How do we come to know things?

[lmelahn]

Another thing!, there is a great amount of things that we have never seen, but if relations inhere on substances, by contemplating any of them we should be able to know all the others. A simple example: By contemplating the substance of a person, so to say, we should be able to discern (by inference) who his parents are, how many brothers and sisters he has, if they are younger or elder than him, heavier or lighter, taller or shorter.

Why? Just because the relations are real doesn’t mean we are in a position to know them. I have no idea how far London is from Bankok (at the moment of writing), but surely that distance exists. Didn’t I claim that we know the substance first, and only afterwards learn some subset of its characteristics (accidents)? And relation is the very weakest and least intelligible accident, so it is not surprising that it is difficult to know.

Aristotle must have been aware of all this power; otherwise, how could have him said these amazing things (if he really did)?

The answers to the other objections are sufficient to answer this one . (I.e., there is no guarantee what we will know all the relations inherent in a substance. In fact, it is impossible for us.)

Incidentally, when I say we know the “whole substance,” perhaps the better phrase would be “the substance as a whole.” We don’t know all of its characteristics or properties at first, but we do know what it is, albeit only in a general way.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

Reasoning is “spontaneous” when it is based on habit. All of us, without exception, have the habit of the first principles (which allows us to see, for example, the principle of non-contradiction). We acquire other habits as we gain experience and systematic knowledge. (These habits constitute “knowledge” or “scientia” in the classical sense of the term.) This becomes important for my answer below.

But do you not see that, when there is no direct observation, we arrive at our conclusions through reasoning? The dog is absent from its doghouse (minor premise), but I cannot see it at the moment. I know from experience that bodies don’t simply disintegrate (major premise). I conclude (without much effort, but I conclude it nonetheless) that the dog is outside its doghouse. This isn’t heavy lifting, but it requires reasoning, because I am composing two judgments to make a third. (I even left out, for brevity’s sake, some of the intermediate steps that would have to be taken.)

No, because animals don’t even get as far as apprehension. They get as far as their estimative power, and no further. They neither apprehend (intellectually), nor judge, nor reason.

Imelahn: Is the habit a modification of our being?

This is what I see: when I don’t find an object where I supposed it was, I immediately ask myself, “where is it then?”, and look for it somewhere else. Other times, I simply look for it somewhere else, without asking myself the question. For those purposes, I don’t need the logical artifacts that you are mentioning. Now, please see what my cat does: Every day in the morning it goes to my bed to request its breakfast. When it doesn’t find me in my bed, it looks for me in the bathroom. It displays behaviors that are very similar to the behaviors you describe for a human being looking for his dog. However, while for the human being you say “evidently he is reasoning”, for the animal you say “evidently it is using its estimative power”. Is it because you have apprehended the estimative power of the animal and comparing it to human reasoning you say: “there is no resemblance whatsoever”? No, it is because you are under the influence of a theory, which leads you to establish certain relations and not others, or even deny them.

The specific point here is this: In situations like the example in your thesis, do we know immediately and infallibly the substance as a whole (albeit in a general way)? And to introduce a contrast I propose again this variation: you trip with a pile of objects. Do you even know if those objects are substances (in the Aristotelian sense) by your simple apprehension? and I f they are, do you know by simple apprehension how many they are (please remember your only interaction with them has been the tripping in the darkness)? Before you apprehend their substances as wholes you need to know how many they are.

What permitted the scientists to see the abberation was their scientia, their habitual knowledge, worked out through systematic reasoning.

However, consider this: if Jupiter and Saturn had been completely invisible, we would never have known they existed. We also could never have learned their characteristics and properties (e.g., the trajectory of their obits), much less the interactions between them. Most likely, we would never have discovered Neptune, or anyway, not so soon (unless we had happened to make a chance discovery by direct observation).

And here the point is this: it was the interaction with the big body what was observed first, then the big body. Do you grant this, Imelahn?

 

[Aloysium]

. . . it was the interaction with the big body what was observed first, then the big body. . .

I cannot see how an interaction in which one is participating can be observed.
One has to “detach” an interaction from its object and oneself, and consider it as object in order to do so.
At that point one would not not observe but rather would be participating in the new interaction.

An interaction occurs between the astronomer, by means of the telescope and the observed body, Jupiter.
One can note that there exists this interaction, only having first observed Jupiter.
Actually, the interaction itself can become the object, only after the observer self-reflects about his doing the observing - I am Looking at Jupiter; what is this all about.

What can we say about the actual interaction other than it remains a mystery, as are both the observer and the object in their wholeness.

As to the nature of relationship,
I find interesting how,
not only does it allow us to know the object,
but also we find aspects of the subject revealed as they manifest themselves in how the object is known,
and all we can say about the nature of relationship itself is that it exists.

 

[Richca]

Shall we forget then about the “idea” of substance as “that which underlies…”?

The english word substance comes from latin roots and it literally means “to stand under.” So, the idea of substance as that which underlies is the very etymological meaning of the word.

 

[lmelahn]

Imelahn: Is the habit a modification of our being?

Sure it is. It is a modum substantiae, something that measures or qualifies a substance; i.e., a quality. (Quality is that species of accident that answers the question “Which?” or Quale?—hence the term qualitas, literally “which-ness”).

This is what I see: when I don’t find an object where I supposed it was, I immediately ask myself, “where is it then?”, and look for it somewhere else. Other times, I simply look for it somewhere else, without asking myself the question. For those purposes, I don’t need the logical artifacts that you are mentioning. Now, please see what my cat does: Every day in the morning it goes to my bed to request its breakfast. When it doesn’t find me in my bed, it looks for me in the bathroom. It displays behaviors that are very similar to the behaviors you describe for a human being looking for his dog.

Two observations:

(1) You don’t have to do any looking to surmise that your dog is somewhere around. You did that with your intellect. You cat does not ask questions of the type you describe.

(2) The only relevant datum that direct observation gives you is the dog’s absense. To get anything else, you are going to have to put that judgment (that the dog is absent) together with other judgments (the permanence of physical substance, for example, which children learn when they are very young).

However, while for the human being you say “evidently he is reasoning”, for the animal you say “evidently it is using its estimative power”.

We have direct experience of reasoning (not to mention apprehension and composition/division), so that part is rather evident.

There is also no doubt that the animal is using its estimative power—because it is seeking out the sensual good (food, companionship, or whatever it is). We have an estimative power too (although for us it does more than just give a sensual judgment of benefit or noxiousness), and we have to use it in order to gain intellectual knowledge.

The question is, “does the human being do something more than the cat?”

Is it because you have apprehended the estimative power of the animal and comparing it to human reasoning you say: “there is no resemblance whatsoever”? No, it is because you are under the influence of a theory, which leads you to establish certain relations and not others, or even deny them.

On the contrary, there is a profound resemblance between the cat’s estimative power and our own cogitative power. That is where the confusion often arises, I think.

On the other hand, there is nothing in the cat’s (or in any other animal’s) behavior that can’t be explained by the use of the imagination, the memory of past estimative judgments (which are sensory, not intellectual, judgments—they are not composition/division), and the use of the estimative power.

No sub-human animal can come even remotely close to what we are doing now: discussing cats and animals in the abstract, theorizing how their knowledge works, and so on. It is not really reason (in the strict sense; the discursive composition of judgments) that distinguishes man from animals in their cognition; it is man’s ability to apprehend (by abstraction—we will have to discuss abstraction in more detail, I think, later on) and composition/division (i.e., comparing the concepts apprehended to reality).

The specific point here is this: In situations like the example in your thesis, do we know immediately and infallibly the substance as a whole (albeit in a general way)?

I rather think we do, and that if we reflect carefully enough, we can come to realize that.

And to introduce a contrast I propose again this variation: you trip with a pile of objects. Do you even know if those objects are substances (in the Aristotelian sense) by your simple apprehension?

What I know in that first observation (through touch) is that some subsistent reality has hit my toe. I know very little about it without observing more carefully.

But “subsistent reality” (“subsistent” just means existing independently; not inherent) is just another name for “substance” in the Aristotelian sense.

Since the essence of material things (by which Aquinas means, the material thing itself, not its accidents) is the proper object of the human intellect, yes, I must know that they are substances (essences) by the very fact of observing them. Most prople probably don’t know that Aristotle called such things “substances,” but people know them for what they are: material things.

Continued…

 

[lmelahn]

and If they are, do you know by simple apprehension how many they are (please remember your only interaction with them has been the tripping in the darkness)?

I would not necessarily know their number, whether that pile were an aggregate of substances or a single substance. A book is strictly speaking an aggregate of substances anyhow. I don’t see the difficulty here: I know that something (whether an aggregate or a single substance) has made me trip.

Don’t forget that the concept we make is universal, which means that we don’t have direct knowledge of individual substance except by comparison with the sensory species (the mental image produced by our sensory faculties). So, if all that I have apprehended so far is that “something” (i.e., some substance, or group of substances) has made me trip, then that concept applies equally well to all the substances in the pile. The notion is generic until refined by further observation.

Then, as I discover what the different objects are (after turning on the lights), I apprehend the individual substances more clearly.

Before you apprehend their substances as wholes you need to know how many they are.

No, not really. See above. In other words, the number of substances in an aggregate is one of those things that we don’t see clearly at first, if ever. How many peanuts in a bag of party mix? I have no idea. But I still apprehend the peanuts, and the party mix, without any trouble.

And here the point is this: it was the interaction with the big body what was observed first, then the big body. Do you grant this, Imelahn?

It was the iteraction with the aggregate (and ultimately, with the substances that constitute it) that caused me to observe it. But I observed the thing, and at the same time all of the constitutive substances, in the way I explained above. I did not observe their number at first, but that isn’t necessary in order to apprehend the substance(s) as a whole, because of the universal applicability of concepts.

 

[lmelahn]

Regarding the difference between the knowledge of men and animals, I will reproduce here a passage from C.S. Lewis’s That Hideous Strength. Even though I have my philosophical differences with Lewis, this is the best description of animal knowledge that I have encountered. (It is only one paragraph, and should fall under the fair-use doctrine.)

Mr. Bultitude’s [the tame pet bear of the protagonists] mind was as furry and as unhuman in shape as his body. He did not remember, as a man in his situation would have remembered, the provincial zoo from which he had escaped during a fire, not his first snarling and terrified arrival at the Manor [where they lived], not the slow stages whereby he had learned to love and trust its inhabitants. He did not know that he loved and trusted them now. He did not know that they were people, nor that he was a bear. Indeed, he did not know that he existed at all: everything that is represented by the words I and Me and Thou was absent from his mind. When Mrs. Maggs [the one who most often took care of him] gave him a tin of golden syrup, as she did every Sunday morning, he did not recognise either a giver or a recipient. Goodness occurred and he tasted it. And that was all. Hence his loves might, if you wished, be all described as cupboard loves: food and warmth, hands that caressed, voices that reassured, were their objects. But if by a cupboard love you meant something cold or calculating you would be quite misunderstanding the real quality of the beast’s sensations. He was no more like a human egoist than he was like a human altruist. There was no prose in his life. The appetencies which a human mind might disdain as cupboard loves were for him quivering and ecstatic aspirations which absorbed his whole being, infinite yearnings, stabbed with the threat of tragedy and shot through with the colours of Paradise. One of our race, if plunged back for a moment in the warm, trembling, iridescent pool of that pre-Adamite consciousness, would have emerged believing that he had grasped the absolute: for the states below reason and the states above it have, by their common contrast to the life we know, a certain superficial resemblance. Sometimes there returns to us from infancy the memory of a nameless delight or terror, unattached to any delightful or dreadful thing, a potent adjective floating in a nounless void, a pure quality. At such moments we have experience of the shallows of that pool. But fathoms deeper than any memory can take us, right down in the central warmth and dimness, the bear lived all its life (C.S. Lewis, That Hideous Strength, chapter 14, “Real Life is Meeting,” p. 306 in the Scribner 1996 paperback edition).

 

[lmelahn]

JuanFlorencio, you read Spanish, right? Then I would recommend a book that deals with the differences between man and animals. (For the rest the readers, I am afraid there is no translation into English—I will have to convince the author, a former colleague of mine, to do that, because it is quite an interesting book.)

It is appropriately called El hombre y el animal by Leopoldo Prieto.

It is much broader than just the difference between animal and human cognition, but it goes over that, too.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Regarding the difference between the knowledge of men and animals, I will reproduce here a passage from C.S. Lewis’s That Hideous Strength. Even though I have my philosophical differences with Lewis, this is the best description of animal knowledge that I have encountered. (It is only one paragraph, and should fall under the fair-use doctrine.)

My favorite book, I have read it five times!

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

In the following article Edward Feser discusses the difference between animals and humans. Its a good review. But, contrary to Thomists I do think animals and other living forms will be resurrected when God gives us a " new heaven and a new earth. " And why not, they glorified God by their lives, though not intelligently?

thepublicdiscourse.com/2015/04/14777/

Linus2nd

 

[JuanFlorencio]

Just for the sake of your peace of mind: I never have said that there is no difference between human beings and animals. If in the future -just by chance-, you ever read me saying that animals and humans occupy a place in space, please don’t conclude from that that I believe that animals write novels or do scientific research, as humans do.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

The english word substance comes from latin roots and it literally means “to stand under.” So, the idea of substance as that which underlies is the very etymological meaning of the word.

Yes, Richca, you are right. Still, it would be convenient to forget that etymological meaning of the word, which is misleading, and even absurd if taken literally in philosophy.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

I am not sure that we can completely jettison it. We must abandon crass interpretations, certainly. But we cannot abandon the idea that there is a single, unified principle that is perfected by accidents.

The important point is that, in reality, substance is that which is—simply and without qualification (substance in the first, most basic sense). It is also the principle that gives rise to and is perfected by the accidents (substance in the second sense, as co-principle with accident).

But we are not to think that there is a hidden substance “inside” or “underneath” the things that we encounter. No, substance in the second sense is just a principle of being, not a being in and of itself (that is substance in the first sense). Substance (in the first sense) cannot subsist without accident.

In De Rerum Natura, Titus Lucretius Carus says that atoms are not perceived by our senses, but we can “see” them with our reason. It is a typical philosophical assertion. Starting from common experiences (in the case of Lucretius, the drying of humid clothes, the decomposition of cadavers…) we can describe them, ask ourselves how can they take place, imagine the process, and get to a probable conclusion. If after hearing his arguments someone did not agree with Lucretius, he only could ask: “how else do you explain those experiences?”, and the other person would have to give him his own explanation. They would evaluate each other’s assertions confronting them with other related experiences, and showing that such or such doctrine would predict something which does not happen. This is how Aristotle, for example, rejects some assertions of Democritus about vision:

“Democritus, on the other hand, is right in his opinion that the eye is of water; not, however, when he goes on to explain seeing as mere mirroring. The mirroring that takes place in an eye is due to the fact that the eye is smooth, and it really has its seat not in the eye which is seen, but in that which sees. For the case is merely one of reflexion. But it would seem that even in his time there was no scientific knowledge of the general subject of the formation of images and the phenomena of reflexion. It is strange too, that it never occurred to him to ask why, if his theory be true, the eye alone sees, while none of the other things in which images are reflected do so.”

The ability of reason to “see” something not accessible to our senses is the ability to provide explanations. We conceive in our minds that something has to be in a certain way for us to be able to explain what we perceive with our senses. Lucretius would say that he “sees” atoms with his reason; others would refute him saying that “the existence of atoms would imply vacuum between them, but vacuum (a non-being which however is) is repugnant to reason”; so, they would conclude that Lucretius actually does not “see” atoms with his reason. He puts them in reality with his “imagination”. And they would affirm also that what they say is actually the true product of a rational vision. So, the claim is that reason does “see” something (in particular, their reason), but sometimes it makes mistakes (Lucretius’ reason, for example). Why does it make mistakes? Because it does not consider all the aspects of a “situation”, but only some of them. Or it adds elements that are not part of the situation. And how can we make sure that we are considering all the aspects of the “situation”? Or, how can we make sure that we are not adding something that does not belong to the “situation”? Aristotle has said something which at first sight sounds wise to me: The collectivity can do it. However, we still need to ask “which collectivity? Because there are many”. Nevertheless, if a given collectivity can do something for the truth it must be through open, honest and disciplined discussions.

Coming back to the concept of “substance”, if a substance is said to be something that underlies accidents, I say it might belong to the class of notions that are obtained through reasoning, and which could be erroneous. If on the other side it is meant to signify certain constancy, certain unification which is first increasing and later decaying over time, I say it is a descriptive term, which hardly anyone could object. If it is said that substance is an “energeia” that introduces certain order where there was a lower level of it, and pushes towards its prolongation and towards its proliferation, I would say it becomes again a conclusion derived from some reasonings, but which is based on such amount of data that appears more credible than the first notion. The second notion could be transformed into a fourth one -a metaphysical notion again- if we start asking ourselves: is anyone of the unified elements the cause of the unification? And looking at the way in which the quasi-unit changes over time, I think we would be forced to say: no, none of the unified elements can be the cause of the unification. It must be something else. Though it is strong in my mind, I realize it is just a supposition, and for the moment I cannot go beyond this.

I think it is substance in the descriptive sense above what “our cognitive power” realizes when we interact with material objects. But the obvious condition is that the set of interactions must be a complex plurality. Otherwise, if the interaction is very limited, the “whole” that we conceive is not the result of an apprehension, but a constructed one, as I have said before.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

I cannot see how an interaction in which one is participating can be observed.
One has to “detach” an interaction from its object and oneself, and consider it as object in order to do so.
At that point one would not not observe but rather would be participating in the new interaction.

An interaction occurs between the astronomer, by means of the telescope and the observed body, Jupiter.
One can note that there exists this interaction, only having first observed Jupiter.
Actually, the interaction itself can become the object, only after the observer self-reflects about his doing the observing - I am Looking at Jupiter; what is this all about.

What can we say about the actual interaction other than it remains a mystery, as are both the observer and the object in their wholeness.

As to the nature of relationship,
I find interesting how,
not only does it allow us to know the object,
but also we find aspects of the subject revealed as they manifest themselves in how the object is known,
and all we can say about the nature of relationship itself is that it exists.

If I understood you correctly, Louis, what you say above is very acute, and challenging. I will comment on this, but first let me clarify something:

The interaction that I was speaking about takes place between Uranus (or Saturn, or Jupiter) and Neptune. As Father Melahn pointed out, it was noticed as an aberration of Uranus’ orbit. I added that only a “theoretical mind” that had developed certain expectations (about the form of the orbit) could have observed it. We don’t participate on that specific interaction (the one that influences Uranus’ orbit). Our complex observation of the orbit does not produce its aberration.

Now, the object of my example was to respond to Father Melahn’s request

The point is, we understand the interactions only after (or at least at the same time as) we apprehend the things that do the interacting.

Could you give me an example to the contrary?

As I have said, what was observed first was this interaction (the “anomalous” movement); and only some weeks later Galle observed Neptune, the “cause” of the aberration, following Le Verrier’s instructions. So, this is the example that Father Melahn had requested.

I would like to add something else, because it could help to understand the significance of my example: Le Verrier knew also that Mercury’s orbit too was “anomalous”. He repeated his procedure to determine the location of another planet which interacting with Mercury produced the aberration. Once he communicated his results, the astronomers were looking for the unknown celestial body, but they didn’t find it. Decades later, Einstein provided an explanation of the phenomenon with his General Theory of Relativity, and in the explanation there was no need of another planet.

Examples like this give us the opportunity to revise our theories about how we know material things. But each one decides if he is willing to do it or not.

Now, about the detachment…

Your words are a challenge to me because they remind me how I arrived to the specific use I give to the words “relation” and “interaction”; and it is a long story of theoretical difficulties which has not ended. I cannot say it shortly. Everybody can be misunderstood, and I am aware that in general I will suffer the same destiny here, but anyway let me offer you some hints (if what you say is what I have understood, I think you will find them meaningful). As a kind of background, please have in mind our singular ability to project our past experiences and our future possibilities into our present.

• We perceive pluralities and heterogeneities.
• Our memory allows us to “perceive” change.
• We look for references.
• We compare.
• We bring past into the present.
• We establish relations between distant objects.
• We find patterns.
• We are affected by change.
• We change.
• We become sophisticated.
• Our perception of reality becomes sophisticated.
• We perceive meanings.
• Different levels of sophistication allow the perception of different meanings.
• Reality becomes multifaceted.
• We establish relations between patterns.
• We wish certain changes and are afraid of others.
• We predict certain changes and sometimes we are successful in our predictions.
• We bring our future possibilities into the present.
• We plan.
• Imagining or thinking change and performing it follow different procedures (relation and interaction).
• We bring certain things together and separate others following certain planned procedures.
• We promote certain changes and inhibit others.
• We are submerged into a universal ocean of change.
• Change is overwhelming…

I will stop here. In those cases in which you take part on an interaction you might be aware of the effect on you (put your hand close to the fire -but not so close, you know), or you might be aware of the change on the object with which you are interacting (try to sculpt a piece of wood), or you might be thinking on something else (like when I take my daily bath). When you are simply aware of the interaction you remain in that realm; but when you think of it, you introduce the realm of relations. In that very moment you are imitating the interaction. That is the moment of detachment; and I like the word you have used, because the transit from interaction to relation really resembles a detachment: trying to “capture” reality with our mind, we become suddenly separated from it.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

Reasoning is “spontaneous” when it is based on habit. All of us, without exception, have the habit of the first principles (which allows us to see, for example, the principle of non-contradiction). We acquire other habits as we gain experience and systematic knowledge. (These habits constitute “knowledge” or “scientia” in the classical sense of the term.) This becomes important for my answer below.

Imelahn: Is the habit a modification of our being?

Sure it is. It is a modum substantiae, something that measures or qualifies a substance; i.e., a quality. (Quality is that species of accident that answers the question “Which?” or Quale?—hence the term qualitas, literally “which-ness”).

If a habit is a modification of our being, is it a modification of our operations as well?

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Just for the sake of your peace of mind: I never have said that there is no difference between human beings and animals. If in the future -just by chance-, you ever read me saying that animals and humans occupy a place in space, please don’t conclude from that that I believe that animals write novels or do scientific research, as humans do.

I had no one’s view on understanding the difference. I just thought the link was appropriate to the discussion.

Linus2nd

 

[JuanFlorencio]

I had no one’s view on understanding the difference. I just thought the link was appropriate to the discussion.

Linus2nd

It’s ok, Linus, no harm. Mine was just a clarification that I considered pertinent. Continuing the discussion in that direction would have been an unnecessary digression in the middle of another digression. Completely unnecessary.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

Two observations:

(1) You don’t have to do any looking to surmise that your dog is somewhere around. You did that with your intellect. You cat does not ask questions of the type you describe.

(2) The only relevant datum that direct observation gives you is the dog’s absense. To get anything else, you are going to have to put that judgment (that the dog is absent) together with other judgments (the permanence of physical substance, for example, which children learn when they are very young).

There is …] no doubt that the animal is using its estimative power—because it is seeking out the sensual good (food, companionship, or whatever it is). We have an estimative power too (although for us it does more than just give a sensual judgment of benefit or noxiousness), and we have to use it in order to gain intellectual knowledge.

…] There is a profound resemblance between the cat’s estimative power and our own cogitative power. That is where the confusion often arises, I think.

…] There is nothing in the cat’s (or in any other animal’s) behavior that can’t be explained by the use of the imagination, the memory of past estimative judgments (which are sensory, not intellectual, judgments—they are not composition/division), and the use of the estimative power.

I don’t know if my cat asks questions to itself. But if you say it doesn’t, it must be so. I leave it to you. What I do observe is a great similitude between the actions of the cat and the actions of a human being when they are looking for something (please, notice that I am being specific; don’t extrapolate what I am saying here). Even what you say about the absence. If you consider it more slowly, you will notice that direct observation alone cannot give you “the dog’s absence”: A dog has been living for a while in a pet store, and it uses to be within a dog’s house. One day, someone purchases the dog. Then, at another moment, the owner of the store and you (you are visiting the store for the first time) look inside the dog’s house. He “observes” the dog’s absence, while you simply observe the interior of the house. Apparently, my cat too observes my absence when it doesn’t find me in my bed, which is noticeable.

But again, Imelahn, you say that besides our cogitative power, we have an estimative power, and that it is more perfect than the cat’s; still, you are able to observe a profound resemblance between the estimative power of the cat and our cogitative power (how do you do that, Imelahn?); then you affirm that to explain the specific behavior of the cat (which resembles the specific behavior of the human) nothing besides imagination, the memory of past “estimative judgments”, and the use of their estimative power is needed. However, you say that the human being would need to use his cogitative power to perform similar activities. According to you, his estimative power, which is more perfect than the cat’s, is not enough!; so he needs his cogitative power. I don’t know who can accept this, but I don’t.

 

[lmelahn]

In De Rerum Natura, Titus Lucretius Carus says that atoms are not perceived by our senses, but we can “see” them with our reason.

Before we get too much further along, I can’t remember if I mentioned this already, but from the perspective of Aquinas (which I am fundamentally in agreement with), discursive reason—the act that composes judgments into new judgments—is different from the act of composing-or-dividing (the composition of concepts into judgments).

Hence, the “intellect” is the faculty that makes concepts and judgments; but our ability to reason is distinct, and it is properly called ratiocinium.

What complicates matters is that authors frequently use “reason” to mean intellection in general (whether judgment or reasoning). In this case, Lucretius almost certainly means “reason” in this more general sense.

“Democritus, …] It is strange too, that it never occurred to him to ask why, if his theory be true, the eye alone sees, while none of the other things in which images are reflected do so.”

This is not a work of Aristotle that I have read. However, I can tell you that a common critique that Aristotle levels at his predecessors is that they simply “conjecture” things without providing any basis for their claims. This paragraph seems to go along these same lines.

The ability of reason to “see” something not accessible to our senses is the ability to provide explanations. We conceive in our minds that something has to be in a certain way for us to be able to explain what we perceive with our senses.

Did you ever wonder how we know that every phenomenon has an explanation? (Or, more generally: that every effect has a cause?) That is, of course, true, but based on what?

I agree that “seeing” (a metaphor for “knowing”) that which transcends direct observation requires knowledge of causes. (It also requires the use of reason—specifically in the form of analogy.)

Lucretius would say that he “sees” atoms with his reason; others would refute him saying that “the existence of atoms would imply vacuum between them, but vacuum (a non-being which however is) is repugnant to reason”; so, they would conclude that Lucretius actually does not “see” atoms with his reason.

I should point out that Aristotle, at least, does not deny that there can be “empty space” between things. He merely objects to reifying the “vacuum,” as if there is an imperceptible “ether” between things. But that is for another thread.

Well, on that account, we could just as easily accuse the early chemists of “seeing” phlogiston, or early physicists of “seeing” the luminiferous ether. Those are simply superseded theories. If Lucretius’ theory was incorrect, then his reasoning was incorrect, just like the proponents of phlogiston and ether.

(Democritus’ and the Atomists’ theory was quite a bit different from modern day atomic theory, needless to say. Modern atomic theory is quite compatible with hylomorphism: atoms have matter, form, and accidents, just like other substances, or—as is more common—just like the other constitutive parts of substances.)

He puts them in reality with his “imagination”.

I didn’t follow you here. How can you make something real with your imagination? Or with any cognitive faculty, for that matter?

And they would affirm also that what they say is actually the true product of a rational vision. So, the claim is that reason does “see” something (in particular, their reason), but sometimes it makes mistakes (Lucretius’ reason, for example). Why does it make mistakes? Because it does not consider all the aspects of a “situation”, but only some of them. Or it adds elements that are not part of the situation. And how can we make sure that we are considering all the aspects of the “situation”? Or, how can we make sure that we are not adding something that does not belong to the “situation”? Aristotle has said something which at first sight sounds wise to me: The collectivity can do it. However, we still need to ask “which collectivity? Because there are many”. Nevertheless, if a given collectivity can do something for the truth it must be through open, honest and disciplined discussions.

Even without considering every aspect of the situation, true reasoning is possible, provided we don’t overstep its boundaries. What is certain is certain; what is only conjectural must remain conjectural. The Atomists’ mistake was, among other things, to tout a highly conjectural as if it were established truth.

Continued…

 

[lmelahn]

Coming back to the concept of “substance”, if a substance is said to be something that underlies accidents, I say it might belong to the class of notions that are obtained through reasoning, and which could be erroneous.

Granted, the concept of substance, taken in the abstract like that, is certainly obtained through reason.

If on the other side it is meant to signify certain constancy, certain unification which is first increasing and later decaying over time, I say it is a descriptive term, which hardly anyone could object. If it is said that substance is an “energeia” that introduces certain order where there was a lower level of it, and pushes towards its prolongation and towards its proliferation, I would say it becomes again a conclusion derived from some reasonings, but which is based on such amount of data that appears more credible than the first notion. The second notion could be transformed into a fourth one -a metaphysical notion again- if we start asking ourselves: is anyone of the unified elements the cause of the unification? And looking at the way in which the quasi-unit changes over time, I think we would be forced to say: no, none of the unified elements can be the cause of the unification. It must be something else. Though it is strong in my mind, I realize it is just a supposition, and for the moment I cannot go beyond this.

I think it is substance in the descriptive sense above what “our cognitive power” realizes when we interact with material objects. But the obvious condition is that the set of interactions must be a complex plurality. Otherwise, if the interaction is very limited, the “whole” that we conceive is not the result of an apprehension, but a constructed one, as I have said before.

Just to clarify something: I think you are correct in saying that the primary meaning of “substance” cannot be that of “hypokeimenon.” Aristotle himself says a much in Book 7, when he argues that ousia cannot be the arché of his predecessors, as I mentioned.

In Aristotle’s mind, “ousia” just means the things that are the very easiest for our minds to apprehend: the material things around us. (Eventually, he gets to non-material ousiai, but that isn’t his starting point. Substance are just things. The term “substance” at this stage is not intended to be especially difficult: he is just giving a name to refer to all the things we experience every day: trees, flowers, stones, men, as I have mentioned.

I like your idea of substance as an enérgeia. That is the endpoint of Aristotle’s reasoning process: substance as to ti en einai. Substance is the enérgeia that gives, not just order, but being (to einai) to the phenomena that we encounter.

And I agree that substance as enérgeia is a much better understanding of substance (understood as a co-principle with accident) than “subject.” Even though I don’t think we can entirely do away with it: I mean, substance as co-principle is hidden from view, right?

I would be interested in your thoughts about the following example:

Have you even seen Michelangelo’s David in person? I am sure that you that it is a marble statue of David, portrayed just after having flung the stone at Goliath.

OK. Now the figure that is carved in the marble: what is its status? It is substance or accident? Just an accident: the quality that is called “figure.”

What is the substance, then? The marble. The marble is the “subject” in which the figure can inhere. You see, it is not a crass “underlying,” the way Thales thought water underlay everything. It is simply the fact that an accident (characteristic or property) has to be an accident of something. There could be no figure of David without some “stuff” (marble or bronze or what have you) to work with.