How do we come to know things?

[inocente]

Greetings,

My primary concern, Juan and inocente, is that your views seem to favour a certain relativism and fideism. This may not be a problem for you inocente, but the Catholic church rejects fideism, primary through our belief that God’s existence can be established by reason. Juan, if human reason is all representation of external interactions as relations, then is there any way of being reasonably sure of the existence of God? Can you provide a concrete example of a rational proof of the existence of God that would suit your epistemology?

God bless,
Ut

God bless you too.

Georges Lemaître argued for Isaiah’s hidden god, “hidden even in the beginning of creation” yet “even though he is hidden, you can still know him”. I’d agree, reason isn’t opposed to faith, it’s just that no so-called proof can work. I guess the logic might be along the lines that we have to use symbols and words to construct a proof, and since God transcends all definition, we cannot construct a proof. Which in turn means we can’t prove which religion or morality is top dog, but that’s fine. Certainty is overrated. Once we’re certain, our mind is closed. A mustard seed of doubt can move a mountain. My :twocents:

 

[Linusthe2nd]

And how do we know that what the Bible says is true, how do we know that the Being we call God has actually revealed himself to mankind?

Linus2nd

 

[utunumsint]

God bless you too.

Georges Lemaître argued for Isaiah’s hidden god, “hidden even in the beginning of creation” yet “even though he is hidden, you can still know him”. I’d agree, reason isn’t opposed to faith, it’s just that no so-called proof can work. I guess the logic might be along the lines that we have to use symbols and words to construct a proof, and since God transcends all definition, we cannot construct a proof. Which in turn means we can’t prove which religion or morality is top dog, but that’s fine. Certainty is overrated. Once we’re certain, our mind is closed. A mustard seed of doubt can move a mountain. My :twocents:

I don’t see this as a scriptural attitude. At least not in Romans 1.

For since the creation of the world God’s invisible qualities—his eternal power and divine nature—have been clearly seen, being understood from what has been made, so that people are without excuse.

Certainly there is a certain darkening of the intellect that needs to be overcome due to our fallen nature, but that doesn’t let people off the hook.

God bless,
Ut

 

[lmelahn]

It is part of my view that there is nothing like things evident by themselves. The analogy between the light and the truth is poetically beautiful, but misleading. It is the kind of tools that marketing experts use to sell their products or services, especially when they are bad.

I would like to pursue this idea, if you don’t mind.

Although I can appreciate that all of our knowledge is conditioned by what Gadamer called our pre-comprehensions, or preconceptions, it seems to me that knowledge is impossible unless it resolves into something.

(Gadamer has a good insight here, but—true to his hermeneutic method—he does not seek the foundations of his epistemology. I think that with Aquinas’ categories we can go a step further than Gadamer. But that would be a digression.)

To put it in logical terms, we can tolerate spiral reasoning, but not circular reasoning. The premises have to begin somewhere; otherwise, they are purely formal and empty. (Not a few 20th century philosophers held that knowledge was like that. The so-called second Wittgenstein—Wittgenstein in his second period—had an idea something like that.)

I am probably not understanding your thought well (my own pre-conceptions are doubtless to blame ), but in your system, what do all the relations resolve into? Where to they get their original source of knowledge?

(I ask, because you said that nothing is evident itself—at least that is how understood you.)

 

[lmelahn]

1. 
   *]You never make a poll to determine if a theory is viable. You certainly can benefit from the discussion with others about the viability of a system, but in the end it is you alone who judge. In the first step you superimpose the doctrine under revision (which you should know thoroughly, as George Berkeley demanded) upon your basic set of first order relations. Then, you are missing the analysis of the possible points of divergence, in which second order relations originate.
   *]Yes, the analysis of higher order relations is a logical analysis (in which, from what I have seen, you are wanting at some difficult moments).
   *]This is not different from 2.
   *]This is not different from 2 either. Look how people working on different disciplines produce new second order relations, and some times they are even able to promote novel interactions. If any system must be based ultimately on first order relations, I don’t see why we should not consider some of them just because they belong (as a result of scientific traditions) to other disciplines. Also, I think that we are forced to consider carefully the second order relations which belong to those same disciplines (for example, those that belong to the relativistic and quantum physics) and which might be relevant to the subject under our investigation.

1. 
   Some of these are logically equivalent, but I make them explicit so that they serve as a rule of thumb.
   
   They are meant to be a rule of thumb for any discipline, so the specifics of the scientific method, say, are not included here.
   

   If logics is still to be considered a philosophical discipline, then I think that it belongs to philosophy the logical analysis of theories (your point #2); but more fundamentally, the analysis of second order relations, which is not based on logics.

   I am confused. Second-order relations are (if I got it right) relations whose elements are themselves relations. Wouldn’t logic be precisely the science that studies—so to speak—the right ordering of these kinds of relation?
   
   I mean, for example, it is logic that tells me that in order to put a hypothesis to the test, I need first to deduce the implications of that hypothesis and then conduct an experiment or make an observation based on that implication.
   
   The classic case is the great “confirmation” of Einstein’s theory of general relativity in 1919.
   
   It is logic that tells us that this is a valid way to conduct science: we are, in a way, seeing if the data would “falsify” the hypothesis via the modus tollens. (I am not a Popperian, but Popper rightly notes that subjecting hypotheses to tests that could falsify them is the bread-and-butter of the scientific method.)

 

[utunumsint]

Ut,
You have very beautifully described your experiencing of the actual and habitual knowing of the intellect, how it is not part of time (sort of aeviternal after the box is open, yet accidentally temporal with the recognition of a key where the will moves you to work temporally at opening each lock), and the metadata about your own knowing - the intuition that knowing, the species you know actually or habitually are real, and also either are actual outside you, or you actualize the known object outside you in your technical writing (when you know how your writing should be formed, temporally actualizing the external object word by word into individual equality to the aeviternal known specific object), with the result that what is outside for sensitive experience is, in the end, equal to what you know in intelligible species within your intellect… And what is known, habitually or in act in the passive intellect, is not in any way obscure.

Interesting! Your words make it evident to me how many more boxes I need to open up before I have clarity on Aquinas and Aristotle. I will have to keep at it.

Although there does seem to be something timeless in knowledge once that knowledge is know. I can see how Plato made the mistake of positing some timeless eternal third realm of forms to which our intellect conforms to.

Thanks for your kind response.

God bless,
Ut

 

[lmelahn]

I think this quote is enough: I can see that St. Thomas really uses the sentences you mentioned in your last post. To understand him properly, it would be necessary, among other things, to compile all the texts where he wrote about the will and the intellect. …]

JuanFlorencio and Richea, we could be up all night talking about this. The magnitude of this topic is an entire year’s metaphysics course .

If you really want to understand Aquinas on the intellect and the will, you have to start (at a minimum) with , I, q. 77Summa.

I can’t re-state the whole Summa in a few lines, here, so I will limit myself to the following. For Aquinas, a substance—especially a human or angelic substance; that is, a person—is something active. God has endowed it with a store of “act” or enérgeia that is striving to get out and express itself, so to speak. Evidence of this is that humans and animals grow and develop, seeds become adult trees, and even stones seek their “end” (e.g., when they fall down).

However, unless the substance is God Himself, the substance is never identical with its operation. In fact, a “naked” created substance (one without accidents) cannot “do” anything directly; it can only “be.” (Naturally, there is no such thing as a naked substance; but if there were one, it would be unable to perform any operation.) Hence, in order for a substance to produce an action, it must have a “power” that produces that action.

A couple of examples: I have a plastic cup in front of me. I can will to lift it up into the air as many times as I like, but it will not move until I take it in my hand and use my muscles to lift it up. My muscular system is an example of one of my powers: the one that allows my body to move itself.

I have another power that enables me to imagine things: real things that I saw in the past, real things that are currently obstructed (like the back side of my computer), or even completely fictitious things (like the phoenix).

Moving on to properly spiritual activities, there is a power that enables me to know things (the intellect) and a different one that allows me to love things (my will).

There is an aspect here that is probably not obvious to the reader: in terms of Aristotle’s paradigm of act and potency, a power is always in act, or actual, in one respect and in potency, or potential, in a different respect. That is a universal and intrinsic condition of a power (except in God, whose powers are identical with Himself).

Look at the muscles, for example: they are in act inasmuch as they subsist (they are incomplete substances, like my hands), and inasmuch as they are ready, chemically and biologically, to contract when that is called for (or to relax, as the case may be).

However, in a different respect, they are also in potency: right at this moment they are either relaxed or contracted, as the case may be, and so they are in the opposite state in potency. And they are also in potency with respect to various stimuli: the motor nerves (which are ultimately directed by my will, in some cases), various reflexes, and so on.

With the intellect and the will, there is something similar. Both of these are properly speaking qualities of the soul (qualities of the second species, if you want to be technical). They do not subsist like my muscles, but they inhere directly in me; they are the first accidents to proceed or emanate from my soul. They emanate necessarily from the soul; there cannot be a human being who does not possess an intellect and a will. (So yes, even embryos and mentally handicapped people have intellects.)

Each of these powers is clearly in act: they exist (they are inherent in my soul); each of them has an active principle that enables them to function in response to what moves them (e.g., the agent intellect, and the will considered as appetite).

And yet, like all creaturely powers, they are also in potency. I think this is obvious in the case of the will: it can freely will or not will a particular good. That means that it is in potency with respect to that good, and in act once it actually makes its decision.

With the intellect… well, I don’t see how we can avoid saying that it is in potency to the things that it knows, before it knows them. I have never taken a course in quantum physics (but I would enjoy it); that means that my intellect is currently in potency with respect to the science of quantum physics.

The movement from potency to act is synonymous with change itself. So, if my intellect goes from “not knowing” to “knowing” it must go from potency to act. I don’t see how to avoid that conclusion.

Likewise, just as my body can, in a way, move itself, so too the intellect (through the agent intellect) can move itself. But that doesn’t take away the fact the intellect has to have something to work on: it needs data from the outside world in order to operate.

 

[Richca]

Originally Posted by JuanFlorencio View Post
I would like to see where does St. Thomas says that “the intellect moves the will as an end moves an agent and the will moves the intellect as an agent cause. An agent cause is an efficient cause so the will moves the intellect as an efficient cause”. This sounds like the “perpetual motion machine”. While you let me know where does St. Thomas says it, please tell me

I think we may have to make a correction here. According to Fr. James F. Keenan S.J. and his book Goodness and Rightness in Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae, in around 1270 when St Thomas was writing Ia IIae, St Thomas made a shift in his thinking concerning the intellect moving the will as a final cause or end to a formal cause or principle. In ST, Pt. I-II, Q. 9, art. 1, St Thomas says:
“On the other hand, the object moves, by determining the act, after the manner of a formal principle, whereby in natural things actions are specified, as heating by heat. Now the first formal principle is universal “being” and “truth,” which is the object of the intellect. And therefore by this kind of motion the intellect moves the will, as presenting its object to it.”

The end or final cause of the will is God and God only. Only God can move the will efficiently or efficaciously not only as its final cause but also as God is the first efficient cause and the First Mover. God is also the formal cause of the will.

In the same article, Q.9, art.1, St Thomas says the will is an agent cause and the first mover of the other powers of the soul including the intellect. He says the same in Pt. I, Q. 82, and in other articles. “Since every agent acts for an end… the principle of this motion lies in the end.” The final cause is the first of causes and since God is the final cause of all things, “God is the cause of every operation as its end. Again it is to be observed that where there are several agents in order, the second always acts in virtue of the first; for the first agent moves the second to act. And thus all agents act in virtue of God Himself: and therefore He is the cause of action in every agent.” (ST, Pt. I, Q. 105, art.5). The second part of this quote concerning agent causes, St Thomas is referring here to God as the first efficient cause which he proves in the second proof for the existence of God. Since the will is a second agent cause, God as the first agent moves it.

Personally, at present and without further study and reflection, I’m not sure what to make of the shift Fr. Keenan says that St Thomas made concerning the causality of the intellect on the will or in what manner the intellect moves the will, not that I don’t believe what St Thomas says, but I can see how before the shift St Thomas says the intellect moves the will as an end moves an agent. As Fr. Keenan points out though, this does present some problems.

Take for example what St Thomas says in Pt. I-II, Q. 3, art. 4, whether happiness is essentially an operation of the intellect or the will.
“Objection 3: Further, the last end corresponds to the first mover: thus the last end of the whole army is victory, which is the end of the general, who moves all the men. But the first mover in regard to operations is the will: because it moves the other powers, as we shall state further on (Question [9], Articles [1],3). Therefore happiness regards the will.”

“Reply to Objection 3: The intellect apprehends the end before the will does: yet motion towards the end begins in the will. And therefore to the will belongs that which last of all follows the attainment of the end, viz. delight or enjoyment.”

As you can see, St Thomas says the intellect apprehends the end before the will does, however, movement towards the end begins in the will.

Concerning the voluntary and the involuntary, St Thomas says in Pt. I-II, Q. 6, art. 5,:
“Now in order for a thing to be done for an end, some knowledge of the end is necessary. Therefore, whatever so acts or is moved by an intrinsic principle, that it has some knowledge of the end, has within itself the principle of its act, so that it not only acts, but acts for an end.” Now knowledge of the end is obviously in the intellect. So, it appears that there is some sense to make out of what St Thomas previously held before the shift that the intellect moves the will as an end moves an agent. However, as I said previously, Fr Keenan points out in his book some of the difficulties involved in this view especially where St Thomas says in some passages that the will is as a passive power before the intellect. Now, I think St Thomas realized later in his career the difficulties involved with his previous thinking.

As a solution to some of these difficulties, I think we may need to look at the distinction between a final cause and an efficient cause so here are some of my thoughts. Though the end moves the agent to act and it appears to me that knowledge of the end is in the intellect, the intellect is not a motive power. The motive power is the efficient cause and the will is a motive power and the first mover of the other powers of the soul. The final cause though it is the first of causes, is not an efficient cause. So that though the intellect apprehends the end before the will does, movement towards the end begins in the will as St Thomas says.

 

[Richca]

(continued)

St Thomas says that the end and the universal good is the object of the will. The question can be asked here, does the end or final cause pertain more to the will or to the intellect? From what I just said, it appears that St Thomas says the end pertains to the will as good which is the object of the will has the nature of an end. However, what is sort of confusing to me is when St Thomas says the intellect apprehends the end before the will does and it appears to me that knowledge of the end is in the intellect for knowledge refers to the intellect. Accordingly, the end appears to be in the intellect too in some manner… As a possible solution to this difficulty, St Thomas says that the intellect understands what the will wills. So the end and the good which is the object of the will, the intellect apprehends and understands this for the very ideas of an end and appetible good is in the intellect.

In the end, St Thomas holds that the intellect or any object it presents to the will cannot move the will efficiently or to the very exercise of the act of the will. He says “no object moves the will necessarily, for no matter what the object be, it is in man’s power not to think of it, and consequently not to will it actually.” (cf. Pt. I-II, Q. 10, art. 2). Here he makes a distinction in the will between the exercise of its act and to the specification of its act derived from the object. As to the very exercise of its act, God as the first efficient cause alone moves it, “For everything that is at one time an agent actually, and at another time an agent in potentiality, needs to be moved by a mover.” (Pt. I-II, Q. 9, art. 4).

Any thoughts? Imelahn, would you like to comment on this?

 

[Richca]

 

[Richca]

Richca;12998936:

 

[JuanFlorencio]

I would like to pursue this idea, if you don’t mind.

Although I can appreciate that all of our knowledge is conditioned by what Gadamer called our pre-comprehensions, or preconceptions, it seems to me that knowledge is impossible unless it resolves into something.

(Gadamer has a good insight here, but—true to his hermeneutic method—he does not seek the foundations of his epistemology. I think that with Aquinas’ categories we can go a step further than Gadamer. But that would be a digression.)

To put it in logical terms, we can tolerate spiral reasoning, but not circular reasoning. The premises have to begin somewhere; otherwise, they are purely formal and empty. (Not a few 20th century philosophers held that knowledge was like that. The so-called second Wittgenstein—Wittgenstein in his second period—had an idea something like that.)

I am probably not understanding your thought well (my own pre-conceptions are doubtless to blame ), but in your system, what do all the relations resolve into? Where to they get their original source of knowledge?

(I ask, because you said that nothing is evident itself—at least that is how understood you.)

Isn’t it evident by itself?

My answer will be related to your questions in your post 663. I agree with Aristotle when he says that there must be some premises which are not demonstrated. Some call them axioms, and they are said to be “evident”. They could be called “evident by themselves” because it is supposed that no other premises are required to accept them as true. Surely every philosophical doctrine has its own axioms. However, the statemens that a particular philosopher accepts as axioms are not accepted by every other philosopher. Those axioms are second order relations, and as such they are not the object of a logical analysis; but reasoning starts with them.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

I am confused. Second-order relations are (if I got it right) relations whose elements are themselves relations. Wouldn’t logic be precisely the science that studies—so to speak—the right ordering of these kinds of relation?

I mean, for example, it is logic that tells me that in order to put a hypothesis to the test, I need first to deduce the implications of that hypothesis and then conduct an experiment or make an observation based on that implication.

The classic case is the great “confirmation” of Einstein’s theory of general relativity in 1919.

It is logic that tells us that this is a valid way to conduct science: we are, in a way, seeing if the data would “falsify” the hypothesis via the modus tollens. (I am not a Popperian, but Popper rightly notes that subjecting hypotheses to tests that could falsify them is the bread-and-butter of the scientific method.)

See above: second order relations are called axioms.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

…With the intellect… well, I don’t see how we can avoid saying that it is in potency to the things that it knows, before it knows them. I have never taken a course in quantum physics (but I would enjoy it); that means that my intellect is currently in potency with respect to the science of quantum physics.

The movement from potency to act is synonymous with change itself. So, if my intellect goes from “not knowing” to “knowing” it must go from potency to act. I don’t see how to avoid that conclusion.

Likewise, just as my body can, in a way, move itself, so too the intellect (through the agent intellect) can move itself. But that doesn’t take away the fact the intellect has to have something to work on: it needs data from the outside world in order to operate.

Certainly! If we go from “not having established a relation” to “having established a relation” we have passed from potency to act. It is a brief way to say it, which I like. What I deny is that something external to us impresses the relation in us.

And certainly too!, to establish relations you need either elements of interactions, interactions, or relations.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

I am a technical writer. My position is always that of a learner. I convert documentation written by highly technical, and sometimes highly intelligent people, and I make the ideas more accessible so that readers at different levels of understanding can quickly grasp the concepts.

As a learner, I am always learning about software, what a particular software can do, how you can use it, what you can build with it, and what different types of users are expected to do with the software. The complexity of the software I work with means that there is rarely one type of user that I write for. Some are interested only in administrative tasks, some are modeling solutions with the integrated development environments we provide, some are involved in coding and working with APIs. Each one of these approaches the product from a different perspective. And this is only the application level. There is also the transport layer, the hardware layer, the database layer, and the middleware layer. Each one of these domains has a vast learning curve. One can generally find more things to learn depending on the scope of the solution you are working with. Different problems require different configurations, different topologies, and so on.

In addition, there are different types of learners. Some learn in a top down way, from concept to procedure. Some can only learn in a bottom up way, from demonstrations or going through procedures to concepts.

For myself, I have sometimes had false understandings of concepts, functionality, or processes which subject matter experts latter corrected me about, or I figured out on my own through trial and error. In some areas, my understanding was solid from the beginning. I did not make errors. What I understood soundly then, I still understand the same way. In other areas of knowledge, my understanding has grown considerably over the last 10 years I have been in this field. There is a large body of knowledge that I am now absolutely certain about. I know my knowledge corresponds to reality. I am not worried that something will happen down the road that will prove me wrong.

Certainly, there are different levels of reality that I could analyze the software at. For example, I will never be able to comprehend how my software works at the binary level. Although, I suppose, in principle, I could. In theory, I know what is happening at this level, but the reality is really beyond my grasp.

But it is interesting how when I finally grasp something and understand that thing, what had been complex becomes much simpler to me. It is like my brain is a shape shifting key, and the object I am trying to understand is hidden within a thousand layers of boxes with locks. As each lock opens, I get a little further along. And sometimes the process is daunting, because as I open on one box, I can start to get a better understanding of how many more boxes I have to unlock. But eventually, I open that last box. And I have clarity. The thousands of keys I needed to use to get to that final box are all but forgotten. This knowledge I have, it is more than merely a representation, or a facsimile. It is something real.

After all this, I will admit, that I am still learning about Aquinas and Aristotle’s epistemology. But I have this intuition that real knowledge is more than just representation.

Something else? Like what?

You need to distinguish between truth and certainty. Immanuel Kat was so certain about Newton’s physics that he developed his “Critic of pure reason”; then, he became quite certain of his Critic, but what does it imply to you?

Yes, but we previously discussed logical versus real relations. We perceive God’s creative power as a relation, but it is not so in reality. Only logically.

We don’t perceive God’s creative power; we talk about it. However, just as “creator” is not a relation inherent in God, but a relation belonging to the “mental order”, every other relation belongs to this order as well. If not, how would you distinguish a logical relation from a real relation?

Agreed. But the rational preambles can open the door to make the choice of faith much easier to make.

God bless,
Ut

Interesting! Some say that reason can get you lost. Some are confused because they eventually fall in perplexity due to the paradoxes they find along their rational ways. Some trust their reason so much that they are trying to demonstrate that Adam and Eve existed. Some are afraid that reason will cause damage to their faith or to the faith of others… And you think reason will open the door to faith. I believe on those words that say “nobody can come to me if my Father does not call him”; I believe that my ability for rational debate is useful as long as it creates an opportunity for silence, where you could listen the call from the Father.

 

[lmelahn]

It isn’t evident to me either. But we both regard reality as having something to do with special instruments and laborious calculations. Cultures which did not, and which had other priorities, would not agree on what is evident. (The OED has evident = clearly seen or understood from Old French or Latin obvious to the eye or mind, so the mindset is an important factor).

Sure, but all the same that worldview was once evident to many people. It all fitted together, it all made perfect sense to them. It isn’t evident to us products of modernity, we have other myths. Our criteria are scientific, theirs were not. We can argue that we are closer to our notion of truth, but they would argue our notion is wrong.

I agree that the ancient world (and other non-Western cultures even today) did not have a “scientific” outlook. That is a great advantage on our part, because we have become used to looking at common opinions with a healthy critical thinking. (Sometimes we get a little carried away, however.)

But that isn’t exactly what I was referring to. An example of something “evident” is the color of the trees. How you explain that color involves the use of reason.

A “scientific” culture will investigate the biological, chemical, and physical properties of the leaves (as well as how our eyes work), and rightly so.

A culture that still uses “myth” will invent some story about how the gods painted the trees green in some primordial struggle.

But neither conclusion is evident quoad nos (from our perspective). One is the result of a rational method, and the other is rather far-fetched, but both involve the use of our reason.

How can we discern which one is a viable theory, and which one is a quack theory? Well, need to make sure that the logical process that leads to the conclusion is solid. In the first case, the logic is quite solid (but, since we are dealing with empirical sciences, never “apodictic”). The second suffers from major gaps in logic.

My point is, no one can dispute the raw data that all men see; the difference is all in the conclusions drawn.

If you stand at the entrance to a shopping mall and ask people where God lives, I think you’ll find most will look upwards. …]

The appearance of the “heavens” as “above” the earth (even though we now know that, as a scientific proposition, that idea is misleading) makes a good analogy for the relationship of God and His creatures. (If JuanFlorencio and UtUnumSint are listening, naturally, I think that the relation of God to His creatures is a relation “of reason,” but our relation to God is a “real” relation.)

To the degree that the Scriptures, or anyone else, makes it seem as though God were physically “located” above the earth, we must view that as strictly metaphorical. In reality, God, in His Divine Nature, is omnipresent.

The one exception here is Acts 1, which describes the Ascension: in that case, Jesus (hence God) could well have ascended physically; however, that could only have occurred in his human nature. This is basic Chalcedonian doctrine: the operations done by Jesus are truly and properly attributed to God, but nevertheless, those operations that require a physical body are accomplished through Jesus’ human nature.

That’s probably not how it works though. The hunters learn that certain indentations are associated with animals, and then learn to differentiate between indentations made by various kinds of animal, and so on. …].

Note that inductive reason is still a kind of reason. (But the birds are not engaged in reasoning, just in memory reinforced by reward.)

You do not have to “do philosophy” in order to use your reason. All human beings learn to reason pretty quickly: just take our ability to learn language. No other animal—and that includes the higher apes, and yes, that includes Koko and company—can learn language as fluidly and efficiently as man can. And language is nothing other than the verbal expression of our reasoning process.

So the hunters saw indentations. How is that they “learned” that they belonged to certain animals? By observing animals make those tracks. Unlike the birds, the hunters would have had no trouble learning what “animal tracks” are and what they signify.

If “naturally Aristotle knew nothing about faith” then faith could not be part of human nature, QED my friend.

Faith is a gift of God that perfects our nature, and God gives it to those to whom He wishes to give it. It was only after the coming of Christ that God wished to proclaim the Good News to all men.

So, you are right: faith is not a “part” of human nature, but it is necessary for us to reach our fulfillment.

(Those who, like Aristotle, are not in a position to have faith, through no fault of their own, will still, of course, have the opportunity to be saved and to have the Beatific Vision, which takes the place of faith.)

Perhaps Aristotle’s concept of man as a rational animal, when connected to Genesis’ concept that we are made in the image of God, causes some to believe that the non-rational aspects of our minds are base traits we must work to overcome.

I am not sure where this idea—that the non-rational powers must be “overcome”—came from: perhaps from vestiges of Platonic or Stoic philosophy. In any case, it is not a very healthy outlook. In reality, our spiritual powers (intellect and will) are designed to ennoble our lower powers. There is nothing wrong with, say, the passions (love, joy, anger, etc.), provided they are properly ordered. Indeed, the “apatheia” (passionlessness) that was the ideal of the Stoics is a gross distortion.

 

[John_Martin]

…

We don’t perceive God’s creative power; we talk about it. However, just as “creator” is not a relation inherent in God, but a relation belonging to the “mental order”, every other relation belongs to this order as well. If not, how would you distinguish a logical relation from a real relation?

Interesting! Some say that reason can get you lost. Some are confused because they eventually fall in perplexity due to the paradoxes they find along their rational ways. Some trust their reason so much that they are trying to demonstrate that Adam and Eve existed. Some are afraid that reason will cause damage to their faith or to the faith of others… And you think reason will open the door to faith. I believe on those words that say “nobody can come to me if my Father does not call him”; I believe that my ability for rational debate is useful as long as it creates an opportunity for silence, where you could listen the call from the Father.

“Creator” is a revelation from the creator, not a conclusion of observation. And yet, “the invisible things of him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made; his eternal power also, and divinity: so that they are without excuse.” (Rom 1:20)
Without inherent order (relationship) there would be excuse.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

“Creator” is a revelation from the creator, not a conclusion of observation. And yet, “the invisible things of him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made; his eternal power also, and divinity: so that they are without excuse.” (Rom 1:20)
Without inherent order (relationship) there would be excuse.

It is enough if you have the inherent ability to establish relations…, but, are you saying that there is an inherent relation (an accident) in God?

 

[inocente]

inocente;12998298:

Georges Lemaître argued for Isaiah’s hidden god, “hidden even in the beginning of creation” yet “even though he is hidden, you can still know him”. I’d agree, reason isn’t opposed to faith, it’s just that no so-called proof can work. I guess the logic might be along the lines that we have to use symbols and words to construct a proof, and since God transcends all definition, we cannot construct a proof. Which in turn means we can’t prove which religion or morality is top dog, but that’s fine. Certainty is overrated. Once we’re certain, our mind is closed. A mustard seed of doubt can move a mountain. My :twocents:

I don’t see this as a scriptural attitude. At least not in Romans 1.

I’m sure Isaiah is crest-fallen .

Paul also writes we live by faith, not by sight, echoed in John’s No one has ever seen God. Turns out Thomas also commented on this, here’s a commentary by a professor at a seminar. I don’t necessarily agree with all of it, but link it to show that Thomas also found transcendence and new depths in scripture by not simply dismissing the hiddenness of God,

ewtn.com/library/THEOLOGY/FR93203.htm

 

[lmelahn]

Isn’t it evident by itself?

My answer will be related to your questions in your post 663. I agree with Aristotle when he says that there must be some premises which are not demonstrated. Some call them axioms, and they are said to be “evident”. They could be called “evident by themselves” because it is supposed that no other premises are required to accept them as true. Surely every philosophical doctrine has its own axioms. However, the statemens that a particular philosopher accepts as axioms are not accepted by every other philosopher. Those axioms are second order relations, and as such they are not the object of a logical analysis; but reasoning starts with them.

Two questions, then:

(1) The principle of non-contradiction is not self-evident? It seems tough (if not impossible) to affirm anything coherently without it. (I don’t mean that people can readily formulate it, necessarily; but they seem to use it whenever they affirm something.)

(2) So, in your opinion, are the axioms, in reality, purely formal (like in some branches of mathematics)?