God passing over people

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I think we need to say something about time, here.

Aquinas does not subscribe either to the A theory or to the B theory. (There is a good article regarding these theories on plato.stanford.edu/entries/time/#TheBThe.)

Instead, he follows Aristotle, who describes time as “the measure of change according to the before and after” (Physics IV, 11, 219b1-2; see Aquinas’ commentary on the same text, In IV Phys., lc. 17).

The idea is, time depends strictly on the changes that occur in the material beings that we encounter (including us). Time does not exist “on its own” independently of the world; rather, the universal and continuous experience that we have of time is perceived by our senses and abstracted by our intellects.

To be clear: the continual change in material reality is real. The change flows on, regardless of whether we perceive it or not. However, it only becomes “time” in the strict sense when there are human beings to measure it.

Super-human intelligences (angels, and especially God) do not have to deal with time, because their intellection does not depend on the material world, as ours does. (Angels are not, of course, omnipotent, but unlike us, their knowledge is strictly intuitive.)

Hence—and this part might be counter-intuitive at first—for Aquinas (and Aristotle, as well as Augustine), only the “present” is real. It has really arrived from the past, and it is really tending toward the future, but at present, neither past nor future exist.

Because we are immersed in the material world, we have the greatest difficulty in imagining what it would be like to be outside of time, like God.

When God looks at a temporal creature—say an animal—He does not experience it the same way we do. We see the animal, so to speak, as our fellow companion on the journey. It is moving along in time at the same speed we are (so to speak). We experience its present, and only the present, as it unfolds.

God, however, sees in one glance the entire span of the animal’s life. He decrees when it should come into existence (i.e., at its conception), and when it should go out of existence (i.e., at its death). For God, every moment of time is present.

That boggles the mind, but perhaps an analogy can help. If I am driving in traffic, I can only see the cars that are driving alongside me. That is like the way we experience time. However, the traffic helecopter can see my entire trajectory, in a way that is impossible for me, as I am immersed in the traffic. That is why the traffic helecopter is so useful for predicting where the traffic jams are.

Now, note that although the traffic helecopter sees my entire trajectory, the trajectory is still my choice. There is nothing preventing me from taking a different route.

Clearly, there is a difference here: the traffic helecopter did not cause my trajectory, whereas God certainly did cause my existence, and He even causes the actions that I take.

However, the contingency of a being (or an action), and the fact that (from our point of view) it is in the future does not prevent it from being the object of God’s knowledge of vision (any more than the contingency of my trajectory prevents the helecopter pilot from seeing that trajectory).

That is what Aquinas is arguing in the text you cite from I, q. 14., a. 13. (Notice how Aquinas uses Aristotle’s terminology on time: God’s “knowledge is measured by eternity.”) If you look at the reply to Objection 3, you will see an argument rather like mine :).

Yes, God knows the future, and even causes the future, but the future does not cease to be contingent—i.e., the fact that God already knows it does not suddenly render it deterministic.

So no, I think that determinism and the B-Theory are quite foreign to Aquinas.
Aquinas did not argue for a temporal God, rather he held that God does not have real relations with the world.
 
If souls are not saved, it is not because God “passed over” them, but because they spurned His grace, as St. Alphonsus has aptly demonstrated with reference to Church Father, Church Councils, the Saints etc:

catholictreasury.info/books/prayer/pr16.php

Excerpt: "… The same error was finally condemned in the 12th and 13th Propositions of Quesnel. In the former it was said: “When God wills to save a soul, the will of God is undoubtedly effectual;” in the latter: “All whom God wills to save through Christ are infallibly saved.” These propositions were justly condemned, precisely because they meant that God does not will all men to be saved; since from the proposition that those whom God wills to be saved are infallibly saved, it logically follows that God does not will even all the faithful to be saved, let alone all men.

This was also clearly expressed by the Council of Trent, in which it was said that Jesus Christ died, “that all might receive the adoption of sons,” and in chapter 3: “but though He died for all, yet all do not receive the benefits of His death.” [Sess. 6, c. 2-3] The Council then takes for granted that the Redeemer died not only for the elect, but also for those who, through their own fault, do not receive the benefit of Redemption.
 
Aquinas did not argue for a temporal God, rather he held that God does not have real relations with the world.
Right. God is outside of time, and (being Pure Act) cannot have relation as an accident, as we do. (But He is not lacking relation; He is subsistent relation, in the Holy Trinity, and that is something even better for us.)

I hope I didn’t give the impression that God is temporal; but He can see the unfolding of time in His eternal present.
 
Deep thoughts have apparently occurred in divergent directions on this issue. How about simple logic…If the outcome of a creation is infallibly known by the creator, how can that creator escape responsibility?
Many more than you have had deep thoughts on this matter, including myself.
God chooses to creates, human then choose and act, and from these acts God knows what happens by his vision of time in one glance. But does he have this BEFORE things happen? That is not a logical question because His time and ours are not parrallel
 
How do you arrive at that from the word ALL?
He preordains everything in a general way.

For Pete’s sake that encyclopedia anyway is just a privately written book. Stop bringing it up in thread after thread like its a some amazing revelation of how we think
 
Before you commented “Could but wont give everyone efficacious grace?”

God gives everyone sufficient grace. The Dogmas of faith on this are:
  • God gives all the just sufficient grace (gratia proxime vel remote sufficiens) for the observation of the Divine Commandments.
  • There is a grace which is truly sufficient and yet remains inefficacious (gratia vere et mere sufficiens).
  • The Human Will remains free under the influence of efficacious grace, which is not irresistible.
From the Council of Trent [Denzinger 814, cf. n. 797]:Can. 4. If anyone shall say that man’s free will moved and aroused by God does not cooperate by assenting to God who rouses and calls, whereby it disposes and prepares itself to obtain the grace of justification, and that it cannot dissent, if it wishes, but that like something inanimate it does nothing at all and is merely in a passive state: let him be anathema
The quasi Calvinist position that God doesn’t save anyone so He can demonstrate His karate chop in seperating the goats from the sheep… that is ridiculous. All sheep is always better than many eternal goats and some sheep.
 
I think we need to say something about time, here.

Aquinas does not subscribe either to the A theory or to the B theory. (There is a good article regarding these theories on plato.stanford.edu/entries/time/#TheBThe.)

Instead, he follows Aristotle, who describes time as “the measure of change according to the before and after” (Physics IV, 11, 219b1-2; see Aquinas’ commentary on the same text, In IV Phys., lc. 17).

The idea is, time depends strictly on the changes that occur in the material beings that we encounter (including us). Time does not exist “on its own” independently of the world; rather, the universal and continuous experience that we have of time is perceived by our senses and abstracted by our intellects.

To be clear: the continual change in material reality is real. The change flows on, regardless of whether we perceive it or not. However, it only becomes “time” in the strict sense when there are human beings to measure it.

Super-human intelligences (angels, and especially God) do not have to deal with time, because their intellection does not depend on the material world, as ours does. (Angels are not, of course, omnipotent, but unlike us, their knowledge is strictly intuitive.)

Hence—and this part might be counter-intuitive at first—for Aquinas (and Aristotle, as well as Augustine), only the “present” is real. It has really arrived from the past, and it is really tending toward the future, but at present, neither past nor future exist.

Because we are immersed in the material world, we have the greatest difficulty in imagining what it would be like to be outside of time, like God.

When God looks at a temporal creature—say an animal—He does not experience it the same way we do. We see the animal, so to speak, as our fellow companion on the journey. It is moving along in time at the same speed we are (so to speak). We experience its present, and only the present, as it unfolds.

God, however, sees in one glance the entire span of the animal’s life. He decrees when it should come into existence (i.e., at its conception), and when it should go out of existence (i.e., at its death). For God, every moment of time is present.

That boggles the mind, but perhaps an analogy can help. If I am driving in traffic, I can only see the cars that are driving alongside me. That is like the way we experience time. However, the traffic helecopter can see my entire trajectory, in a way that is impossible for me, as I am immersed in the traffic. That is why the traffic helecopter is so useful for predicting where the traffic jams are.

Now, note that although the traffic helecopter sees my entire trajectory, the trajectory is still my choice. There is nothing preventing me from taking a different route.

Clearly, there is a difference here: the traffic helecopter did not cause my trajectory, whereas God certainly did cause my existence, and He even causes the actions that I take.

However, the contingency of a being (or an action), and the fact that (from our point of view) it is in the future does not prevent it from being the object of God’s knowledge of vision (any more than the contingency of my trajectory prevents the helecopter pilot from seeing that trajectory).

That is what Aquinas is arguing in the text you cite from I, q. 14., a. 13. (Notice how Aquinas uses Aristotle’s terminology on time: God’s “knowledge is measured by eternity.”) If you look at the reply to Objection 3, you will see an argument rather like mine :).

Yes, God knows the future, and even causes the future, but the future does not cease to be contingent—i.e., the fact that God already knows it does not suddenly render it deterministic.

So no, I think that determinism and the B-Theory are quite foreign to Aquinas.
Do you happen to know where Aquinas says that God is His own eternity? Isn’t that like saying time is one of His qualities?
 
If souls are not saved, it is not because God “passed over” them, but because they spurned His grace, as St. Alphonsus has aptly demonstrated with reference to Church Father, Church Councils, the Saints etc:

catholictreasury.info/books/prayer/pr16.php

Excerpt: "… The same error was finally condemned in the 12th and 13th Propositions of Quesnel. In the former it was said: “When God wills to save a soul, the will of God is undoubtedly effectual;” in the latter: “All whom God wills to save through Christ are infallibly saved.” These propositions were justly condemned, precisely because they meant that God does not will all men to be saved; since from the proposition that those whom God wills to be saved are infallibly saved, it logically follows that God does not will even all the faithful to be saved, let alone all men.

This was also clearly expressed by the Council of Trent, in which it was said that Jesus Christ died, “that all might receive the adoption of sons,” and in chapter 3: “but though He died for all, yet all do not receive the benefits of His death.” [Sess. 6, c. 2-3] The Council then takes for granted that the Redeemer died not only for the elect, but also for those who, through their own fault, do not receive the benefit of Redemption.
Trent did not say that all whom God wills to save through Christ are infallibly saved. The Council of Quesnel was a local council, which is why the majority of theologians before modern times believed God could, but choices not to, save all
 
The quasi Calvinist position that God doesn’t save anyone so He can demonstrate His karate chop in seperating the goats from the sheep… that is ridiculous. All sheep is always better than many eternal goats and some sheep.
I don’t understand your sentence.
 
He preordains everything in a general way.

For Pete’s sake that encyclopedia anyway is just a privately written book. Stop bringing it up in thread after thread like its a some amazing revelation of how we think
What, the 1911 Catholic Encyclopedia was confirmed as conforming to Catholic beliefs. Check out the imprimatur, etc.

John
 
Do you happen to know where Aquinas says that God is His own eternity? Isn’t that like saying time is one of His qualities?
Eternity is, if you like, the opposite of time.

Time results when things change, and when changing beings (like us) perceive that change.

Eternity is the characteristic of beings that don’t change—hence it practically only applies (in the strict sense) to God.

Here is the passage you are thinking of:
The idea of eternity follows immutability, as the idea of time follows movement, as appears from the preceding article. Hence, as God is supremely immutable, it supremely belongs to Him to be eternal. Nor is He eternal only; but He is His own eternity; whereas, no other being is its own duration, as no other is its own being. Now God is His own uniform being; and hence as He is His own essence, so He is His own eternity (S.Th. I, q. 10, a. 1, responsum).
Note that Aquinas fundamentally accepts Boethius’ definition of eternity as interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio: complete, simultaneous, and perfect possession of unending life.

Have a look also at Article 4 of the same question: eternity and time are very different.
 
What, the 1911 Catholic Encyclopedia was confirmed as conforming to Catholic beliefs. Check out the imprimatur, etc.

John
Stop ok. Just stop it. We already discussed this several times. One bishop’s imprimatur from over a century ago of a huge encyclopedia means nothing to us Catholics with regard to that one statement which I have already explained by the way. I know you rejected our Faith because of this but it doesn’t excuse your behavior over one phrase in an old dusty book that didn’t come from papal or council authority
 
I don’t understand your sentence.
Assuming your position, sinners responsibility in rejecting sufficient grace does not exonerate God for not giving them efficacious grace.
 
Eternity is, if you like, the opposite of time.

Time results when things change, and when changing beings (like us) perceive that change.

Eternity is the characteristic of beings that don’t change—hence it practically only applies (in the strict sense) to God.

Here is the passage you are thinking of:

Note that Aquinas fundamentally accepts Boethius’ definition of eternity as interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio: complete, simultaneous, and perfect possession of unending life.

Have a look also at Article 4 of the same question: eternity and time are very different.
“Now God is His own uniform being; and hence as He is His own essence, so He is His own eternity”. Aquinas uses syllogism like this all the time. I am not sure the necessary follow though
 
Augustine … many are called but few are chosen. Well, *quia non secuti quamvis vocati *is “because they had not followed even through chosen”:
    1. Sed si vocatio ista ita est effectrix bonae voluntatis, ut omnis eam vocatus sequatur, quomodo verum erit: Multi vocati, pauci electi 116? Quod si verum est et non consequenter vocationi vocatus obtemperat atque ut non obtemperet in eius est positum voluntate, recte etiam dici potest: Igitur non miserentis Dei sed volentis atque currentis est hominis, quia misericordia vocantis non sufficit, nisi vocati oboedientia consequatur. An forte illi, qui hoc modo vocati non consentiunt, possent alio modo vocati accommodare fidei voluntatem, ut et illud verum sit: Multi vocati, pauci electi, ut quamvis multi uno modo vocati sint, tamen quia non omnes uno modo affecti sunt, illi soli sequantur vocationem qui ei capiendae reperiuntur idonei, et illud non minus verum sit: Igitur non volentis neque currentis sed miserentis est Dei, qui hoc modo vocavit, quomodo aptum erat eis qui secuti sunt vocationem? Ad alios autem vocatio quidem pervenit, sed quia talis fuit, qua moveri non possent nec eam capere apti essent, vocati quidem dici potuerunt sed non electi; et non iam similiter verum est: Igitur non miserentis Dei sed volentis atque currentis est hominis, quoniam non potest effectus misericordiae Dei esse in hominis potestate, ut frustra ille misereatur, si homo nolit; quia si vellet etiam ipsorum misereri, posset ita vocare, quomodo illis aptum esset, ut et moverentur et intellegerent et sequerentur. Verum est ergo: Multi vocati, pauci electi. Illi enim electi qui congruenter vocati, illi autem qui non congruebant neque contemperabantur vocationi non electi, quia non secuti quamvis vocati. Item verum est: Non volentis neque currentis sed miserentis est Dei, quia etiamsi multos vocet, eorum tamen miseretur quos ita vocat, quomodo eis vocari aptum est ut sequantur. Falsum est autem si quis dicit: Igitur non miserentis Dei sed volentis atque currentis est hominis, quia nullius Deus frustra miseretur. Cuius autem miseretur, sic eum vocat, quomodo scit ei congruere, ut vocantem non respuat.
St. Thomas Aquinas taught that predestination, a part of providence, pertains to those who are destined to eternal glory. Reprobation pertains to those who **will not **attain eternal glory. St. Thomas Aquinas taught that God does not will every good to all rational creatures, although He wills certain goods to all.

See Summa Theologica I, Question 23 (Predestination) especially A4:

Reply to Objection 1. If the communication of the divine goodness in general be considered, God communicates His goodness without election; inasmuch as there is nothing which does not in some way share in His goodness, as we said above (Question 6, Article 4). But if we consider the communication of this or that particular good, He does not allot it without election; since He gives certain goods to some men, which He does not give to others. Thus in the conferring of grace and glory election is implied.
newadvent.org/summa/1023.htm
I’ve been waiting for some to help us translate this from Augustine (2. 13), but nobody has yet 😦
 
Trent did not say that all whom God wills to save through Christ are infallibly saved. The Council of Quesnel was a local council, which is why the majority of theologians before modern times believed God could, but choices not to, save all
The quote from St. Alphonsus never said that.

I agree that God’s consequent will is not to save certain sinners - this is just; but he antecedently wills the salvation of all, which entails that no one will lack the grace to be saved if they pray.

St. Augustine says, “it is the deepest injustice to reckon anyone guilty of sin for not doing that which he could not do.” And St. Thomas: “God is not more cruel than man; but it is reckoned cruelty in a man to oblige a person by law to do that which he cannot fulfill; therefore we must by no means imagine this of God.” [In 2 Sent. d. 28, q. 1, a. 3] “It is, however, different,” he says, “when it is through his own neglect that he has not the grace to be able to keep the Commandments,” [De Ver. q. 24, a. 14] which properly means, when man neglects to avail himself of the remote grace of prayer, in order to obtain the proximate grace to enable him to keep the law, as the Council of Trent teaches: “God does not command impossibilities; but by commanding admonishes you to do what you can, and to ask for that which is beyond your power; and by his help enables you to do it.” [Sess. 6, Cap. 11] (St. Alphonsus)
 
Stop ok. Just stop it. We already discussed this several times. One bishop’s imprimatur from over a century ago of a huge encyclopedia means nothing to us Catholics with regard to that one statement which I have already explained by the way. I know you rejected our Faith because of this but it doesn’t excuse your behavior over one phrase in an old dusty book that didn’t come from papal or council authority
The passage is relevant to the OP…you may not like it, you may think you’ve explained it away, but there it is for anyone to witness. So far as my behavior, I think I have been conducting myself as a complete gentle man, and certainly will not be censored by anyone but an administrator.
If you don’t like my responses, you know where the ignore button is.

John
 
The passage is relevant to the OP…you may not like it, you may think you’ve explained it away, but there it is for anyone to witness. So far as my behavior, I think I have been conducting myself as a complete gentle man, and certainly will not be censored by anyone but an administrator.
If you don’t like my responses, you know where the ignore button is.

John
Its not really relevant because it is not what most Catholics believe and it is not from Church authority. At the most you can say it is that it is an oddity like the elephant man

I don’t have a problem at all with the way you express yourself, but I don’t feel you pay attention to what people write for you
 
The quote from St. Alphonsus never said that.

I agree that God’s consequent will is not to save certain sinners - this is just; but he antecedently wills the salvation of all, which entails that no one will lack the grace to be saved if they pray.

St. Augustine says, “it is the deepest injustice to reckon anyone guilty of sin for not doing that which he could not do.” And St. Thomas: “God is not more cruel than man; but it is reckoned cruelty in a man to oblige a person by law to do that which he cannot fulfill; therefore we must by no means imagine this of God.” [In 2 Sent. d. 28, q. 1, a. 3] “It is, however, different,” he says, “when it is through his own neglect that he has not the grace to be able to keep the Commandments,” [De Ver. q. 24, a. 14] which properly means, when man neglects to avail himself of the remote grace of prayer, in order to obtain the proximate grace to enable him to keep the law, as the Council of Trent teaches: “God does not command impossibilities; but by commanding admonishes you to do what you can, and to ask for that which is beyond your power; and by his help enables you to do it.” [Sess. 6, Cap. 11] (St. Alphonsus)
Possibly for Augustine, and for sure for Banez and many others, God antecedently wants everyone to be saved, but even more wants the majority to fall so His justice can be expressed in the separation of goats from sheep. This is a foolish doctrine
 
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