How do we come to know things?

[lmelahn]

Other cultures would not view scientific rigor as the benchmark. I think you’re judging his culture by your culture’s standards. The writers of Star Trek judged all aliens by the standards of twentieth century America. Star Trek was also a myth.

I am, but I don’t think that is necessarily a problem. Goodness and badness do not depend on cultures; cultures have good qualities and bad qualities, and if we examine them carefully, we can discern which is which. The insistence on scientific rigor—which we owe to the ancient Greeks—is a great contribution to mankind that all cultures can benefit from (and have benefited from).

We began this discussion following your claim that Aristotle’s cosmology is not evident, and agreed, it isn’t evident to 21st century Westerners, but it was part of a worldview for many more centuries than our scientific post-industrial worldview, and it was once evident to many that God is in his heaven, and heaven is beyond the stars, and God placed the earth in the center of creation because we are his children.

But I don’t think we agreed on what “evident” means. Logically, there is a big difference between what can be established by direct observation, and what needs to be demonstrated. That the sun has risen each day since I can remember is evident; how and why that happens is not.

So, I am asserting that the ancient geocentric cosmology wasn’t evident to Aristotle, or his culture, either. His theory had to be demonstrated, and it turns out to have been wrong in some important aspects (mostly things established by better observations and experiments).

Then I think you dramatically underestimate the complexity of your philosophical and theological ideas.

I grant you that they are not easy to understand explicitly and fully. That is one disadvantage of a forum format, since I have to express in a couple of lines what would ordinarily be dealt with in an entire course.

The word “heaven” is mentioned 399 times in the NIV (and “heavens” 190 times), and I doubt you would find it possible to sustain your hypothesis that in all cases the location of heaven is metaphorical, or that there is any progression towards metaphor in later writers.

The use of the term “heaven(s)” in the Bible is complex. It can mean the sky, it can mean what the Hebrews considered the location of the stars and planets, it can mean the immediate presence of God, and it can sometimes mean God Himself (which is an example of what is called “synecdoche”).

We also need to keep in mind that Hebrew is a very “concrete” language; it has a hard time expressing abstractions. When it has to, it often makes recourse to images, analogies, and metaphors. You will see this often if you read the Psalms: they often represent God as the Lord of a pair of opposites (heaven and earth, the sea and the dry land, the night and the day, the east and the west, and so on). That kind of language is intended to show that God is the Lord of both extremities, as well as everything in between.

So, sure, it speaks of God as inhabiting Heavens, but that is more often than not the author’s way of stating God’s radical transcendence. If we take a view that is too anthropomorphic, we would not do justice to God’s majesty and transcendence: “For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways, declares the LORD (Is. 55:8).

I think most people want to believe that a loved one who has passed on is in a good place. The notion that heaven has no location, and therefore the souls of the dearly departed are not somewhere, is alien, impossible.

I never said that Heaven has no location. I just said that God, in His Divine Nature, does not occupy “space” in any meaningful way. Our Beatific Vision will be of a different kind:

“What no eye has seen, nor ear heard,
nor the heart of man imagined,
what God has prepared for those who love him”—

these things God has revealed to us through the Spirit (1 Cor. 2:9-10
0).

But they don’t need it to fill their bellies.

Not the speculative science of logic, no. But they did have to use their intellects in order to hunt, and that includes the use of deductive reason at times. Animals have all kinds of instincts to help them hunt. We human beings don’t, or we have very few: instead, we have to learn everything. (If I had to survive on hunting starting tomorrow, I would probably starve to death.)

We, of course, don’t baptize until a child is mature enough to decide for herself, and we don’t believe anything supernatural happens. Indeed she doesn’t need to be “dunked” if she’s frightened of water or of being the center of attention, it’s just a happy event, signifying joining and being accepted into her church, and being reborn. We could spend a lot of time discussing your last paragraph, let’s just say that those of other religions wouldn’t agree with you.

I was aware of that. I suppose we had better not open another digression on this thread.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

I am 82 years old and…

/QUOTE]

I like so much hearing, from a man of your age, the kind of words you are saying. It’s like making plans for your future life, and developing your own expectations… They will be greatly exceeded without any doubt.

May God bless you.

 

[yppop]

yppop;13011751:

I am 82 years old and…

/QUOTE]

I like so much hearing, from a man of your age, the kind of words you are saying. It’s like making plans for your future life, and developing your own expectations… They will be greatly exceeded without any doubt.

May God bless you.

Thank you Juan for your kind remark.
I am prepared for whatever the future has in store, but not just yet. I am currently taking my 16th Coursera course (free lectures given by first rate professors associated with Universities throughout the world). No pressure, quit or continue, with freedom to extract as much as you want. Keeps my mind active although I’ve discovered that I have gone from a one time “A” student to an indefatigable “C” student. Comprehension is still there; the ability to commit to memory is departing on a slow ship to who knows where. In the meantime as a person suffering from compulsive curiosity I am reveling in the discovery of the magnificence of Neurobiology and Paleontology. It’s like discovering Algebra again for the first time.

I am enjoying the very rational and polite discussion going on in this thread. Even my friends Linus and the Baptist Guy have been well behaved.
Yppop

 

[Linusthe2nd]

I don’t see any problems. The original Hebrew belief was that God lives in heaven, and heaven is beyond the stars, in all directions. Heaven surrounded and cradled Creation, and when the world ends there would still be heaven. There was no knowledge of other galaxies or of the huge distances involved. Instead there was a firmament (רָקִ֖יעַ), a solid dome (Gen 1:6-8) which God beat out, from which the stars, sun and moon were attached or embedded (Gen 1:14). Some liked to think of stars as holes in the dome which let through the light of heaven. God was directly available, just look up and he is always there, shining through.

Let It Shine On Me, Nanci Griffith - youtube.com/watch?v=8MIYBGo9YdQ

You might think it’s illogical, but that doesn’t mean others do. There are more things in heaven and earth, Linus, than are dreamt of in your philosophy.

The Catholic Encyclopedia says most theologians agree that heaven is a place: “At the end of the world, the earth together with the celestial bodies will be gloriously transformed into a part of the dwelling-place of the blessed (Revelation 21). Hence there seems to be no sufficient reason for attributing a metaphorical sense to those numerous utterances of the Bible which suggest a definite dwelling-place of the blessed. Theologians, therefore, generally hold that the heaven of the blessed is a special place with definite limits. Naturally, this place is held to exist, not within the earth, but, in accordance with the expressions of Scripture, without and beyond its limits.”

I’ve not given my opinion. I’m saying that if we let scripture speak to us without imposing our preconceptions then clearly the writers believed heaven is in the sky. And many people still hold that belief, for this simple reason:- Think of someone you love who has passed on. It is very difficult to think of him or her as existing while yet not existing anywhere, without any locus.

Here is my opinion, it is that given in the Catholic Encyclopedia.

" In general, however, theologians deem more appropriate that there should be a special and glorious abode, in which the blessed have their peculiar home and where they usually abide, even though they be free to go about in this world. For the surroundings in the midst of which the blessed have their dwelling must be in accordance with their happy state; and the internal union of charity which joins them in affection must find its outward expression in community of habitation. At the end of the world, the earth together with the celestial bodies will be gloriously transformed into a part of the dwelling-place of the blessed (Revelation 21). Hence there seems to be no sufficient reason for attributing a metaphorical sense to those numerous utterances of the Bible which suggest a definite dwelling-place of the blessed. Theologians, therefore, generally hold that the heaven of the blessed is a special place with definite limits. Naturally, this place is held to exist, not within the earth, but, in accordance with the expressions of Scripture, without and beyond its limits. All further details regarding its locality are quite uncertain. The Church has decided nothing on this subject. "

Linus2nd

 

[JuanFlorencio]

According to the axiom, St Thomas says “It is not in respect of the same that the will moves itself and is moved: wherefore neither is it in act and in potentiality in respect of the same. But forasmuch as it actually wills the end, it reduces itself from potentiality to act, in respect of the means, so as, in a word, to will them actually.”

As Imelahn has mentioned, only something in act can reduce a potentiality to act. In willing the end, the will is in act and it can reduce choice of the means itself to actually willing the means as this is precisely its “job.” The will can do all this in its own order and as a proximate cause. However, I will grant you this, if we consider choice as an act of the will, it is therefore an act and a being, and any act or being is reduced to God as the first cause. This does not mean that God makes our choices for us as this would violate our free will which he created us with but it simply means that without God’s causality creatures cannot produce themselves an act or being. In a word, God can concur with our choices or not concur and if He doesn’t concur with some choice or attraction He sees we are going to make, then that choice is not going to come to fruition. Human actions are not outside the scope of Divine Providence, they fall under it. I believe what I have said here is correct according to the teaching of St Thomas as well as Holy Scripture. St Paul says “it is God who works in you both to will and to work for His good pleasure.”

St. Paul was not an aristotelian philosopher. On the other hand, you surely can find in St. Paul’s writings that some of our actions displease God. Would it mean that some of our actions are the result of God’s efficiency and others (the bad ones) are the manifestation of our own and independent efficiency?

You are playing with two axioms. The first is the one that is under discussion now: “nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality”; the second is this: “We are free”; and you are trying to solve the evident conflict between them by imagining God as a kind of available energy for our will to work, an energy which would make itself unavailable sometimes, depending on the quality of our choices. You are forgetting that a choice itself is a transit from potency to act, and that for this very act you wouldn’t be able to make use of any available energy. You would have to be acted. It is precisely about this fundamental act that I am talking about.

St. Thomas says that “God moves man to act, not only by proposing the appetible to the senses, or by effecting a change in his body, but also by moving the will itself; because every movement either of the will or of nature, proceeds from God as the First Mover”, but the fundamental movement of the will is “choice”, or “decision”, whatever you like. Therefore, it would be right and precise to say that God makes our choices; and it is not acceptable as an argument to say that it must not be so “because otherwise it would violate our free will”. Instead, you would have to reject at least one of your two axioms or impose a limit on the application of the first one.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

JuanFlorencio, I don’t think you have exactly understood the axiom.

That which is in act now (i.e, what which exists now, in one way or another), if it came to be in any way, was brought into being by something that is in act (i.e, something that itself exists).

It does not follow that the thing that caused the coming-to-be (another name for a “reduction of potency to act”) was compelled to do so. Some causes produce their effect necessarily; others do not.

Our wills are in the second category: we can produce our effect, or decide not to.

You are mixing things, Imelahn. Let me quote St. Thomas again:

“God moves man to act, not only by proposing the appetible to the senses, or by effecting a change in his body, but also by moving the will itself; because every movement either of the will or of nature, proceeds from God as the First Mover”.

So, now…

“That which is in act now”: Your will in the state of desiring to eat a very delicious Italian pizza.
“If it came to be”: Your “will desiring to eat pizza” was not in that state since the time you were conceived (I am in doubt now!), therefore it came to be into that state.
“Was brought into being by something that is in act”: In the end, God. I don’t see how you can escape from it: Your choice is not a real choice, according to you axiom.

“It does not follow that the thing that caused the coming-to-be”: that is to say, in the end, God.
“was compelled to do so”: So, God is free.
“Some causes produce their effect necessarily; others do not”: The First Mover would be the only One who would not produce His effects necessarily, but every other causes (secondary causes), would necessarily do so (if you are consequent in the application of your axiom). In particular, God would be compelling you to chose; and the idea that you are acting as a free agent would be another reduction from potency (your state of not thinking this way) to act (your state of thinking this way) finally attributable to God, according to your axiom.

 

[lmelahn]

You are mixing things, Imelahn. Let me quote St. Thomas again:

“God moves man to act, not only by proposing the appetible to the senses, or by effecting a change in his body, but also by moving the will itself; because every movement either of the will or of nature, proceeds from God as the First Mover”.

So, now…

“That which is in act now”: Your will in the state of desiring to eat a very delicious Italian pizza.
“If it came to be”: Your “will desiring to eat pizza” was not in that state since the time you were conceived (I am in doubt now!), therefore it came to be into that state.
“Was brought into being by something that is in act”: In the end, God. I don’t see how you can escape from it: Your choice is not a real choice, according to you axiom.

“It does not follow that the thing that caused the coming-to-be”: that is to say, in the end, God.
“was compelled to do so”: So, God is free.
“Some causes produce their effect necessarily; others do not”: The First Mover would be the only One who would not produce His effects necessarily, but every other causes (secondary causes), would necessarily do so (if you are consequent in the application of your axiom). In particular, God would be compelling you to chose; and the idea that you are acting as a free agent would be another reduction from potency (your state of not thinking this way) to act (your state of thinking this way) finally attributable to God, according to your axiom.

God can make a secondary cause that is so noble that, in the image of God, it is able to decide whether to go into operation or not. That is the case for the angels and for men.

As I said before about Aristotle, if you are going to critique Aquinas, please understand him first.

For Aquinas, causality is always simultaneous with its effect, and in the present. That is important for understanding the Five Ways, but what is more pertinent here is that, for Aquinas, the causality exerted by God flows out like a cascade. (Aquinas is very much a Neoplatonist at heart, although he is scrupulously careful to “baptize” Neoplatonism properly. In particular, for Aquinas, God is perfectly free to create or not, a point about which the ancient Neoplatonists were generally in error.)

As an extremely brief review of Aquinas’ theory of intrinsic causes, Aquinas holds that there is a twofold composition in every substance (a threefold composition in every material substance):

(1) Substance is to be distinguished from its properties and characteristics (accidents).
(2) Prime matter is to be distinguished from substantial form (in material beings only).
(3) Essence is to be distinguished from its esse ut actus or actus essendi, its act of being.

God is by nature Ipsum Esse (Being Itself): being (esse) without composition or limit. Hence, when God creates, his proper effect is being (esse ut actus). Creation consists in endowing a creature with its actus essendi, and at the same time co-creating the essence that receives it. The actus essendi is an active principle of a substance; the essence here is a type of potency.

When we speak of God as First Cause or First Mover, we mean His causality inasmuch as He endows His creatures with their act of being.

The point of all this is that operations flow from the essence, the essence that has been actuated by its actus essendi. The essence receives its actuation from the actus essendi, and in turn the essence actuates its powers (e.g., intellect and will—see I. q. 77, as I mentioned), which in turn produce operation. (Hence, as you can see, it is not unlike a cascade. Each layer communicated being to the next one, which receives it and communicates it in turn.)

That is what Aquinas means when he says that God moves the will as First Mover: that He gave me my act of being (while co-creating my essence), which actuates my essence; the essence actuates my intellect and will; and my will is then free to act.

God endows me with so much power (relative to sub-human creatures), that I (i.e., my essence that is actuated) have full discretion to actuate my will or not. (Unless I am seeing the Beatific Vision, which, unfortunately, I am not seeing right now.)

 

[lmelahn]

So, let’s apply what I posted just earlier to what you say here:

“That which is in act now”: Your will in the state of desiring to eat a very delicious Italian pizza.
“If it came to be”: Your “will desiring to eat pizza” was not in that state since the time you were conceived (I am in doubt now!), therefore it came to be into that state.
“Was brought into being by something that is in act”: In the end, God. I don’t see how you can escape from it: Your choice is not a real choice, according to you axiom.

So, what I am about to explain is bread-and-butter Thomism. There are the proximate, secondary causes to consider, and also the “remote” or First Cause.

What came together here, in order for me to desire the pizza?

(1) The pizza itself, which is a good thing that exerts attraction upon my will. (It exerts attraction upon me by the mediation of my intellect and also of my senses.) This is, therefore, a final cause for me.

(2) My nature, or essence, which seeks its perfection. In particular, my nature happens to be hungry right now, which induces me to seek sources of nourishment. My nature is, therefore, both an efficient and a final cause, in different respects. (Final, because it is my nature that I am trying to perfect; efficient, because it is from the nature that both the will and its operation derive their being.)

(3) My will, which is in act, in the sense that it is ready to command me to take the pizza or not. (This is in the order of efficient causes, because it is my will that will issue the command, or refrain from doing so.)

These are the proximate causes.

God is the First Cause in the order of efficient or agent causes, because He gave me my act of being, which in turn actuates my essence, and ultimately my will and its operation. But he endowed me with a nature sufficiently powerful that it has the discretion to issue a command, or not.

God is also the Ultimate Cause in the order of final causes, because the goodness in the pizza ultimately derives from Him.

“It does not follow that the thing that caused the coming-to-be”: that is to say, in the end, God.

In the end, God, but this does not mean that secondary causes are not real causes, nor that secondary causes are necessarily automata.

“was compelled to do so”: So, God is free.

Indeed.

“Some causes produce their effect necessarily; others do not”: The First Mover would be the only One who would not produce His effects necessarily, but every other causes (secondary causes), would necessarily do so (if you are consequent in the application of your axiom). In particular, God would be compelling you to chose; and the idea that you are acting as a free agent would be another reduction from potency (your state of not thinking this way) to act (your state of thinking this way) finally attributable to God, according to your axiom.

Not at all: God is giving me the power to choose.

Put more Neoplatonically, we are free precisely because we participate in God’s freedom. The sub-human creatures do not.

I am in doubt now!

Believe it or not, I went through a phase when I was very young in which I did not like pizza. It did not last long.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

God can make a secondary cause that is so noble that, in the image of God, it is able to decide whether to go into operation or not. That is the case for the angels and for men.

I am not questioning that! I am sorry, I was not clear enough. Let me put here again what is under discussion: there is a conflict between these axioms of yours:

• “Nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality”
• “We are free”

So, whenever you respond, please do it addressing the conflict. Ok?

As I said before about Aristotle, if you are going to critique Aquinas, please understand him first.

I guess reality is right now trying to impress on my mind some relations I need, and it is trying to do it through you. But it must happen according to my nature. And as I am of a very inquisitive nature, there must be a detailed discussion; otherwise, reality won’t be effective.

For Aquinas, causality is always simultaneous with its effect, and in the present. That is important for understanding the Five Ways, but what is more pertinent here is that, for Aquinas, the causality exerted by God flows out like a cascade. (Aquinas is very much a Neoplatonist at heart, although he is scrupulously careful to “baptize” Neoplatonism properly. In particular, for Aquinas, God is perfectly free to create or not, a point about which the ancient Neoplatonists were generally in error.)

For me too causality is simultaneous with its effect. I am not talking about the five ways. I have taken into account that in a cause-effect chain all the chain is simultaneous. I have implicitly included in my objection this statement: “God is free”, and I am not questioning it.

I hope this serves to clarify my objection. Please read it again while you are aware of this.

As an extremely brief review of Aquinas’ theory of intrinsic causes, Aquinas holds that there is a twofold composition in every substance (a threefold composition in every material substance):

As you are knowledgeable about St. Thomas doctrine of the act of being, you must know what is the best way to expose it and which are the essential statements. So, if at any moment you think you need to rearrange your arguments please proceed. Just advice me.

(1) Substance is to be distinguished from its properties and characteristics (accidents).
(2) Prime matter is to be distinguished from substantial form (in material beings only).
(3) Essence is to be distinguished from its esse ut actus or actus essendi, its act of being.

God is by nature Ipsum Esse (Being Itself): being (esse) without composition or limit. Hence, when God creates, his proper effect is being (esse ut actus). Creation consists in endowing a creature with its actus essendi, and at the same time co-creating the essence that receives it. The actus essendi is an active principle of a substance; the essence here is a type of potency.

When we speak of God as First Cause or First Mover, we mean His causality inasmuch as He endows His creatures with their act of being.

The point of all this is that operations flow from the essence, the essence that has been actuated by its actus essendi. The essence receives its actuation from the actus essendi, and in turn the essence actuates its powers (e.g., intellect and will—see I. q. 77, as I mentioned), which in turn produce operation. (Hence, as you can see, it is not unlike a cascade. Each layer communicated being to the next one, which receives it and communicates it in turn.)

That is what Aquinas means when he says that God moves the will as First Mover: that He gave me my act of being (while co-creating my essence), which actuates my essence; the essence actuates my intellect and will; and my will is then free to act.

God endows me with so much power (relative to…), that I (i.e., my essence that is actuated) have full discretion to actuate my will or not. (Unless I am seeing the Beatific Vision, which, unfortunately, I am not seeing right now.)

So, according to you it is the mental construct of the “essence-actus essendi” composition which will dissolve the conflict between your two axioms. It makes sense in general: Sometimes we just need to add a new relation to a system in order to make it coherent.

With the addition of the “essence-actus essendi” mental construct, your model looks similar to the idea of God as an available energy (through our act of being) that we can use as we want. It really doesn’t look promising to me!, and…, where is it going to lead us?

Before I ask you any question about the consequences of the addition, I need some clarifications from you:

I need to tell you that while reading your post I found my mind, so to say, making some deficient tricks in order to follow you. You had said that cause and effect are simultaneous; and then, while reading, I needed to think on pre-existing receptacles that receive something (for example, “creatures” that are endowed with an “actus essendi”, “layers” which before being, are able to receive being…). Could you please clarify this? I don’t want to be condescending with those tricks of my mind.

Then, I remember that, according to you, “essence” means for Aristotle the individual substance. Now, you say that there is this composition “essence-actus essendi”. So, what are the ontological statuses of essences? Is there a “before” and an “after” for them in relation to the “actus essendi”?

Also, when you say things like “I (i.e., my essence that is actuated) have full discretion to actuate my will or not.”, it sounds as if you had two wills: the one that has the full discretion, and the one that is actuated.

 

[Richca]

St. Paul was not an aristotelian philosopher. On the other hand, you surely can find in St. Paul’s writings that some of our actions displease God. Would it mean that some of our actions are the result of God’s efficiency and others (the bad ones) are the manifestation of our own and independent efficiency?

Our good actions are the result of God’s efficiency, firstly and primarily, as God is the first efficient cause, and secondarily from us as second causes and as cooperating with God with our free will. This is especially seen if we take supernatural grace into consideration. Grace always precedes (as well as accompanies) all our good thoughts and actions that are conducive to salvation.

Our bad actions or sins are caused by us not really as a result of our efficiency but rather as a result of our deficiency. An efficient cause produces being but evil is not a being, it is rather the lack of being. So it is said that evil or moral fault does not have an efficient cause but a deficient cause. Still, there is some efficiency here in that a sinful act is a being and every being as a being is good. Evil is founded on the good. There is also efficiency from God even in our bad acts considered as beings as every being, whatever the mode of its being, is derived from the First Being and He is the first efficient cause of it. That the bad act has a defect though is from us.

You are playing with two axioms. The first is the one that is under discussion now: "nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality

 

[JuanFlorencio]

Our good actions are the result of God’s efficiency, firstly and primarily, as God is the first efficient cause, and secondarily from us as second causes and as cooperating with God with our free will. This is especially seen if we take supernatural grace into consideration. Grace always precedes (as well as accompanies) all our good thoughts and actions that are conducive to salvation.

I can conceive myself cooperating with another person like me to obtain a result that both of us desire. We can sum our energy so that we can act faster or more vigorously together. But if I take an stick to push with it another body, the stick will not add any energy to mine. This last case is analogous to an action in which I would allegedly be cooperating with God. If all my energy has its origin in God, I am adding nothing really.

Besides, I don’t think that the consideration of a theological subject as complex as that of grace will help clarify the philosophical subject we are discussing now. It would produce too many digressions.

Our bad actions or sins are caused by us not really as a result of our efficiency but rather as a result of our deficiency. An efficient cause produces being but evil is not a being, it is rather the lack of being. So it is said that evil or moral fault does not have an efficient cause but a deficient cause. Still, there is some efficiency here in that a sinful act is a being and every being as a being is good. Evil is founded on the good. There is also efficiency from God even in our bad acts considered as beings as every being, whatever the mode of its being, is derived from the First Being and He is the first efficient cause of it. That the bad act has a defect though is from us.

I don’t know who was the first in devising this kind of “arguments”… It makes me so sad. Please, if it is so clear and true to you, tell me which being is needed to be added to convert a cruel assassination into something good.

I do not see a conflict between the two axioms you are referring to here. God moves things according to their natures and for human beings this means that He moves us according as we are subject to our own free choice. As far as choice being a transit from potency to act, the will is able to make this transition by its own power (not excluding Divine help) because in willing the end it is in act and the axiom states that only something in act can reduce a potency to act. So, the will in act reduces itself from potentiality to act, in repect of the means, to will them actually. The will cannot will anything, either an end or the means or move to its operation without first being moved by God as you quote St Thomas below “because every movement, either of the will or nature, proceeds from God as the First Mover.” The created will as a second cause must cause something. One of its effects is to actually will the means.

The question is if, in view of your first axiom, the will is a cause at all. It seems to me that you and Imelahn accept that your first axiom must be limited in its application to rational beings, but both of you resist to say it openly.

Let me try with an example to show you the conflict:

You are in a car, and it is supposed that you are the driver. But the car does not have gas, so someone has to push it; you just have to apply your foot on the accelerator. But you don’t have strength in your feet, so someone else has to push your foot; you just have to control the wheel. But you don’t have strength in your hands, so someone else has to move your hands; you just have to give indications with your voice. But you can’t speak, so someone has to give the indications for you; you just have to make some signals with your eyes. But you can’t, so someone has to push your eyes to produce the signals as he sees it fit. Does it make sense if someone says that you are a good driver? Consider that those who were “helping” you did it according to your nature.

What do you mean when you say that the will can chose by its own power, but with God’s help?

God moves our will according to its nature and its nature is that its movement is not necessitated nor is it determinate to one thing. The will is free to will or not will, or to will this or that except in those things to which it is moved naturally. God does make our choices in the sense that it is through Him that we are able to make choices at all and that these choices have being, but He does not determine our choices as this would be acting against the very nature He created us with.

Two more examples:

First example: An hypnotist hypnotizes you and commands you to perform an action, which is according to your habits, as soon as certain circumstances are given. When those circumstances occur you proceed as you were commanded. Is this a free act?

Second example: I know a person so well that I can predict what she is going to do given a set of circumstances. I desire that she does something. So, I talk to her and tell her such words that she will react as I expect. Is she acting freely?

Please tell me, just to understand what you mean with “acting according to the nature of free will”.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

You are in a car, and it is supposed that you are the driver. But the car does not have gas, so someone has to push it; you just have to apply your foot on the accelerator. But you don’t have strength in your feet, so someone else has to push your foot; you just have to control the wheel. But you don’t have strength in your hands, so someone else has to move your hands; you just have to give indications with your voice. But you can’t speak, so someone has to give the indications for you; you just have to make some signals with your eyes. But you can’t, so someone has to push your eyes to produce the signals as he sees it fit. Does it make sense if someone says that you are a good driver? Consider that those who were “helping” you did it according to your nature.

Why do you have to push the accelerator? I forgot that the car doesn’t have gas. It makes no sense, right?

 

[JuanFlorencio]

What does it mean “we are moved according to our nature”?

Observe how the principle of conservation of energy (which might be proved wrong some day, but that so far seems to work fine) tells us that we can’t introduce additional energy into the world. There is a fixed amount of it, and that is it. Nevertheless, this scientific fact is not an obstacle for us to eat as much pizza as we want, or spend part of the available energy eating Mexican tacos or seafood, or whatever we decide. We can rearrange our surroundings according to our plans, and to do this we simply “mobilize” part of the available energy without even thinking on it. Our free actions do not alter the total amount of energy in the world, but we can use it to our advantage (or to our disadvantage). So, whatever we do is according to the world’s “nature”. But the world is not free.

“To be moved according to our nature” (the nature of free beings) would imply at least a first independent movement, a kind of signal through which we could reveal our incipient decision, so that an “spiritual available energy” could complete it accordingly. However, no matter how “insignificant”, such incipient decision should not be “assisted”; otherwise it wouldn’t be free. Then, a self reduction from potency to act should be possible (which means that no external efficient cause would be required).

Imelahn has said that we are endowed with great power so that we can issue commands or not, depending on our will. It sounds like he is accepting that we don’t need the influence of an external efficient cause to issue those commands. But his position is not sufficiently clear yet.

 

[lmelahn]

I am not questioning that! I am sorry, I was not clear enough. Let me put here again what is under discussion: there is a conflict between these axioms of yours:

• “Nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality”
• “We are free”

In that case, let us address the strictly logical problem here.

First of all, let us define “free.” A person is “free” if he is capable of seeking out a good that attracts him, or he is able to refuse it, at his own discretion.

Clearly, in order for him to seek out that good, he goes from potency (merely desiring it) to act (possessing and enjoying it). He does not, however, go from absolute potency (whatever that means) to act: he is already partly in act, because he exists, he has an intellect and a will capable of desiring, and so on.

In Thomistic terminology, we call the kind of act that exists even before the will has actually done anything “first act;” we call the actual operation of the will (moving from desire to enjoyment) “second act.”

Are we on board up to here?

OK, now for the statement in question, which I will present in its entirely, and translate literally:

[D]e potentia autem non potest aliquid reduci in actum, nisi per aliquod ens in actu, sicut calidum in actu, ut ignis, facit lignum, quod est calidum in potentia, esse actu calidum, et per hoc movet et alterat ipsum.

However, a thing cannot be reduced from potency to act, except by some being that is in act; for example, something hot in act, the way that fire makes wood—which is hot in potency—hot in act, and in this way changes and alters it ([I, q.2, a.3, corpus (http://dhspriory.org/thomas/summa/FP/FP002.html#FPQ2A3THEP1)).

We could formulate this principle in the following fashion:

If a being has been reduced from potency to act, then it must be reduced by another being that is, itself, in act.

The direction of this hypothetical statement is important. It is clear logical fallacy to affirm the inverse (which I will put in red to show that it is invalid):

If a being is in act, then it must reduce another being from potency to act.

This is a logical fallacy called “affirming the consequent.” In fact, this last statement is neatly false. There are plenty of reasons why something in act might not actually produce its proper effect. For example, to use the example that Aquinas uses, the fire is hot and therefore has the capacity to change and alter wood. But the action of the fire might be impeded: if the wood happens to be on the other side of a brick wall for example, or if the wood is extremely wet.

Returning to our wills: all of the will’s actuality ultimately comes from God. We can go up the chain of causes with perfect security, because if a being has been reduced from potency to act, then it was put into act by something that is itself in act. (And actually, this would be an example of the First Way.)

We cannot, however, run down* that chain of causes using this principle. God is clearly in act, but it does not follow that He will necessarily create something. A rational creature is clearly in act (“first act”), but it does not follow necessarily that it will produce a particular action (“second act”). In both these cases, the action is “optional” because the agent is free.

In other words, there is no contradiction whatsoever between the principle and our freedom.*

 

[lmelahn]

Now let’s tackle the more metaphysical problem.

I know that I still have pending a “proof” of the substance-accident distinction, but that sort of thing takes time to get right, and, well, I need to do other things besides Catholic Answers forums sometimes .

So, according to you it is the mental construct of the “essence-actus essendi” composition which will dissolve the conflict between your two axioms. It makes sense in general: Sometimes we just need to add a new relation to a system in order to make it coherent.

Keep in mind that for Aquinas, essence and actus essendi are not just a mental construct; they are real principles of a substance. But they are principles, not things: entia quibus (beings “by which” a things exists), not entia quae (beings “that” exist).

With the addition of the “essence-actus essendi” mental construct, your model looks similar to the idea of God as an available energy (through our act of being) that we can use as we want. It really doesn’t look promising to me!, and…, where is it going to lead us?

Perhaps the post I just put up will help clear that up. God as an agent is absolutely free. We creatures, however, are absolutely dependent on Him for our being (actus essendi). Dependence goes only in one direction: upward, toward God, never downward, toward His creatures.

Note that this new relation—in your parlance—comes to light because Aquinas need a way to explain the existence of the angels: beings without matter, which are, nonetheless, only limited beings.

Before I ask you any question about the consequences of the addition, I need some clarifications from you:

I need to tell you that while reading your post I found my mind, so to say, making some deficient tricks in order to follow you. You had said that cause and effect are simultaneous; and then, while reading, I needed to think on pre-existing receptacles that receive something (for example, “creatures” that are endowed with an “actus essendi”, “layers” which before being, are able to receive being…). Could you please clarify this? I don’t want to be condescending with those tricks of my mind.

I can understand that. What is happening is that we are coming to the limits of what our language is capable of expressing, so we have to make very careful use of analogy to avoid illegitimate extrapolations.

The principles of actus essendi and essence are a kind of act and potency, but they are not exactly like the other kinds of acts and potency that we experience more directly. We are dealing, not with the transformation of pre-existing beings, but with creation itself.

I was very careful to say that when God endows a creature with its actus essendi, in the very same act He co-creates the creature’s essence. There is no such thing as actus essendi without essence (at least, not in a creature), and there is no such thing as an essence that is not actuated by an actus essendi.

You see, the only act and potency that we are used to dealing with are pre-existing potencies that are transformed. Creation is not a transformation, and so we have to make the necessary adjustment when we think of actus essendi and essence as act and potency.

The essence does delimit and define the actus essendi, but it is not pre-existing in any way. Indeed, it is the actus essendi that makes it exist at all.

 

[lmelahn]

Then, I remember that, according to you, “essence” means for Aristotle the individual substance.

That is correct, but I also mentioned that “essence” and “substance” can change slightly in meaning according to the context. Also, keep in mind that Aristotle did not know the real distinction between actus essendi and essence; at least, he did not have a fully developed notion of it. (There are hints that he was on the right track in Metaphysics VI, but it is very schematic.)

In part the mixing of terms arises because Aquinas modified, or built on, Aristotle’s theory a bit. So, I propose the following terminology to avoid confusion:

• essentia ut potentia essendi (essence as potency for being): the original potency that God co-creates together with the actus essendi
• essentia in actu (essence in act): the essence considered as the principle of the powers and operations of a substance. This is identical with the “substance” that is the potency actualized by the accidents. (The “subiectum” that you like so much .)
• The supposit, or the concrete individual, taken as a whole, including all of its compositions and principles.

The last two are also sometimes called “substance,” and it is usually clear from the context what we are referring to. If I am comparing the “substance” to one of its properties or characteristics, then I mean the “essence in act.” If I am saying, “trees are substances and so are stones,” then I mean “supposits,” or individual things taken as concrete wholes.

Also there aren’t two different essences, here, just a single essence considered in two different ways: (1) in its capacity as a potency that receives the act of being, and (2) in its capacity as active principle of operation and passive principle of inherence (essentia in actu).

Now, you say that there is this composition “essence-actus essendi”. So, what are the ontological statuses of essences? Is there a “before” and an “after” for them in relation to the “actus essendi”?

There is not strictly a “before” and “after,” because creation is not exactly a “change.” (It is certainly not a transformation of pre-existing things.) We can consider the essence as the potency that is co-created in order to receive the actus essendi, or we can consider it as the active principle (which is, however, only partly in act!) that produces the powers and, ultimately, operations.

Also, when you say things like “I (i.e., my essence that is actuated) have full discretion to actuate my will or not.”, it sounds as if you had two wills: the one that has the full discretion, and the one that is actuated.

There aren’t two wills, but yes two acts, as I explained in the previous post. There is the act that makes the will exist and capable of operating (the “first act”), and then there is the will’s operation (“second act”). The will’s operation is simply the last outflow of the “cascade” that I described earlier. (That is a metaphor, obviously, just intended as a help to understand more easily.)

 

[inocente]

I am 82 years old and more and more, each day, heaven becomes an important object of contemplation. I’ve decided that since I have never seen a description of Heaven that is both imaginable and plausible and also accounts for that other possibility we call Hell, I stopped guessing what Heaven and Hell are like and began to imagine what I would liked them to be. It is easier to describe my Heaven than my Hell because fortunately this lifetime was closer to a Heaven than to a Hell. So here’s what I would like Heaven to be like: <snip to fit 6000 characters>

So my Heaven and Hell would look a lot like my present life except there would be fewer regrets and sins committed. In other words it would be palpably better. Kind of like the movie “Ground Hog Day” in which Bill Murray repeatedly wakes up on the same day, but with each repetition, he alters his behavior for the better, and experiences more and more joy. Each new life would be closer to Heaven and farther from Hell until I and all the rest of humanity achieved that goal a of being united in the fullness of the Mystical Body of Christ.

I am not saying with certainty that this is a theological view of Heaven in accordance with scripture and the “defined dogma” of the Catholic Church, it is merely what I want Heaven to be like. On the other hand, it describes how those that have been derived of a full lifetime of wonder, peace, and joy, like a young teen age girl with a fine mind and a body wracked with spina bifida can have a clear vision of hope. It also allows those now suffering in a life that seems like Hell to escape, so that eventually all bodies will be perfected and all souls will be sanctified. In the meantime, we are making our way through our personnel Purgatories of sin and infirmity in which we too often make the wrong choices by failing to respond to God’s grace. Eventually we will all escape our personal Hell’s and arrive at that perfect world we call Heaven.

And how would this sort of Heaven/Hell come about. Well there does happen to be a scientific solution for my hope. It is called the Many World Interpretation of the Schroedinger wave equation. It is based on the principle of superposition which when applied to the wave equation means that whenever a choice is made between good and evil the world splits in two and you follow your chosen path. So if the MWI is real, it would mean a promise of successive lifetimes (parallel worlds). I experienced the efficacy of the Schroedinger equation while working as an engineer in the semiconductor industry and believe I will live again in a parallel world that is even more sanctifying than the present one.

I find theological support for my view in the following excerpt from the Vatican’s 2004 International Theological Commissions report on “Human Persons Created in the Image of God” where it states in step 29:
The central dogmas of the Christian faith imply that the body is an intrinsic part of the human person and thus participates in his being created in the image of God. … The effects of the sacraments, though in themselves primarily spiritual, are accomplished by means of perceptible material signs, which can only be received in and through the body. This shows that not only man’s mind but also his body is redeemed. The body becomes a temple of the Holy Spirit. Finally, that the body belongs essentially to the human person is inherent to the doctrine of the resurrection of the body at the end of time, which implies that man exists in eternity as a complete physical and spiritual person.
From this I infer that since our bodies are resurrected at the end of time to exist eternally as a complete physical and spiritual person, and since in this present state the body and soul are imperfect, and since it is through grace and the application of our free will that we are justified, it seems plausible to me that there be interim states in which the process of justification and the perfection of the body is brought to fruition. Hence parallel worlds.

Yppop

I’d agree with those theologians on that point. The promise of eternal life implies the continued existence of you as a person. If you were merely subsumed into some collective consciousness then your mind would cease to exist as a functioning person, whereas the promise implies the continued existence of the whole of your being, body and soul, hence heaven must be somewhere that bodies can be.

But I wonder if, after a mere one thousand years, you would still be the same person, whether you would still recognize that future you. If not, then you, the person who is you now, couldn’t really be said to have eternal life. But if you did remain the same, I wonder if it doesn’t get a bit boring after the first five hundred trillion years, with no possible escape from eternal tedium. Some tell me no, time won’t pass, you’ll be in an eternal now, constantly beaming with joy. Which sounds a bit like being on a permanent morphine drip.

So I agree that the whole business of heaven needs a lot more rigor, and your constant reincarnation solution sounds attractive.

P.S. I looked up the document you referred to, and paragraph 30, straight after the one you quoted, is admirably physicalist in its abject refusal of substance dualism. But then, as is the way of all committees, the Commission lost its nerve, due to, as they put it, the lack of metaphysical data.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

That is correct, but I also mentioned that “essence” and “substance” can change slightly in meaning according to the context. Also, keep in mind that Aristotle did not know the real distinction between actus essendi and essence; at least, he did not have a fully developed notion of it. (There are hints that he was on the right track in Metaphysics VI, but it is very schematic.)

In part the mixing of terms arises because Aquinas modified, or built on, Aristotle’s theory a bit. So, I propose the following terminology to avoid confusion:

• essentia ut potentia essendi (essence as potency for being): the original potency that God co-creates together with the actus essendi
• essentia in actu (essence in act): the essence considered as the principle of the powers and operations of a substance. This is identical with the “substance” that is the potency actualized by the accidents. (The “subiectum” that you like so much .)
• The supposit, or the concrete individual, taken as a whole, including all of its compositions and principles.

The last two are also sometimes called “substance,” and it is usually clear from the context what we are referring to. If I am comparing the “substance” to one of its properties or characteristics, then I mean the “essence in act.” If I am saying, “trees are substances and so are stones,” then I mean “supposits,” or individual things taken as concrete wholes.

Also there aren’t two different essences, here, just a single essence considered in two different ways: (1) in its capacity as a potency that receives the act of being, and (2) in its capacity as active principle of operation and passive principle of inherence (essentia in actu).

There is not strictly a “before” and “after,” because creation is not exactly a “change.” (It is certainly not a transformation of pre-existing things.) We can consider the essence as the potency that is co-created in order to receive the actus essendi, or we can consider it as the active principle (which is, however, only partly in act!) that produces the powers and, ultimately, operations.

There aren’t two wills, but yes two acts, as I explained in the previous post. There is the act that makes the will exist and capable of operating (the “first act”), and then there is the will’s operation (“second act”). The will’s operation is simply the last outflow of the “cascade” that I described earlier. (That is a metaphor, obviously, just intended as a help to understand more easily.)

One question before I explain again the conflict between your axioms, because you responded to someone else (and I didn’t see his objection): why do you say “co-created” instead of “created” in relation to the essence?

 

[inocente]

I am, but I don’t think that is necessarily a problem. Goodness and badness do not depend on cultures; cultures have good qualities and bad qualities, and if we examine them carefully, we can discern which is which. The insistence on scientific rigor—which we owe to the ancient Greeks—is a great contribution to mankind that all cultures can benefit from (and have benefited from).

Most people probably believe the culture in which they are raised is the best possible culture, and you were raised in a scientific culture. But perhaps that’s coincidence.

The West didn’t decide slavery was bad until the Industrial Revolution did away with the need for slaves. Perhaps that’s also a coincidence.

Women only started to get treated equally when they were required to keep factories going while the men went off to war. Perhaps that’s another coincidence.

You’ll see where I’m going with this. It’s very difficult to see other moralities and ways of life objectively.

But I don’t think we agreed on what “evident” means. Logically, there is a big difference between what can be established by direct observation, and what needs to be demonstrated. That the sun has risen each day since I can remember is evident; how and why that happens is not.

So, I am asserting that the ancient geocentric cosmology wasn’t evident to Aristotle, or his culture, either. His theory had to be demonstrated, and it turns out to have been wrong in some important aspects (mostly things established by better observations and experiments).

The OED defines evident as clearly seen or understood; obvious. Our disagreement is over what is clearly understood or obvious. Paul decided that “since the creation of the world God’s invisible qualities—his eternal power and divine nature—have been clearly seen, being understood from what has been made”. Compare the OED’s “clearly seen or understood” with the NIV’s “clearly seen, being understood”. Paul thinks that not just the observation but also what it demonstrates is evident. But that’s not at all evident to a Buddhist. Or, if you walk for 40 days through the wilderness of the Grand Canyon, it may become evident that all things, the rocks included, are sacred. I think what is clearly understood depends not just of observation but on perspective.

I grant you that they are not easy to understand explicitly and fully. That is one disadvantage of a forum format, since I have to express in a couple of lines what would ordinarily be dealt with in an entire course.

True. But I continue to suspect that the Aristotle + Thomas combo is inordinately complicated only because there are so many holes.

*The use of the term “heaven(s)” in the Bible is complex. It can mean the sky, it can mean what the Hebrews considered the location of the stars and planets, it can mean the immediate presence of God, and it can sometimes mean God Himself (which is an example of what is called “synecdoche”).

We also need to keep in mind that Hebrew is a very “concrete” language; it has a hard time expressing abstractions. When it has to, it often makes recourse to images, analogies, and metaphors. You will see this often if you read the Psalms: they often represent God as the Lord of a pair of opposites (heaven and earth, the sea and the dry land, the night and the day, the east and the west, and so on). That kind of language is intended to show that God is the Lord of both extremities, as well as everything in between.

So, sure, it speaks of God as inhabiting Heavens, but that is more often than not the author’s way of stating God’s radical transcendence. If we take a view that is too anthropomorphic, we would not do justice to God’s majesty and transcendence: “For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways, declares the LORD (Is. 55:8).*

It doesn’t seem that complicated - God can be transcendent without being an abstraction. The problem with trying to make God fit with logic is surely not simply that it makes God less accessible, it restricts who we think God can be, which works against transcendence.

Not the speculative science of logic, no. But they did have to use their intellects in order to hunt, and that includes the use of deductive reason at times. Animals have all kinds of instincts to help them hunt. We human beings don’t, or we have very few: instead, we have to learn everything. (If I had to survive on hunting starting tomorrow, I would probably starve to death.)

The danger is that if you start from the supposition of man as rational animal, divided from all other species, then the divide becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. We obviously have more going on between our ears but I think there is evidence of a continuum with other social species. For instance, independent.co.uk/news/science/primate-instincts-6148420.html

 

[lmelahn]

One question before I explain again the conflict between your axioms, because you responded to someone else (and I didn’t see his objection): why do you say “co-created” instead of “created” in relation to the essence?

Just to emphasize the fact that it is a single act. By creating the potency (the essence), God also creates the act (the actus essendi), and vice-versa.

It is not like some other kinds of potency and act, in which the potency can remain without going into act. Like the human will, for example .

Aquinas applies the term directly to the creation of prime matter, which is co-created together with the substantial forms. In other words, you can never have matter without form, and in material creatures, you can never have form without matter. This is one of Aquinas’ improvements over Aristotle, who though that matter was eternal. Although I have never seen Aquinas apply the term to essence, it expresses the idea very well.