How do we come to know things?

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Since you were speaking of God’s creating: ("We don’t perceive God’s creative power; we talk about it. ") perhaps I should have phrased it “God being Creator of Heaven and Earth” to distinguish it from other creators of art or architecture.

As to God revealing it, yes he did.

As to the revelation, it is revealed in the mode perceivable to the recipient of the revelation (us) rather than in the mode known by the revealer (God), who addresses us always and only through his messengers, the Angels, the Prophets, the Church, and supremely in his Son.

So, something external to us delivered relation to us, as a predicate of God, and, it seems, as convertible with the subject (God is the Creator equates to the Creator is God), since our knowing is entirely passive. (even when we use “logical syllogism” we are putting a proposal back from the realm of objects of intellectual species via phantasms into the place in ourselves for intellectual sensitive observation of a conscious thought, where it becomes in us a proposed sensitive intelligible individual object, and we may even take it a step further setting up an experiment with an actual real object to have a full cycle of sensitive perception, all so that we can judge, true or false, of what we are sensing, “Is the known species true? do I understand?”).
If our knowing is entirely passive, why do we make mistakes?
 
If our knowing is entirely passive, why do we make mistakes?
That would be a discussion of sensitive apprehension and appetite being present along with intellective apprehension and appetite and a discussion of habits (virtue, vice, and indeterminate habits) of these four powers - since apprehension and appetite are indeterminate to what they are able to actualize (can receive anything or reduce to act), habit (good or bad or unknown outcome) is requisite.
 
Folklore can be OK as long as we don’t confuse it with reality. I enjoy Aesop’s fables as much as anyone, but I know that they never actually happened. As vehicles for teaching virtue or lessons, they are fine, but myths that are mistaken for reality need to be purified.
From that and the previous post one could be mistaken that you’re making a moral judgment that anything which doesn’t coincide with your personal worldview is necessarily wrong. Whatever, I admire your confidence.
We are not less rational either. Don’t forget that “rational” can mean at least two things: namely (1) possessing a spiritual nature and an intellect; or (2) acting in way that is becoming to that spiritual and intellectual nature (i.e., acting morally).
Both we and our ancestors are equally rational in the first sense. We may or may not be more “rational” in the second way. Clearly, using up resources wantonly is an “irrational” action, but it is irrational because it is unbecoming, not because the creatures that produce the action are not endowed with an intellect.
That’s a complicated definition, relying on previous agreement to the concepts of spiritual, natures and intellect, and the moral judgment as to what is becoming or unbecoming.
*And yet the Scriptures themselves take pains to avoid that view. Consider the episode of the Tower of Babel, or Psalm 94:
If you examine the Old Testament, you will see that, as their knowledge of God increased, the Jewish People gradually became less attached to anthropomorphic images of God. Or else, in the New Testament:
The transcendence of God is something that the People of Israel learned gradually.*
I’m not sure that those with the most sophisticated theology are necessarily the closest to God. Sometimes it would seem more likely to separate, and the average hill farmer might decide to bypass the abstractions of the Trinity and a God who is invisible yet somehow everywhere and everywhen. Either way, the NT writers often state that heaven is in the sky, here’s a sprinkling of references:

*for an angel of the Lord came down from heaven - Mat 28

He looked up to heaven - Mark 7

While he was blessing them, he left them and was taken up into heaven.- Luke 24

“I am the bread that came down from heaven.” - John 6

I saw something like a large sheet being let down from heaven by its four corners, and it came down to where I was. - Acts 11

“Do not say in your heart, ‘Who will ascend into heaven?’” (that is, to bring Christ down) - Rom 10

This is the gospel that you heard and that has been proclaimed to every creature under heaven - Col 1

For the Lord himself will come down from heaven - Thess 4

Therefore, since we have a great high priest who has ascended into heaven - Heb 4

Every good and perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of the heavenly lights - James 1

and showed me the Holy City, Jerusalem, coming down out of heaven from God. - Rev 21*
But, unlike the birds, the hunters are able to understand what they are doing. They learn what animal tracks are, and what they mean. (Similar to the way you are reading the words I write now and understand what they mean.) The birds are just follow their instincts blindly.
But the original point was that neither the hunters nor birds need deductive reasoning to fill their bellies. They both use a similar hit-and-miss process of inference. The hunters are much more advanced, but we should beware of a priori dogmas that animals are mere robots.
Faith in the strict sense is the theological virtue by which we know God (and as a consequence, and based on His authority, everything that He proposes to us for belief as revealed by Him). It is a free, unmerited, supernatural gift from God. It is very different from the human faith that Aristotle would have experienced.
It would need a separate thread to examine the rationale for predicting the relative chances of receiving the gift for (1) a child who happens to be born in a Catholic country such as Spain or Italy, (2) a child on the other side of the Mediterranean, or (3) born in a Buddhist country. Or for that matter a child born in Spain or Italy today compared with 100 years ago. 🙂
 
And in fact they correspond to the two type of freedom that the will has: freedom of exercise, and freedom of choice (of specification).

I am assuming here that the fundamental principle is clear: a thing cannot reduce itself from potency to act, at least not in such a way that the agent and the thing (or aspect of that thing) receiving the action is exactly the same, because that would imply that the thing is in act and in potency in exactly the same respect. That would violate the principle of non-contradiction. (Aquinas uses this very same principle in his First Way, as you may recall.)

The fictitious objector (probably one of Aquinas’ students) is asking, “Isn’t the will ‘moving itself;’ that is, isn’t it reducing itself from potency to act in exactly the same respect?”

In essence, this occurs because the will is partially in act and partially in potency (in different respects, obviously), as I mentioned in my post on I, q. 77, the other day.

To see what is going on, imagine that you have a good, an “end,” before you. A pizza, say. (It could also be something more important, like some moral obligation you have to fulfill, but it works the same way.) Your intellect has presented the pizza to your will, and your will now is in the position of desiring the pizza. In that respect, the will is already in act; it is also already set up so as to be able to act on this desire. This is what Aquinas means when he says that the will “actually (actu) wills the end.”

Now, suppose that you are hungry and you decide the eat the pizza. As soon as you move your arm to take a slice, you are beginning to take the necessary means to achieve your end. That decision to pick up a slice of pizza was also an act of the will, but one that you commanded. (Or else, looked at a different way: the pizza is exerting an attraction on you. You decide to yield to that attraction, and take the necessary means to obtain the object of desire. There is, therefore, both a “pull” of attraction exerted by the pizza, and a “push” from inside you, because we always seek our perfection and fulfillment.)

By taking the necessary means, you are reducing your will from potency to act; that is possible, because your will is already in act (in a different way) thanks to your natural desire for fulfillment, and still the more because the pizza is attracting you.

That is what Aquinas is getting at when he says (rather cryptically), “inasmuch as it [the will] actually wills the end, it reduces itself from potentiality to act.”

(This odd phrasing comes from Aristotle, who defines “change” as the “act of a thing in potency inasmuch as it is in potency.” It is quoted in the objection.)

Make sense?
Wait a second, Imelhan… So, the will is in potency to desire the pizza and, then, it is actually desiring it. What was it that reduced it from potency to act?
 
That would be a discussion of sensitive apprehension and appetite being present along with intellective apprehension and appetite and a discussion of habits (virtue, vice, and indeterminate habits) of these four powers - since apprehension and appetite are indeterminate to what they are able to actualize (can receive anything or reduce to act), habit (good or bad or unknown outcome) is requisite.
I am ready! Go ahead!
 
From that and the previous post one could be mistaken that you’re making a moral judgment that anything which doesn’t coincide with your personal worldview is necessarily wrong. Whatever, I admire your confidence.
Do you really think that the Hesiod’s Words and Days is comparable to our modern cosmology for its scientific rigor?
That’s a complicated definition, relying on previous agreement to the concepts of spiritual, natures and intellect, and the moral judgment as to what is becoming or unbecoming.
I grant you that it depends on those concepts, but I don’t think they are quite so difficult to understand as may be imagined (with the possible exception of “spiritual”). We all have first-hand experience of all these things, even if we are not able to put them into words.
I’m not sure that those with the most sophisticated theology are necessarily the closest to God.
Perhaps not, but any authentic truth can only help us to come closer to the one who is the Way, the Truth, and the Life.
Sometimes it would seem more likely to separate, and the average hill farmer might decide to bypass the abstractions of the Trinity and a God who is invisible yet somehow everywhere and everywhen.
All the same, I don’t see how having an anthropomorphic idea of God is helpful in fostering our relationship with Him.
Either way, the NT writers often state that heaven is in the sky, here’s a sprinkling of references:
*for an angel of the Lord came down from heaven - Mat 28
He looked up to heaven - Mark 7
While he was blessing them, he left them and was taken up into heaven.- Luke 24
“I am the bread that came down from heaven.” - John 6
I saw something like a large sheet being let down from heaven by its four corners, and it came down to where I was. - Acts 11
“Do not say in your heart, ‘Who will ascend into heaven?’” (that is, to bring Christ down) - Rom 10
This is the gospel that you heard and that has been proclaimed to every creature under heaven - Col 1
For the Lord himself will come down from heaven - Thess 4
Therefore, since we have a great high priest who has ascended into heaven - Heb 4
Every good and perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of the heavenly lights - James 1
and showed me the Holy City, Jerusalem, coming down out of heaven from God. - Rev 21*
Sure, but I still think the most natural interpretation is to understand these references as metaphorical (except when, say, Jesus, in his human nature, physically looks upwards, as in Mark 7). That is not much of a stretch, after all, since Jesus makes use of a great many metaphors to describe himself: the Good Shepherd, the Bridegroom, the Door of the sheepfold, and so on. The heavenly realities are too much for us to understand: that is something that God insists on again and again, in both the Old and the New Testaments. That is why, for example, Jesus teaches us in parables, because it is very difficult to express certain realities in simple, direct language.

But the original point was that neither the hunters nor birds need deductive reasoning to fill their bellies. They both use a similar hit-and-miss process of inference. The hunters are much more advanced, but we should beware of a priori dogmas that animals are mere robots.

I think that even hunter-gatherers use deductive reasoning more often than we might realize. Reasoning does not have to be formal in order to be valid.
It would need a separate thread to examine the rationale for predicting the relative chances of receiving the gift for (1) a child who happens to be born in a Catholic country such as Spain or Italy, (2) a child on the other side of the Mediterranean, or (3) born in a Buddhist country. Or for that matter a child born in Spain or Italy today compared with 100 years ago. 🙂
According to your avatar, your religious affiliation is Baptist, so you might not agree with what I will answer. Catholics believe that faith is infused into us at Baptism (although adults seeking Baptism receive the gift of faith even beforehand; it is faith that prompts them to seek Baptism.)

Faith is not a probabilities game: God offers to all men the possibility of salvation, so He seeks opportunities to give the gift of faith to those who still lack it. (Naturally, those who, through no fault of their own, never have the chance to receive it, will be judged mercifully.)
 
And in fact they correspond to the two type of freedom that the will has: freedom of exercise, and freedom of choice (of specification).

I am assuming here that the fundamental principle is clear: a thing cannot reduce itself from potency to act, at least not in such a way that the agent and the thing (or aspect of that thing) receiving the action is exactly the same, because that would imply that the thing is in act and in potency in exactly the same respect. That would violate the principle of non-contradiction. (Aquinas uses this very same principle in his First Way, as you may recall.)

The fictitious objector (probably one of Aquinas’ students) is asking, “Isn’t the will ‘moving itself;’ that is, isn’t it reducing itself from potency to act in exactly the same respect?”

In essence, this occurs because the will is partially in act and partially in potency (in different respects, obviously), as I mentioned in my post on I, q. 77, the other day.

To see what is going on, imagine that you have a good, an “end,” before you. A pizza, say. (It could also be something more important, like some moral obligation you have to fulfill, but it works the same way.) Your intellect has presented the pizza to your will, and your will now is in the position of desiring the pizza. In that respect, the will is already in act; it is also already set up so as to be able to act on this desire. This is what Aquinas means when he says that the will “actually (actu) wills the end.”

Now, suppose that you are hungry and you decide the eat the pizza. As soon as you move your arm to take a slice, you are beginning to take the necessary means to achieve your end. That decision to pick up a slice of pizza was also an act of the will, but one that you commanded. (Or else, looked at a different way: the pizza is exerting an attraction on you. You decide to yield to that attraction, and take the necessary means to obtain the object of desire. There is, therefore, both a “pull” of attraction exerted by the pizza, and a “push” from inside you, because we always seek our perfection and fulfillment.)

By taking the necessary means, you are reducing your will from potency to act; that is possible, because your will is already in act (in a different way) thanks to your natural desire for fulfillment, and still the more because the pizza is attracting you.

That is what Aquinas is getting at when he says (rather cryptically), “inasmuch as it [the will] actually wills the end, it reduces itself from potentiality to act.”

(This odd phrasing comes from Aristotle, who defines “change” as the “act of a thing in potency inasmuch as it is in potency.” It is quoted in the objection.)

Make sense?
Yes, thanks, I see some light. A key for me when first reading your post is that movement (towards an end) is an imperfect act as Aristotle defines motion; the thing is partially in act and partially in potency as you say. It wouldn’t be in motion if it was already at the end. I also thought about some other things St Thomas says to help clarify this which at present I don’t have the time to mention (maybe later). I think there are a number of things that can be analyzed through study and reflection of what St Thomas says if I want to gain a better understanding and clarification. I find it very interesting.
 
Yes, thanks, I see some light. A key for me when first reading your post is that movement (towards an end) is an imperfect act as Aristotle defines motion; the thing is partially in act and partially in potency as you say. It wouldn’t be in motion if it was already at the end. I also thought about some other things St Thomas says to help clarify this which at present I don’t have the time to mention (maybe later). I think there are a number of things that can be analyzed through study and reflection of what St Thomas says if I want to gain a better understanding and clarification. I find it very interesting.
Another key to understanding St Thomas I think when he says that the will reduces itself from potentiality to act in respect of the means to will them actually and how this is not in respect of the same that the will moves itself and is moved is in Pt. I-II, Q. 8, art. 2 and 3. In article 2, he says volition is of the end and the means and the means are a kind of middle space before arriving at the terminus. In article 3, he says the will is moved by one and the same movement [or act] — to the end, as the reason for willing the means, and to the means themselves. Consequently, it is not in respect of the same that the will in willing the end reduces itself from potency to act in respect of the means. Whenever a man wills the means by the same act he wills the end, but not conversely. A man cannot will the means without willing the end.
 
Another key to understanding St Thomas I think when he says that the will reduces itself from potentiality to act in respect of the means to will them actually and how this is not in respect of the same that the will moves itself and is moved is in Pt. I-II, Q. 8, art. 2 and 3. In article 2, he says volition is of the end and the means and the means are a kind of middle space before arriving at the terminus. In article 3, he says the will is moved by one and the same movement [or act] — to the end, as the reason for willing the means, and to the means themselves. Consequently, it is not in respect of the same that the will in willing the end reduces itself from potency to act in respect of the means. Whenever a man wills the means by the same act he wills the end, but not conversely. A man cannot will the means without willing the end.
Another key to understanding St Thomas I think when he says that the will reduces itself from potentiality to act in respect of the means to will them actually and how this is not in respect of the same that the will moves itself and is moved is in Pt. I-II, Q. 8, art. 2 and 3. In article 2, he says volition is of the end and the means and the means are a kind of middle space before arriving at the terminus. In article 3, he says the will is moved by one and the same movement [or act] — to the end, as the reason for willing the means, and to the means themselves. Consequently, it is not in respect of the same that the will in willing the end reduces itself from potency to act in respect of the means. Whenever a man wills the means by the same act he wills the end, but not conversely. A man cannot will the means without willing the end.

What would violate the principle that a thing cannot be in act and potency in the same respect I think is if the will was actually willing the end and potentially willing the end at the same time. This is obviously not possible. Since the will is a power or agent that is sometimes in actuality and sometimes in potentiality (in the exercise of its act or actually willing an end or not willing an end), it needs to be moved in its first movement by an external mover or agent cause which is God, the first agent mover. The will is such a power that while moved by God it also moves itself and can even drop out of act. The motion by God is indeterminate in human beings as he moves things according to their natures. He moves us towards the universal good which is the natural inclination of the will while we choose the means which may be either true good or apparent good. By supernatural grace, God also moves us to some determinate good which he would like us to perform but it is in our power to either accept or reject this grace.
 
What would violate the principle that a thing cannot be in act and potency in the same respect I think is if the will was actually willing the end and potentially willing the end at the same time. This is obviously not possible. Since the will is a power or agent that is sometimes in actuality and sometimes in potentiality (in the exercise of its act or actually willing an end or not willing an end), it needs to be moved in its first movement by an external mover or agent cause which is God, the first agent mover. The will is such a power that while moved by God it also moves itself and can even drop out of act. The motion by God is indeterminate in human beings as he moves things according to their natures. He moves us towards the universal good which is the natural inclination of the will while we choose the means which may be either true good or apparent good. By supernatural grace, God also moves us to some determinate good which he would like us to perform but it is in our power to either accept or reject this grace.
Look how you can divide the object or the subject as many times as you want, but in the end the axiom “nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality” applied to rational beings, will always lead you to the same conclusion: there is no freedom, or freedom is not what you might think.

Let’s suppose you are a being composed of “n” parts. You can say that, for a particular movement, part “n” moves part “n-1”, and so on until you end in part “1” which is moved but doesn’t move, or which moves something else. In the end you will have to ask “what moves part “n”?” And whatever it is, it will be the cause that moves you as a composite. St. Thomas says the following in the Summa Theologica, I-II, Question 6, Reply to Objection 3:

“God moves man to act, not only by proposing the appetible to the senses, or by effecting a change in his body, but also by moving the will itself; because every movement either of the will or of nature, proceeds from God as the First Mover. And just as it is not incompatible with nature that the natural movement be from God as the First Mover, inasmuch as nature is an instrument of God moving it: so it is not contrary to the essence of a voluntary act, that it proceed from God, inasmuch as the will is moved by God. Nevertheless both natural and voluntary movements have this in common, that it is essential that they should proceed from a principle within the agent.”

Whatever that principle within the agent may be, it is not a “first principle” and, therefore, it is not a prime mover; it needs to be moved by another agent. So, what does it mean that a human act is voluntary? St. Thomas responds (Summa Theologica, I-II, Question 6):

“I answer that, There must needs be something voluntary in human acts. In order to make this clear, we must take note that the principle of some acts or movements is within the agent, or that which is moved; whereas the principle of some movements or acts is outside. For when a stone is moved upwards, the principle of this movement is outside the stone: whereas when it is moved downwards, the principle of this movement is in the stone. Now of those things that are moved by an intrinsic principle, some move themselves, some not. For since every agent or thing moved, acts or is moved for an end, as stated above (Question 1, Article 2); those are perfectly moved by an intrinsic principle, whose intrinsic principle is one not only of movement but of movement for an end. Now in order for a thing to be done for an end, some knowledge of the end is necessary. Therefore, whatever so acts or is moved by an intrinsic principle, that it has some knowledge of the end, has within itself the principle of its act, so that it not only acts, but acts for an end. On the other hand, if a thing has no knowledge of the end, even though it have an intrinsic principle of action or movement, nevertheless the principle of acting or being moved for an end is not in that thing, but in something else, by which the principle of its action towards an end is not in that thing, but in something else, by which the principle of its action towards an end is imprinted on it. Wherefore such like things are not said to move themselves, but to be moved by others. But those things which have a knowledge of the end are said to move themselves because there is in them a principle by which they not only act but also act for an end. And consequently, since both are from an intrinsic principle, to wit, that they act and that they act for an end, the movements of such things are said to be voluntary: for the word “voluntary” implies that their movements and acts are from their own inclination. Hence it is that, according to the definitions of Aristotle, Gregory of Nyssa, and Damascene [See Objection 1, the voluntary is defined not only as having “a principle within” the agent, but also as implying “knowledge.” Therefore, since man especially knows the end of his work, and moves himself, in his acts especially is the voluntary to be found.”

But, does the knowledge of the end determine an act of the will as voluntary if the will is efficiently moved by an external cause? If the act is voluntary, it is not because of the knowledge of the end, but because of the nature of the prime mover. However, it would be better to say that it is not your act which is voluntary, but the act of the prime mover.*
 
Look how you can divide the object or the subject as many times as you want, but in the end the axiom “nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality” applied to rational beings, will always lead you to the same conclusion: there is no freedom, or freedom is not what you might think.
Only something in act can reduce a potency to act, but it does not follow that the thing in act will do so. Some things (namely, persons) are free to reduce certain potencies to act, or not. (Only God can reduce all potencies to act.)
Let’s suppose you are a being composed of “n” parts. You can say that, for a particular movement, part “n” moves part “n-1”, and so on until you end in part “1” which is moved but doesn’t move, or which moves something else. In the end you will have to ask “what moves part “n”?” And whatever it is, it will be the cause that moves you as a composite. St. Thomas says the following in the Summa Theologica, I-II, Question 6, Reply to Objection 3:
…]
The will can be “moved” will either by a final cause or by an agent cause. (Indeed, it won’t go anywhere without both kinds of causes.) My nature moves my will as an agent cause; the good thing that I desire moves it as a final cause. We are not, therefore, completely determined by the goods that attract us. In addition to the attractive thing, there is also my own decision: I may accede or abstain.

Also—and this is a common pitfall when those of us formed in Modern philosophy read Aquinas—from the effect, we can deduce that there is a cause. However, from the cause, we cannot always deduce that there is an effect (or a specific effect). The effect might be impeded, or (in the case of free causes, like us rational creatures), the agent may decide not to put a certain effect in practice. And some causes have multiple possible effects (e.g., the cue ball in a billiard table), but only one actually comes to be.
Whatever that principle within the agent may be, it is not a “first principle” and, therefore, it is not a prime mover; it needs to be moved by another agent. So, what does it mean that a human act is voluntary? St. Thomas responds (Summa Theologica, I-II, Question 6):
That is true, but the Prime Mover (i.e., God) moves us precisely by endowing us with a will and also with things that participate in His goodness. He does not—indeed, cannot—force the will to adhere to a particular created good.

He can compel the will to adhere to Himself, but He will save that for Beatific Vision in Heaven. Even in the case of the Beatific Vision, the compulsion is not a “violent” one but a “natural” one: God will not be forcing us to love Him against our will (which is impossible), but rather, He will be so attractive to our will that we will be unable to resist loving Him.
But, does the knowledge of the end determine an act of the will as voluntary if the will is efficiently moved by an external cause? If the act is voluntary, it is not because of the knowledge of the end, but because of the nature of the prime mover. However, it would be better to say that it is not your act which is voluntary, but the act of the prime mover.
The “extrinsic” cause of the will’s action is God alone. That is Aquinas’ fancy way of saying that nothing can force us to make an act of the will that adheres to a created good. The ultimate origin of our volition, in the order of agent causes, is God, Who gives the will its being (via giving our very natures their being). But we are not to imagine God making the decisions of the will for us; He creates the will free, and allows us to put it into act, or not.

(He is also the ultimate origin of what makes good things attractive to the will, because all good things participate in the Divine Goodness.)
 
Only something in act can reduce a potency to act, but it does not follow that the thing in act will do so. Some things (namely, persons) are free to reduce certain potencies to act, or not. (Only God can reduce all potencies to act.)
It is precisely human freedom which we are talking about, but applying to it the axiom that I mentioned in my previous post.
The will can be “moved” will either by a final cause or by an agent cause. (Indeed, it won’t go anywhere without both kinds of causes.) My nature moves my will as an agent cause; the good thing that I desire moves it as a final cause. We are not, therefore, completely determined by the goods that attract us. In addition to the attractive thing, there is also my own decision: I may accede or abstain.
Either you accede or abstain, you make a decision, and making a decision implies a transit from potency to act. Therefore, according to your axiom, something else moves your will in this specific movement.
Also—and this is a common pitfall when those of us formed in Modern philosophy read Aquinas—from the effect, we can deduce that there is a cause. However, from the cause, we cannot always deduce that there is an effect (or a specific effect). The effect might be impeded, or (in the case of free causes, like us rational creatures), the agent may decide not to put a certain effect in practice. And some causes have multiple possible effects (e.g., the cue ball in a billiard table), but only one actually comes to be.
I agree, but this paragraph is irrelevant, because we are analyzing actual movements (like your decision to eat pizza, if you want), not possible decisions. And as I said above, any of your decisions implies a reduction from potency to act; therefore, you are moved by an external efficient agent (and that is what St. Thomas clearly says in the first quote of my previous post).
That is true, but the Prime Mover (i.e., God) moves us precisely by endowing us with a will and also with things that participate in His goodness. He does not—indeed, cannot—force the will to adhere to a particular created good.

He can compel the will to adhere to Himself, but He will save that for Beatific Vision in Heaven. Even in the case of the Beatific Vision, the compulsion is not a “violent” one but a “natural” one: God will not be forcing us to love Him against our will (which is impossible), but rather, He will be so attractive to our will that we will be unable to resist loving Him.
I agree with all this, but this is not what St. Thomas said in the first quote of my previous post. He certainly says that God moves the will according to its nature, but being God the author of every nature, it is equivalent to say simply that He moves the will.
The “extrinsic” cause of the will’s action is God alone. That is Aquinas’ fancy way of saying that nothing can force us to make an act of the will that adheres to a created good. The ultimate origin of our volition, in the order of agent causes, is God, Who gives the will its being (via giving our very natures their being). But we are not to imagine God making the decisions of the will for us; He creates the will free, and allows us to put it into act, or not.

(He is also the ultimate origin of what makes good things attractive to the will, because all good things participate in the Divine Goodness.)
This is a restriction that you need to introduce arbitrarily in the application of your axiom; but it is obviously a violation of it. You had better say from the beginning that it does not apply totally to living beings or at least to rational living beings.
 
Do you really think that the Hesiod’s Words and Days is comparable to our modern cosmology for its scientific rigor?
Other cultures would not view scientific rigor as the benchmark. I think you’re judging his culture by your culture’s standards. The writers of Star Trek judged all aliens by the standards of twentieth century America. Star Trek was also a myth.

We began this discussion following your claim that Aristotle’s cosmology is not evident, and agreed, it isn’t evident to 21st century Westerners, but it was part of a worldview for many more centuries than our scientific post-industrial worldview, and it was once evident to many that God is in his heaven, and heaven is beyond the stars, and God placed the earth in the center of creation because we are his children.
*I grant you that it depends on those concepts, but I don’t think they are quite so difficult to understand as may be imagined (with the possible exception of “spiritual”). We all have first-hand experience of all these things, even if we are not able to put them into words.
Perhaps not, but any authentic truth can only help us to come closer to the one who is the Way, the Truth, and the Life.
All the same, I don’t see how having an anthropomorphic idea of God is helpful in fostering our relationship with Him.*
Then I think you dramatically underestimate the complexity of your philosophical and theological ideas.
Sure, but I still think the most natural interpretation is to understand these references as metaphorical (except when, say, Jesus, in his human nature, physically looks upwards, as in Mark 7). That is not much of a stretch, after all, since Jesus makes use of a great many metaphors to describe himself: the Good Shepherd, the Bridegroom, the Door of the sheepfold, and so on. The heavenly realities are too much for us to understand: that is something that God insists on again and again, in both the Old and the New Testaments. That is why, for example, Jesus teaches us in parables, because it is very difficult to express certain realities in simple, direct language.
The word “heaven” is mentioned 399 times in the NIV (and “heavens” 190 times), and I doubt you would find it possible to sustain your hypothesis that in all cases the location of heaven is metaphorical, or that there is any progression towards metaphor in later writers.

I think most people want to believe that a loved one who has passed on is in a good place. The notion that heaven has no location, and therefore the souls of the dearly departed are not somewhere, is alien, impossible.
I think that even hunter-gatherers use deductive reasoning more often than we might realize. Reasoning does not have to be formal in order to be valid.
But they don’t need it to fill their bellies.
*According to your avatar, your religious affiliation is Baptist, so you might not agree with what I will answer. Catholics believe that faith is infused into us at Baptism (although adults seeking Baptism receive the gift of faith even beforehand; it is faith that prompts them to seek Baptism.)
Faith is not a probabilities game: God offers to all men the possibility of salvation, so He seeks opportunities to give the gift of faith to those who still lack it. (Naturally, those who, through no fault of their own, never have the chance to receive it, will be judged mercifully.)*
We, of course, don’t baptize until a child is mature enough to decide for herself, and we don’t believe anything supernatural happens. Indeed she doesn’t need to be “dunked” if she’s frightened of water or of being the center of attention, it’s just a happy event, signifying joining and being accepted into her church, and being reborn. We could spend a lot of time discussing your last paragraph, let’s just say that those of other religions wouldn’t agree with you.
 
…[snip]…The word “heaven” is mentioned 399 times in the NIV (and “heavens” 190 times), and I doubt you would find it possible to sustain your hypothesis that in all cases the location of heaven is metaphorical, or that there is any progression towards metaphor in later writers.

I think most people want to believe that a loved one who has passed on is in a good place. The notion that heaven has no location, and therefore the souls of the dearly departed are not somewhere, is alien, impossible.
If you want to think of heaven as a place, a location. that is fine. Revelation is silent on that. so is the Church. You may also think of heaven as " up, " as in the heavenly spaces. But this presents problems. If this world is to come to an end, then where would heaven be? Also, for people who lived in polar opposite locales, where would heaven be?

Linus2nd
 
If you want to think of heaven as a place, a location. that is fine. Revelation is silent on that. so is the Church. You may also think of heaven as " up, " as in the heavenly spaces. But this presents problems. If this world is to come to an end, then where would heaven be? Also, for people who lived in polar opposite locales, where would heaven be?
I don’t see any problems. The original Hebrew belief was that God lives in heaven, and heaven is beyond the stars, in all directions. Heaven surrounded and cradled Creation, and when the world ends there would still be heaven. There was no knowledge of other galaxies or of the huge distances involved. Instead there was a firmament (רָקִ֖יעַ), a solid dome (Gen 1:6-8) which God beat out, from which the stars, sun and moon were attached or embedded (Gen 1:14). Some liked to think of stars as holes in the dome which let through the light of heaven. God was directly available, just look up and he is always there, shining through.

*Let It Shine On Me, Nanci Griffith - youtube.com/watch?v=8MIYBGo9YdQ
*
You might think it’s illogical, but that doesn’t mean others do. There are more things in heaven and earth, Linus, than are dreamt of in your philosophy. 🙂

The Catholic Encyclopedia says most theologians agree that heaven is a place: “At the end of the world, the earth together with the celestial bodies will be gloriously transformed into a part of the dwelling-place of the blessed (Revelation 21). Hence there seems to be no sufficient reason for attributing a metaphorical sense to those numerous utterances of the Bible which suggest a definite dwelling-place of the blessed. Theologians, therefore, generally hold that the heaven of the blessed is a special place with definite limits. Naturally, this place is held to exist, not within the earth, but, in accordance with the expressions of Scripture, without and beyond its limits.”

I’ve not given my opinion. I’m saying that if we let scripture speak to us without imposing our preconceptions then clearly the writers believed heaven is in the sky. And many people still hold that belief, for this simple reason:- Think of someone you love who has passed on. It is very difficult to think of him or her as existing while yet not existing anywhere, without any locus.
 
I am 82 years old and more and more, each day, heaven becomes an important object of contemplation. I’ve decided that since I have never seen a description of Heaven that is both imaginable and plausible and also accounts for that other possibility we call Hell, I stopped guessing what Heaven and Hell are like and began to imagine what I would liked them to be. It is easier to describe my Heaven than my Hell because fortunately this lifetime was closer to a Heaven than to a Hell. So here’s what I would like Heaven to be like: My mother, father will be in the same age-relationship with me as they were this time around. They won’t be teenagers and they won’t be ageless, they will be my mother and father. So too will my brothers and sisters, my children, their children and all the people I have known in this lifetime will be there just as they are or were in this lifetime. Yes, there will be the same animals, flowers, oceans, stars, rocks and all the things I’ve experienced in this lifetime. I will fall in love again with the same beautiful woman and live an entire married life immersed in romance, good humor, and friendship. My Heavenly life will be filled with the same or more of the laughter, wonder, love, joy, fun, peace, nostalgia, and piety that has filled this life. I will hit a baseball again; I will hear La Boheme for the first time again; I will sing babies to sleep in the middle of a quiet night again. I will eat peanuts, smell roses, hear a whippoorwill, see the ocean for the first time; see Broadway musicals, watch my children graduate, marry the same persons, and have the same children again. You get the idea.
Code:
On the Hell side, there will be diseases, earthquakes, plaques, floods, and all sorts of physical evil. But that stuff will be diminished as also will social evil such as wars, bigotry, injustice, tyranny, and poverty be diminished next time. Since I have had a minimum of disappointments in this life, I can't describe a vision of a personal Hell but it would consist of far too many regrets and sins, none of which I care to share. But if I have confessed those sins, transgressions, and regrets, then they won't happen in the Heaven that is my next lifetime because I will enter into it with a more effective conscience.

So my Heaven and Hell would look a lot like my present life except there would be fewer regrets and sins committed. In other words it would be palpably better. Kind of like the movie "Ground Hog Day" in which Bill Murray repeatedly wakes up on the same day, but with each repetition, he alters his behavior for the better, and experiences more and more joy. Each new life would be closer to Heaven and farther from Hell until I and all the rest of humanity achieved that goal a of being united in the fullness of the Mystical Body of Christ.

I am not saying with certainty that this is a theological view of Heaven in accordance with scripture and the "defined dogma" of the Catholic Church, it is merely what I want Heaven to be like. On the other hand, it describes how those that have been derived of a full lifetime of wonder, peace, and joy, like a young teen age girl with a fine mind and a body wracked with spina bifida can have a clear vision of hope. It also allows those now suffering in a life that seems like Hell to escape, so that eventually all bodies will be perfected and all souls will be sanctified. 	In the meantime, we are making our way through our personnel Purgatories of sin and infirmity in which we too often make the wrong choices by failing to respond to God's grace. Eventually we will all escape our personal Hell's and arrive at that perfect world we call Heaven.

And how would this sort of Heaven/Hell come about. Well there does happen to be a scientific solution for my hope. It is called the Many World Interpretation of the Schroedinger wave equation. It is based on the principle of superposition which when applied to the wave equation means that whenever a choice is made between good and evil the world splits in two and you  follow your chosen path. So if the MWI is real, it would mean a promise of successive lifetimes (parallel worlds). I experienced the efficacy of the Schroedinger equation while working as an engineer in the semiconductor industry and believe I will live again in a parallel world that is even more sanctifying than the present one.  

I find theological support for my view in the following excerpt from the Vatican's 2004 International Theological Commissions report on "Human Persons Created in the Image of God" where it states in step 29:
The central dogmas of the Christian faith imply that the body is an intrinsic part of the human person and thus participates in his being created in the image of God. … The effects of the sacraments, though in themselves primarily spiritual, are accomplished by means of perceptible material signs, which can only be received in and through the body. This shows that not only man’s mind but also his body is redeemed. The body becomes a temple of the Holy Spirit. Finally, that the body belongs essentially to the human person is inherent to the doctrine of the resurrection of the body at the end of time, which implies that man exists in eternity as a complete physical and spiritual person.
From this I infer that since our bodies are resurrected at the end of time to exist eternally as a complete physical and spiritual person, and since in this present state the body and soul are imperfect, and since it is through grace and the application of our free will that we are justified, it seems plausible to me that there be interim states in which the process of justification and the perfection of the body is brought to fruition. Hence parallel worlds.

Yppop
 
It is precisely human freedom which we are talking about, but applying to it the axiom that I mentioned in my previous post.

Either you accede or abstain, you make a decision, and making a decision implies a transit from potency to act. Therefore, according to your axiom, something else moves your will in this specific movement.
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According to the axiom, St Thomas says “It is not in respect of the same that the will moves itself and is moved: wherefore neither is it in act and in potentiality in respect of the same. But forasmuch as it actually wills the end, it reduces itself from potentiality to act, in respect of the means, so as, in a word, to will them actually.”

As Imelahn has mentioned, only something in act can reduce a potentiality to act. In willing the end, the will is in act and it can reduce choice of the means itself to actually willing the means as this is precisely its “job.” The will can do all this in its own order and as a proximate cause. However, I will grant you this, if we consider choice as an act of the will, it is therefore an act and a being, and any act or being is reduced to God as the first cause. This does not mean that God makes our choices for us as this would violate our free will which he created us with but it simply means that without God’s causality creatures cannot produce themselves an act or being. In a word, God can concur with our choices or not concur and if He doesn’t concur with some choice or attraction He sees we are going to make, then that choice is not going to come to fruition. Human actions are not outside the scope of Divine Providence, they fall under it. I believe what I have said here is correct according to the teaching of St Thomas as well as Holy Scripture. St Paul says “it is God who works in you both to will and to work for His good pleasure.”
 
It is precisely human freedom which we are talking about, but applying to it the axiom that I mentioned in my previous post.

Either you accede or abstain, you make a decision, and making a decision implies a transit from potency to act. Therefore, according to your axiom, something else moves your will in this specific movement.

I agree, but this paragraph is irrelevant, because we are analyzing actual movements (like your decision to eat pizza, if you want), not possible decisions. And as I said above, any of your decisions implies a reduction from potency to act; therefore, you are moved by an external efficient agent (and that is what St. Thomas clearly says in the first quote of my previous post).

I agree with all this, but this is not what St. Thomas said in the first quote of my previous post. He certainly says that God moves the will according to its nature, but being God the author of every nature, it is equivalent to say simply that He moves the will.

This is a restriction that you need to introduce arbitrarily in the application of your axiom; but it is obviously a violation of it. You had better say from the beginning that it does not apply totally to living beings or at least to rational living beings.
JuanFlorencio, I don’t think you have exactly understood the axiom.

That which is in act now (i.e, what which exists now, in one way or another), if it came to be in any way, was brought into being by something that is in act (i.e, something that itself exists).

It does not follow that the thing that caused the coming-to-be (another name for a “reduction of potency to act”) was compelled to do so. Some causes produce their effect necessarily; others do not.

Our wills are in the second category: we can produce our effect, or decide not to.
 
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