How Aquinas confuses the First and Second way

[Richca]

If Aquinas starts to demonstrate a proof based on observations of the sensible world then, in theory, that proof is falsifiable by other observations that may show his observations (or his principles inducted from observation) to be mistaken in any way.

This is exactly the approach Aquinas appears to assert in the First Way.

In the Summa Contra Gentiles Book 1, chapter 13, Aquinas mentions the sun when he says that there are some things in motion evident to sense. For the sake of simplicity, lets substitute for the sun the planets in our solar system and the earth’s moon which are evidently in motion or change and changing places. Aquinas’ argument proceeds that things in motion or change are moved or changed by another. Far from disproving this thesis, Newton’s first law of motion in reference to the solar system’s planets and the earth’s moon, confirms it. Where is the contradiction?

 

[balto]

I am not pursuing this line with you Balto because it is inherently logically contradictory as I have prev stated. “At a frozen instant” there is no observable motion, no locomotive causality to be inferred and no agent to be seen." These things are only observed and inferred by comparing successive instants which you have disallowed. You are simply trying to square the circle, turn Physics into Metaphysics and essentially are asking me a “have you stopped beating your wife” type question which forces me to acknowledge an assumption whatever response I give .

I didn’t ask you for a “cause.” I asked you for a “reason.” It is “inherently contradictory” to ask whether a current instance of a thing changing requires a current reason for its changing? You are going to have to somehow make this viewpoint of yours plausible, that something can change over a fixed timespan yet at any given point along said timespan it is not changing.

Do you accept that even in the hand ball example start time and end time differ wrt the chain of locomotive cause/effects? Even Linus accepts this. Even Feser seems open to this where he states such chains need not be simultaneous.
Why don’t you?

I have never denied the reality of temporally separated causes and effects and have already acknowledged their reality to both you and utunumsint several times already.

Then we have nothing further to discuss on this particular thread though its an interesting position you take here. Aristotle and Aquinas obviously believe this is change.

It doesn’t matter if it is accidental or substantial change, both are real and worthy of the single name “change” in their systems. If you cannot accept this then you must accept that you do not accept the coherence of their philosophic systems.
If that is the case on what basis do you argue using their philosophic concepts and terminology?

Again, this is interesting because you are always asserting that we should reinterpret Aquinas and Aristotle in light of modern science. When someone attempts to do so, you complain that they don’t share Aquinas and Aristotle’s viewpoints exactly.

If you don’t accept that uniform velocity is valid change maybe this applies to you more than me?

Until you are willing to accept this postulate of Aristotle I simply cannot discuss this thread topic further with you because you are inherently involved in a contradiction if you want to use some of their philosophic vocab but not others. Its a coherent vocab, if you do not accept their definition of “change” then there is going to be something implicitly misleading in your application of their four causes and hence cause/effect.

Which does seem to be the case.

How is uniform velocity valid change? It is neither a substantial change nor an accidental change. Aristotle and Aquinas thought it was accidental change, but I have argued it is not change at all. That contradicts their physics, not their metaphysics. They are still correct that change requires instrumental causes (since you seem to like that term better than “simultaneous”).

 

[balto]

The point is that some philosopher’s here have been trying to say that chains of locomotive causality are “simultaneous.”

This to me is a palpable nonsense. If that is so either our scientific instruments are wrong or the metaphysic principle is wrong or it has been misapplied to the case in question.

It is pretty obvious to me, and it appears, to UUS, Linus and even Feser, that such is not the case with chains of locomotive causality despite appearances.

It is a case of a misapplication of a valid metaphysic principle to physical reality.

You are still not understanding what I am saying. And I need you to tell me why I am wrong, not tell me that Feser and the other posters don’t agree with me. Whether they agree with me is irrelevant; it does nothing to establish that anything I have said is indeed wrong.

If what you are saying is true, then the cause occurs and then the effect occurs sometime later. No one disputes that. But what is happening in between the cause and effect? Is there some continuous action of an agent on the thing acted upon during this timespan until the effect is realized? If yes, then we are in agreement. That is instrumental/simultaneous causation. If no, then why do the cause and effect occur together regularly? The early moderns said it was because it is a “law of nature” that they do so. In other words, God has to jump in and make sure the effect comes after the cause. This is really messy, but it at least makes some sense out things. Current moderns cut God out of the picture. Well now there is really no objective basis for why a certain effect always follows a certain cause. Moderns say that an effect regularly follows a cause because it is a law of nature that they do so. Ask what a law of nature is and they’ll usually tell you it is just an observed regularity in nature. So the term “law of nature” is meaningless because all it does is redescribe a regularity in nature and not explain the regularity. The only other way out that I can see is to posit that a “law of nature” refers to something almost like a Platonic form.

 

[balto]

I guess this means that whatever is self moved or moving must by nature be able to do so. So a bullet does not naturally accellerate and move through space. I think I can agree with this. Any objections?

Yes, I can agree with that. Although you raise a good point later with your concern that locomotion could refer to “self motion.” He must mean something else by “self motion” because it cannot be that the thing that is moved can move itself since that would entail the thing being both actually and potentially X, a contradiction. I bet he means something like what we were discussing earlier, where you have the nature or soul of something that has the active power for performing an action through its parts, where the soul is doing the moving but the soul only has the power of moving because God sustains its nature.

I think I can agree with this, but I’m not sure. Basically, I take him to mean that anything that has parts that would have to work together to move illustrates the principle that everything that is moved is moved by another. Because composite being is only moved because a part of it is moving, like its feet. But wouldn’t this motion all be self contained, and have its ultimate origination in the person or animal deciding to move one way or another? Perhaps he will unpack this point later on. Maybe in itself, it is enough that any animal has parts that ultimately depend on one another for their motion.

I think you are right. When I move my arm, my “self” is moving a “part of my self.” It is not my self moving my self. I don’t know how this relates to animal movement, if the source of the animal movement is wholly in its soul and the soul is sustained by God, or if it is moved by other natural causes. I think in human wills, for the will to be free, there could be no natural cause of the will, only God’s divine sustaining cause of the nature of the will. But I think what he is referring to here is an “active power” in Scholastic jargon.

Hmmm. I think by this, he is making a comparison between an immaterial reality, such as an angel or God, and a material reality. Basically between composite and non composite entities. Here, I think he would bring in the idea of material cause and formal cause as the most fundamental form of such divisibility.

I’m not sure what he means here, although what you have written makes sense. But I don’t think the line is between immaterial and material realities, but between God and everything else. Angels are immaterial, but they do have wills supposedly. And there is still a minor distinction in angels since their essences and existences are separate.

 

[utunumsint]

[7] Nor is it an objection to this argument if one might say that, when something is held to move itself, a part of it cannot be at rest;

This statement seems to contradict the point that Aquinas makes in 5.2.1 where he explains that anything with parts would have one part in actuality that moves another part at rest, and basically actualizes it.

or, again, if one might say that a part is not subject to rest or motion except accidentally, which is the unfounded argument of Avicenna.

This one also contradicts what Aquinas says in 5.2.1.

For, indeed, the force of Aristotle’s argument lies in this:
if something moves itself primarily and through itself, rather than through its parts, that it is moved cannot depend on another.

Here he seems to be insisting that a self mover cannot have parts.

But the moving of the divisible itself, like its being, depends on its parts; [point 5.3 (finally!)]it cannot therefore move itself primarily and through itself. [point 5.1]

Interesting. So because the moving of a divisible being depends on its parts, in just the same way that its being depends on its parts, it cannot therefore move “primarily and through itself”.

Hence, for the truth of the inferred conclusion it is not necessary to assume as an absolute truth that a part of a being moving itself is at rest.
What must rather be true is this conditional proposition: if the part were at rest, the whole would be at rest.
Now, this proposition would be true even though its antecedent be impossible.
In the same way, the following conditional proposition is true: if man is an ***, he is irrational.

A self mover that is at rest is an inherent contradiction, pointing to the idea that a self mover must be pure actuality, I guess.

So much for proof 1 of Aquinas’ principle quid movetur ab alio movetur. I would say that this argument rests essentially on point 5.1 , that a self mover must have the principle of motion within itself, and the idea that a self mover cannot have parts (therefor must be immaterial), but that anything that is movable, must have parts (therefor be material).

What I find interesting about this first approach is that locomotion is never even mentioned. This is an approach that focuses exclusively on the idea of a self movers and what could possibly constitute a self mover. I honestly think that this first approach totally sidesteps the issue of locomotion in point 5.1. That is not to say that locomotion is not dealt with later on, but even if those other arguments fail with regard to locomotion, this one could still stand.

God bless,
Ut

 

[balto]

Right, so points 5.1, 5.2, 5.2.1 and 5.3 are going to be deployed here and in the next paragraph 7. Seems that 5.2 and 5.2.1 are his starting point

I think this is helping me understand what he means in 5.2. By primarily moved, he means altogether, not in a dependent sequence.

Ugg… seems fairly self evident. It a self mover cannot have parts, and its motion must occur together, then it can’t be moved by a resting part of itself, but must be moved by a moving part of itself. But then there were be a division in the entity. You could restate this that there would be a part of the entity that actualizes another part of the entity that is in potential.

OK. Well, he deals with some objects in paragraph 7 where perhaps he will help us unpack these statements and conclusions.

God bless,
Ut

I am not sure, but it seems that he is trying to draw the following distinction. If I raise my arm above my head through my own will and power, that would be an example of what he calls “self movement.” But if you come over and grab my arm and raise it over my head, then that would be an example of me being moved by another. I think that is what he means to say when he says “for if, while one part was at rest, another part in it were moved, then the whole itself would not be primarily moved; it would be that part in it which is moved while another part is at rest” as opposed to it moving itself by moving its parts. What I don’t understand is what this means: “therefore, that which was posited as being moved by itself is not moved by itself.” What was being posited as moving itself when it really wasn’t moving itself after all? I guess it must be something like I said, a part of a composite body moving alone (moved by violence to use an earlier term) versus a part of the body moving because the other parts are moving (moved by nature).

 

[utunumsint]

Originally Posted by utunumsint View Post
I guess this means that whatever is self moved or moving must by nature be able to do so. So a bullet does not naturally accellerate and move through space. I think I can agree with this. Any objections?

Yes, I can agree with that. Although you raise a good point later with your concern that locomotion could refer to “self motion.” He must mean something else by “self motion” because it cannot be that the thing that is moved can move itself since that would entail the thing being both actually and potentially X, a contradiction. I bet he means something like what we were discussing earlier, where you have the nature or soul of something that has the active power for performing an action through its parts, where the soul is doing the moving but the soul only has the power of moving because God sustains its nature.

Agreed. The way I see it, he is setting us up with this principle 5.1, where essentially the only possible candidate for a self mover is God, or a soul sustained by God, as you say. He has a really interesting way of making statements that we will use later on in further proofs, that he will end up contradicting, or severely limiting.

Originally Posted by utunumsint View Post
I think I can agree with this, but I’m not sure. Basically, I take him to mean that anything that has parts that would have to work together to move illustrates the principle that everything that is moved is moved by another. Because composite being is only moved because a part of it is moving, like its feet. But wouldn’t this motion all be self contained, and have its ultimate origination in the person or animal deciding to move one way or another? Perhaps he will unpack this point later on. Maybe in itself, it is enough that any animal has parts that ultimately depend on one another for their motion.

I think you are right. When I move my arm, my “self” is moving a “part of my self.” It is not my self moving my self. I don’t know how this relates to animal movement, if the source of the animal movement is wholly in its soul and the soul is sustained by God, or if it is moved by other natural causes. I think in human wills, for the will to be free, there could be no natural cause of the will, only God’s divine sustaining cause of the nature of the will. But I think what he is referring to here is an “active power” in Scholastic jargon.

Interesting. I like your interpretation of 5.2 and 5.2.1. This makes a lot more sense if we take the example of the human self moving the body using its parts. The parts take their motion from the soul, and the soul is moved or sustained directly by God. At least for human being. I suppose the souls of animals are moved primarily by their appetites.

Originally Posted by utunumsint View Post
Hmmm. I think by this, he is making a comparison between an immaterial reality, such as an angel or God, and a material reality. Basically between composite and non composite entities. Here, I think he would bring in the idea of material cause and formal cause as the most fundamental form of such divisibility.

I’m not sure what he means here, although what you have written makes sense. But I don’t think the line is between immaterial and material realities, but between God and everything else. Angels are immaterial, but they do have wills supposedly. And there is still a minor distinction in angels since their essences and existences are separate.

Right - that is exactly what he proves in his “On essence and being.”

Thanks for these responses. This is very helpful!

God bless,
Ut

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Quote:
Originally Posted by Richca View Post
Indeed, according to science, the entire body of the universe is expanding at an accelerating rate.

This would be an intertesting new topic.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

If Aquinas starts to demonstrate a proof based on observations of the sensible world then, in theory, that proof is falsifiable by other observations that may show his observations (or his principles inducted from observation) to be mistaken in any way.

Check Wiki or elsewhere for Popper and the principle of falsifiability.
If you still have questions lets pursue this then.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Right - So this conversation is jumping all over the place. I wonder if folks could simply focus on the chapter in summa contra gentiles so that we can agree on the source material for our discussion. This also happens to be the chapter that thinkandmull wants us to respond to, so it is the most on topic.

dhspriory.org/thomas/ContraGentiles1.htm#13

I propose a phased approach.

In phase 1, lets try to define the arguments that Aquinas makes from motion, as best we can.

If we can come to a consensus on phase 1, without regard to modern or classical physics, then we can move on to establish how the principles may be violating the canons of modern or classical physics in phase 2.

What say you all?

God Bless,
Ut

Worth a try.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Yes, I think this is a good idea. Sorry, I didn’t mean to sound cranky in my last post and apologize to you and Blue Horizon if that is how it came across . But I still suspect the real disagreement is over semantics and not content.

No problem, I am not exactly pure as the driven snow myself in that regard .

 

[utunumsint]

We are on paragraph 8 at the moment. I already did an analysis of this paragraph a few days back for thinkandmul. forums.catholic-questions.org/showpost.php?p=12388650&postcount=82

God bless,
Ut

 

[Linusthe2nd]

"Or we could posit natural forces such as gravity"
Linus this is poor Physics, gravity can only ever cause acceleration, never uniform motion which you seem to be talking about here?

If Newton can use hypotheticals so can we. Gravity is at work throughout the universe ( there is no " vaccum " in space - one of Newton’s false assumptioins ). Therefore, gravity from distant and near sources may accoung for " uniform motion " or there may be some unknown power at work - even God or his Angels. If he can hypothosize about uniform motion through a non-existent vaccum, not positing any reason or cause for the motion in the body of his works, then we can suggest unknown sources of gravity or some other cause for the imagined uniform motion. What is good for the goose is good for gander. I have nothing against Newton, but I do have a problem with his adoring, modern fans, who refuse to look at his work with a critical eye.

This “principle” is the problem which is causing all the above somersaults.
I see two problems with this “principle” and the way you are using it:
(i) you’ve put it very vaguely if we are talking about the First Way.
I think you mean to say “whatever is moving must be being moved by another.”
I think that is the most accurate rendering of Aristotle in Latin, or do you disagree?

Your translation is incorrect, which Ut has pointed out to you. The correct translation is " Whatever is moved is moved by another. " Everything is in the past tense. Most English translations of the Five Ways are incorrect. In fact I have seldom seen a correct translation, including the one used by New Advent or Catholic Answers. This problem was addressed by myself in the philosophy thread " The First Way Explained, " which I referred to earlier. My source is Nature and Motion in the Middle Ages by Fr. John A. Weisheiple, which I also referred to earlier.

The Latin " motus " applies to any kind of motion or change, but not to the act of creation or to substantial change. And it does not apply to the natural movements of things which have a definable nature, animate or inanimate, animal, vegatible, or mineral. And BTW, it is not necessary that the efficient cause of motion be in constant contact with the moved object in all cases. In fact, given the unversal amount of movement in the universe, I would judge that these instances would be in the large minority. I have discussed this also in the thread, " The First Way Explained. "

ii) If the First Way is truly aposteriori then the certainty of this principle must also be somehow derived from observation of the sensible world, presumably by induction from everybody’s consistent observation of motion in everyday life.And here’s the logical problem. If this principle is true it must be true of local motion. And if true of local motion it must hold for all local motion.

Yes, it is true of local motion. In fact Aristotle says that local motion is the first and most important motion, and Thomas agrees.

Now Newton showed that all observed sensible motion is either due to continuously applied sensible force (resulting in ongoing acceleration) or temporarily applied force (resulting in initial acceleration terminating in uniform velocity) no exceptions.

If Newton said that, then he was wrong, as I have explained in the thread " The First Way Explained, " which I got from the 1979 edition of From a Realist Point of View by Fr. William A. Wallace. And they get it from Thomas himself, for Thomas gives the example of a boy throwing a ball or an archer firing an arrow, They were right about the impetus or impulse ( Newton’s choice of verbs ) but they were wrong about the air keeping the objects going. Wallace correctly points out that the impetus causes a change in the nature of the object, causing the object to continue moving by nature or naturally and not by continuous contact with an efficient cause. Wallace treats of this as well ( Newtonian Antinomies against the " Prima Via, " pp 329-370). BTW, William A. Wallace is a world renowned Philosopher of the Philosophy of Science or Natue, look up his bio. Ditto Weisheiple.

Therefore the principle you enunciate above that is allegedly aposteriori is in need of a slight correction if we accept it’s truth is aposteriori rather than apriori.

Conclusions based on observation are a’ posteriori as far as I am aware. So how are Thomas’ conclusions not based on observation?

Namely: “whatever is moving was put into motion by another” is the most we can consistently say. We cannot say “whatever is moving is being moved by another” because that is only true of an object demonstrating continuously accelerating motion (or constant velocity in the face of friction).

As pointed out above, your translation is wrong.

Once again, since Newton’s case or example is purely hypothetical, since there is no perfect vaccum, not even in a laboratory and certainly not in space, there is no justifiction for being dogmatic about the interpretations others have made about his work - Newton himself, as I have shown, was not nearly so dogmatic. Now I have cited an example above showing that Newton was not at all dogmatic about the reasons for why he thought nature operated the way it did.

If you are implying that there is no cause to Newton’s hypothetical, uniform motion, I am truely surprised. All motion/change has some cause, either it is from the nature of the thing which moves by nature, or it is some efficient cause, seen or unseen, even the hand of God or of one of his Angels. One thing we know for sure, there is a cause, efficient or natural.

to be continued
Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Blue, continued from post 153

The problem is instead of questioning the truth of the principle you are questioning the truth of reality and positing a worldly “god of the gaps” explanation simply because “there must be one.”

Fiddle sticks! If there is no natural or earthly efficient cause, that leaves God. I’m sorry that embarrasses you. It is perfectly logical since Thomas has adequately demonstrated God’s existence, and if some doubt it, that cannot be helped. You can lead a horse to water but you can’t make him drink. Quite frankly people can call my view whatever they want, I’m perfectly comfortable with them.

This seems to be a logical flaw in your methodology if the truth of the First Way is truly aposteriori. If you believe your methodology is valid then in fact you seem forced to accept that your understanding of the First Way is in fact primarily apriori metaphysical.

Have you read Aquinas by Edward Feser? I think you need to .

Your principle of movement “whatever is moving is being moved by another” then becomes a metaphysical sacred cow that is non-falsifiable by empirical observations or experiments and Newton hasn’t gone far enough - there must be more for the Physicists to discover/understand in the sensible world.

Again, your translation is wrong. I object to your snyde remark. Most metaphysical truths are non-falsifiable, if that is unsatisfactory - tough toenails. No one has to accept them.

However I believe this principle is aposteriori and Newton has fine tuned our understanding of local motion which means Aristotle’s principle of motion has to be amended from “whatever is moving is being moved by another” to “whatever is moving was put into motion by another.”

Nonesense, Newton hasn’t " fine tuned " anything. He is giving a mathematical physical explanation which abstracts from reality. See Wallace in From a Realist Point of View
Again, your translation is wrong.
Obviously if something is moved it is moved by another, but Newton refused to speculate on the cause of the uniform motion. However he hints at it in the quote I gave you above from Optics. Further he is quite willing to assign as cause of the various powers he deals with in Principia. In the General Scholium of Principia he states in part, " …it is not to be conceived that mere mechanical causes could give birth to so many regular motions ( i.e. the sun, planets, stars, etc.)…" And certainly we must include Newton’s hypothetical, uniform motion among such " regular motions," at least they cannot be logically excluded. Shall we accuse Newton himself of appealing to a " god of the gaps? " If we do not hesitate to accuse Thomas and Aristotle of such a crime, then how does Newton escape?

The only efficient cause of pertinence wrt local motion is the fuel burning and expanding and providing the impetus. There is no prior chain of local motion beyond that from what I can see. Of course there are prior efficient causes to the liquid oxygen/hydrogen being there.

How about the designers and engineers who designed the craft, how about the efficient cause of all the materials ( compound and simple ) of which it is constructed? And guess what, God is the efficient cause or generator of them all.

Planets and heavenly bodies are a little different.

The problem I see with this tortured “modification of nature” hypothesis is that a self-mover must have a different constituent “part” from which the internal agent act arises.
In living things this is the soul. A projectile does not have a soul - though it would be logical for you and Linus to posit one wouldn’t it? Afterall it is internal self-movement which defines “life” (the ability to move oneself).

But any projectile will have a nature which can be modified, unless one is to say that God or his Angels are responsible directly. And in the case of the space ship, we would have thousands of machanical natures which could collectively be called the nature of an artifical body ( in the case of uniform motion we would have to assume that all fuel has been exhausted ). Everything has a nature, living and non-living.

But of course we today would not posit a soul in a projectile so the problem is how can the atoms being moved be moved by a “change in nature” of the same atoms? Whence the distinct “part” of the cannonball that causes act of the other part of the cannonball and makes it a self mover?

A space ship is made up of thousand of parts, each of which has a designed nature, which nature assumes the uniform activity of its constituent atomic and subatomic particles. I don’t see any problem here at all.

God Bless
Linus2nd

 

[Blue_Horizon]

I better wind up my spurious responses here as, due to a time lag, I can see I am not observing Richhca’s request to discuss from SGC.

It is “inherently contradictory” to ask whether a current instance of a thing changing requires a current reason for its changing? … something can change over a fixed timespan yet at any given point along said timespan it is not changing.

Correct. Someone else will have to explain the logical contradiction to you because it seems I cannot .

I have never denied the reality of temporally separated causes and effects and have already acknowledged their reality to both you and utunumsint several times already.

OK, sorry if I missed that but statements do seem to keep popping up that seem to contradict this .

Again, this is interesting because you are always asserting that we should reinterpret Aquinas and Aristotle in light of modern science. When someone attempts to do so, you complain that they don’t share Aquinas and Aristotle’s viewpoints exactly.

But to assert that Aristotle got it completely wrong wrt local motion and change would render most of his foundational philosophic structure/vocab invalid and so most of his philosophy. “Place” is one of his Predicamental categories (ie the Accidents that inhere in a subject). A change in place (which is what local motion inherently means) is therefore an accidental change. if you deny this then you are effectively saying Place is not one of the Predicamentals which seems a very big call indeed. Perhaps I am wrong, I don’t think so though.

How is uniform velocity valid change? It is neither a substantial change nor an accidental change. Aristotle and Aquinas thought it was accidental change, but I have argued it is not change at all. That contradicts their physics, not their metaphysics.

Look I tend to agree with you that uniform velocity is not a Physical change (ie no change in energy or mass or applied force)…however, as above, for Aristotle it does change his Metaphysics sorry. Substance and Accidents are metaphysical principles/terminology that carry over into ontological discussion so there are implications it seems.

They are still correct that change requires instrumental causes (since you seem to like that term better than “simultaneous”).

Well that’s out of left field. Do go on, this may be the cause of our inability to quite see eye to eye wrt chains of cause/effect wrt local motion.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

If Newton can use hypotheticals so can we…

Linus all you wrote here stands or falls simply on the bit I now quote:

Quote: BlueHorizon
Now Newton showed that all observed sensible motion is either due to continuously applied sensible force (resulting in ongoing acceleration) or temporarily applied force (resulting in initial acceleration terminating in uniform velocity) no exceptions.

If Newton said that, then he was wrong, as I have explained in the thread…

I am not into appeals to authority unless something is beyond my intellectual pay level (as opposed to somebody not being able to make a good case because they don’t actually have one).

So quickly summarise the argument for the benefit of everybody here why Newton is wrong if his principles lead to the above conclusion…which I believe is undeniable so far as both empirical experiment and mathematical extrapolation is concerned.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Linus all you wrote here stands or falls simply on the bit I now quote:

I am not into appeals to authority unless something is beyond my intellectual pay level (as opposed to somebody not being able to make a good case because they don’t actually have one).

So quickly summarise the argument for the benefit of everybody here why Newton is wrong if his principles lead to the above conclusion…which I believe is undeniable so far as both empirical experiment and mathematical extrapolation is concerned.

That is your interpretation of what you think Newton showed. His works deal only with gravitational motion and uniform motion of an object in the " vaccum " of space.

As regards the force projecting an object into space, it is obvious that there is an efficient cause. As regards " uniform motion " is concerned I have addressed that. Newton,himself, never addressed the cause of his inertial motion or why an object would continue at a uniform speed. I have addressed both. Please read my comments again. In either case there is the ultimate efficient causality of God. This is established through the principles of causality established by Aristotle, as interpreted by Thomas Aquinas.

One final thing, Newton did not prove that every violent motion ( an inertial force for example) required the continual application of this force. Such a notion is easily disproven if you pick up a rock or ball and throw it. Again, read through my comments again…

I have made my case, if it is unsatisfactory to you, that is something I have no control over.

What’s wrong with appealing to authority, you have done it yourself when you appeal to the authority of Newton.

Linus2nd

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Blue, continued from post 153

Fiddle sticks! If there is no natural or earthly efficient cause, that leaves God.

There was an efficient cause…the rocket fuel that set it into constant motion in space.

Intelligent people who haven’t studied Aristotle (who wasn’t fortunate enough to be able to correct his earthly observations with those of space) accept the evidence of their senses and instruments that constant velocity in space does not require an ongoing immediate agent cause like acceleration does.

Why don’t you? - unless perhaps you are too respectful of an antiquity that inducted imperfect principles based on limited observation of the physical world. They got a lot right, but not everything.

It is perfectly consistent with fully observed reality to hold that uniform motion does not need a sustaining immediate agent cause as does other types of locomotion. That’s just how reality is .

In the end it seems the only possible reason that uniform motion needs to be explained, given Newtonian discovery proven by the space age, would be an argument from uniformity or consistency. All other motion does, why not constant velocity?

I suppose this is a form of inductive reasoning…but inductive reasoning is not certain as the Black Swann problem/theory demonstrates.
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Falsifiability#Inductive_categorical_inference

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_swan_theory

Your defence may be a classic case of this Linus.
Who knows, neither of us can be sure.

Your principle of movement “whatever is moving is being moved by another”

OK if you disagree with this what do you hold to exactly - and please don’t give me “whatever is moved is moved by another” because that is so ambiguous as to be meaningless?

Your principle of movement… then becomes a metaphysical sacred cow that is non-falsifiable by empirical observations or experiments and Newton hasn’t gone far enough - there must be more for the Physicists to discover/understand in the sensible world.

I object to your snyde remark.

What are you on about?
If a metaphysical principle is inducted from limited observation of nature then that principle is indeed a “sacred cow” (ie not able to be corrected or critiqued) if one is later unable to assimilate new and contradictory observations .

Your surprising personal reaction just seems to confirm this truism .
Yet I intended no insult whatsoever .

 

[Blue_Horizon]

That is your interpretation of what you think Newton showed.

Linus my statement is, to the best of my knowledge, a direct corollary of the First two Laws of Motion. If you doubt the consistency of this statement with observed reality then
I think it is your grasp of modern Physics that is questionable. Sure, say modern Physics is wrong, but at least demonstrate that you understand what modern Physics actually says. I am not convinced you do sorry.

One final thing, Newton did not prove that every violent motion ( an inertial force for example) required the continual application of this force. Such a notion is easily disproven if you pick up a rock or ball and throw it.

I am more interested in what modern Physics observes re these sorts of empirical issues Linus. If you could explain what you mean by “violent motion” then I will endeavour to analyse it and see if I agree that modern Physics is mistaken on that point.

Newton,himself, never addressed … why an object would continue at a uniform speed.

Of course not, its now a given of observed nature.
You only question it because you hold to motion “laws” inducted from ancient (and incomplete) observations of nature that you are loathe to question.

They cannot both be right so if you don’t question one then you must question the other.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

There was an efficient cause…the rocket fuel that set it into constant motion in space.

Intelligent people who haven’t studied Aristotle (who wasn’t fortunate enough to be able to correct his earthly observations with those of space) accept the evidence of their senses and instruments that constant velocity in space does not require an ongoing immediate agent cause like acceleration does.

Why don’t you? - unless perhaps you are too respectful of an antiquity that inducted imperfect principles based on limited observation of the physical world. They got a lot right, but not everything.

It is perfectly consistent with fully observed reality to hold that uniform motion does not need a sustaining immediate agent cause as does other types of locomotion. That’s just how reality is .

In the end it seems the only possible reason that uniform motion needs to be explained, given Newtonian discovery proven by the space age, would be an argument from uniformity or consistency. All other motion does, why not constant velocity?

I suppose this is a form of inductive reasoning…but inductive reasoning is not certain as the Black Swann problem/theory demonstrates.
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Falsifiability#Inductive_categorical_inference

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_swan_theory

Your defence may be a classic case of this Linus.
Who knows, neither of us can be sure.

OK if you disagree with this what do you hold to exactly - and please don’t give me “whatever is moved is moved by another” because that is so ambiguous as to be meaningless?

What are you on about?
If a metaphysical principle is inducted from limited observation of nature then that principle is indeed a “sacred cow” (ie not able to be corrected or critiqued) if one is later unable to assimilate new and contradictory observations .

Your surprising personal reaction just seems to confirm this truism .
Yet I intended no insult whatsoever .

I have given solid reasons for everything I have said. You raised the questions, I answered them. Either you haven’t read what I said or you have not studied it. These are prerequisites to honest discussion. I’m not going to go over the whole thing again.I could be wrong but I don’t think so. I have read the sources and the arguments of the sources seem reasonable to me.

Linus2nd