Godless morality?

[PRmerger]

This may be the same case with your own theistic morality – you’re just not aware of it as such.

You believe it comes from God, whereas it may come from human beings who merely proclaim it to be so.

Theists are human beings who claim they know that God exists, and what God’s morality is.

If they are wrong, their own morality is a social construct, regardless of what they claim. Their own religion – and concept of God – is one of the more interesting creations of the human mind.

You may not agree, but your own theism exists on the same shaky ground, so long as it is you speaking for your God, and not your God speaking for himself.

So if you could answer this: why does a group of people (society) have any moral authority over the atheist, when it comes to proposing morality?

 

[polytropos]

This may be the same case with your own theistic morality – you’re just not aware of it as such.

You believe it comes from God, whereas it may come from human beings who merely proclaim it to be so.

Theists are human beings who claim they know that God exists, and what God’s morality is.

If they are wrong, their own morality is a social construct, regardless of what they claim. Their own religion – and concept of God – is one of the more interesting creations of the human mind.

You may not agree, but your own theism exists on the same shaky ground, so long as it is you speaking for your God, and not your God speaking for himself.

If God doesn’t exist, then the whole concept of “being wrong about morality” is inconsequential. Theistic morality would be a social construct if God does not exist, in which case it would not matter that theistic morality is a social construct.

People speak of social constructs as if they are inherently bad because they are arbitrary and impermanent, but if atheists are right then everything is arbitrary and nothing has moral character.

I would only claim that belief in divinely ordained moral principles provides a concrete (albeit faith-reliant) basis from which morality can proceed. I don’t know if God exists and I don’t know why I would have faith, but I am unconvinced that rational morality can proceed from other premises.

 

[Portofino]

That’s why we claim that our faith is superior to our reason, Portofino. We have faith in the people that proclaim God’s Revelation to us.

Of course, you do this as well. You live a lot of your life–the majority of it, I propose–based on faith.

You’re just not aware of it as such.

I respect any invocation of faith. In terms of my actual beliefs, I straddle the line between skepticism and some kind of faith – in other words, I hope that there is objective meaning and goodness, though I don’t think I can prove it (nor can I know for sure).

For me it is more of a Pascal’s wager as regards this life – what does one have to lose?

So a lot of my own “secular” arguments are – admittedly – trying to give non-moral reasons (social norms, natural empathy, self-interest) for things that I largely believe anyway, in terms of what can be considered faith in a kind of morality.

Of course, what it’s really straddling the line between is secular humanism and a kind of “theistic humanism” – so, not Catholic per se, but still believing that there is something in the human soul that is indeed more than animal. And believing that there is something in the universe – an ordering agent, albeit one that defies comprehension.

It is, indeed, incomprehensible to me that the universe does not have an ordering intelligence – but then again, I’m no scientist. I’ve said before that I can’t understand how an airplane flies, so what’s incomprehensible to me is no good form of proof.

But when I ask, “for someone who truly believes in nothing, what is there worth living for?” I think my personal answer would be “the existence of humor.” That’s a form of pleasure that makes life worth living – if not metaphysically, then in terms of motivation.

Humor is the ultimate consolation and the ultimate form of pleasure, in that sense – which can make life sweet and worth living, at least in terms of sticking around.

And humor is suitably paradoxical – the most interesting, most pleasant form of “irrationality.” Even the religious recognize the value of humor, even though humor has nothing to do – in their eyes – with morality, only with wisdom.

 

[Portofino]

If God doesn’t exist, then the whole concept of “being wrong about morality” is inconsequential. Theistic morality would be a social construct if God does not exist, in which case it would not matter that theistic morality is a social construct…

I agree entirely. Of course, for the theist, for it to be “merely” a social construct would be a deplorable thing.

From my perspective, however, I can appreciate that “what do you have to lose” attitude, especially if it gives you pleasure of consolation to believe, and you personally find pleasure or consolation to be a worthwhile thing.

I would only claim that belief in divinely ordained moral principles provides a concrete (albeit faith-reliant) basis from which morality can proceed. I don’t know if God exists and I don’t know why I would have faith, but I am unconvinced that rational morality can proceed from other premises.

In effect, yes – pragmatically speaking, that’s absolutely the case. But if it’s faith-reliant, what do you do when you have competing forms of faith? It can come to appear ever-more tenuous, the more competition you have – so many “concrete foundations” pointing in different directions.

The question of whether such thing as objective truth exists is more interesting, in a way – even without an objective morality, it would seem there is such thing as objective truth.

For example, you either had me over for dinner last night, or you did not – yes?

This is quite independent (it seems to me) from an absence of value judgment, in the sense that “it doesn’t matter whether you had me over for dinner or not”…

The existence of truth is one thing; its value is another (“we pursue truth – why not untruth?”).

 

[Bradski]

Except when you try to appeal to the atheist CT who says, “I arrived at my reasoning the very same way you did. Now what?”

If he arrived at a different decision, then what he has accepted as the facts of the matter are different to those as I see them, or he cannot have arrived at the answer the same way I did. Starting with an agreed set of facts I would step through the process that he went through to find out where his line of reasoning differed from mine.

As regards the facts, maybe he thinks that cats don’t feel pain. In which case we could show him that they do. As regards the line of reasoning, maybe he says it doesn’t matter if you cause pain to something, in which case you can smack him in the mouth and see if he objects.

That’s why we claim that our faith is superior to our reason, Portofino. We have faith in the people that proclaim God’s Revelation to us. Of course, you do this as well. You live a lot of your life–the majority of it, I propose–based on faith.

In a loose sense of the term, I’d agree.

If I read something by Aristotle or Thomas Paine or AC Grayling (or indeed the pope), then I do my best to follow the logic of their arguments and see if what they are saying makes some sense to me. I have faith that they actually believe what they have written and I apply what they say to my own life and see if it is applicable.

A lot of it is. Some of it isn’t. But if what Paine says on a particular subject is different to that which the pope might say on the same subject, then I have to make a decision on who makes the most sense. Who’s argument is the most reasonable. Then I have a reason to support that point of view, other than to say: I have faith that it’s correct.

 

[PRmerger]

I respect any invocation of faith. In terms of my actual beliefs, I straddle the line between skepticism and some kind of faith – in other words, I hope that there is objective meaning and goodness, though I don’t think I can prove it (nor can I know for sure).

For me it is more of a Pascal’s wager as regards this life – what does one have to lose?

Believe because it’s true.

Truly, isn’t that really the only reason to believe in something?

 

[Portofino]

So if you could answer this: why does a group of people (society) have any moral authority over the atheist, when it comes to proposing morality?

I’m not sure how you would define moral authority, so – if I may – I will simply say that society does – even on the most pragmatic level – have “authority” over the behavior of an atheist who is both nihilistic and sadistic or indifferent to the feelings of others, socially and legally.

Indiscriminate killing will never be permitted in our society, even if there were no belief in God – and that’s because most people are committed to protecting their lives and protecting the lives of those who are close to them. Stealing will never be permitted so long as people don’t like being stolen from.

If most people greatly enjoyed being stolen from, stealing would not be illegal.

If most people enjoyed being violently attacked, or killed, killing would not be illegal.

Society represents the interests of the majority of its citizens.

Heck, even the protection of minority rights – which is very important in the U.S. – can be buttressed by the selfish argument, “you never know when you might be the minority in need of protection, whether because of your religion – or lack thereof – your sexual orientation, etc.” Every member of the majority, according to this reasoning, is the potential victim of the persecution of a minority.

In a theistic society, I think moral authority over the atheist is still social and legal and nature, but buttressed by an invocation of God’s commandments (God won’t stop you, but people who believe in God will!).

On the most pragmatic levle, it is belief in their moral authority – and the power to back it up – that gives them authority of you, though this is not without hazards (from a Christian perspective), since the promulgators of sharia law believe that they have moral authority over others, on the firm foundation of the will of Allah.

 

[PRmerger]

So a lot of my own “secular” arguments are – admittedly – trying to give non-moral reasons (social norms, natural empathy, self-interest) for things that I largely believe anyway, in terms of what can be considered faith in a kind of morality.

Of course, what it’s really straddling the line between is secular humanism and a kind of “theistic humanism” – so, not Catholic per se, but still believing that there is something in the human soul that is indeed more than animal. And believing that there is something in the universe – an ordering agent, albeit one that defies comprehension.

But when I ask, “for someone who truly believes in nothing, what is there worth living for?” I think my personal answer would be “the existence of humor.” That’s a form of pleasure that makes life worth living – if not metaphysically, then in terms of motivation.

Yes. I’ve never, ever, argued to the atheist: well, you have a worthless life since you believe in nothing. You believe you’re going to end up as worm food, so how can you be happy?

I am certain that atheists feel good living a moral life. :yup:

Humor is the ultimate consolation

Uh…no.

But I do like me my laughter. That’s for sure.

Even the religious recognize the value of humor,

*Even *the religion, eh?

Sheesh!

Wasn’t it St. Teresa of Avila (a religious woman, we are agreed?) who said something like, “God save me from sour-faced saints!”

even though humor has nothing to do – in their eyes – with morality, only with wisdom.

In your eyes, humor has to do with morality?

Please 'splain.

 

[Portofino]

*Even *the religion, eh?

Sheesh!

Wasn’t it St. Teresa of Avila (a religious woman, we are agreed?) who said something like, “God save me from sour-faced saints!”

Sorry – didn’t mean to say that the religious do not value humor!

One of the great paradoxes of the Gospels, though – appreciated even by the likes of Chesterton – is that nowhere does it say, “Jesus laughed.”

You may say it’s self-evident that he did laugh – and joke – but most of the humor of Christians has been drawn out by the latter-day followers of Christ.

your eyes, humor has to do with morality?

It’s a question that’s fascinated me, from a distance.

For a Catholic priest with a good sense of humor, humor is a manifestation of kindness – giving people comfort and consolation; making them smile; helping to “lighten the load” they are bearing.

You see this humanitarian humor in someone like John XXIII, or Charles Dickens, or Robin Williams, or Jim Henson. You give pleasure to others through humor, make them feel good.

Of course, humor can also be cutting and sarcastic and even hateful, though it’s another question as to whether this is truly humor (I know of someone who once said, “by a sense of humor, I do not mean an act of hostility disguised with laughter”).

Insofar as humor is often related to happiness, there is also an interesting relationship between happiness and kindness, or generosity.

If I’m very happy, I’m probably more inclined to respond generously to someone begging for money, than if I am in a lousy mood.

Likewise, a dictator in a lousy mood might sentence someone to death for a minor slip-up; whereas, if he’s in a particularly good mood (say his firstborn son has just been delivered), he would be more inclined to pardon you, even to “laugh” at this minor slip-up.

Employees all over the world wait until their boss is in a good mood, to ask him stuff! If he’s just thrown a fit, and slammed the door, they probably won’t approach him for a raise or for time off.

The Dalai Lama, pretty uncontroversially, spoke about how kindness and generosity is not only a means to happiness, but that those who are happy are more disposed to be generous and kind (the Charles Dickens’ Scrooge phenomenon – he was mean-spirited because he was miserable; and when he saw the positive in life, he became happy and full of generosity).

 

[polytropos]

I agree entirely. Of course, for the theist, for it to be “merely” a social construct would be a deplorable thing.

From my perspective, however, I can appreciate that “what do you have to lose” attitude, especially if it gives you pleasure of consolation to believe, and you personally find pleasure or consolation to be a worthwhile thing.

It would be deplorable if the theist ever knew he was wrong. If he never finds out, he would not find it deplorable (this is all assuming God doesn’t exist).

When I was first taught about Pascal’s wager I didn’t think it could work because it isn’t the most honest reason for taking faith - although I guess if God’s existence is genuinely unknowable, it could for some be the only way of taking faith. I tried my own “variant” of Pascal’s wager that I thought of in more psychological terms (because then I felt more comfortable making the wager even if I did not believe in God to start with). Mainly I tried to start practicing on the basis that religion confers psychological benefits to those who can believe in it, and I hoped that over time I would start to believe in it genuinely. It didn’t last, maybe because there is still some form of dishonesty and doubt encoded into that kind of assumption. I couldn’t really get rid of my other, more technical doubts, so eventually (pretty quickly, after a few weeks) I just stopped practicing.

In effect, yes – pragmatically speaking, that’s absolutely the case. But if it’s faith-reliant, what do you do when you have competing forms of faith? It can come to appear ever-more tenuous, the more competition you have – so many “concrete foundations” pointing in different directions.

The question of whether such thing as objective truth exists is more interesting, in a way – even without an objective morality, it would seem there is such thing as objective truth.

For example, you either had me over for dinner last night, or you did not – yes?

This is quite independent (it seems to me) from an absence of value judgment, in the sense that “it doesn’t matter whether you had me over for dinner or not”…

The existence of truth is one thing; its value is another (“we pursue truth – why not untruth?”).

I agree, I also do believe in objective truth although I do not believe in objective morality. (Although objective truth does not imply universally knowable truth.) So I think that certain truths would make different sorts of valuation possible. If it is true that God exists, then humans have objective value. If it is true that God does not exist, then subjective valuation is the only thing humans can really have. (I don’t know if I’m really disputing anything that you are saying here.)

I don’t know about competing forms of faith, and that’s, I guess, what I have to deal with. I don’t know whether or not God exists, which has prevented me from practicing faithfully, so my sense is that my faith defaults towards atheism. I guess you could argue that I have underlying agnostic principles for that reason. I tend not to worry about the labels for now. I think about the logical extensions of different faith-based claims, but I have kind of given up on acting on them because I don’t know.

 

[Simon_Hurt]

Simon

**People create purpose, meaning, and values for themselves based on their own subjective experiences. Whether an objective purpose - one independent of human cognition - exists or not is irrelevant. **

Not so. We are talking about whether we exist on the planet for a purpose. We cannot assign that purpose to our own designing. A dog can believe his purpose in life is to chase cats. But he did not assign that purpose to himself. A higher power designed that purpose in his genes. You would probably say Nature designed that purpose. But that’s only going part way. Who or What designed Nature’s purpose?

Oh, I forgot. Nature has no purpose!

I’m saying its not known whether we have an objective purpose or not. As such, the only purpose that matters is the one that we create for ourselves and believe to be true.

Let’s say the dog does have an objective purpose, how would he know what that purpose is? If he has a belief about what his purpose is, how can he know if it is the same or different from the objective one? For that matter, in what way is the objective purpose more important or relevant to the dog than his subjective one?

It seems rather irrelevant to me that people can value subjectively. As animals we have drives, but without God there is no intrinsic importance in those drives’ satisfaction. There is no natural consequence for violating a subjective purpose, meaning, or value.

People can think that they’ve created their own purpose, meaning or values. That does not make those valuations true, though, because nothing metaphysical can have any integrity in a godless, purely physical, random universe. To move from subjective valuation to “morality” is a very large leap that you have, I think, not argued for with sufficient rigor.

Intrinsic drives and consequences arise from interrelated psychological, sociological, and physiological factors. No god is necessary for conscious interpretation of experience.

That people create purpose, values and meaning does make it true. To them.

Welcome to the forum, Simon.

Thank you.

How on earth - or anywhere else - could we - or anyone else - create purpose, meaning, and values if they didn’t exist?

Through consciousness, knowledge, experience, cognition, socialization, emotion, etc.

It sounds like a case of wishful thinking:

Like the concept of god?

“Let’s pretend life isn’t futile, absurd and worthless even though it’s a spark in the dark!”

“Existence precedes essence” and all that

 

[tonyrey]

What is your reason

You are mistaken because I don’t believe life is fortuitous. Accidents are insignificant and meaningless…

 

[tonyrey]

IHow on earth - or anywhere else - could we **- **

None of which make purpose, meaning, and values objectively real - as you have pointed out.

It sounds like a case of wishful thinking:

Like the concept of god?

The concept of God has a rational basis which corresponds to the universal moral and legal principles of liberty, equality, fraternity and individual responsibility.

“Let’s pretend life isn’t futile, absurd and worthless even though it’s a spark in the dark!”

“Existence precedes essence” and all that.

?

 

[polytropos]

I’m saying its not known whether we have an objective purpose or not. As such, the only purpose that matters is the one that we create for ourselves and believe to be true.

Let’s say the dog does have an objective purpose, how would he know what that purpose is? If he has a belief about what his purpose is, how can he know if it is the same or different from the objective one? For that matter, in what way is the objective purpose more important or relevant to the dog than his subjective one?

I don’t think the debate here is whether we have an objective purpose but rather whether morality can be rationally believed in without believing in God. My argument is that if you believe in God, you may believe in morality and purpose, because those things become absolute through belief in God (as a faith-based assumption you make about the nature of reality, regardless of whether it is really true).

I disagree that the only purpose that matters is what we create for ourselves. There are problems with this statement. Purpose is something that I should do. Without a God, there is nothing in the universe that prescribes one course of action for me over another. I might not be hurtful or mean to others because my psychology works out in a way that being mean makes me feel bad. That is not tantamount to purpose. Drives and psychological tendencies do not a purposeful being make.

Intrinsic drives and consequences arise from interrelated psychological, sociological, and physiological factors. No god is necessary for conscious interpretation of experience.

That people create purpose, values and meaning does make it true. To them.

I’ll continue my issues with subjective morality here. The other problem is one of cognition. The example of the dog, I think, is irrelevant because its drives are much more “animal” and responsive than ours. I would again claim that a dog’s response to stimuli and its drives can’t be argued to form a purpose.

You are essentially allowing the fact that we have “conscious interpretation of experience” to be a basis for morality. I think you will have to explain more how, from that premise, we can arrive at morality, and why that morality would actually prescribe what I should do as a human.

Furthermore, there is no truth “to [insert person].” That is what we call an illusion. In any other form of knowledge this type of thinking is anathema and here it arises out of a cultured aversion to telling someone that they are wrong about morality.

My argument is that there are two possibilities: God exists and God does not exist. In one case we can easily deduce that there are moral consequences to our actions and we should act in a certain way. In the other case we must deduce that there are not moral consequences to our actions. While we may imagine that responding to psychological, social motivations constitutes “purpose,” once we are aware of the necessary conclusion that is drawn from our premise (that everything is random and uncreated), then we lose every rational basis for morality and purpose.

 

[Portofino]

It would be deplorable if the theist ever knew he was wrong. If he never finds out, he would not find it deplorable (this is all assuming God doesn’t exist).

When I was first taught about Pascal’s wager I didn’t think it could work because it isn’t the most honest reason for taking faith .

I agree, I think. The only form of a wager that makes sense to me is that of hope, combined with a confession of ignorance – “I don’t know whether it’s true or not, but I hope so!”

I suppose I would “justify” my hope – from a truth perspective – by the fact that I would be hoping in that which is indeed a possibility. Thus, I am “daring to hope.”

But it is much more diffuse than belief in a particular religion or set of dogmas – more a basic humanism. In other words, “there is more meaning to life than meets the eye” or “there is truth in joy; there is truth in love and togetherness.” It’s daring to hope that a basic humanistic ethic and enjoyment of existence – nothing more – does, in fact, have some sort of metaphysical substrate.

My other sense, though, is that – if there is a God out there – “it” is not terribly offended by atheists (if there is a God, I see non-believer more as a product of the limitations of human perception). Skepticism has gotten people in trouble (if nihilism is a bad thing); but, then again, blind belief has gotten people in trouble (if fanaticism and “zeal” is a bad thing).

No easy answers, just human beings groping their way through to something that makes sense to them. And it seems that theists, deists (in the Jefferson sense), and secular humanists have at least agreed on a lot of things… Through common sense? Intuition? Inner emotional attunement?

 

[Portofino]

I don’t think the debate here is whether we have an objective purpose but rather whether morality can be rationally believed in without believing in God. My argument is that if you believe in God, you may believe in morality and purpose, because those things become absolute through belief in God (as a faith-based assumption you make about the nature of reality, regardless of whether it is really true)…

There could technically be a creator of the universe that had absolutely no sense of morality, with morality still being a human construct that we have “projected” onto the divine being – who may, for all we know, exist “beyond good and evil.”

But I think your logic is, admittedly, unimpeachable in a strictly objective sense, regarding no possibility for an objective morality if morality is an entirely human-made creation.

I don’t know any non-believer who would deny that the cosmos doesn’t care whether we, as a species, destroy ourselves, or survive another 10 million years (or, perhaps, even find a way of surviving until the end of time). It’s all about inter-subjective human preferences, and the aligning of preferences (firemen who extinguish fires, not start them; sanitation that picks up gargage, not throws it down) is what creates norms of conduct for our society, and practical consequences to violating those norms of conduct (there are also personal consequences; if you harm your parents because you believe it is not immoral, that does not mean you necessarily will be immune from grief or regret).

Also, pragmatically, our social norms become “self-fulfilling prophecies”, in a way. As far as human experience is concerned - from this non-believer’s perspective – we do make the rules, so there is – pragmatically, at least – the sense that “something is wrong because we say it’s wrong” (just like this forum has certain rules of conduct, and the breaking of those rules entail practical consequences).

Similarly, money is intrinsically without value – pieces of paper. Money is valueless. But, on a relative level, the value of money is a concrete reality, with concrete consequences.

Yet, metaphysically speaking, I have absolutely no rational reason to say that “money has value” – that is a false proposition, in the ultimate sense. The same with morality.

 

[polytropos]

I agree, I think. The only form of a wager that makes sense to me is that of hope, combined with a confession of ignorance – “I don’t know whether it’s true or not, but I hope so!”

I suppose I would “justify” my hope – from a truth perspective – by the fact that I would be hoping in that which is indeed a possibility. Thus, I am “daring to hope.”

But it is much more diffuse than belief in a particular religion or set of dogmas – more a basic humanism. In other words, “there is more meaning to life than meets the eye” or “there is truth in joy; there is truth in love and togetherness.” It’s daring to hope that a basic humanistic ethic and enjoyment of existence – nothing more – does, in fact, have some sort of metaphysical substrate.

Hope would be a suitable basis. And maybe it did play a part in my last attempt at being Catholic (so it wasn’t all about expected psychological benefits): I did want morality to exist. As doubts weakened my hopes, I quickly abandoned the venture.

There could technically be a creator of the universe that had absolutely no sense of morality, with morality still being a human construct that we have “projected” onto the divine being – who may, for all we know, exist “beyond good and evil.”

That is a good point. If the universe was created, humans could still be incident, in which case there would not be intrinsic “human dignity.” I honestly don’t think very much about agnosticism because the parts of Catholicism that attract me the most are the cohesive moral system and the institutionalization. But then I just don’t believe. Alas.

I think this might raise other issues about what nature a “creator” could have if not personal. If the creator is not personal, what do we mean by “create” and how is it still metaphysical? These may not be appropriate for this moral discussion, however.

 

[Iron_Donkey]

There could technically be a creator of the universe that had absolutely no sense of morality, with morality still being a human construct that we have “projected” onto the divine being – who may, for all we know, exist “beyond good and evil.”

The thing is, a creator doesn’t make the standard, a creator is the standard, at least according to the sort of philosophy that Catholics accept. This is because the creator isn’t just some guy who made us, but the most fundamental Am, etc etc. The being is not a good being, but goodness, and so cannot be said to be beyond good and evil - that really would just mean beyond Himself and not Himself, which doesn’t make much sense.

If good and bad were viewed as creations, then yeah you’d be right. But we don’t see them that way.

(The rest makes sense to me from an atheist perspective, though of course I don’t believe it to actually be true. There may be a certain practical morality, or rules that we end up following for various reasons, but there’s nothing particularly special about them, and no way to say that it is in any real way bad to ignore them.)

 

[Bradski]

Similarly, money is intrinsically without value – pieces of paper. Money is valueless. But, on a relative level, the value of money is a concrete reality, with concrete consequences.

I like the metaphor.

The Christian would say that money does have value and it is set by the Central Bank. If there was no central Bank it would not have any objective value.

The atheist says he’s not sure if there is such a thing as the Central Bank. But that money has value in any case. It’s the value we personally put on it. It’s relative, not objective.

The Christian then asks: What if someone values the dollar differently to you? What do you say to him?

I’d say he can value it as he sees fit. But if he wants to operate in the real world, then he has to reach agreement with others as to what value is acceptable.

That’s my 2 cents anyway.

 

[polytropos]

The Christian would say that money does have value and it is set by the Central Bank. If there was no central Bank it would not have any objective value.

The atheist says he’s not sure if there is such a thing as the Central Bank. But that money has value in any case. It’s the value we personally put on it. It’s relative, not objective.

The Christian then asks: What if someone values the dollar differently to you? What do you say to him?

I’d say he can value it as he sees fit. But if he wants to operate in the real world, then he has to reach agreement with others as to what value is acceptable.

I don’t know if Christians would attribute objective value to money. The existence of objective morality does not necessarily instill every object with objective value. How you use that money might become a moral issue, but then the issue pertains to action, not object.

People who want to use money, regardless of creed, are forced to value it at the rate at which it can be spent. I don’t think that this is equivalent to moral valuation. Moral valuation would relate more to the question of how much energy and time one should invest in earning money and how that money should be used.

That’s my 2 cents anyway.

Ah, ha ha.