How do we come to know things?

[JuanFlorencio]

In the case of God moving the human will, look at it this way:

Unless God were acting on the will, sustaining its being, the will would be in state A: unable to desire anything or to operate. (I am not sure that Aquinas intends “state A” as different from the very existence of the will. In fact, I suspect that he does not.)

God “moves”*the will in such a way that it can now desire the things that will make the person happy. (However, in reality, this “movement” is taken in a very broad sense; it is not necessarily posterior in time to the existence of the will, or for that matter, to the existence of the person himself.) That state of being capable of desiring and operating is state B.

So the “movement” from state A to state B is irresistible. However state B is one that gives the will freedom of action: freedom to act or not to act, and also—with the help of the intellect—the freedom to choose “this” action or “that” one.

We are indeed real authors of our own actions. Just not the only authors. God is also their author. God gives us a capacity, and we decide whether to exercise it or not.

(This is, by the way, the only way I can think of to reconcile God’s universality in causation, His omnipotence, and our freedom.)

Oh, don’t stop! We have now state B, which is irresistible; but then there is state C (the action). The movement from state B to state C, performed by an all powerful intelligent agent, is equally irresistible. We would not be individuals.

 

[lmelahn]

Oh, don’t stop! We have now state B, which is irresistible; but then there is state C (the action). The movement from state B to state C, performed by an all powerful intelligent agent, is equally irresistible. We would not be individuals.

Going from “state A” to state B is irresistible, not because all of God’s motions are irresistible, but because this motion is the one that actually gives being to the will. (God’s actions are all infallible, but not all of them are irresistible.)

It is like you yourself, the person called JuanFlorencio: God created you without asking for your permission. That “motion” was irresistible. However, now that you exist, you can do things—even things that are contrary to God’s will.

In a similar way—and in reality, it is just looking at the same action from the point of view of the will—God gives being to the will and makes it capable of experiencing appetite. That is the constitution of the will itself, which requires, obviously, no consent on the will’s part. The will, once constituted in this way, is then able to operate freely (i.e., freely move on to state C).

So, state C is the operation, yes. (It would be better to speak of many state C’s: state C[sub]1[/sub], state C[sub]2[/sub], and so on, because there are many alternatives.) But the immediate cause of the operation is state B, the fully constituted will. The will gets to state B whether we like it or not; whether or not it goes on to state C[sub]n[/sub] (or, for that matter, state C[sub]m[/sub] or C[sub]l[/sub]) is entirely up to us.

This is what I was trying to get at before: at every stage here there is freedom: the move from “state A” (which is technically not a state at all, but the absence of any state) to state B is entirely up to God. He can give His creature being, or not. The move from state B to state C[sub]n[/sub] (which presupposes the first move and depends on it) is entirely up to the creature (if it is a spiritual creature).

In the case of the will, God does not, and indeed cannot, force the will to take on a state C[sub]n[/sub] that it does not want.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

Going from “state A” to state B is irresistible, not because all of God’s motions are irresistible, but because this motion is the one that actually gives being to the will. (God’s actions are all infallible, but not all of them are irresistible.)

It is like you yourself, the person called JuanFlorencio: God created you without asking for your permission. That “motion” was irresistible. However, now that you exist, you can do things—even things that are contrary to God’s wil.

In a similar way—and in reality, it is just looking at the same action from the point of view of the will—God gives being to the will and makes it capable of experiencing appetite. That is the constitution of the will itself, which requires, obviously, no consent on the will’s part. The will, once constituted in this way, is then able to operate freely (i.e., freely move on to state C).

So, state C is the operation, yes. (It would be better to speak of many state C’s: state C[sub]1[/sub], state C[sub]2[/sub], and so on, because there are many alternatives.) But the immediate cause of the operation is state B, the fully constituted will. The will gets to state B whether we like it or not; whether or not it goes on to state C[sub]n[/sub] (or, for that matter, state C[sub]m[/sub] or C[sub]l[/sub]) is entirely up to us.

This is what I was trying to get at before: at every stage here there is freedom: the move from “state A” (which is technically not a state at all, but the absence of any state) to state B is entirely up to God. He can give His creature being, or not. The move from state B to state C[sub]n[/sub] (which presupposes the first move and depends on it) is entirely up to the creature (if it is a spiritual creature).

In the case of the will, God does not, and indeed cannot, force the will to take on a state C[sub]n[/sub] that it does not want.

Not all God’s actions are irresistible? I am not “quite” sure about that. I cannot resist the power of the sea; but what is the sea, compared to God?

Anyway, important to me is this approach to the problem: we decide and act by ourselves, and are entirely responsible for our human actions. So, apparently we coincide in that it is not impossible for us to act independently; to be first causes (though not “necessary beings”, but contingent first causes).