will. Temporally asymmetrical necessity and the transfer of necessity principle threaten a host of metaphysical theses that require that a proposition about the past entails a proposition about the future (e.g., Matter is indestructible). This is not an issue that can be evaded by denying the religious doctrine of divine foreknowledge.

It was suggested in section 2.6 that the problem may be (a) above. There is no temporally asymmetrical necessity. If the root intuition behind the necessity of the past is something like the non-causability of the past, there is another inconsistency. There is an inconsistency between the alleged non-causability of the past, the transfer of non-causability principle, and the supposition that a proposition about the past entails a proposition about the future. But in these arguments it is the transfer principle that is suspicious. Arguments of this kind are discussed in some detail in Zagzebski (2002b).

Regardless of what one thinks of the argument for theological fatalism, there is a more general problem in the logic of time and causation that needs to be addressed. Both the alleged modal asymmetry of time and the causal asymmetry should be examined in more detail, as well as the various transfer principles that result in an inconsistency with metaphysical theses that have the consequence that a proposition about the past entails a proposition about the future.

 

[Cybophonia]

To add to my post, I think there are a couple of “roadblocks” that have to be overcome when reading Aquinas.

The most important one is that, for Aquinas “cause” does not imply “determined effect.” Aquinas is not a mechanist.

Those used to the hard sciences are probably used to thinking “given cause C[sub]1[/sub], effect E[sub]1[/sub] will necessarily follow.” This is Cartesian-inspired mechanism.

But not Aquinas. He would say, “given cause C, either effect E[sub]1[/sub], or E[sub]2[/sub], or E[sub]3[/sub] (up to E[sub]n[/sub]) will follow (assuming C is not impeded), but we cannot know which one for certain until it actually happens.” (Of course, by “we,” we mean “we human beings.” God, of course, knows what will happen.) Why? Because a given cause, in general, can produce a variety of distinct effects, or it might even fail to produce any effect at all.

Hence, God can perfectly create a human being with a will that might choose to cooperate with Him, or else might not.

God can be the cause of the acts of our wills without determining those acts.

This solution denies the first premise of the basic argument: (1) Yesterday God infallibly believed T. What is denied according to this solution is not that God believes infallibly, and not that God believes the content of proposition T, but that God believed T yesterday. This solution probably originated with the 6th century philosopher Boethius, who maintained that God is not in time and has no temporal properties, so God does not have beliefs at a time. It is therefore a mistake to say God had beliefs yesterday, or has beliefs today, or will have beliefs tomorrow. It is also a mistake to say God had a belief on a certain date, such as June 1, 2004. The way Boethius describes God’s cognitive grasp of temporal reality, all temporal events are before the mind of God at once. To say “at once” or “simultaneously” is to use a temporal metaphor, but Boethius is clear that it does not make sense to think of the whole of temporal reality as being before God’s mind in a single temporal present. It is an atemporal present, a single complete grasp of all events in the entire span of time.

Aquinas adopted the Boethian solution as one of his ways out of theological fatalism, using some of the same metaphors as Boethius. One is the circle analogy, in which the way a timeless God is present to each and every moment of time is compared to the way in which the center of a circle is present to each and every point on its circumference (SCG I, 66). In contemporary philosophy probably the most well-known defenders of the idea that God is timeless are Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann (1981), who apply it explicitly to the foreknowledge dilemma (1991). Recently it has been defended by Kevin Timpe (2007) and Michael Rota (2010).

Most objections to the timelessness solution to the dilemma of foreknowledge and freedom focus on the idea of timelessness itself, arguing either that it does not make sense or that it is incompatible with other properties of God that are religiously more compelling, such as personhood (e.g., Pike 1970, 121–129; Wolterstorff 1975; Swinburne 1977, 221). Zagzebski has argued (1991, chap. 2 and 2011) that the timelessness move does not avoid the problem of theological fatalism since an argument structurally parallel to the basic argument can be formulated for timeless knowledge. If God is not in time, the key issue would not be the necessity of the past, but the necessity of the timeless realm. So the first three steps of the argument would be reformulated as follows:

(1t)
God timelessly knows T.
(2t)
If E is in the timeless realm, then it is now-necessary that E.
(3t)
It is now-necessary that T.
Perhaps it is inappropriate to say that timeless events such as God’s timeless knowing are now-necessary, yet we have no more reason to think we can do anything about God’s timeless knowing than about God’s past knowing. The timeless realm is as much out of our reach as the past. So the point of (3t) is that we cannot now do anything about the fact that God timelessly knows T. The rest of the steps in the timeless dilemma argument are parallel to the basic argument. Step (5t) says that if there is nothing we can do about a timeless state, there is nothing we can do about what such a state entails. It follows that we cannot do anything about the future. K.A. Rogers (2007) argues that Anselm’s version of the timelessness solution makes all of time like the present, so if the timeless realm necessitates human acts, so does the present. Since knowledge of the present does not conflict with free choice, neither does Anselmian timeless knowledge.

The Boethian solution does not solve the problem of theological fatalism by itself, but since the nature of the timeless realm is elusive, the intuition of the necessity of the timeless realm is probably weaker than the intuition of the necessity of the past. The necessity of the past has the advantage of being deeply imbedded in our ordinary intuitions about time; there are no ordinary intuitions about the realm of timelessness. Perhaps, then, the view that God is timeless puts the theological fatalist on the defensive.

< plato.stanford.edu/entries/free-will-foreknowledge/#2.5

 

[thinkandmull]

There is no possibility where “God could but won’t save” since He has granted free will so can’t go against it without revoking free will. This is in keeping with justice also, in that those that choose Him, will be granted merit.

Could but wont give everyone efficacious grace???