How Aquinas confuses the First and Second way

[Blue_Horizon]

Quote:
Originally Posted by balto
That cannot be the case. If that were the case, then the rock is currently changing for no reason, because the cause started at a certain time but had no effect until a later time. At that frozen instant, you are saying that the cause of the rock’s change was at a prior instant, so at this frozen instant there is nothing causing the change. Rocks do not accelerate by nature, so there must be an external reason for its being changed, but your analysis makes it the case that there can be no reason at all for this.

Apologies, I didn’t evade it I just gave up because you missed the point.
Clearly if you isolate a “frozen point in time” away from preceding snapshots it doesn’t make sense.

The only reason you are right when looking solely at a single timeless instant…is because no effect is actually present is it? In an isolated timeless instant there is no movement at start or end, no cause or effect.

I am saying that if you compare sequential frozen instants you can see that cause-effect pairing does not lie within the same instant but between sequential instants.
Namely, the motion effect observed between instants 2-3 at the bottom of the stick is actually caused by a related motion higher up the stick observed between instants 1-2, not by the motion higher up the stick between instants 2-3 as 'simultaneous" would suggest.

Yes…the other atoms are not directly acted on in the first instant so they are not accelerated until other atoms accelerate them. What is so difficult/controversial about all of this? You keep appealing to Newton and/or physics to try to evade the metaphysical issues that are really what this discussion is about.

Well if you affirm that the top of the stick moves before the bottom of the stick when the hand acts then we are agreed.

This to me is what I understand by a chain of temporal sequential causality wrt to the hand imparting motion to the ball.

That is why I cannot yet see how this example of Aquinas may also demonstrate a causal chain of motion that simultaneously move the ball when the hand moves .

The two principles appear to be mutually exclusive when demonstrated by this single example which is nevertheless asserted by opposing parties.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Thanks for responding.

So let me look at the three possibilities you mention:

“And if we are considering Newton’s constant fixed velocity of an object in a " vacuum " then one of three things has happened:

1. 
   *]Either the nature of the moving object is such that it maintains a constant velocity. In which case God is the efficient cause, since he is the creator of such a nature.
   *]God is the direct efficient cause of such constant velocity.
   *]The efficient cause is the collection of causes which constructed the moving object and projected it, through and applied impetus. And even in this case God is the First Agent Cause.”
   
   I think 1 makes sense to me. I don’t like 2 since that smacks of occasionalism. I’m not sure I understand 3.

1. 
   We are discussing options here. I listed three possible explanations. If we are dealing with heavenly bodies, 1 and 2 would be the only solutions. It has to be one or the other. Motion must be caused by something. I’m not up on " occasionalism, " but if that is the only choice left, then God would be the cause. Or we could posit natural forces such as gravity, which is caused by god.
   
   #3 would be the example of a space ship moving through space. It would be constructed and put together and launched by a consortum of men and companies, all of whom would act as efficient cause applying an impetus to the space ship. The impetus would modify the " nature " or artificial form of the ship causing it to travel through space at a nearly constant speed ( but not absolutely constant because space is not a vacuum.)…
   

   1 seems to concur with my idea of enabling causality. In this case, locomotion is simply a property of matter. The cause of the initial change in velocity is due to the causal power of an agent (efficient causality), or an instrumental cause that terminates in the primary agent cause. The initial cause that brought the object to that constant state of velocity is still an efficient cause. But what keeps keeps the object in motion after the change in velocity is a part of the nature of physical objects.

   Yes, that sounds correct.
   

   This reminds me of my post 82 where Aquinas says:

   He gives the following example:

   I think he is referring here to the idea that the four elements have a natural place where they tend (water in one place, earth in another, air in still another, fire tending upward). Here the motion is part of their nature, much like what we are proposing here for motion, only using modern physics.

   God bless,
   Ut

   Yes, that sounds correct, except I would say the power of imparting motion is a part of their nature rather than saying motion is a part of their nature. And God is the agent or efficient cause because he created such a nature…
   
   Now Thomas regarded the motion of heavenly bodies as Aristotle did. So they were moved by their natures which were intelligent and which desired to imitate God by their perfect motion. Or, he surmised they might be moved by Angels which were intelligent.
   
   I am just discussing possibilities, I’m not saying anything absolutely. You know that, right?
   
   God Bless
   Linus2nd

 

[Blue_Horizon]

"And if we are considering Newton’s constant fixed velocity of an object in a " vacuum " then one of three things has happened:

1. Either the nature of the moving object is such that it maintains a constant velocity. In which case God is the efficient cause, since he is the creator of such a nature.
2. God is the direct efficient cause of such constant velocity.
   The efficient cause is the collection of causes which constructed the moving object and projected it, through and applied impetus. And even in this case God is the First Agent Cause."

"Or we could posit natural forces such as gravity"
Linus this is poor Physics, gravity can only ever cause acceleration, never uniform motion which you seem to be talking about here?

Motion must be caused by something.

This “principle” is the problem which is causing all the above somersaults.
I see two problems with this “principle” and the way you are using it:
(i) you’ve put it very vaguely if we are talking about the First Way.
I think you mean to say “whatever is moving must be being moved by another.”
I think that is the most accurate rendering of Aristotle in Latin, or do you disagree?

(ii) If the First Way is truly aposteriori then the certainty of this principle must also be somehow derived from observation of the sensible world, presumably by induction from everybody’s consistent observation of motion in everyday life.

And here’s the logical problem. If this principle is true it must be true of local motion. And if true of local motion it must hold for all local motion.

Now Newton showed that all observed sensible motion is either due to continuously applied sensible force (resulting in ongoing acceleration) or temporarily applied force (resulting in initial acceleration terminating in uniform velocity) no exceptions.

Therefore the principle you enunciate above that is allegedly aposteriori is in need of a slight correction if we accept it’s truth is aposteriori rather than apriori.

Namely: “whatever is moving was put into motion by another” is the most we can consistently say. We cannot say “whatever is moving is being moved by another” because that is only true of an object demonstrating continuously accelerating motion (or constant velocity in the face of friction).

The problem is instead of questioning the truth of the principle you are questioning the truth of reality and positing a worldly “god of the gaps” explanation simply because “there must be one.”

This seems to be a logical flaw in your methodology if the truth of the First Way is truly aposteriori. If you believe your methodology is valid then in fact you seem forced to accept that your understanding of the First Way is in fact primarily apriori metaphysical.

Your principle of movement “whatever is moving is being moved by another” then becomes a metaphysical sacred cow that is non-falsifiable by empirical observations or experiments and Newton hasn’t gone far enough - there must be more for the Physicists to discover/understand in the sensible world.

However I believe this principle is aposteriori and Newton has fine tuned our understanding of local motion which means Aristotle’s principle of motion has to be amended from “whatever is moving is being moved by another” to “whatever is moving was put into motion by another.”

How this correction of Aristotle’s principle affects the First Way I don’t know.

It may have more serious implications for ontological principles of change perhaps.
If of sensible reality it cannot be said that “whatever is moving is being moved by another”
then from where does the truth of "“whatever is changing is being changed by another?”

Perhaps we can only say “whatever is changing began its change by another?”

#3 would be the example of a space ship moving through space. It would be constructed and put together and launched by a consortum of men and companies, all of whom would act as efficient cause applying an impetus to the space ship. The impetus would modify the " nature " or artificial form of the ship causing it to travel through space at a nearly constant speed ( but not absolutely constant because space is not a vacuum.)…

The only efficient cause of pertinence wrt local motion is the fuel burning and expanding and providing the impetus. There is no prior chain of local motion beyond that from what I can see. Of course there are prior efficient causes to the liquid oxygen/hydrogen being there.

The problem I see with this tortured “modification of nature” hypothesis is that a self-mover must have a different constituent “part” from which the internal agent act arises.
In living things this is the soul. A projectile does not have a soul - though it would be logical for you and Linus to posit one wouldn’t it? Afterall it is internal self-movement which defines “life” (the ability to move oneself).
But of course we today would not posit a soul in a projectile so the problem is how can the atoms being moved be moved by a “change in nature” of the same atoms? Whence the distinct “part” of the cannonball that causes act of the other part of the cannonball and makes it a self mover?

 

[utunumsint]

We are discussing options here. I listed three possible explanations. If we are dealing with heavenly bodies, 1 and 2 would be the only solutions. It has to be one or the other. Motion must be caused by something. I’m not up on " occasionalism, " but if that is the only choice left, then God would be the cause. Or we could posit natural forces such as gravity, which is caused by god.

#3 would be the example of a space ship moving through space. It would be constructed and put together and launched by a consortum of men and companies, all of whom would act as efficient cause applying an impetus to the space ship. The impetus would modify the " nature " or artificial form of the ship causing it to travel through space at a nearly constant speed ( but not absolutely constant because space is not a vacuum.)…

Yes, that sounds correct.

Yes, that sounds correct, except I would say the power of imparting motion is a part of their nature rather than saying motion is a part of their nature. And God is the agent or efficient cause because he created such a nature…

Now Thomas regarded the motion of heavenly bodies as Aristotle did. So they were moved by their natures which were intelligent and which desired to imitate God by their perfect motion. Or, he surmised they might be moved by Angels which were intelligent.

I am just discussing possibilities, I’m not saying anything absolutely. You know that, right?

God Bless
Linus2nd

Thanks for the explanations Linus. Of course, I know you are discussing possibilities. My goal is the better understand Aquinas, so I continue to work toward that end. I am sure that a lifetime isn’t enough to cover all that he has to say about reality.

That is the problem with discussions like this. Unless one has a firm grasp of both subject matters -Aquinas’ metaphysical assumptions / Aquinas’ outdated physics, and Newton’s metaphysical assumptions / classical physics - one can make little progress.

God bless,
Ut

 

[utunumsint]

This “principle” is the problem which is causing all the above somersaults.
I see two problems with this “principle” and the way you are using it:
(i) you’ve put it very vaguely if we are talking about the First Way.
I think you mean to say “whatever is moving must be being moved by another.”
I think that is the most accurate rendering of Aristotle in Latin, or do you disagree?

omne quod movetur, ab alio movetur.

All that is moved, is moved by another. Movetur is the passive form of moveo. Movetur can be “He is moved, she is moved, it is moved, whatever is moved”. Your construction would be “omne quod movens, ab alio movetur”. You can find the whole Latin text here: dhspriory.org/thomas/ContraGentiles1.htm

It is interesting that by using this construction, it leaves the cause of the motion indeterminate. It need not be an efficient cause. Thus the source of the motion can be anything. Any other, whether that be another physical object or caused by the object’s very nature. It is a very general metaphysical principle.

The problem I see with this tortured “modification of nature” hypothesis is that a self-mover must have a different constituent “part” from which the internal agent act arises.
In living things this is the soul. A projectile does not have a soul - though it would be logical for you and Linus to posit one wouldn’t it? Afterall it is internal self-movement which defines “life” (the ability to move oneself).

What defines life is no trivial matter and is still being debated today. See this link for an example of someone who denies that there is any such distinction between living and non living things and a response from Ed Feser.

edwardfeser.blogspot.ca/2014/03/stop-it-youre-killing-me.html#more

Now, while we Aristotelian-Scholastic philosophers can hardly deny that there is no “universally accepted” definition of life, we maintain that a “precise” definition of life is in fact possible. Living things, the Scholastic holds, are those which exhibit immanent causation as well as transeunt (or “transient”) causation; non-living things exhibit transeunt causation alone. Transeunt causal processes are those that terminate in something outside the cause. Immanent causal processes are those which terminate within the cause and tend to its good or flourishing (even if they also have effects external to the cause). For example, an animal’s digesting of a meal is a causal process that tends to the good or flourishing of the animal itself (though it also has byproducts external to the animal, such as the waste products it excretes). By contrast, one rock’s knocking into another is a transeunt causal process, in that it does not in any sense tend to the good or flourishing of the rock itself. (For recent exposition and defense of this characterization of life, see chapter 8 of David Oderberg’s Real Essentialism, and his paper “Synthetic Life and the Bruteness of Immanent Causation.”)

But of course we today would not posit a soul in a projectile so the problem is how can the atoms being moved be moved by a “change in nature” of the same atoms? Whence the distinct “part” of the cannonball that causes act of the other part of the cannonball and makes it a self mover?

It belongs to the nature of physical thing to be movable (to go from potential location B from actual location A, and that potential location B to become the new actual location.) That physical nature (anything with mass) can be analyzed at the macro level (classical physics) where no cause can be found for locomotion, or at the micro level (quantum physics) where causation seems to be more apparent. There is no need to posit a soul in this discussion except with regard to living things.

God bless,
Ut

 

[utunumsint]

I don’t deny this UUS but what you are describing sounds to me like the material cause of local motion not the efficient cause.

As I’ve said above, “omne quod movetur, ab alio movetur.” is not restricted to efficient causes alone. You also have to factor in formal and final causation. The material and the formal causes are intrinsic to all physical things. The final and efficient causes are extrinsic. Is it so much of a stretch to postulate that an efficient cause can create a change in another in terms of velocity that is preserved in terms of constant motion by the material and formal causality? And its not like sustaining motion has no cause whatsoever in classical physics. It requires that objects have mass, right?

God bless,
Ut

 

[utunumsint]

Here is an interesting analysis of motion at the quantum level. What we see at the macro level is enabled at the quantum level. Quanta is simply a packet of energy, such as a photon. When a photon hits an electron that circles an atom, the electron jumps to the next quantum energy ring. Given the nature of the atom, it tends to want to return to its original energy level, so it eventually emits a photon of energy which collides into the next atom/electron, and so on, and so forth. Every motion you make is enabled, literally, by trillions and trillions of such photon exchanges between atoms and their electron.

We don’t have to get into the quantum wave/particle duality question to appreciate the cause and effect nature of such interactions. Clearly Aristotle and Thomas’ physics were wrong, but their metaphysical principles were correct. Whatever is moved, is really moved by another.

This interaction is also fundamental to electrical currents. The motor neurons fundamentally use electrical charges to convey instructions through the nervous system to our muscles, causing the muscle cells to contract or relax, creating the energy needed to move the stick. The stick is able to change location through the interaction of photons hitting its atoms, which in turn causes the rock to move through an exchange of photons from the stick to the rock. It is also what keeps to rock in motion where it hit in a vacuum. The exchange of energy in the atoms of the rock would keep the rock in motion because they would never get transferred to another object through collision.

God bless,
Ut

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Just give us the quote please Linus and we will see if we are really comparing apples with apples and whether it can be reconciled with Newton’s 1st law which I have quoted.

" The vis inertiae is a passive principle by which bodies persist in their motion or rest, receive motion in proportion to the force impressing it, and resist as much as they are resisted. By this principle alone there never could be any motion in the world. Some other principle was necessary for putting bodies into motion; and now they are in motion, some other principle is necessary for conserving the motion. " ( Optics, p 540 quoted in From a Realist Point of View, Catholic University of America, 1979, Fr. William A. Wallace, first appearing as an article entitled Newtonian Antinomies Against the )Prima Via, in the periodical, The Thomist. )

It is obvious from other sources from Newton’s works that this " other principle " is ultimately God. He is implying that God is the ultimate cause for the original impulse causing the motion and for the sustaining of the motion. For a more full discussion of Newton’s views I refer you to the article cited above in From a Realist Point of View, 1979 or the Thomist.

We are going over old ground here Linus - see post #32 and #41 below.

eg “Self movers” (ie how the soul of living things moves the body) is not an example of the “motion” Aquinas has in mind in the First Way (cf Magee) - this is the basis of the 2nd Way not the First Way."

Please explain exactly what you are objecting to, because I don’t know. But I was discussing some things with Ut, surely you don’t object to that.

Magee is not one of my favorites.

Besides it seems there can be no chain of motion greater than two links when we call in the temporal self-mover link from temporal body to the “soul” of the self-mover. Maybe in Aristotle’s time, or even Aquinas’s, people would posit the Celestial Bodies were “alive” (which is what ‘self-mover’ usually implied) … but not nowadays. This seems a dead-end as Magee opines.

And I would agree. But Thomas, in my view, gets beyond that. He does not hold strictly to the Aristetlian explanation of movement. He suggests that such movement might indeed be caused by the Angelic higherarchy which ultimately reaches down to the movement and change of the sublunar world, earth and its immediate satelites. And contrary to Magee, I personally see no need to hold slavishly to any specific interpretation of Thomas. In my view, he always allowed for the eternal creating, causing, and sustaing power of the Unmoved Mover, God. He gives arguments which allow for such in several places.

Again, many philosophers, Ed Feser for one, would disagree with Magee.

Likewise with projectiles I’ll go with Newton, inertia, energy-transfer and simplicity - as Ocham suggests we should do in both cases.

You should check with World Cat for a local library that might have either Wallace’s book ( the 1979 edition, the earlier edition didn’t have that article ) or the 1979 edition of the Thomist ( You may have to research the exact volume, I didn’t have it exactly ).

This is so ambiguous as to be of little assistance Linus.
Everything rests on what you mean by “power” which certainly doesn’t look like “a force applied over a certain distance for a certain time” which is how Newton thought of it (as does any boy who made it past age 15 at school).

Newton recognized that a moving object gets its motion from some initial impulse, an impulse caused by some external agent ( I say ultimately, God ). Thomas would call it an impetus. Anyway, this impetus is a power, transferred from the agent to the moved object. In some way we don’t understand, this impulse or impetus alters the nature or form of the moved object so that it keeps moving. That seems simple logic to me. Otherwise we must posit the direct moving power of God ( which seems unreasonable, since we know he typically acts through instrumental causes ) or black magic. The only reasonable choice is that the nature of the object is modified so as to allow uniform motion.

If that is how we validly can define your unusual phrase then the agent’s “power” certainly is not available at the bottom of the stick the exact moment it is applied by the hand.

I think we stress that too much. I think it is enough that the principle is illustrated.
Both the hand and the stick are instrumental causes. When the power of the agent reaches the end of the stick, the rock moves. I don’t think we have to insist that it is simultaneous. Perhaps we should say " here and now, " as Feser says.

That does not deny a chain of causality from hand to ball - but lets not say its “simultaneous” for it isn’t, its only available after a time lag. That is what I call a sequential chain of local motion.

O.K.

So it would seem that the ball cannot be put into act at the same time as the hand is put into act. If Aquinas calls that “simultaneous” then it seems he is poorly translated .

I don’t know that Thomas ever said such actions were simultaneous, I don’t recall that he ever did. I used the term to point out the direct causality involved. But it should be pointed out that God’s causality is simultaneous to his effects and he is the immediate cause of the existence of everything that comes into being. For secondary or instrumental causes can be the cause of change and motion but not of existence, itself, of the new or changed thing. Only God can give existence or being.

God Bless

Linus2nd

 

[utunumsint]

I think we stress that too much. I think it is enough that the principle is illustrated.
Both the hand and the stick are instrumental causes. When the power of the agent reaches the end of the stick, the rock moves. I don’t think we have to insist that it is simultaneous. Perhaps we should say " here and now, " as Feser says.

O.K.

I don’t know that Thomas ever said such actions were simultaneous, I don’t recall that he ever did. I used the term to point out the direct causality involved. But it should be pointed out that God’s causality is simultaneous to his effects and he is the immediate cause of the existence of everything that comes into being. For secondary or instrumental causes can be the cause of change and motion but not of existence, itself, of the new or changed thing. Only God can give existence or being.

God Bless

Linus2nd

Interesting point Linus. I was wondering where this idea that simultaneous means instantaneous. I checked the summa contra gentiles and found this in the chapter on God’s existence.

[13] Furthermore, that it is impossible for the above mentioned infinites to be moved in a finite time Aristotle proves as follows. **The mover and the thing moved must exist simultaneously. ** This Aristotle proves by induction in the various species of motion. But bodies cannot be simultaneous except through continuity or contiguity. Now, since, as has been proved, all the aforementioned movers and. things moved are bodies, they must constitute by continuity or contiguity a sort of single mobile. In this way, one infinite is moved in a finite time. This is impossible, as is proved in the Physics [VII, 1].

If I understand this rightly, Aquinas is only insisting on that the the mover and the thing moved be simultaneously** in existence** - not that there be no time lag between the agent power and the motion of the instrumental causes. Thus, in the stick example, the rock would not move at all if the man died before the motor neurons could reach the muscles to move the stick to move the rock.

Now God, as the actuality that brings all potentialities to actualities, must be simultaneously existing for any other causal series to exist.

Oh, I found another interesting quote:

Furthermore, since the being of what is eternal does not pass away, eternity is present in its presentiality to any time or instant of time. We may see an example of sorts in the case of a circle. Let us consider a determined point on the circumference of a circle. Although it is indivisible, it does not co-exist simultaneously with any other point as to position, since it is the order of position that produces the continuity of the circumference. On the other hand, the center of the circle, which is no part of the circumference, is directly opposed to any given determinate point on the circumference. Hence, whatever is found in any part of time coexists with what is eternal as being present to it, although with respect to some other time it be past or future. Something can be present to what is eternal only by being present to the whole of it, since the eternal does not have the duration of succession. The divine intellect, therefore, sees in the whole of its eternity, as being present to it, whatever takes place through the whole course of time. And yet what takes place in a certain part of time was not always existent. It remains, therefore, that God has a knowledge of those things that according to the march of time do not yet exist.

And

[7] **Moreover, God’s understanding has no succession, as neither does His being. He is therefore an ever-abiding simultaneous whole-which belongs to the nature of eternity. **On the other hand, the duration of time is stretched out through the succession of the before and after. Hence, the proportion of eternity to the total duration of time is as the proportion of the indivisible to something continuous; not, indeed, of that indivisible that is the terminus of a continuum, which is not present to every part of a continuum (the instant of time bears a likeness to such an indivisible), but of that indivisible which is outside a continuum and which nevertheless co-exists with any given part of a continuum or with a determinate point in the continuum. For, since time lies within motion, eternity, which is completely outside motion, in no way belongs to time.

God bless,
Ut

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Interesting point Linus. I was wondering where this idea that simultaneous means instantaneous. I checked the summa contra gentiles and found this in the chapter on God’s existence.

If I understand this rightly, Aquinas is only insisting on that the the mover and the thing moved be simultaneously** in existence** - not that there be no time lag between the agent power and the motion of the instrumental causes. Thus, in the stick example, the rock would not move at all if the man died before the motor neurons could reach the muscles to move the stick to move the rock.

Now God, as the actuality that brings all potentialities to actualities, must be simultaneously existing for any other causal series to exist.

Oh, I found another interesting quote:

And

God bless,
Ut

I’m not sure where the confusion lies because it is obvious that the agent cause can cease to exist or be inactive before its power causes the effect. And we can find many examples of this. So that is why I said that when the power of the agent touches the moved object that this happens instantaneously.

Your " interesting quote " didn’t come through

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Interesting point Linus. I was wondering where this idea that simultaneous means instantaneous. I checked the summa contra gentiles and found this in the chapter on God’s existence.

If I understand this rightly, Aquinas is only insisting on that the the mover and the thing moved be simultaneously** in existence** - not that there be no time lag between the agent power and the motion of the instrumental causes. Thus, in the stick example, the rock would not move at all if the man died before the motor neurons could reach the muscles to move the stick to move the rock.

Now God, as the actuality that brings all potentialities to actualities, must be simultaneously existing for any other causal series to exist.

Oh, I found another interesting quote:

And

God bless,
Ut

O.K., I see what happened, You needed to set the highlighted quotes off by quotation marks. Otherwise they doesn’t get copied. I’ve seen the quotes before. Pretty deep, one has to meditate on them, very deep stuff.

Linus2nd

 

[wittgenstein]

Suppose a man shoots a gun and a man dies. Does pulling the trigger cause the man to die? No. It causes the bullet to leave the gun. (I am purposely leaving out the infinite steps of causation ). Does the bullet leaving the gun cause the man’s death? No. It causes the bullet to enter the man’s skull. Does entering the man’s skull cause his death. No… until you arrive at the man’s death.
In other words there is no precise moment when the bullet causes the man’s death. Cause and effect as seen from the perspective of this thread is Newtonian. Relativity sees cause and effect as a pattern in spacetime. Imagine a grain in wood. The grain starts one inch from the left corner and then weaves about until it reaches the right corner. Does the left corner position of the grain cause the grain to be in the position at the right? No.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Suppose a man shoots a gun and a man dies. Does pulling the trigger cause the man to die? No. It causes the bullet to leave the gun. (I am purposely leaving out the infinite steps of causation ). Does the bullet leaving the gun cause the man’s death? No. It causes the bullet to enter the man’s skull. Does entering the man’s skull cause his death. No… until you arrive at the man’s death.
In other words there is no precise moment when the bullet causes the man’s death. Cause and effect as seen from the perspective of this thread is Newtonian. Relativity sees cause and effect as a pattern in spacetime. Imagine a grain in wood. The grain starts one inch from the left corner and then weaves about until it reaches the right corner. Does the left corner position of the grain cause the grain to be in the position at the right? No.

What A and T are doing is establishing principles, we can argue until the cows come home over the arcane specifics of any given example

Linus2nd

 

[Richca]

Originally posted by Richca:
No created thing can either exist or move without the universal causality of God.

Noone is denying that. But your credal assertion here is so generalised, vague and ambiguous as to be meaningless in this discussion about the causality of local motion.
So we have come back full circle to begging the question that this thread started with - namely the confusing of the five ways into one confusing tangle of different causal explanations that need to be separated out and treated each on its own merits not tangled together and treated as one.

The credal assertion above is founded upon Holy Scripture and the catholic faith as in a previous post I noted a few passages from Holy Scripture and the CCC. As one of the prophets said in the Old Testament “Believe and you will understand.” Since we know the truth, it is not absolutely necessary to demonstrate it except to understand the truth better and this is what St Thomas Aquinas does.
The statement I made above is just a restatement of what the CCC#308 says “The truth that God is at work in all the actions of his creatures is inseparable from faith in God the Creator. God is the first cause who operates in and through secondary causes.” There are no exceptions that no created thing can either exist, move or act without the universal causality of God. God is the first cause of created being in whatever mode or manner of being.

Some people have a misconception that creation was a one time event that began in ages past. Creation was not just a one time event but it is a continuous activity of God. As you can tell in the first proof in the summa theologica, St Thomas does not get bogged down with particulars. This argument can be summed up by the example of the staff being moved by the hand. The hand is the first mover, God; the staff, all of creation.

I think we can use the same illustration for the second proof that deals with efficient causes except we add a stone that is moved by the stick which is moved by the hand. The hand is God, the first efficient cause, the stick is all of creation who are second causes, the stone is the effect. As the example shows, second causes are dependent for their causality on the first cause, for the first cause moves the second to act and the movement of the stone is primarily due to the first cause.

 

[Richca]

Richca:
(Continued from previous post)

Newton’s law of inertia does not nullify Aquinas’ first proof nor can it. The theoritical law of inertia is a physical law based on physics which is limited to the physical, quantifiable, and sense observable world. The first mover of Aquinas is metaphysical, trans-sensible, transcendent, separate from the world and known only by the intellect. To reach the metaphysical unmoved mover among a series of moved movers whether these moved movers are one or several or more, at some point, one has to transcend the physical, observable world. And this can be done rather swiftly, indeed, immediately as in the case where God immediately works in our souls as St Paul says “It is God who worketh in you both to will and to work for His good pleasure.”

 

[balto]

Apologies, I didn’t evade it I just gave up because you missed the point.
Clearly if you isolate a “frozen point in time” away from preceding snapshots it doesn’t make sense.

The only reason you are right when looking solely at a single timeless instant…is because no effect is actually present is it? In an isolated timeless instant there is no movement at start or end, no cause or effect.

I am saying that if you compare sequential frozen instants you can see that cause-effect pairing does not lie within the same instant but between sequential instants.
Namely, the motion effect observed between instants 2-3 at the bottom of the stick is actually caused by a related motion higher up the stick observed between instants 1-2, not by the motion higher up the stick between instants 2-3 as 'simultaneous" would suggest.

Well you seem to have defined cause and effect in such a way that it necessitates that causes and effects be temporally separated. Since I cannot get you to see that this definition is dubious, I will start using new terminology that might be more acceptable to you. At this frozen instant, is there a reason that the rock is accelerating? And if so, what is that reason? No appeals to prior moments are allowed.

The two principles appear to be mutually exclusive when demonstrated by this single example which is nevertheless asserted by opposing parties.

That’s because Aquinas, you, and I are equivocating when we use the terms “cause” and “effect.” The conception I am trying to give to you and the one you are actually thinking of are not the same because we obviously are not agreeing on terminology. It is probably the case that I am right in my way and you are right in your way, but you are having difficulty understanding how I am right in my way because you are taking the words that I am using and taking them to mean something other than what I am meaning them to be.

 

[balto]

As I’ve said above, “omne quod movetur, ab alio movetur.” is not restricted to efficient causes alone. You also have to factor in formal and final causation. The material and the formal causes are intrinsic to all physical things. The final and efficient causes are extrinsic. Is it so much of a stretch to postulate that an efficient cause can create a change in another in terms of velocity that is preserved in terms of constant motion by the material and formal causality? And its not like sustaining motion has no cause whatsoever in classical physics. It requires that objects have mass, right?

God bless,
Ut

Yes, this is an excellent observation. Unfortunately, in common parlance the word “cause” basically means what an ancient or medieval would understand as “efficient cause” so when they hear talk of a material, formal, or final cause they think it is really some special type of efficient cause. And it is difficult for the modern thinker to see this error (it took me a long time to realize this). So final causes become efficient causes that cause things in the past from the future, which is wrong, and formal and material causes become ethereal forms coming into contact with ethereal matter stuff and metaphysically reacting to generate an object, which is also wrong (it is essentially Platonism which Aquinas/Aristotle reject). Realizing that when Aquinas/Aristotle use the word “cause” they mean something much more general than “efficient cause” is extremely crucial to understanding these issues.

 

[utunumsint]

Yes, this is an excellent observation. Unfortunately, in common parlance the word “cause” basically means what an ancient or medieval would understand as “efficient cause” so when they hear talk of a material, formal, or final cause they think it is really some special type of efficient cause. And it is difficult for the modern thinker to see this error (it took me a long time to realize this). So final causes become efficient causes that cause things in the past from the future, which is wrong, and formal and material causes become ethereal forms coming into contact with ethereal matter stuff and metaphysically reacting to generate an object, which is also wrong (it is essentially Platonism which Aquinas/Aristotle reject). Realizing that when Aquinas/Aristotle use the word “cause” they mean something much more general than “efficient cause” is extremely crucial to understanding these issues.

Do you think I am using these terms properly? Or am I unknowingly sneaking in efficient causality?

The way I understand it, the material and formal causes really define the inner nature of an object. The efficient cause is what causes a change in an object, the final cause is the directedness that a thing has towards a certain goal or range of goals. Material and formal causation are certainly important when describing motion because they define how an object will react given a certain effect, right? Basically the final cause of an effect cannot be something that the material and formal cause cannot accept. And the material and formal cause can also define how an object will continue to react to an initial effect, such as by sustained motion.

God bless,
Ut

 

[balto]

Do you think I am using these terms properly? Or am I unknowingly sneaking in efficient causality?

The way I understand it, the material and formal causes really define the inner nature of an object. The efficient cause is what causes a change in an object, the final cause is the directedness that a thing has towards a certain goal or range of goals. Material and formal causation are certainly important when describing motion because they define how an object will react given a certain effect, right? Basically the final cause of an effect cannot be something that the material and formal cause cannot accept. And the material and formal cause can also define how an object will continue to react to an initial effect, such as by sustained motion.

God bless,
Ut

Yes, I think you have it right (although I am not anywhere near an authority on Scholastic metaphysics haha). I think the confusion that many of the posters here are having over this issue of simultaneous causation is that in simultaneous causation involves more material and formal causes that are at play. The potentiality of one member (material cause) is actualized by the form of another, whose form is actualized by the next member, and so on, until you get to pure actuality. Or at least something like that is at play.

 

[utunumsint]

Yes, I think you have it right (although I am not anywhere near an authority on Scholastic metaphysics haha). I think the confusion that many of the posters here are having over this issue of simultaneous causation is that in simultaneous causation involves more material and formal causes that are at play. The potentiality of one member (material cause) is actualized by the form of another, whose form is actualized by the next member, and so on, until you get to pure actuality. Or at least something like that is at play.

Right, but do you agree that this process can be over time? The way I understand it is that all that needs to be simultaneous is that the initial cause that starts the per se causal chain needs to be in existence as the source of the action that moves the entire instrumental chain. If that initial cause were to go out of existence, say half way through the execution of the causal chain, then the remainder of that uninstantiated causal chain would not be moved.

Using the example you mentioned to Blue:

Well you seem to have defined cause and effect in such a way that it necessitates that causes and effects be temporally separated. Since I cannot get you to see that this definition is dubious, I will start using new terminology that might be more acceptable to you. At this frozen instant, is there a reason that the rock is accelerating? And if so, what is that reason? No appeals to prior moments are allowed.

I would say that the immediate cause of the rock moving (or at least in the initial accelerating) is the stick. The stick (with an artificially imposed final cause of moving rocks) immediately moved the rock, but the motion of the stick was caused by a temporally earlier cause and effect transaction between the motion of the hand and the motion of the stick, that was cause by an earlier cause and effect transaction between the motor neurons that triggered the muscles to contract, which was caused by processes in the brain, etc…

What do yo think? The only thing that need be simulateous in this description, in terms of the entire sequence of actions and the end goal of moving the rock, is the existence of the initial mover, and all the instrumental causes in between, and the rock that moves, even though the events may be spread out over time.

God bless,
Ut