V
Vico
Guest
Aquinas did not argue for a temporal God, rather he held that God does not have real relations with the world.I think we need to say something about time, here.
Aquinas does not subscribe either to the A theory or to the B theory. (There is a good article regarding these theories on plato.stanford.edu/entries/time/#TheBThe.)
Instead, he follows Aristotle, who describes time as “the measure of change according to the before and after” (Physics IV, 11, 219b1-2; see Aquinas’ commentary on the same text, In IV Phys., lc. 17).
The idea is, time depends strictly on the changes that occur in the material beings that we encounter (including us). Time does not exist “on its own” independently of the world; rather, the universal and continuous experience that we have of time is perceived by our senses and abstracted by our intellects.
To be clear: the continual change in material reality is real. The change flows on, regardless of whether we perceive it or not. However, it only becomes “time” in the strict sense when there are human beings to measure it.
Super-human intelligences (angels, and especially God) do not have to deal with time, because their intellection does not depend on the material world, as ours does. (Angels are not, of course, omnipotent, but unlike us, their knowledge is strictly intuitive.)
Hence—and this part might be counter-intuitive at first—for Aquinas (and Aristotle, as well as Augustine), only the “present” is real. It has really arrived from the past, and it is really tending toward the future, but at present, neither past nor future exist.
Because we are immersed in the material world, we have the greatest difficulty in imagining what it would be like to be outside of time, like God.
When God looks at a temporal creature—say an animal—He does not experience it the same way we do. We see the animal, so to speak, as our fellow companion on the journey. It is moving along in time at the same speed we are (so to speak). We experience its present, and only the present, as it unfolds.
God, however, sees in one glance the entire span of the animal’s life. He decrees when it should come into existence (i.e., at its conception), and when it should go out of existence (i.e., at its death). For God, every moment of time is present.
That boggles the mind, but perhaps an analogy can help. If I am driving in traffic, I can only see the cars that are driving alongside me. That is like the way we experience time. However, the traffic helecopter can see my entire trajectory, in a way that is impossible for me, as I am immersed in the traffic. That is why the traffic helecopter is so useful for predicting where the traffic jams are.
Now, note that although the traffic helecopter sees my entire trajectory, the trajectory is still my choice. There is nothing preventing me from taking a different route.
Clearly, there is a difference here: the traffic helecopter did not cause my trajectory, whereas God certainly did cause my existence, and He even causes the actions that I take.
However, the contingency of a being (or an action), and the fact that (from our point of view) it is in the future does not prevent it from being the object of God’s knowledge of vision (any more than the contingency of my trajectory prevents the helecopter pilot from seeing that trajectory).
That is what Aquinas is arguing in the text you cite from I, q. 14., a. 13. (Notice how Aquinas uses Aristotle’s terminology on time: God’s “knowledge is measured by eternity.”) If you look at the reply to Objection 3, you will see an argument rather like mine.
Yes, God knows the future, and even causes the future, but the future does not cease to be contingent—i.e., the fact that God already knows it does not suddenly render it deterministic.
So no, I think that determinism and the B-Theory are quite foreign to Aquinas.