How do we come to know things?

[lmelahn]

I guess you are consciously using a metaphor when you say that relations flow from the substance. Somehow Aristotle and St. Thomas must have been able to “see” such flow and how they received it in their mind, which was continuously being filled with all sorts of relations. Imelahn has said that relations might be the less intelligible of all accidents (which is catastrophic to me, because I say that relationability and relations constitute intellibility). It means that he doesn’t “see” the flow, and his mind is not continuously filled with it; he just guesses that such flow must exist. In that respect, I am like Imelahn, because I don’t see any flow of relations coming out from substances. The difference is that I don’t dare to say that it must exist.

By “flow” we just mean that the relation owes its existence to the substance that it inheres in, and also to whatever that substance is related to.

The more technical term would be “proceed.”

 

[lmelahn]

Sensations are interactions which become conscious. There are other interactions between you and things which are not conscious; for example, those that take place in your digestive system. There are many others which take place between things different from you, and you might or might not witness them. When you witness them you introduce with your presence new interactions which constitute the witnessing. Certainly knowledge is based on all these interactions. The explanation about composition/division which St. Thomas provides (and which Imelahn has mentioned several times) is a good point to start.

For St. Thomas, composition/division is a spiritual (immaterial) activity, not part of sensation, just so we are clear about that. There is something analogous on the sensory level that might be called the “sensitive judgment,” performed by the vis cogitativa, like when we see a lion or something and feel afraid.

Just a question for you, JuanFlorencio, so I can understand you better: do you consider interaction primarily a psychological phenomenon, or the actual actions that “elements” perform on each other, or both?

For example: suppose I am a scientist studying sodium, and I throw a piece of sodium in water. As you may know, the sodium begins to fizz and pop and eventually bursts into flame. (Technically, it is the hydrogen produced by the reaction that bursts into flame.)

For you, is the interaction the action of the water on the sodium, that causes it it fizz, pop, and flame (and conversely, the action of the sodium on the water that makes it alkaline and heats it up)?

Or is interaction primarily our perception of those phenomena?

Or are both realities to be classified as interactions?

 

[JuanFlorencio]

For St. Thomas, composition/division is a spiritual (immaterial) activity, not part of sensation, just so we are clear about that. There is something analogous on the sensory level that might be called the “sensitive judgment,” performed by the vis cogitativa, like when we see a lion or something and feel afraid.

If you read my post again you might notice how I say that knowledge is based on interactions, not that knowledge is an interaction. For me too relations are immaterial.

Just a question for you, JuanFlorencio, so I can understand you better: do you consider interaction primarily a psychological phenomenon, or the actual actions that “elements” perform on each other, or both?

For example: suppose I am a scientist studying sodium, and I throw a piece of sodium in water. As you may know, the sodium begins to fizz and pop and eventually bursts into flame. (Technically, it is the hydrogen produced by the reaction that bursts into flame.)

For you, is the interaction the action of the water on the sodium, that causes it it fizz, pop, and flame (and conversely, the action of the sodium on the water that makes it alkaline and heats it up)?

Or is interaction primarily our perception of those phenomena?

Or are both realities to be classified as interactions?

There is a lot of theory implicit in your example. There are many interactions going on there, from which I will mention a few: Water molecules attack the sodium crystal and solvate its superficial atoms; sodium atoms react with water molecules in such a way that hydrogen molecules are released; energy is released too as heat; the solvating and the reaction processes occur at an increasing rate, which again increases the rate at which energy is released. The remaining sodium could melt and the hydrogen gas could react with oxygen in the air, producing water and even more heat, at such rate that an explosion could take place; the surrounding air will vibrate so violently that you will hear a noisy sound; light will be emitted and it will travel reaching your visual system so that you will see it; it might be that you could feel the heat being released…

All those are interactions, Imelahn. Some of them take place between things different from you (sodium and water, hydrogen and oxygen…), some others take place between something and you (the air and your hearing system, the light and your visual system, the thermal energy and your tactile system…). These last ones are conscious interactions, and they are the basis for a great number of relations that can be established. Surely you learned them in college, and this enabled you to understand what I said.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

I would be forced to conclude, then, that our intellect is the unique efficient cause of our knowledge, and reality merely the exemplary cause, and in a different way, its final cause (inasmuch as we desire full, faithful knowledge of reality as a kind of ideal to fulfill). Is that correct?

I said that I was trying to become closer to you, but as I said too, it is better to say that reality is the occasion of many of our relations.

One difference between our systems, it seems to me, is that I do recognize an efficient causality—which is the same thing as a reduction of potency to act—on the part of reality on our intellect.

Yes, that is a clear and important difference.

The first mover is the one who causes the change in other things (today, there is a debate as to whether Aristotle considered it only as a final cause or also as efficient cause), but He Himself does not change. There is no reduction from potency to act in Him.

In any event, Aquinas considers God the Efficient Cause of all creatures, while retaining the idea of God is Unmoved Mover, and it is chiefly Aquinas I follow.

Who will produce the best system of relations about the aristotelian corpus, and how shall we all know and agree that it is actually the best?

…And St. Thomas also thinks that there is Life in God, but life is change. So, God would be unmoved, but not immobile. And if it is so, what prevents us from being unmoved in certain peculiar movements?

Fire actualizes iron and makes it glow, but I don’t know how it works unless I study it. Why should our intellection be any different?

I thought we both agreed that we can only learn about what is not directly available to our senses can only know by analogy. Intellection (indeed cognition in general) is one of those non-sensory realities. We can’t directly “see” a person think.

No, Imelahn, I said that we use analogy even with what is directly available to our senses, and I think that this is another point of disagreement between you and me: while you think knowledge in terms of identity (partial identity if you will), I think it in terms of difference: to know A we need to compare it with B, which in fact is different from A. I say that if we meet something unique and simple it will be absolutely unintelligible to us (like when St. John of the Cross has a mystical experience and he says that he knows without knowing). To know something you need to put it into a category; you need to make it poor; you need to eliminate what constitutes it (and some will think they are wise if they say: “oh well, those peculiarities are mere accidents”, just because their great master told them so).

Why would relations constitute the world? Substances constitute the world; relations are just accidents.

I was responding to your statement: “If it were not so, the world would not transcend the intellect; it would be made up by us.” Why if relations are not impressed by reality on our mind, but established by us in an imitative effort, would the world be made up by us?

I guess one difference between you and me is that I think models can be judged based on whether or not they correspond to experience. I think that we can arrive at a “correct” model. I am not saying that I necessarily have the correct model (and I certainly do not have it in all respects), but I think we can seek it out.

I think the difference here is more subtle: while you think that you have a correct model in some respects, I think that our models are simultaneously weak and powerful imitations, and that they become more and more powerful (which is very descriptive).

I will illustrate:…

So, to return to our problem, I know a little bit about the pine tree, and undoubtedly my professor of botany (unfortunately fictional) knows a lot more than I do. It would still be useful for me to listen to what my botanist has to say about the pine tree: I would learn something new.

So, even though the pine tree imposed itself upon my intellect, as well as on the botanist, it did not reveal everything about itself to me: indeed, it only revealed a little bit. I can always learn more. The individual essence is unfathomable, after all. It revealed a lot more to the botanist, who already has the intellectual habits that help him learn more, and more quickly.

(I think I am right in saying that you would characterize that situation as follows: the botanist has previously established relations about pine trees, which helps him to establish more and better relations, and more quickly. I can concur with that: that is why I think the best paragon between our systems is to identify your relation with Aquinas’ composition-and-division, and systems of relations with intellectual habits—that is, with “science” in the classical sense.)

When you compare what I say with St. Thomas “composition-and-division” it is of course an honor to me; but I insist that composition and division are included in my relations. Anyway, I want to stress that you are superimposing a system of relations upon what you know of mine. That is an example of what it means to know something.

 

[lmelahn]

If you read my post again you might notice how I say that knowledge is based on interactions, not that knowledge is an interaction. For me too relations are immaterial.

OK. That helps me to understand. Then I think that confirms what I suspected earlier: that the Thomistic concept of composition/division corresponds rather well with your concept of relation.

I don’t think that your kind of relation corresponds well with Thomas’ relatio or Aristotle’s pros ti. It would, in my opinion, be more accurate to say that you think that kind of relation simply does not exist.

That is one reason it took me a long time to understand your system, because I was making an implicit paragon between your “relation” and Thomas’ relatio.

(So, to answer Linus2nd’s post from a couple of days ago, we needed to clarify what “relations” are in order to answer the question.)

There is a lot of theory implicit in your example. There are many interactions going on there, from which I will mention a few: Water molecules attack the sodium crystal and solvate its superficial atoms; sodium atoms react with water molecules in such a way that hydrogen molecules are released; energy is released too as heat; the solvating and the reaction processes occur at an increasing rate, which again increases the rate at which energy is released. The remaining sodium could melt and the hydrogen gas could react with oxygen in the air, producing water and even more heat, at such rate that an explosion could take place; the surrounding air will vibrate so violently that you will hear a noisy sound; light will be emitted and it will travel reaching your visual system so that you will see it; it might be that you could feel the heat being released…

All those are interactions, Imelahn. Some of them take place between things different from you (sodium and water, hydrogen and oxygen…), some others take place between something and you (the air and your hearing system, the light and your visual system, the thermal energy and your tactile system…). These last ones are conscious interactions, and they are the basis for a great number of relations that can be established. Surely you learned them in college, and this enabled you to understand what I said.

OK. That is what I thought. In essence, interactions are always in the “real order.” We could say, that our “imitation” of reality is constituted by relations, right?

Where I do struggle a little to understand is the mechanism by which we imitate reality. If I understood what you said above, reality is the occasion, but not strictly the “efficient cause” of our systems of relations.

I think I am right in saying that reality is our exemplar for the imitation, but if it exerts no efficient causality on us, how to we gain access to it? Usually, when we make an imitation of an exemplar, we know the exemplar before we construct the imitation. (E.g., when someone paints a portrait of someone, he first studies that person’s aspect.) It seems different with knowledge: we construct the imitation, and only afterwards know the exemplar. How does that work?

 

[lmelahn]

I said that I was trying to become closer to you, but as I said too, it is better to say that reality is the occasion of many of our relations.

Yes, that is a clear and important difference.

OK. I commented on these in my previous post.

Who will produce the best system of relations about the aristotelian corpus, and how shall we all know and agree that it is actually the best?

There will never be a “best” one, because our knowledge can always improve. But I think that we can check to see if a system corresponds with reality. (For example, is it consistent with first-hand experience? Is it logically coherent? Is it open to and consistent with other branches of knowledge—like science, theology, etc.?) To the degree that it does, it is a “correct” system.

…And St. Thomas also thinks that there is Life in God, but life is change. So, God would be unmoved, but not immobile. And if it is so, what prevents us from being unmoved in certain peculiar movements?

In St. Thomas, life is not the same thing as change; it entails an immanent capacity to change things, which is not the same thing. (For Aquinas, life is the being—the esse—of creatures that have an immanent principle of motion.) Since God is Being Itself (Ipsum Esse), it follows that He is Life to an eminent degree. But possessing “life” does not necessarily imply that the possessor has been changed by something else, just that it can change other things (which God certainly can do).

As far as we being unmoved movers: we lost the opportunity to be that, just by being created. Our very life—our very being—depends on God’s act of creation in every moment.

No, Imelahn, I said that we use analogy even with what is directly available to our senses, and I think that this is another point of disagreement between you and me: while you think knowledge in terms of identity (partial identity if you will), I think it in terms of difference: to know A we need to compare it with B, which in fact is different from A. I say that if we meet something unique and simple it will be absolutely unintelligible to us (like when St. John of the Cross has a mystical experience and he says that he knows without knowing).

OK, I think I understand better now.

To know something you need to put it into a category; you need to make it poor; you need to eliminate what constitutes it (and some will think they are wise if they say: “oh well, those peculiarities are mere accidents”, just because their great master told them so).

Sorry, I didn’t quite follow here: are you saying this is my system, or is this yours?

I was responding to your statement: “If it were not so, the world would not transcend the intellect; it would be made up by us.” Why if relations are not impressed by reality on our mind, but established by us in an imitative effort, would the world be made up by us?

I effectively commented on this in my previous post. Let’s leave aside “real relations” for the moment; what actually interests me are the “elements” or “substances.” Unless these elements/substances act upon me (hence they reduce me from potency to act somehow), how can I imitate them?

(I will take advantage to clarify something important: I hope I didn’t give you the impression that real relations act on their own to actuate our intellects. In reality, it is the substance—always the protagonist—that acts on my intellect, thereby revealing its characteristics and properties, including its weakest characteristics; namely, its relations to other substances.)

I think the difference here is more subtle: while you think that you have a correct model in some respects, I think that our models are simultaneously weak and powerful imitations, and that they become more and more powerful (which is very descriptive).

Not unlike Thomas Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Interesting book, and accessible, if you have not read it. I don’t know if Kuhn read Gadamer’s Truth and Method, but his ideas are structurally very similar to Gadamer’s hermeneutic model, in my opinion. (My chief critique of both authors is that they both do a lot of interpreting, which is fine, and they have a lot of good insights regarding the process of interpretation, but they never seem to be able to clear away the fog and get to reality itself.)

When you compare what I say with St. Thomas “composition-and-division” it is of course an honor to me; but I insist that composition and division are included in my relations. Anyway, I want to stress that you are superimposing a system of relations upon what you know of mine. That is an example of what it means to know something.

Strictly, I am making a paragon or analogy between our two systems, wouldn’t you say? (Which is certainly a way of obtaining knowledge.) One difference between us is that I think there is a more fundamental way of obtaining knowledge: deriving it directly from experience. In other words, I think that we need analogata—raw data, the “terms” of analogies—before we can make analogies.

Just a question, then: what is an example of a relation that is not a judgment or composition/division?

 

[John_Martin]

If anyone saw a photo of me and my father, they could easily say, “They seem to be related to one another”.
Both with rather large and almost identically shaped ears, round tipped noses, similar thickness of eyeglasses required, almost identical height, etc.
While some unrelated people tend to look alike (though, we are all to some degree physically related), the person seeing the photo would be noticing a real relationship between my father and me, and would also in his own internal intelligible object be knowing a pair of individual objects with possible relations. We are the reality he observes with material relationship, and the viewer of the photo has an intelligible object for “sensing” by his intellect that has possible relationship. (Intelligible object coming about through the habitual movement of cognition to recognize substance from the splash of colors and light and dark that are sensed by the eyes and know objects in the field of vision instead of non “re-cognized” coloration)

The relation does exist really, and it also exists possibly in the viewer of the photo. And if the viewer were to have the understanding of it being desirable to know if real relation exists, his will would tend his appetites and passions to ask the question “Are you related?” so that his passive intellect might have a perfect object of either relationship or not relationship.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

OK. That helps me to understand. Then I think that confirms what I suspected earlier: that the Thomistic concept of composition/division corresponds rather well with your concept of relation.

I don’t think that your kind of relation corresponds well with Thomas’ relatio or Aristotle’s pros ti. It would, in my opinion, be more accurate to say that you think that kind of relation simply does not exist.

That is one reason it took me a long time to understand your system, because I was making an implicit paragon between your “relation” and Thomas’ relatio.

(So, to answer Linus2nd’s post from a couple of days ago, we needed to clarify what “relations” are in order to answer the question.)

I will respond to this in my following comments.

OK. That is what I thought. In essence, interactions are always in the “real order.” We could say, that our “imitation” of reality is constituted by relations, right?

Where I do struggle a little to understand is the mechanism by which we imitate reality. If I understood what you said above, reality is the occasion, but not strictly the “efficient cause” of our systems of relations.

I think I am right in saying that reality is our exemplar for the imitation, but if it exerts no efficient causality on us, how do we gain access to it? Usually, when we make an imitation of an exemplar, we know the exemplar before we construct the imitation. (E.g., when someone paints a portrait of someone, he first studies that person’s aspect.) It seems different with knowledge: we construct the imitation, and only afterwards know the exemplar. How does that work?

This is how I responded to Ut in my post # 593:

“No doubt there are interactions between objects and us. When you distinguish between senses and intellect you are theorizing already, and you should realize it; however, I will accompany you a few steps: objects definitely interact with our senses, but they cannot interact with our intellect. How could a material thing interact with our intellect?”

I have described how some of those interactions in which we participate are conscious. I don’t regard those conscious interactions as “knowledge” yet, but knowledge is based on them. In your comment you separate verbally knowledge from “imitation”, but “imitation” and knowledge are the same thing. You don’t “imitate” first and then know, nor first know and then “imitate”; but the act of knowing is an act of imitation. When someone studies a person’s aspect to paint her, he is imitating her already. As a representative of the aristotelians you would say that our intellect becomes intentionally the thing known. This is fine until you say that it is because reality actualizes our intellect (though partially), or until you say that we abstract the form from substances (though inefficiently), or imply until you exaggerate and come to believe that there is identity between the thing known and our intellect at least a partial identity). I would rather say that we try to become the things with which we interact (directly or indirectly), but as the means we use are analogies, we never reach the desired identity.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

Just a question, then: what is an example of a relation that is not a judgment or composition/division?

Aristotelian relations, Imelahn!

Let’s consider this example: your infamous pine tree is bigger than my sweet cat. Now, what I say is that it’s through you that the relation is established. When you interact with both, you might establish this relation because you can compare certain interaction you have with them. If you were not there, they would be absolutely indifferent to each other in respect to size. It is like when you say that God is our creator and we are His creatures, but there is no real relation in God. I say that there is no “real relation” whatsoever. You are a being that establishes relations and so, relations come into the world…

There will never be a “best” one, because our knowledge can always improve. But I think that we can check to see if a system corresponds with reality. (For example, is it consistent with first-hand experience? Is it logically coherent? Is it open to and consistent with other branches of knowledge—like science, theology, etc.?) To the degree that it does, it is a “correct” system.

Can it always improve? Is the aristotelian thought infinite in some respect?

There is a history of science, a history of theology, and a diversity of scientific and theological thoughts. Which of them must be the reference to qualify the aristotelian discourses as “correct” or “incorrect”?

In St. Thomas, life is not the same thing as change; it entails an immanent capacity to change things, which is not the same thing. (For Aquinas, life is the being—the esse—of creatures that have an immanent principle of motion.) Since God is Being Itself (Ipsum Esse), it follows that He is Life to an eminent degree. But possessing “life” does not necessarily imply that the possessor has been changed by something else, just that it can change other things (which God certainly can do).

That is fine! And we are living beings as well; so we “have” an immanent principle of motion too. And this is what St. Thomas says (Summa theologica, Part I, Question 18, Article 3):

“*Other things have self-movement in a higher degree, that is, not only with regard to executing the movement, but even as regards to the form, the principle of movement, which form they acquire of themselves. Of this kind are animals, in which the principle of movement is not a naturally implanted form; but one received through sense. Hence the more perfect is their sense, the more perfect is their power of self-movement. Such as have only the sense of touch, as shellfish, move only with the motion of expansion and contraction; and thus their movement hardly exceeds that of plants. Whereas such as have the sensitive power in perfection, so as to recognize not only connection and touch, but also objects apart from themselves, can move themselves to a distance by progressive movement. Yet although animals of the latter kind receive through sense the form that is the principle of their movement, nevertheless they cannot of themselves propose to themselves the end of their operation, or movement; for this has been implanted in them by nature; and by natural instinct they are moved to any action through the form apprehended by sense. Hence such animals as move themselves in respect to an end they themselves propose are superior to these. This can only be done by reason and intellect; whose province it is to know the proportion between the end and the means to that end, and duly coordinate them. Hence a more perfect degree of life is that of intelligible beings; for their power of self-movement is more perfect. This is shown by the fact that in one and the same man the intellectual faculty moves the sensitive powers; and these by their command move the organs of movement. Thus in the arts we see that the art of using a ship, i.e. the art of navigation, rules the art of ship-designing; and this in its turn rules the art that is only concerned with preparing the material for the ship.”

"But although our intellect moves itself to some things, yet others are supplied by nature, as are first principles, which it cannot doubt; and the last end, which it cannot but will. Hence, although with respect to some things it moves itself, yet with regard to other things it must be moved by another. Wherefore that being whose act of understanding is its very nature, and which, in what it naturally possesses, is not determined by another, must have life in the most perfect degree. Such is God; and hence in Him principally is life. From this the Philosopher concludes (Metaph. xii, 51), after showing God to be intelligent, that God has life most perfect and eternal, since His intellect is most perfect and always in act.*.

At least for St. Thomas it is not impossible for our intellect to move itself to some things. For you, it seems it is impossible. For me, it is ordinary.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

As far as we being unmoved movers: we lost the opportunity to be that, just by being created. Our very life—our very being—depends on God’s act of creation in every moment.

However, we “have” an immanent principle of movement which allows us, for example, to establish relations and build systems of them which imitate reality, without needing the actualization of our potency by that same reality.

Sorry, I didn’t quite follow here: are you saying this is my system, or is this yours?

No, it is not your system nor mine; it is the way we know, always simplifying.

I effectively commented on this in my previous post. Let’s leave aside “real relations” for the moment; what actually interests me are the “elements” or “substances.” Unless these elements/substances act upon me (hence they reduce me from potency to act somehow), how can I imitate them?

(I will take advantage to clarify something important: I hope I didn’t give you the impression that real relations act on their own to actuate our intellects. In reality, it is the substance—always the protagonist—that acts on my intellect, thereby revealing its characteristics and properties, including its weakest characteristics; namely, its relations to other substances.)

According to St. Thomas, the starting point to know things is their “external accidents”. This corresponds to sensory interactions, which are conscious. You can imitate reality thanks to conscious interactions.

Not unlike Thomas Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Interesting book, and accessible, if you have not read it. I don’t know if Kuhn read Gadamer’s Truth and Method, but his ideas are structurally very similar to Gadamer’s hermeneutic model, in my opinion. (My chief critique of both authors is that they both do a lot of interpreting, which is fine, and they have a lot of good insights regarding the process of interpretation, but they never seem to be able to clear away the fog and get to reality itself.)

Do you think you have cleared the fog away? There was no fog, Imelahn, nor painted nor dirty windows, nor anything like that. Gadamer, Kuhn, I, whoever!, perceive your pine tree with the same clarity as any aristotelian or Thomist. Who has cleared the imaginary fog away?

Strictly, I am making a paragon or analogy between our two systems, wouldn’t you say? (Which is certainly a way of obtaining knowledge.) One difference between us is that I think there is a more fundamental way of obtaining knowledge: deriving it directly from experience. In other words, I think that we need analogata—raw data, the “terms” of analogies—before we can make analogies.

It would be absurd to think otherwise! But look at your own words: “I think that we need analogata—raw data, the “terms” of analogies—before we can make analogies”. Were you saying “I think that we need to know analogata—raw data, the “terms” of analogies—before we can make analogies”; I would respond: “then, you would never know anything”.

 

[lmelahn]

Aristotelian relations, Imelahn!

Let’s consider this example: your infamous pine tree is bigger than my sweet cat. Now, what I say is that it’s through you that the relation is established. When you interact with both, you might establish this relation because you can compare certain interaction you have with them. If you were not there, they would be absolutely indifferent to each other in respect to size. It is like when you say that God is our creator and we are His creatures, but there is no real relation in God. I say that there is no “real relation” whatsoever. You are a being that establishes relations and so, relations come into the world…

What I cannot understand yet is the following. I think we both agree that the pine tree is bigger than your cat, and that the difference in size is independent us. It is not as if the tree and the cat magically become “bigger” and “smaller”*when a man considers them in his mind, right?

So the “bigness” and “smallness” of each thing is real—i.e., independent of us—at least to some degree.

But my question is this: the bigness and smallness cannot be elements of interaction, nor can they be interactions. In that case, what are they?

Can it always improve? Is the aristotelian thought infinite in some respect?

It is not Aristotelian thought, but our intellects, that are potentially infinite. We can always learn more.

There is a history of science, a history of theology, and a diversity of scientific and theological thoughts. Which of them must be the reference to qualify the aristotelian discourses as “correct” or “incorrect”?

All of them; philosophy should agree with the best science in any field. (On the same token, empirical science should not overstep its bounds.) In theology, we are fortunate to have a Magisterium that can help us. And it is not Aristotelian discourse, but any philosophy, that must be judged according to how well it explains reality.

That is fine! And we are living beings as well; so we “have” an immanent principle of motion too. And this is what St. Thomas says (Summa theologica, Part I, Question 18, Article 3):

…]

At least for St. Thomas it is not impossible for our intellect to move itself to some things. For you, it seems it is impossible. For me, it is ordinary.

I never denied that there is an intellectus agens, which is what Aquinas means by saying that our intellect ad aliqua se agat (roughly, “directs itself to certain things”). (See our first posts.) The idea of the intellectus agens might be a way of rapprochement between us.

To get from our sensory species (representations) to out intellect, we need an adapter, so to speak. More technically, there must be a power that bridges the incommensurability of the material product of perception with the immaterial intellect.

That is the intellectus agens. If you want to think of the product of the intellectus agens, the conceptus, as a kind of imitation of reality, I would be open to that.

I will insist, however, that the object of our knowledge is the reality, not the imitation or representation. We know cats, dogs, turnips, pine trees, and even JuanFlorencio. Not imitations of cats, dogs, turnips, pine trees, much less an imitation of JuanFlorencio.

 

[lmelahn]

However, we “have” an immanent principle of movement which allows us, for example, to establish relations and build systems of them which imitate reality, without needing the actualization of our potency by that same reality.

As I said, the intellectus agens may be a point of rapprochement.

I think there can be little question that our sensory and cognitive faculties are put into act by the outside world.

Then, when we apprehend something, the intellectus agens takes that “model” and puts our intellectus possibilis into act. (That is Thomas’ model.)

No, it is not your system nor mine; it is the way we know, always simplifying.

In that case, I would observe that the so-called “categories” are actually modes of being, manners in which a thing can be. We don’t make them up, but we encounter them in the world.

According to St. Thomas, the starting point to know things is their “external accidents”. This corresponds to sensory interactions, which are conscious. You can imitate reality thanks to conscious interactions.

Speaking as a Thomist, I don’t care for the term “external accidents” in this context. I think you meant the “proper sensibles”: colors, tastes, smells, touch stimuli, and so on. The proper objects of the external senses.

Do you think you have cleared the fog away? There was no fog, Imelahn, nor painted nor dirty windows, nor anything like that. Gadamer, Kuhn, I, whoever!, perceive your pine tree with the same clarity as any aristotelian or Thomist. Who has cleared the imaginary fog away?

No, I don’t think there is any fog. But, much as I admire Gadamer, I think that Gadamer thinks there is a fog that needs to be cleared.

It would be absurd to think otherwise! But look at your own words: “I think that we need analogata—raw data, the “terms” of analogies—before we can make analogies”. Were you saying “I think that we need to know analogata—raw data, the “terms” of analogies—before we can make analogies”; I would respond: “then, you would never know anything”.

I think there is a mode of knowledge that is proper and direct. Analogy is for less proper and indirect knowledge.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

What I cannot understand yet is the following. I think we both agree that the pine tree is bigger than your cat, and that the difference in size is independent us. It is not as if the tree and the cat magically become “bigger” and “smaller”*when a man considers them in his mind, right?

So the “bigness” and “smallness” of each thing is real—i.e., independent of us—at least to some degree.

But my question is this: the bigness and smallness cannot be elements of interaction, nor can they be interactions. In that case, what are they?

We don’t alter the cat nor the tree when we establish our relation of sizes between them. I guess that is what you intended to say.

Now, before we appear there, such relation does not exist at all between the cat and the tree. They are “indifferent” to each other, so to say. However, those elements of interaction do interact with us, and we compare the interactions. Is it clear?

It is not Aristotelian thought, but our intellects, that are potentially infinite. We can always learn more.

If you say you can always learn more from the same aristotelian discourses, then you do believe they are infinite in a sense.

All of them; philosophy should agree with the best science in any field. (On the same token, empirical science should not overstep its bounds.) In theology, we are fortunate to have a Magisterium that can help us. And it is not Aristotelian discourse, but any philosophy, that must be judged according to how well it explains reality.

I wasn’t clear, I am sorry. I wanted to say that science changes over the years (and the same happens to theology, and to any system of relations). And at a given moment, there are disagreements among scientists, and between scientists and theologians, and among theologians. Which one of the versions should be taken as the reference?

The reality is indifferent to the aristotelian discourses. It would be us who would need to judge them; but then we go back to the situation that I described above: which system of relations is the reference that must be used?

I never denied that there is an intellectus agens, which is what Aquinas means by saying that our intellect ad aliqua se agat (roughly, “directs itself to certain things”). (See our first posts.) The idea of the intellectus agens might be a way of rapprochement between us.

To get from our sensory species (representations) to out intellect, we need an adapter, so to speak. More technically, there must be a power that bridges the incommensurability of the material product of perception with the immaterial intellect.

That is the intellectus agens. If you want to think of the product of the intellectus agens, the conceptus, as a kind of imitation of reality, I would be open to that.

I will insist, however, that the object of our knowledge is the reality, not the imitation or representation. We know cats, dogs, turnips, pine trees, and even JuanFlorencio. Not imitations of cats, dogs, turnips, pine trees, much less an imitation of JuanFlorencio.

Great! However, it is not me who has said that we don’t “know” (to know is to establish relations) reality but an imitation of it. I have said that the imitation is the knowledge we have of reality. On the contrary, it is the Thomists who say that we know reality through phantasms.

Though, certainly, we do know relations as well, and we elaborate more relations taking them as elements. Those are the high order relations that I have mentioned in previous posts.

 

[lmelahn]

We don’t alter the cat nor the tree when we establish our relation of sizes between them. I guess that is what you intended to say.

Yes, in part, but, it seems to me, there must be some characteristic of the tree that actually makes it larger than the cat. (And a characteristic of the cat that makes it smaller than the tree.) Each one is larger or smaller, even when I am not looking, so to speak.

Now, before we appear there, such relation does not exist at all between the cat and the tree. They are “indifferent” to each other, so to say. However, those elements of interaction do interact with us, and we compare the interactions. Is it clear?

I think I have understood your position.

If you say you can always learn more from the same aristotelian discourses, then you do believe they are infinite in a sense.

Well, I can take what is true from Aristotle and work with it, if that is what you mean, yes. Aristotle has his limits, but I think he is fundamentally sound, and so we can use him as a starting point. I can’t really say the same for, say, Hegel.

I wasn’t clear, I am sorry. I wanted to say that science changes over the years (and the same happens to theology, and to any system of relations). And at a given moment, there are disagreements among scientists, and between scientists and theologians, and among theologians. Which one of the versions should be taken as the reference?

With theology it is easier in way, as I mentioned, because the Church has settled a lot of questions. Church dogma provides an invaluable resource to check the validity of a philosophical theory.

(For example: could the universe be all material? No, that would cause problems with the existence of angels and human souls. Does this philosophy’s definition of “person” square with the definition of Chalcedon regarding Christ’s two natures in one Person?)

However, in general: we should examine a philosophy in the light of the best theories. A good philosophical theory will not be terribly disturbed by advances in physics or chemistry. If it is tied to a particular cosmological model, it needs to be purified (as with Aristotle, in point of fact).

The reality is indifferent to the aristotelian discourses. It would be us who would need to judge them; but then we go back to the situation that I described above: which system of relations is the reference that must be used?

That is why knowledge needs to be grounded on something more solid than a system of relations. Knowledge cannot all be scaffolding. The scaffolding has to rest on something.

Great! However, it is not me who has said that we don’t “know” (to know is to establish relations) reality but an imitation of it. I have said that the imitation is the knowledge we have of reality. On the contrary, it is the Thomists who say that we know reality through phantasms.

Through phantasms (which are the sensory representations), but it is not the phantasms that we know.

Though, certainly, we do know relations as well, and we elaborate more relations taking them as elements. Those are the high order relations that I have mentioned in previous posts.

I see. I think the breakthrough here is seeing that at least some of the relations you speak of correspond to the judgment (composition/division) of Thomists: specifically the ones that join “elements of interaction” together.

Some of your low-order relations seem to correspond to my “reasonings,” whereas some of the low-order relations, I would call “concepts”—i.e., the fruit of apprehension, not judgement. At least tentatively.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Yes, in part, but, it seems to me, there must be some characteristic of the tree that actually makes it larger than the cat. (And a characteristic of the cat that makes it smaller than the tree.) Each one is larger or smaller, even when I am not looking, so to speak.

The relative size of the tree and the cat is determined by their natures, which in those things that have a nature is the source of their rest and motion. And their natures are determined by that efficient cause which is their generator, which gives them their matter-form constituents. And the ultimate " generator " is God.

Nature is in each thing that from which flows all natural operations and actions. This would include growth. And there would be other environmental factors touching on growth and size which are imposed from the outside. But absent the nature there would be no growth at all.

Linus2nd

 

[Richca]

That is fine! And we are living beings as well; so we “have” an immanent principle of motion too. And this is what St. Thomas says (Summa theologica, Part I, Question 18, Article 3):

“*Other things have self-movement in a higher degree, that is, not only with regard to executing the movement, but even as regards to the form, the principle of movement, which form they acquire of themselves. Of this kind are animals, in which the principle of movement is not a naturally implanted form; but one received through sense. Hence the more perfect is their sense, the more perfect is their power of self-movement. Such as have only the sense of touch, as shellfish, move only with the motion of expansion and contraction; and thus their movement hardly exceeds that of plants. Whereas such as have the sensitive power in perfection, so as to recognize not only connection and touch, but also objects apart from themselves, can move themselves to a distance by progressive movement. Yet although animals of the latter kind receive through sense the form that is the principle of their movement, nevertheless they cannot of themselves propose to themselves the end of their operation, or movement; for this has been implanted in them by nature; and by natural instinct they are moved to any action through the form apprehended by sense. Hence such animals as move themselves in respect to an end they themselves propose are superior to these. This can only be done by reason and intellect; whose province it is to know the proportion between the end and the means to that end, and duly coordinate them. Hence a more perfect degree of life is that of intelligible beings; for their power of self-movement is more perfect. This is shown by the fact that in one and the same man the intellectual faculty moves the sensitive powers; and these by their command move the organs of movement. Thus in the arts we see that the art of using a ship, i.e. the art of navigation, rules the art of ship-designing; and this in its turn rules the art that is only concerned with preparing the material for the ship.”

"But although our intellect moves itself to some things*, yet others are supplied by nature, as are first principles, which it cannot doubt; and the last end, which it cannot but will. Hence, although with respect to some things it moves itself, yet with regard to other things it must be moved by another. Wherefore that being whose act of understanding is its very nature, and which, in what it naturally possesses, is not determined by another, must have life in the most perfect degree. Such is God; and hence in Him principally is life. From this the Philosopher concludes (Metaph. xii, 51), after showing God to be intelligent, that God has life most perfect and eternal, since His intellect is most perfect and always in act…

At least for St. Thomas it is not impossible for our intellect to move itself to some things. For you, it seems it is impossible. For me, it is ordinary.

On the other hand, St Thomas says that the intellect is a passive power (ST, Pt. I, Q.79, art.2). St Thomas also distinguishes between powers and their operations or acts in which the powers are related to their operation or acts as potency to act. Operation is the act of a power, it is called second act. In the act of understanding of human beings, the intelligible species or forms of things is the act of the intellectual power. As the sensible in act is the sense in act, so the intelligible in act is the intellect in act. The intelligible species or forms are abstracted from the phantasms which we get from the impressions we receive through our senses from external sense objects. The intellect can also retain intelligible species in the memory in which case to reconsider such species it need not be moved by some external sense object though it does not reconsider the intelligible species without a phantasm. In this case though, the intellect is in potentiality to reconsidering. When St Thomas says that the intellect moves itself to some things, he may be considering the case of a habit of knowledge or science where in as I just said, the intelligible species or knowledge is in the memory. Since a potentiality cannot raise itself to actuality, in the last analysis the intellect is ultimately moved by God, the first mover, to its act.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

Well, I can take what is true from Aristotle and work with it, if that is what you mean, yes. Aristotle has his limits, but I think he is fundamentally sound, and so we can use him as a starting point. I can’t really say the same for, say, Hegel.

There must be someone who says he can work with Hegel’s doctrines, and probably he thinks he couldn’t do it with Aristotle writings. I am just describing something that happens. Based only on that, it could not be said that Aristotle is fundamentally sound because you think he is fundamentally sound.

With theology it is easier in way, as I mentioned, because the Church has settled a lot of questions. Church dogma provides an invaluable resource to check the validity of a philosophical theory.

(For example: could the universe be all material? No, that would cause problems with the existence of angels and human souls. Does this philosophy’s definition of “person” square with the definition of Chalcedon regarding Christ’s two natures in one Person?)

However, in general: we should examine a philosophy in the light of the best theories. A good philosophical theory will not be terribly disturbed by advances in physics or chemistry. If it is tied to a particular cosmological model, it needs to be purified (as with Aristotle, in point of fact).

Certainly, we, as Catholics, are lucky; but in philosophy we are open to controversy with people who do not share our beliefs. So, we need to resort on something else. You say that we should examine philosophies in the light of the best theories. However, you just have taken a step back: how do you determine which are the best theories?

That is why knowledge needs to be grounded on something more solid than a system of relations. Knowledge cannot all be scaffolding. The scaffolding has to rest on something.

A theory (even “the best one”) is a system of relations. So, in your comment above you weren’t saying anything more than I said before.

Aristotle said that any reasoning has to start with evident statements which, as a consequence, do not need a demonstration. But I think he was aware that those statements are not evident to everybody. He didn’t reflect on it anymore.

I tend to think that if we carefully study any system of relations and we try to reproduce the fundamental experiences, in time we will be able to see the viability of the system (based exclusively on those experiences); but as we probably will have some other experiences as well, we probably will be able to see weaknesses and gaps in it. The doctrine could even become unacceptable to us in the light of those additional experiences.

That is why I think the foundation of our judgement should not be “the best theories”, but the sets of experiences that “the best theories” intend to explain (imitate). However, we should be extremely careful, because it is so easy to think that we are dealing with experiences when in fact we are still dealing with theories (we should ask ourselves, for example, “is chirality an experience or does it contain theoretical elements?”; “are force or energy experiences, or do they contain theoretical elements?”, etcetera).

There is nothing unusual on starting with what we believe are sound statements, but we should always remain conscious of our being humans, that is, creatures who simultaneously belong to two realms: the realm of interactions and the realm of relations. If you base all your intellectual work on systems that you received already done, you could build something more complex, but you will lose your chance to make it more powerful. Aristotle is dead, and as a consequence, he is pure relation now. You are alive (you interact), but you can make the mistake of behaving like a dead man.

I see. I think the breakthrough here is seeing that at least some of the relations you speak of correspond to the judgment (composition/division) of Thomists: specifically the ones that join “elements of interaction” together.

Some of your high-order relations seem to correspond to my “reasonings,” whereas some of the low-order relations, I would call “concepts”—i.e., the fruit of apprehension, not judgement. At least tentatively.

I think so too, Imelahn.

 

[John_Martin]

Yes, Aristotle is dead (Aquinas, also); yet there has not become a new species of rational animal since he lived, therefore it is quite certain that when I know myself and the world I will be doing so with his description of what is happening in my knowing, using the habits of wisdom, science, and knowledge to bring the species and at times individuals of the phantasms to my passive intellect, and if some desirable thing, tend my will to move my cognition to imagine an object of the union with the thing desired moving my passions of my appetites to move my hands and feet to union. Understood or not, his description happened then with him and happens now with you in your knowing and acting.

As said before, everyone works and lives and knows as described by Aristotle, and if they wish to know what they are doing, and how, and be a doctor for the souls of others, they learn from him, or better, Thomas.

But it is bouncing in my thoughts right now how Jesus spoke in parables to the crowd, but only to his disciples did he speak plainly.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

Yes, Aristotle is dead (Aquinas, also); yet there has not become a new species of rational animal since he lived, therefore it is quite certain that when I know myself and the world I will be doing so with his description of what is happening in my knowing, using the habits of wisdom, science, and knowledge to bring the species and at times individuals of the phantasms to my passive intellect, and if some desirable thing, tend my will to move my cognition to imagine an object of the union with the thing desired moving my passions of my appetites to move my hands and feet to union. Understood or not, his description happened then with him and happens now with you in your knowing and acting.

As said before, everyone works and lives and knows as described by Aristotle, and if they wish to know what they are doing, and how, and be a doctor for the souls of others, they learn from him, or better, Thomas.

But it is bouncing in my thoughts right now how Jesus spoke in parables to the crowd, but only to his disciples did he speak plainly.

No one around here is Jesus, John. Certainly human beings now are the same as they were at the times of Aristotle. Aristotle was a very active man, always producing new knowledge; but once he died, his corpus is what it is. However, a lot of new experiences in every area of the Aristotelian encyclopedia is available now.

When you, for instance, chose to refute Kant in your mind by reading Schopenhauer (“with whom you don’t entirely agree”), instead of comparing it with your experiences, you are behaving like a dead man, with no capacity to experience anything by yourself. That is what I am talking about. But if you don’t have the means to do so, it is ok if for your life you just read St. Thomas (read every one of his writings, and repeat his good discourses to all around you); but never pretend you have refuted Kant, or anybody else, without having spent the necessary time to comprehend him.

 

[John_Martin]

No one around here is Jesus, John. Certainly human beings now are the same as they were at the times of Aristotle. Aristotle was a very active man, always producing new knowledge; but once he died, his corpus is what it is. However, a lot of new experiences in every area of the Aristotelian encyclopedia is available now.

When you, for instance, chose to refute Kant in your mind by reading Schopenhauer (“with whom you don’t entirely agree”), instead of comparing it with your experiences, you are behaving like a dead man, with no capacity to experience anything by yourself. That is what I am talking about. But if you don’t have the means to do so, it is ok if for your life you just read St. Thomas (read every one of his writings, and repeat his good discourses to all around you); but never pretend you have refuted Kant, or anybody else, without having spent the necessary time to comprehend him.

I believe what I said IS Experience, not repeating, and it is experience that is accurately described - the joyful part is knowing what is happening and viewing it with understanding:

True, no one of us is Jesus, yet we are obliged to put him on - the “habit” of Christ (Romans 13) - we are not permitted some excuse of saying, “Well, I am not Jesus”.