How do we come to know things?

[Richca]

When the final end is not a simple straight easy movement, but requires other things to be in place first, other things that have no desirability of their own, then the intellect poses a picture of the difficult path, that is not good, other than it gets you to a place where you can have your final end. There is nothing to love on the difficult path, but the will tends to what it does not love anyway, willing the difficult path, because it loves the end envisioned. Love for the end (which is in the will) moves the will to love the unlovable difficult path (for its usefulness) and take it. So the will is moving the will. The will, moved by the desirable final end, is moving the will unmoved by an undesirable task to actualize the undesirable task.

Thanks for this (name removed by moderator)ut John. The will can will and desire many different things but love is essentially what it what created by God for. St Therese of Lisieux said that God has no need of our works but only wants our love. I think she may have got this inspiration from St John of the Cross who said in the Living Flame of Love that pure love for God is more beneficial for souls and the Church than all other works. The Holy Spirit of course is the personified Love in the Trinity.

 

[lmelahn]

No, I don’t think efficient causality implies determinism. I am sure you know that determinism is something else. However, given an acting efficient cause, it’s effect is determined by it.

I do think that your “act-potency-act” axiom applied to the actions of rational beings is inconsistent with your belief in our freedom. As I have said, the First Mover would determine the whole “cascade”.

Are we in agreement that the will is a capacity or power, through which a man loves? (I.e., freely chooses—or not—certain goods presented to him?)

Since I am simply trying to demonstrate the compatibility of the “act-from-act” principle with the will’s freedom (not yet trying to demonstrate that the will is in fact free), let us assume for the moment that the will really is free.

In that case, that power, the will, is obviously in potency with respect to something, because it can operate, or refrain from operating. I think we are in agreement up to here (please speak up if that is not the case).

However, in a different respect, the will is also a kind of act. Here, I don’t mean its operation (the things that it does), but the fact that it is. Once a human being exists, the will exists, even before it actually does anything (e.g., in a human embryo or infant before he has the capacity to make decisions). Are we on the same page here?

If we are good up to here, my question is: why does the will exist? How did it get there?

 

[inocente]

inocente;13015974:

Most people probably believe the culture in which they are raised is the best possible culture, and you were raised in a scientific culture. But perhaps that’s coincidence.

The West didn’t decide slavery was bad until the Industrial Revolution did away with the need for slaves. Perhaps that’s also a coincidence.

Women only started to get treated equally when they were required to keep factories going while the men went off to war. Perhaps that’s another coincidence.

You’ll see where I’m going with this. It’s very difficult to see other moralities and ways of life objectively.

I agree with you, insofar as there are certain fortuitous circumstances that permitted us to emancipate the slaves and see more clearly the need for equality under the law (e.g., with women’s rights and so on).

But I guess I am a little surprised: don’t you think that abolishing slavery was a good thing? That—regardless of how we got there—it was a step forward for mankind?

By “certain fortuitous circumstances that permitted us to emancipate the slaves”, it sounds as if you think Westerners always believed slavery is immoral but nevertheless were forced by circumstances to own slaves until the industrial revolution permitted otherwise, and they always believed in equal rights but it slipped their minds until the mechanized slaughter of WWI and WWII jogged their memory.

Even though Aristotle for one argued in favor of slavery and Thomas for one in favor of male superiority.

Oh well. Colonialists believed that all other cultures in the history of the world were mere failed experiments on the road towards their scientific enlightened modernity, thus proving that for some, it’s not just very difficult but impossible to see other moralities and ways of life objectively.

Well, in the more technical, epistemological sense that I am using, God’s “invisibile qualities,” by definition, cannot be evident. Something “evident” needs to be visible (in the broad sense, not necessarily visible through the eyes) directly, It is evident that Mount Etna (I live in Italy) spews forth lava. Where the lava comes from is not evident. You can’t go down to see the opening (and come back alive).

Paul: God’s invisible qualities … have been clearly seen, being understood from what has been made, so that people are without excuse.

lmelahn: Well, in the more technical, epistemological sense that I am using, God’s “invisibile qualities,” by definition, cannot be evident.

Paul: :ehh:

Well, think about this: how may courses does it take to learn quantum mechanics? Is that because the science is full of holes?

Making that comparison is problematic since unlike QM, most of what has been discussed on this thread cannot be tested against empirical evidence.

Note that I never said that God is an abstraction, just that He is not like men. He is a good deal better than even the best men. In fact, there couldn’t be anyone more “concrete” than God.

You never said it in so many words, but Jesus told us to pray to our Father in heaven, and for most people he is very definitely a person, and a person lives in a place, and heaven is that place. Thomists may say that’s not very logical but Jesus didn’t tell us to pray to a logical argument.

*I don’t begin with the presupposition that man is a rational animal. I begin with the observation that man is capable of running many laps, intellectually speaking, around even the most intelligent non-human primate.

(Although the article you quoted was interesting, it does not show that non-human primates are capable of telling right from wrong, just that they can remember what hurts or helps them.)*

I think we disagree on a number of points, and are not aided by the glacial pace of corresponding by exchange of posts .

 

[utunumsint]

inocente!!! I can’t believe you’ve abandoned Isaiah in favour of Paul in so short a time. :nope: I am shocked.

God Bless,
Ut

 

[JuanFlorencio]

It is written “LORD, you will decree peace for us,
for you have accomplished all we have done.” (Isaiah 26:12).

 

[JuanFlorencio]

Are we in agreement that the will is a capacity or power, through which a man loves? (I.e., freely chooses—or not—certain goods presented to him?)

Of course!

Since I am simply trying to demonstrate the compatibility of the “act-from-act” principle with the will’s freedom (not yet trying to demonstrate that the will is in fact free), let us assume for the moment that the will really is free.

Ok, good. I cannot wait to see your demonstration. So, we have now two statements, as follows:

The will is a capacity through which a man loves
The will is free

In that case, that power, the will, is obviously in potency with respect to something, because it can operate, or refrain from operating. I think we are in agreement up to here (please speak up if that is not the case).

I agree. Do you think this implies an additional statement to the two we already have?

However, in a different respect, the will is also a kind of act. Here, I don’t mean its operation (the things that it does), but the fact that it is. Once a human being exists, the will exists, even before it actually does anything (e.g., in a human embryo or infant before he has the capacity to make decisions). Are we on the same page here?

No. That is too different. If something is an act just because it is, it would mean that it would be a potency when it is not. I cannot conceive that.

If we are good up to here, my question is: why does the will exist? How did it get there?

We are not good up to here. Perhaps something is missing?

 

[inocente]

inocente!!! I can’t believe you’ve abandoned Isaiah in favour of Paul in so short a time. :nope: I am shocked.

God Bless,
Ut

But sorry, nope. Just that I think Paul wouldn’t see that as a successful rebuttal.

 

[lmelahn]

By “certain fortuitous circumstances that permitted us to emancipate the slaves”, it sounds as if you think Westerners always believed slavery is immoral but nevertheless were forced by circumstances to own slaves until the industrial revolution permitted otherwise, and they always believed in equal rights but it slipped their minds until the mechanized slaughter of WWI and WWII jogged their memory.

Not exactly. I think a lot of people did not understand—some, perhaps through pardonable ignorance, others through willful ignorance—how evil slavery was (and is). That was probably true for the general public.

Nevertheless, I think it is impossible that a slaveholder who mistreated his slaves could have been completely ignorant of the evil of slavery. However, it is all too easy for a person to put his personal interests first, and overlook his moral obligations.

Even though Aristotle for one argued in favor of slavery and Thomas for one in favor of male superiority.

I concede the point regarding Aristotle. He was actually incoherent with his own philosophy on this issue.

Regarding Aquinas, I am not sure he advocated male superiority.

(Yes, I am aware of famous passage in which he affirms that woman is “misbegotten;” however there can be no doubt, based on other passages, that he affirmed the equality in nature and—which follows immediately—the equality in dignity of the sexes. If you read that passage in context, you will realize that Aquinas is simply adhering to Aristotle’s theory of human generation, which we now know is not accurate. In other words, the “misbegottenness” has to do with the biological processes that—according to Aristotle—differentiate females from males. It is not a commentary on which sex is superior, just on how—according to that archaic biology—they originate.)

Even if Aquinas had advocated male superiority, we are now in position to see that such a stance is false. Isn’t that a good thing?

Oh well. Colonialists believed that all other cultures in the history of the world were mere failed experiments on the road towards their scientific enlightened modernity, thus proving that for some, it’s not just very difficult but impossible to see other moralities and ways of life objectively.

Just out of curiosity, based on which system of morality do you condemn colonialism?

Paul: God’s invisible qualities … have been clearly seen, being understood from what has been made, so that people are without excuse.

lmelahn: Well, in the more technical, epistemological sense that I am using, God’s “invisibile qualities,” by definition, cannot be evident.

Paul: :ehh:

In other words, if God’s attributes are “invisible” then I cannot see them, right? However, by definition, what is “evident” must be visible (at least accessible to the senses).

So, when Paul says that God’s attributes have been “clearly seen,” he is not affirming that they are accessible to the senses (which would prevent them from being “invisible”); hence, those attributes are not, in fact, evident. In reality, in order to know God’s attributes, man has to do either a very difficult philosophical argumentation, or else have faith.

Paul is well aware that the pagans, through their philosophy (including that of the much maligned Aristotle ), had come to the knowledge of the existence of God, and that this knowledge of God came from studying the effects of His power in creation. That is what he is referring to when he says that God’s attributes (or “qualities,” in the translation you used) were “clearly seen.”

Making that comparison is problematic since unlike QM, most of what has been discussed on this thread cannot be tested against empirical evidence.

I am simply pointing out that, just because a subject matter is difficult to understand, doesn’t necessarily mean it is invalid.

You never said it in so many words, but Jesus told us to pray to our Father in heaven, and for most people he is very definitely a person, and a person lives in a place, and heaven is that place. Thomists may say that’s not very logical but Jesus didn’t tell us to pray to a logical argument.

St. Thomas very much considers the Father a Person (along with the Son and the Holy Spirit), like all orthodox Christians. After all, we are persons, precisely because we were created in His image.

But why should God, who is infinitely powerful and infinitely knowing, be confined to a given place? Being confined is a limitation, and God has no limitations.

As far as the logicalness of this: obviously, we don’t worship a logical argument. But we do worship the Divine Logos or Word (i.e., the Son). All truth, regardless of its nature, comes from God. It is He who creates that truth.

I think we disagree on a number of points, and are not aided by the glacial pace of corresponding by exchange of posts .

If there weren’t disagreement, these forums wouldn’t be any fun.

 

[lmelahn]

No. That is too different. If something is an act just because it is, it would mean that it would be a potency when it is not. I cannot conceive that.

OK, then this is an issue that we need to discuss, then, because it shows that we have different interpretations of what “act” is.

Since I am trying to defend St. Thomas’ principle, here, we need to understand what St. Thomas meant by act, and for him act is actually convertible with being: however, with “being” understood as esse, as existence itself; not “being” understood as ens (as something that exists).

I will attempt to illustrate here.

Right now, I am at my desk typing. It is rather hot out right now (mid afternoon), and so later on I might go to our swimming pool for a swim. My being in the swimming pool is a realistic possibility for me; I have the means to go into the swimming pool. Nevertheless, right now, I am not in the swimming pool. (That would be bad for my laptop .)

Translated into terms of act and potency I would say: right now, I am actually at my desk (or at my desk “in act”); however, I am only potentially in the pool (or in the pool “in potency.”)

(On the other hand, although it is not logically contradictory or anything, being in Paris is not a realistic possibility for me. I can’t afford the plane ticket, and I don’t think my superiors would give my permission to go there in any case, since I don’t have any reason to do so. Hence, I am not “potentially” in Paris right now.)

That example simply serves to show that, act is actually identifiable with being (esse).

To be “in act” is simply “to be a certain way.” Unless I really am at my desk, I am not actually at my desk, and vice versa.

I mention this because, for Aquinas, “act” is not limited to operation, even though operation is the most easily recognizable act. This explains why Aquinas calls the root esse that gives being to all aspects of a thing the actus essendi.

So, recalling what I said earlier about the logical process used to resolve the different compositions in creatures, the res significata that is proper to all act—from operation, to accidental form, to substantial form, to actus essendi—is precisely that of being (esse). How the act composes with its proper potency differs, but all act gives being to the potency it is composed with.

So, regarding your objection:

If something is an act just because it is, it would mean that it would be a potency when it is not. I cannot conceive that.

There is, perhaps, an unfortunate duality in Aristotle and Aquinas’ language as regards potency. We must distinguish active potency from passive potency.

I have tried to be careful in our discussions always to call an “active” potency a power. A “power” is an active capacity to do something, an active capacity for operation (like our intellects and wills).

All of the potencies that I have been discussing here—the antagonists of the various kinds of act—are passive potencies, potencies that receive act in some way. These (passive) potencies have included the substance, which is perfected by its accidents; the prime matter, which is perfected by its substantial form; and the essence (considered as a potency), which is perfected by its actus essendi.

Now, to answer your objection more directly: a thing is in act precisely because it is (or because it is the way it is). “Potency” (passive potency), as such, is a type of non-being.

So, a thing cannot simply “be a potency,” if you mean by that a “passive”*potency. Take away a thing’s being relatively, and it will stop being the way it is (e.g., when I move over to the pool, I will stop being at my desk). Take away a thing’s being absolutely, and it will stop existing altogether.

However, something can “be a potency” if by that you mean an active potency, or power. And that is the case of the intellect and will.

In conclusion: the will is indeed “in act” inasmuch as it simply exists, because all act, without exception, is founded on being (esse). The will’s being is a different kind of act than its operation, of course, but it is an act all the same.

Does the will “actually” exist? Yes; we say it exists “in act” (est in actu).

Notice that the will does more than just “exist”: it also tends to the good and has various habits (virtues and vices). Those are also “acts” that are not the will’s operation.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

OK, then this is an issue that we need to discuss, then, because it shows that we have different interpretations of what “act” is.

Since I am trying to defend St. Thomas’ principle, here, we need to understand what St. Thomas meant by act, and for him act is actually convertible with being: however, with “being” understood as esse, as existence itself; not “being” understood as ens (as something that exist,

To be “in act” is simply “to be a certain way.” Unless I really am at my desk, I am not actually at my desk, and vice versa.

I mention this because, for Aquinas, “act” is not limited to operation, even though operation is the most easily recognizable act. This explains why Aquinas calls the root esse that gives being to all aspects of a thing the actus essendi.

So, regarding your objection:

Now, to answer your objection more directly: a thing is in act precisely because it is (or because it is the way it is). “Potency” (passive potency), as such, is a type of non-being.

In conclusion: the will is indeed “in act” inasmuch as it simply exists, because all act, without exception, is founded on being (esse). The will’s being is a different kind of act than its operation, of course, but it is an act all the same.

Does the will “actually” exist? Yes; we say it exists “in act” (est in actu).

Notice that the will does more than just “exist”: it also tends to the good and has various habits (virtues and vices). Those are also “acts” that are not the will’s operation.

Is “being” and “mode of being” the same to you?

 

[JuanFlorencio]

OK, then this is an issue that we need to discuss, then, because it shows that we have different interpretations of what “act” is.

Since I am trying to defend St. Thomas’ principle, here, we need to understand what St. Thomas meant by act, and for him act is actually convertible with being: however, with “being” understood as esse, as existence itself; not “being” understood as ens (as something that exists).

I will attempt to illustrate here.

Right now, I am at my desk typing. It is rather hot out right now (mid afternoon), and so later on I might go to our swimming pool for a swim. My being in the swimming pool is a realistic possibility for me; I have the means to go into the swimming pool. Nevertheless, right now, I am not in the swimming pool. (That would be bad for my laptop .)

Translated into terms of act and potency I would say: right now, I am actually at my desk (or at my desk “in act”); however, I am only potentially in the pool (or in the pool “in potency.”)

(On the other hand, although it is not logically contradictory or anything, being in Paris is not a realistic possibility for me. I can’t afford the plane ticket, and I don’t think my superiors would give my permission to go there in any case, since I don’t have any reason to do so. Hence, I am not “potentially” in Paris right now.)

That example simply serves to show that, act is actually identifiable with being (esse).

Your example shows the way in which you want to use the term “potency” and it gives also a brief and incomplete indication of how you want to use the term “act”. Do you want to designate “states” and “processes” with it, or only “states”? For example:

Processes:

You are eating in act (I think it would be enough if you just said “I am eating” instead of “I am eating in act”, but if you feel that you are adding precision…)
You are reading in act.
You are walking in act.
You are listening in act, etcetera.

States:

You are slim in act.
You are healthy in act.
You are clever in act.
You are tired in act, etcetera.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

To be “in act” is simply “to be a certain way.” Unless I really am at my desk, I am not actually at my desk, and vice versa.

I mention this because, for Aquinas, “act” is not limited to operation, even though operation is the most easily recognizable act. This explains why Aquinas calls the root esse that gives being to all aspects of a thing the actus essendi.

Frankly Imelahn, it sometimes surprises me the way you use words like “explain”. I need to remind you that “to say something” is not equivalent to “to explain something”.

If for you to be “in act” is simply “to be in a certain way”; then you are always “in act”, because no matter which way you are, you are always in a certain way. To be always in act is a result of how you define your terms. As you are always in a certain way, the expression "“to be in a certain way” is practically equivalent to “to be”, and magically you will have your desired conversion “to be” = “act”. You don’t need to play games with words: from the beginning you can define “act” as you like. Just be consistent!

So, recalling what I said earlier about the logical process used to resolve the different compositions in creatures, the res significata that is proper to all act—from operation, to accidental form, to substantial form, to actus essendi—is precisely that of being (esse). How the act composes with its proper potency differs, but all act gives being to the potency it is composed with.

Recalling what you said much earlier, I remember all your efforts to convince me that “being” must be said in many ways. Now you would like it to be accepted that “being” is said in only one way.

Please notice how you want to introduce surreptitiously your “actus essendi” hidden among other “compositions”. Do you remember some months ago how you had the chance to show the necessity of this concept, and you simply abandoned the intent?

To me, the best way you have to introduce a new concept in your system is by showing a gap that needs to be filled, and how it does fill it. A description of the uses you give to your terms is not enough.

So, regarding your objection:

There is, perhaps, an unfortunate duality in Aristotle and Aquinas’ language as regards potency. We must distinguish active potency from passive potency.

I have tried to be careful in our discussions always to call an “active” potency a power. A “power” is an active capacity to do something, an active capacity for operation (like our intellects and wills).

All of the potencies that I have been discussing here—the antagonists of the various kinds of act—are passive potencies, potencies that receive act in some way. These (passive) potencies have included the substance, which is perfected by its accidents; the prime matter, which is perfected by its substantial form; and the essence (considered as a potency), which is perfected by its actus essendi.

The essence considered as a passive potency? You are forcing your imagination too much!

Now, to answer your objection more directly: a thing is in act precisely because it is (or because it is the way it is). “Potency” (passive potency), as such, is a type of non-being.

As you have used too many words to arrive at this point, some people might think that you have provided a satisfactory explanation; but your assertion “a thing is in act precisely because it is (or because it is the way it is)” is completely gratuitous so far.

So, a thing cannot simply “be a potency,” if you mean by that a “passive”*potency. Take away a thing’s being relatively, and it will stop being the way it is (e.g., when I move over to the pool, I will stop being at my desk). Take away a thing’s being absolutely, and it will stop existing altogether.

However, something can “be a potency” if by that you mean an active potency, or power. And that is the case of the intellect and will.

In conclusion: the will is indeed “in act” inasmuch as it simply exists, because all act, without exception, is founded on being (esse). The will’s being is a different kind of act than its operation, of course, but it is an act all the same.

Does the will “actually” exist? Yes; we say it exists “in act” (est in actu).

Notice that the will does more than just “exist”: it also tends to the good and has various habits (virtues and vices). Those are also “acts” that are not the will’s operation.

Never mind; I have no problem in granting you the following statement:

The will actually exists.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

So, now you have these three statements:

The will is a capacity through which a man loves
The will is free
The will actually exists.

What is next?, I am very curious.

 

[lmelahn]

Is “being” and “mode of being” the same to you?

No.

But being (ens) is found in various modes (modus entis), which correspond to the categories.

Likewise, being (understood as esse) can rightly be said to be measured by the essence that it actuates. In that sense, the essence can rightly be called the modus essendi.

So, no, “being”—in either of its meanings—is not the same as its “mode of being,” but being (at least in creatures) always has a manner or mode.

We also have to be careful what kind of “being” we are referring to. Individual beings entia are divided, so to speak, in various modi entis, which correspond to the categories. So ens is more general than, and transcends, any of its modes. (That is why I was insisting earlier in our conversation that ens is an analogical notion. It is not the same thing to be, tout court, as, say, to be red.)

On the other hand, being understood as a perfection (esse) is always measured by the essence that it actuates; hence the essence is the “measure of its being” (modus essendi)

(In Aquinas’ Latin, modus can mean “measure” as well as “manner.”)

 

[lmelahn]

Your example shows the way in which you want to use the term “potency” and it gives also a brief and incomplete indication of how you want to use the term “act”. Do you want to designate “states” and “processes” with it, or only “states”? For example:

Processes:

You are eating in act (I think it would be enough if you just said “I am eating” instead of “I am eating in act”, but if you feel that you are adding precision…)
You are reading in act.
You are walking in act.
You are listening in act, etcetera.

States:

You are slim in act.
You are healthy in act.
You are clever in act.
You are tired in act, etcetera.

All of the above. If they exist now, they are also in act, and vice versa.

I never said it adds precision. In fact, I think it is redundant. But we are trying to understand what “act” is in St. Thomas, so I am giving examples of things that he would consider to be “in act.”

 

[lmelahn]

Frankly Imelahn, it sometimes surprises me the way you use words like “explain”. I need to remind you that “to say something” is not equivalent to “to explain something”.

If for you to be “in act” is simply “to be in a certain way”; then you are always “in act”, because no matter which way you are, you are always in a certain way. To be always in act is a result of how you define your terms. As you are always in a certain way, the expression "“to be in a certain way” is practically equivalent to “to be”, and magically you will have your desired conversion “to be” = “act”. You don’t need to play games with words: from the beginning you can define “act” as you like. Just be consistent!

Recalling what you said much earlier, I remember all your efforts to convince me that “being” must be said in many ways. Now you would like it to be accepted that “being” is said in only one way.

Please notice how you want to introduce surreptitiously your “actus essendi” hidden among other “compositions”. Do you remember some months ago how you had the chance to show the necessity of this concept, and you simply abandoned the intent?

To me, the best way you have to introduce a new concept in your system is by showing a gap that needs to be filled, and how it does fill it. A description of the uses you give to your terms is not enough.

I said several times that the composition is necessary to explain both the act of creation and the diversity of species.

Without recourse to the being/essence composition, you get stuck—like Aristotle—with generation and corruption, and so you would have to postulate an eternal matter.

Likewise, it is impossible to explain how it is possible to have beings with differing levels of nobility (i.e., beings that are members of different species). Matter-and-form explains how different individuals can be members of the same species, but not how different species can be differentiated from each other.

The essence considered as a passive potency? You are forcing your imagination too much!

That is correct: the essence functions as a passive potency, and the actus essendi is what actuates it. However, I insisted that the essence is co-created together with the actus essendi: unlike some other act-and-potency compounds, there is no pre-existing potential principle that is reduced from potency to act.

Technically the essence is not reduced from potency to act. It simply is actual, thanks to the actus essendi.

As you have used too many words to arrive at this point, some people might think that you have provided a satisfactory explanation; but your assertion “a thing is in act precisely because it is (or because it is the way it is)” is completely gratuitous so far.

Never mind; I have no problem in granting you the following statement:

The will actually exists.

In reality, the take-home point is that “act” is convertible with “being.” In whatever way something is—whether simply (like when I say “I am”), or in a certain way (e.g., I am at my computer)—in that respect it is in act. That is all.

It is in this light that we need to interpret the maxim

[D]e potentia autem non potest aliquid reduci in actum, nisi per aliquod ens in actu.

In other words, “if I have some kind of perfection, of any kind, I must have got it from something that that actually possesses that perfection in some way.”

Or, even more simply, “Something that doesn’t exist can’t change me.”

 

[lmelahn]

So, now you have these three statements:

The will is a capacity through which a man loves
The will is free
The will actually exists.

What is next?, I am very curious.

If the will actually exists, it must have been caused by something that actually exists (which is how we should understand our maxim De potentia non potest aliquid reduci in actum, nisi per aliquod ens in actu). And we could continue up this chain of causes until we reach the First Cause, i.e., God.

Note that as we run from effect to cause like this, in no way are we implying that the cause is obligated to produce its effect, only that it has, in fact, produced these particular effects.

Think of an electric arc or lightning: I can see that it has in fact produced the particular dendritic pattern that it has left or that I observed, but it could have taken any number of other paths.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

No.

But being (ens) is found in various modes (modus entis), which correspond to the categories.

Likewise, being (understood as esse) can rightly be said to be measured by the essence that it actuates. In that sense, the essence can rightly be called the modus essendi.

So, no, “being”—in either of its meanings—is not the same as its “mode of being,” but being (at least in creatures) always has a manner or mode.

We also have to be careful what kind of “being” we are referring to. Individual beings entia are divided, so to speak, in various modi entis, which correspond to the categories. So ens is more general than, and transcends, any of its modes. (That is why I was insisting earlier in our conversation that ens is an analogical notion. It is not the same thing to be, tout court, as, say, to be red.)

On the other hand, being understood as a perfection (esse) is always measured by the essence that it actuates; hence the essence is the “measure of its being” (modus essendi)

(In Aquinas’ Latin, modus can mean “measure” as well as “manner.”)

Then, if being (understood as esse) and mode of being are not the same to you, the act that you associate to being is not the same as the act that you associate to a mode of being or to the way a being is; though you are using the same word. I really wouldn’t like to hear that “act is said in many ways” if we can avoid it, and I think we can.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

In reality, the take-home point is that “act” is convertible with “being.” In whatever way something is—whether simply (like when I say “I am”), or in a certain way (e.g., I am at my computer)—in that respect it is in act. That is all.

It is in this light that we need to interpret the maxim

[D]e potentia autem non potest aliquid reduci in actum, nisi per aliquod ens in actu.

In other words, “if I have some kind of perfection, of any kind, I must have got it from something that that actually possesses that perfection in some way.”

Or, even more simply, “Something that doesn’t exist can’t change me.”

It seems to me that I am seeing the gap that you need to fill when you introduce the notion of the actus essendi. It is a matter of dignity, isn’t it?: “If something is reduced from potency to act it must be reduced by something which is already in act (somehow)”. “Somehow” has to be added; otherwise we would have to end in ridiculous conclusions. For example, if water is frozen as a result of a process, it does not imply that the first mover is eternally frozen, but that it must possess the required perfection, whatever it is. If a star is created it does not imply that the first mover is eternally a perfect star; it just means that He possesses the perfections that are required to give existence to a star, whatever they are. Creatures can be this or that, but not everything; this way or that way, but not every way. So, creatures are limited in their being (in their perfections), and the limiting factor must be something which is-not (who can conceive “being” imposing a limit on itself?). You call such non-being “essence”. God either has no essence, or He is his own essence, so He has no limits. Also, He “properly” creates the act of being of creatures, and He creates it limited (bound to an “essence”). And so on and so for…

Whatever…

As I have said above, there will be an “act” associated to the way a being is at a given moment, and there is an “act” associated to its being.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

If the will actually exists, it must have been caused by something that actually exists (which is how we should understand our maxim De potentia non potest aliquid reduci in actum, nisi per aliquod ens in actu). And we could continue up this chain of causes until we reach the First Cause, i.e., God.

No. You would need more. You certainly could say: " if the will actually exists, it must have been caused by something that once existed". And, please, remember that the links of the chain of causes that lead us to a first cause must be simultaneous.

Note that as we run from effect to cause like this, in no way are we implying that the cause is obligated to produce its effect, only that it has, in fact, produced these particular effects.

Think of an electric arc or lightning: I can see that it has in fact produced the particular dendritic pattern that it has left or that I observed, but it could have taken any number of other paths.

It is good that you have it present (may be you need to repeat it to yourself for practice), even though I have never said something different and have asked you to pay attention to what I am really saying.

Nevertheless, I am granting you another sentence:

My will has not existed eternally.