I would never use the Holy Scripture to support my philosophical positions nor will ever engage in the discussion of anybody else’s interpretations of it in a philosophical discussion. It is already hard to discuss pieces of discourse concerning objects within our reach, to dedicate efforts to something that is completely out of our reach. Therefore, I will leave aside the consideration of how you use your biblical quotes.
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We can use Holy Scripture and Divine Revelation to gauge whether or not our philosophical thinking is in error or not or whether it is simply the product of our own imagination. Divine Revelation is the highest truth and truths which can be known by the natural light of reason should not be in conflict with it as God is the author of both. Of course, Divine Revelation contains truths that are not accessible by the natural light of reason but it also contains truths that are. Christian philosophy is for the sake of theology, the catholic faith, and divine revelation. Philosophy helps us to gain a deeper understanding of Divine Truth. Since, your profile says you are a catholic, I assumed you accepted the authority of Holy Scripture. In catholic christian philosophy, we do not divorce reason from faith. The error of the rise of modern philosophy was a divorce of reason from faith and so we have a plethora of philosophical systems much of which is a product of imagination. Even Aristotle who was a common sensible man and who was gifted with a brilliant intellect but who did not have divine revelation made some errors. St Thomas corrected the philosophy of Aristotle and Plato where it was not in conformity to the catholic faith and divine revelation.
That is correct, it is not exactly the same. But act always entails perfection in some way. That is its ratio, as Aquinas would call it.Then, if being (understood as esse) and mode of being are not the same to you, the act that you associate to being is not the same as the act that you associate to a mode of being or to the way a being is; though you are using the same word. I really wouldn’t like to hear that “act is said in many ways” if we can avoid it, and I think we can.
Yes, that is correct. The “somehow” is implicit in Aquinas. That is probably because he distinguishes between pure perfections—ones that can be converted with being (esse)—and impure perfections—those that depend on some kind of potency for their very existence.It seems to me that I am seeing the gap that you need to fill when you introduce the notion of the actus essendi. It is a matter of dignity, isn’t it?: “If something is reduced from potency to act it must be reduced by something which is already in act (somehow)”. “Somehow” has to be added; otherwise we would have to end in ridiculous conclusions. For example, if water is frozen as a result of a process, it does not imply that the first mover is eternally frozen, but that it must possess the required perfection, whatever it is. If a star is created it does not imply that the first mover is eternally a perfect star; it just means that He possesses the perfections that are required to give existence to a star, whatever they are. Creatures can be this or that, but not everything; this way or that way, but not every way. So, creatures are limited in their being (in their perfections), and the limiting factor must be something which is-not (who can conceive “being” imposing a limit on itself?). You call such non-being “essence”. God either has no essence, or He is his own essence, so He has no limits. Also, He “properly” creates the act of being of creatures, and He creates it limited (bound to an “essence”). And so on and so for…
Whatever…
OK. I think we are in agreement.As I have said above, there will be an “act” associated to the way a being is at a given moment, and there is an “act” associated to its being.
Although the last statement is true, I think the more important statement is as follows:So, now you have four sentences (I am restating them to gain in homogeneity):
My will is a capacity through which I love.
My will is free.
My will actually exists.
My will has not existed eternally.
Are we making a lot of progress?
Do you mean “my will exists because of something intermediate between God and me” or “because of God” directly?Although the last statement is true, I think the more important statement is as follows:
My will exists because of something else that, itself, actually exists. (The most immediate cause happens to be me; i.e., my nature or essence.)
In other words, clearly, non-existent (hence non-actual) “beings” are not causes.
It will be good to study the principle in another post or in several of them. Meanwhile, please say how can God be the exemplar of impure perfections.Yes, that is correct. The “somehow” is implicit in Aquinas. That is probably because he distinguishes between pure perfections—ones that can be converted with being (esse)—and impure perfections—those that depend on some kind of potency for their very existence.
For example, frozenness (which in my opinion is a privation rather than a perfection) depends on being material. You have to be capable of lacking “heat”*in order to be “frozen,” which implies being a material creature. The same thing with being “hot,” or having volume (what Aquinas calls “quantity”), or any physical property. So no, God is not a perfect star, nor is He a perfect man, nor even a perfect angel.
Rather He has, in His undivided Essence, all the pure perfections of all these things, to an infinite degree. Moreover, He is the cause and exemplar even of all the impure perfections, even though—possessing no potency whatsoever—he does not have those impure perfections as such.
It’s probably best not to go too far into this, but clearly if there had been consensus that it was so evil then far fewer Christians would have owned and traded slaves, and there would have been far less tolerance of slave owners. Yet consensus was not reached until the industrial revolution provided more efficient means of production, which led to a shift in morals.Not exactly. I think a lot of people did not understand—some, perhaps through pardonable ignorance, others through willful ignorance—how evil slavery was (and is). That was probably true for the general public.
Nevertheless, I think it is impossible that a slaveholder who mistreated his slaves could have been completely ignorant of the evil of slavery. However, it is all too easy for a person to put his personal interests first, and overlook his moral obligations.
*I concede the point regarding Aristotle. He was actually incoherent with his own philosophy on this issue.
Regarding Aquinas, I am not sure he advocated male superiority.
(Yes, I am aware of famous passage in which he affirms that woman is “misbegotten;”* however there can be no doubt, based on other passages, that he affirmed the equality in nature and—which follows immediately—the equality in dignity of the sexes. If you read that passage in context, you will realize that Aquinas is simply adhering to Aristotle’s theory of human generation, which we now know is not accurate. In other words, the “misbegottenness” has to do with the biological processes that—according to Aristotle—differentiate females from males. It is not a commentary on which sex is superior, just on how—according to that archaic biology—they originate.)
Immediately after that passage, in reply 2 Thomas says: “For good order would have been wanting in the human family if some were not governed by others wiser than themselves. So by such a kind of subjection woman is naturally subject to man, because in man the discretion of reason predominates.”. That’s basically the same argument that Aristotle uses for slavery - some are, by their God-given nature, intended to dominant others. The concept of natures is fluid, it can be used to argue that “woman is naturally subject to man” or that all humans have the same nature, or whatever is claimed to be most moral. It was generally accepted that women were not equal to men until, again, economic circumstances led to a change in morality.Even if Aquinas had advocated male superiority, we are now in position to see that such a stance is false. Isn’t that a good thing?
If we believe that no person can subjugate another (since we are all God’s children, or for secularists, that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights), then it follows that no society of persons can subjugate another.Just out of curiosity, based on which system of morality do you condemn colonialism?
But that is not the definition of evident. I gave the OED definition, “clearly seen or understood” meaning clearly seen or clearly understood. I can’t find any dictionary which defines the word otherwise. Paul’s claim is that God’s invisible qualities are clearly understood, i.e. evident, from what has been made.In other words, if God’s attributes are “invisible” then I cannot see them, right? However, by definition, what is “evident” must be visible (at least accessible to the senses).
Though I didn’t say it was difficult to understand, rather that “the Aristotle + Thomas combo is inordinately complicated only because there are so many holes”. Meaning that imho it’s more complicated than it would need to be if it were correct.I am simply pointing out that, just because a subject matter is difficult to understand, doesn’t necessarily mean it is invalid.
*St. Thomas very much considers the Father a Person (along with the Son and the Holy Spirit), like all orthodox Christians. After all, we are persons, precisely because we were created in His image.
But why should God, who is infinitely powerful and infinitely knowing, be confined to a given place? Being confined is a limitation, and God has no limitations.
This may be fine and dandy for philosophers, but if Jesus had expected us to pray to an infinitely powerful and infinitely limitless location-free agency, he would have said so, and he didn’t, he asks us to pray to our father in heaven. We realize God doesn’t have a white beard and isn’t sat on a cloud, we realize the Hubble can’t take photographs of heaven, but nevertheless God is our father and He is in heaven, just like Jesus says.As far as the logicalness of this: obviously, we don’t worship a logical argument. But we do worship the Divine Logos or Word (i.e., the Son). All truth, regardless of its nature, comes from God. It is He who creates* that truth.
St Thomas is clear that the will can reduce itself to potentiality to act in regard to actually willing the means. This the will can do as it is in act or motion prior to actually willing the means. It is of the very nature of the will that it can do this and it we look at the will objectively and what it does and our own actions than this appears reasonable and I think St Thomas is not contradicting any metaphysical principles here as I think he would notice it if he did.It is precisely human freedom which we are talking about, but applying to it the axiom that I mentioned in my previous post.
Either you accede or abstain, you make a decision, and making a decision implies a transit from potency to act. Therefore, according to your axiom, something else moves your will in this specific movement.
I agree, but this paragraph is irrelevant, because we are analyzing actual movements (like your decision to eat pizza, if you want), not possible decisions. And as I said above, any of your decisions implies a reduction from potency to act; therefore, you are moved by an external efficient agent (and that is what St. Thomas clearly says in the first quote of my previous post).
I agree with all this, but this is not what St. Thomas said in the first quote of my previous post. He certainly says that God moves the will according to its nature, but being God the author of every nature, it is equivalent to say simply that He moves the will.
This is a restriction that you need to introduce arbitrarily in the application of your axiom; but it is obviously a violation of it. You had better say from the beginning that it does not apply totally to living beings or at least to rational living beings.
ExcellentSt Thomas is clear that the will can reduce itself to potentiality to act in regard to actually willing the means. This the will can do as it is in act or motion prior to actually willing the means. It is of the very nature of the will that it can do this and it we look at the will objectively and what it does and our own actions than this appears reasonable and I think St Thomas is not contradicting any metaphysical principles here as I think he would notice it if he did.
Metaphysically though, I do not see how we can escape that this very act of choice from the will which is a kind of being and a new event is not dependent on God as the first efficient cause and the first mover. There are many texts from the corpus of St Thomas’ writings that appear to me to hold this.
“But it is clear that as all corporeal movements are reduced to the motion of the heavenly body as to the first corporeal mover, so all movements, both corporeal and spiritual, are reduced to the simple First Mover, Who is God. And hence no matter how perfect a corporeal or spiritual nature is supposed to be, it cannot proceed to its act unless it be moved by God” (Pt. I-II, Q. 109, art. 1).
“Moreover, a more perfect order is found in spiritual things than in corporeal ones. Among bodies however, every motion is caused by the first motion. Therefore, among spiritual things, also, every movement of the will must be caused by the first will, which is the will of God.” (SCG, Book 3, Pt. II, chapter 89, 6).
(De Malo, On Human Choice)
Objection 17: The will sometimes begins to choose when it did not previously choose. Therefore, the disposition in which it previously was either was or was not altered. If not, then the will no more chooses now than it did previously. And so the will not choosing would choose, and this is impossible. And if the will’s disposition is changed, something needs to change it, since everything moved is moved by something else. But a cause of movement imposes necessity on the movable thing, otherwise the cause would be insufficient to move the thing. Therefore, the will is necessarily moved.
Reply to objection 17: The will, when it freshly begins to choose, is transformed from its prior disposition regarding its previous potentiality to choose and its subsequent actual choice. And a cause indeed effects this change as the will moves itself to act and also as an external cause, namely, God moves the will. And yet the will is not moved necessarily, as I have said [answer in body of article and in other replies].
So, it is my opinion if I’m understanding St Thomas correctly, that the very act of choice or any act of the will is dependent on God as the first efficient cause and the first mover which means that the will’s acts are not outside the scope of God’s universal causality. For God is the first efficient cause while the will is a second agent cause. This does not mean that God predetermines our choices for us. The choice is in our power and up to us but to actually will the choice we depend on God as He is the first efficient cause and the first mover. Actually willing a choice is a kind of being and all being, whatever mode or manner of being, is reduced to God as the first Being and the first cause of being. God operates in us according to the nature He created us with and He created our will to be subject to its own free choice.
Now, according to Holy Scripture, it is evident that human actions are not outside of God’s providence and control. St Paul says “for God is at work in you, both to will and to work [accomplish] for his good pleasure.” (2 Philippians 2:13). “Not that we are sufficient of ourselves to claim anything as coming from us; our sufficiency is from God” (2 Corinthians 3:5). " for without me you can do nothing" (John 15:5). “The human heart plans the way, but the LORD directs the steps” (Proverbs 16:9).
Do you think the King of Assyria had the thoughts expressed in the previous verses by himself? If yes, then you accept that he could do something by himself; if not, then you imagine he was going to be unjustly punished due to some thoughts of which he was not responsible.
Concerning evil, we were not discussing if there is an evil nature or not. We were discussing if in relation to our human actions we are first movers or not. You mentioned that God is the efficient cause of “our” good actions, but in the case of our bad actions you said in one of your previous posts: “Our bad actions or sins are caused by us not really as a result of our efficiency but rather as a result of our deficiency.” It seems that no christian philosopher has dared to invent an ingenious argument to “demonstrate” that there are no evil actions. But you think that God is the efficient cause of whatever positive is in a sin; and you leave to our deficiency the power of producing the evil part (which according to you, does not exist at all), which in your understanding means that we are really cause of nothing.
I was not taking a position yet. I was simply observing that whatever it is that makes the will exist (and in that sense be “actual”), itself must exist.Do you mean “my will exists because of something intermediate between God and me” or “because of God” directly?
What I think this proves is that mere knowledge of what is right and wrong is insufficient. We need people with the courage to actually do what is right.…] if there had been consensus that it was so evil then far fewer Christians would have owned and traded slaves, and there would have been far less tolerance of slave owners. …]
On other hand, right above (the answer to the first objection) Aquinas says quite clearly:…]That’s basically the same argument that Aristotle uses for slavery - some are, by their God-given nature, intended to dominant others. The concept of natures is fluid, …].
We see that equality of dignity is not incompatible with some exercise of authority. What we cannot do is subject another person in order to exploit that person. There is a big difference between governing a country, say, and commanding a slave.If we believe that no person can subjugate another (since we are all God’s children, or for secularists, that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights), then it follows that no society of persons can subjugate another.
But that is not the definition of evident. I gave the OED definition, “clearly seen or understood” meaning clearly seen or clearly understood. …]
Quibbling over the meaning of “evidence” aside, there is no way that a thing is “clearly understood” if our ideas about it are false. If people 2000 years ago thought that the earth was at the center of concentric spheres, then they were not seeing things clearly.In that same sense of clearly understood, it was once evident to many that God is in his heaven, and heaven is beyond the stars, and God placed the earth in the center of creation because we are his children.
It can seem that way at first. I don’t think it is terribly complicated, exactly; it just takes some getting used to nowadays.Though I didn’t say it was difficult to understand, rather that “the Aristotle + Thomas combo is inordinately complicated only because there are so many holes”. Meaning that imho it’s more complicated than it would need to be if it were correct.
I think that is one reason that God became incarnate, because it was too difficult for us to know and love God without having a “concrete” reference point, so to speak. Why did God forbid graven images in the Old Testament? Because the People of Israel could easily have begun to think that the images themselves were the “gods” (like the Golden Calf).This may be fine and dandy for philosophers, but if Jesus had expected us to pray to an infinitely powerful and infinitely limitless location-free agency, he would have said so, and he didn’t, he asks us to pray to our father in heaven…]
I think it is best to let Aquinas himself explain:It will be good to study the principle in another post or in several of them. Meanwhile, please say how can God be the exemplar of impure perfections.
I think it is best to let Aquinas himself explain:
But an agent does not act on account of the form ****, except in so far as the likeness of the form is in the agent, as may happen in two ways.
For in some agents the form of the thing to be made pre-exists [Note: in Aquinas “exsistere” does not mean “to be,” but rather “to emerge” or (as in this case) “to be present.”] according to its natural being, as in those that act by their nature; as a man generates a man, or fire generates fire.
Whereas in other agents (the form of the thing to be made pre-exists) according as it is intelligible, as in those that act by the intellect; and thus the likeness of a house pre-exists in the mind of the builder. And this may be called the idea of the house, since the builder intends to build his house like to the form conceived in his mind. As then the world was not made by chance, but by God acting by His intellect, as will appear later (Question 46, Article 1), there must exist in the divine mind a form to the likeness of which the world was made. And in this the notion of an idea consists (I, q. 15, a. 1).
This is the article regarding the Divine Ideas (which shows that Aquinas is not at all a slavish interpreter of Aristotle).
Aquinas, as is his wont, makes an analogy with creaturely agents. Some things produce their effects because they possess a perfection really (like when hot coals set things on fire). However, more perfect creatures, like men, can produce effects because they have conceived them in their minds, like when an architect builds (or designs) a house.
God’s causality is of the second kind. He does not have to possess the heat of the fire in order to create fire. He has the idea of fire, and thus creates fire.
There is an important clarification to be made, however: although we can truly say there are many Divine Ideas, we can only say so because there are many creatures.
Creatures derive their perfections—their “act”—by participation in God’s perfection. They participate, naturally, in differing degrees, which explains the diversity of creatures. As Aquinas explains:
Inasmuch as He knows His own essence perfectly, He knows it according to every mode in which it can be known. Now it can be known not only as it is in itself, but as it can be participated in by creatures according to some degree of likeness. But every creature has its own proper species, according to which it participates in some degree in likeness to the divine essence. So far, therefore, as God knows His essence as capable of such imitation by any creature, He knows it as the particular type and idea of that creature; and in like manner as regards other creatures. So it is clear that God understands many particular types of things and these are many ideas (I, q. 15, a. 2, c).
Said in simpler terms, every perfection found in any creature (even the impure perfections) are a participation in the infinite perfection of God. Hence, when God endows His creatures with such perfections, His own Essence is the Exemplar. That Essence, considered inasmuch as it is communicated to His creature, is called a “Divine Idea.”
Thank you, Imelahn. I have read the two articles. St. Thomas realized that his exposition would receive an objection concerning God’s simplicity and he offers a response; but it is not conclusive: to know something is a mode of being, and to know something in many different ways is a variety of modes of being. God would have a multiplicity of modes of being simultaneously, and so He would not be simple.
Concerning my question, these passages of the Summa do not respond to it. I asked “how can God be the exemplar of impure perfections?”, and St. Thomas just says that creatures participate to some degree in likeness to the Divine Essence; but to say something is not to explain it.
Consider God’s simplicity (not easy, I guess, because we have no experience of simplicity) when you conceive Him (impossible, I know) creating a creature. How can He, in His simplicity, be the exemplar of impure perfections? He is not being imitated by the thing; He is creating it.
What is the statement you would like to add to the ones we have so far?I was not taking a position yet. I was simply observing that whatever it is that makes the will exist (and in that sense be “actual”), itself must exist.
However, now that we broach the subject, there could not be any causes between God and me, because spiritual creatures (those that do not depend on matter for their existence) are never formed out of pre-existent beings. (That is one reason why we need to postulate a type of potency, distinct from matter, that comes to be in the very creation of a spiritual substance; that potency is what Aquinas calls the essentia ut potentia essendi.)
On the other hand, between my will and God, there is a cause that mediates: namely, me.
That opens up the whole question of God’s knowledge. Since that is a huge topic, I would prefer to deal with it on its own at a later moment.Thank you, Imelahn. I have read the two articles. St. Thomas realized that his exposition would receive an objection concerning God’s simplicity and he offers a response; but it is not conclusive: to know something is a mode of being, and to know something in many different ways is a variety of modes of being. God would have a multiplicity of modes of being simultaneously, and so He would not be simple.
Concerning my question, these passages of the Summa do not respond to it. I asked “how can God be the exemplar of impure perfections?”, and St. Thomas just says that creatures participate to some degree in likeness to the Divine Essence; but to say something is not to explain it.
“Imitation” here should be understood in the Platonic sense (mimesis). It does not require a conscious imitation of the exemplar (although conscious imitation is one kind of mimesis).Consider God’s simplicity (not easy, I guess, because we have no experience of simplicity) when you conceive Him (impossible, I know) creating a creature. How can He, in His simplicity, be the exemplar of impure perfections? He is not being imitated by the thing; He is creating it.
What I think this proves is that mere knowledge of what is right and wrong is insufficient. We need people with the courage to actually do what is right.
I’ve put these two points together because in the first you claim that people in the past had knowledge of your morality, and in the second you claim that thereby your morality transcends cultural boundaries. They knew what we think is right but didn’t have our courage, or they were confused, or misled by others.I completely agree with you, of course, that colonialism is wrong. But that goes to show that at least some moral principles transcend cultural boundaries.
*On other hand, right above (the answer to the first objection) Aquinas says quite clearly:
as regards human nature in general, woman is not misbegotten, but is included in nature’s intention as directed to the work of generation.
(He is saying, in essence that, although woman—according to his faulty biological theory—comes about as a result of an “imperfection” in how the seed develops, nevertheless, there is nothing “misbegotten” about the end product.)
As a result, Aquinas clearly holds to the equality of man and woman according to human nature, and the equality in dignity follows immediately from this.
What Aquinas says in the answer to the second objection is not politically correct, but neither does it say that woman is inferior to man. In fact, he takes great pains to distinguish between two kinds of “subjection”:
Subjection is twofold. One is servile, by virtue of which a superior makes use of a subject for his own benefit; and this kind of subjection began after sin. There is another kind of subjection [in modern language, more like a deference to authority] which is called economic or civil, whereby the superior makes use of his subjects for their own benefit and good; and this kind of subjection existed even before sin.
No one seriously thinks that all* kinds of authority are wrong (except perhaps anarchists): children are subject to their parents, students are subject to their teacher, team members are subject to their coach, patients are subject to their doctor, citizens are subject to the state, and so on. In none of these case does the deference to authority imply an intrinsic inferiority of the person who is subject. In all these cases, the subjects are guided by “others wiser than themselves” in some way.
Aquinas is suggesting that there is a similar relationship between husband and wife. I am not saying that we need to be in agreement with Aquinas on this point, but we should also not misunderstand him. His argument is not based on a supposed intrinsic inferiority of woman, but based on the different way men and women think. He says, as you point out:
So by such a kind of subjection woman is naturally subject to man, because in man the discretion of reason (discretio rationis) predominates.
What Aquinas is getting at is that, according to him, men have a greater tendency to make use of their ratiocinium, their ability to go from known knowledge to unknown knowledge. That is what discretio rationis is referring to, not to the person’s intellect as such. (Hence—following this line of reasoning—women would be better at intuitive, relational kinds of knowledge.)
That was a laudable attempt to rescue Thomas, but in the first quote which you made he says " woman is not misbegotten, but is included in nature’s intention as directed to the work of generation". This follows his I answer that section, in which he argues that “It was necessary for woman to be made, as the Scripture says, as a “helper” to man; not, indeed, as a helpmate in other works, as some say, since man can be more efficiently helped by another man in other works; but as a helper in the work of generation”. Woman exists only to provide a passive womb in which to grow the man’s active seed, that’s the sole reason she is “included in nature’s intention”. But “there is a vital operation nobler than generation”, which is why “the male sex is not found in continual union with the female”, and that “nobler vital action” is “intellectual operation”. It’s hard to see how Thomas could make woman any more inferior.I am not going to take a firm position in favor of Aquinas’ affirmation here—Aquinas is not immune from the prejudices of his time—but that is what he is arguing: not that woman is inferior; rather, that man’s ability to use discursive reason makes him a more apt head of the family.