How do we come to know things?

[JuanFlorencio]

On the other hand, St Thomas says that the intellect is a passive power (ST, Pt. I, Q.79, art.2). St Thomas also distinguishes between powers and their operations or acts in which the powers are related to their operation or acts as potency to act. Operation is the act of a power, it is called second act. In the act of understanding of human beings, the intelligible species or forms of things is the act of the intellectual power. As the sensible in act is the sense in act, so the intelligible in act is the intellect in act. The intelligible species or forms are abstracted from the phantasms which we get from the impressions we receive through our senses from external sense objects. The intellect can also retain intelligible species in the memory in which case to reconsider such species it need not be moved by some external sense object though it does not reconsider the intelligible species without a phantasm. In this case though, the intellect is in potentiality to reconsidering. When St Thomas says that the intellect moves itself to some things, he may be considering the case of a habit of knowledge or science where in as I just said, the intelligible species or knowledge is in the memory. Since a potentiality cannot raise itself to actuality, in the last analysis the intellect is ultimately moved by God, the first mover, to its act.

I really don’t think so. It would be comparable to the situation in which a body receives an impetus and without the influence of any other body it continues moving along a rectilinear path with uniform speed. But in that case, we wouldn’t say that after receiving the impetus the body moves itself. So with the intellect: retaining an intelligible species wouldn’t be “moving itself”. That is not what St. Thomas said.

It is said in the Thomist doctrines that the will follows the intellect. But if the intellect is passive, so that it always needs to be actuated, then the will is also actuated indirectly. Therefore, the will is not free. Is this what you think?

 

[lmelahn]

There must be someone who says he can work with Hegel’s doctrines, and probably he thinks he couldn’t do it with Aristotle writings.

Yes, Feuerbach, Marx, Engels…

Curiously, Hegel’s philosophy works kind of like the “Borg” in Star-Trek: it just assimilates all of its adversaries, instead of refuting them.

But there are objective reasons for rejecting Hegel’s system: for one thing, it permits patent contradictions; it is a true “ideology” that allows nothing to contradict it; it makes affirmations that go against simple, everyday experience.

<…> Based only on that, it could not be said that Aristotle is fundamentally sound because you think he is fundamentally sound.

No, of course not. But see below.

<…> However, you just have taken a step back: how do you determine which are the best theories?

Let’s take a step back ourselves.

When we evaluate a theory of any kind—philosophical, theological, scientific—there are objective epistemological criteria we can use to see if it is correct, or at least viable, or not. For example:

(1) It should not contradict anything that is evident to all people. Contra factum non argumentum est. (See below for more comments on this idea.)

(2) It should be logically coherent. No patent contradictions, or circular reasoning, or any other logical fallacies.

(3) More derived and difficult conclusions (relations, in your parlance) should be based on the ones that are more direct and easily known.

(4) A discipline should respect its ambit and method. The First Science (philosophy) should deal with the most fundamental causes and properties of reality; second sciences (empirical sciences, mathematics, history, grammar, or whatever it is) should seek the causes and properties of their object of study. Neither level should interfere with the other (although they can, of course, mutually illuminate one another).

(That is why, more often than not, the particular findings of physics or chemistry do not fundamentally alter the findings of philosophy: they do not place the ultimate causes in doubt, just the proximate or secondary causes. Moreover, philosophy has the role of discovering the foundation for the second sciences; however, people can legitimately conduct those second sciences even when they do not know the foundation.)

When we examine Aristotle’s system, we find that it fairs rather well against these criteria. It needs some purification in order to pass criterion 4, and there are cases in which Aristotle fails to follow his own logic. However, on the whole the system is coherent and squares with the notions that are evident to everyone. We can work with Aristotle and improve his system.

On the other hand, Hegel, for example, has a lot of far-fetched ideas that do not square with our experience, uses highly circular reasoning, admits flat-out contradictions, and frequently draws strictly scientific (as in empirical science) conclusions (many of which have since been convincingly refuted). Hence, although some of his ideas are interesting, his system, as a whole, does not work.

A theory (even “the best one”) is a system of relations. <…>.

What I am trying to say is that those relations need to be grounded ultimately in—if I can use the term—first-order relations: i.e., ones that are taken directly from sensory evidence.

Aristotle said that any reasoning has to start with evident statements which, as a consequence, do not need a demonstration. But I think he was aware that those statements are not evident to everybody. He didn’t reflect on it anymore.

Perhaps not, but Aquinas did. He says that things can be evident in themselves (per se nota), but that does not necessarily mean that they can be easily known by all men. For example, that the square of 854 is 729316 is per se notum, but because of its difficulty, it is only known to experts. To found a science, we have to begin with things that are not only per se nota, but also easily known by all men (quoad nos).

Aquinas makes a great analogy on this score. What is more luminous per se? A lamp, or the sun? The sun, of course. But which one is easier for us to look at? The lamp, because the sun is actually too bright for our eyes. On the other hand, a stone in a dark room would be impossible to see, because it produces no light at all.

In the same way, some things are difficult to know because they are so poor, so lacking in consistency (one thinks in modern physics of quantum indeterminism). Other things are difficult to know because they are too rich, and they overpower our intellects (that is the case, for example, with God). In order to get to either extreme, we need to begin with what is most easily knowable by us (quoad nos): which is the things that are accessible to our senses.

<…>

That is why I think the foundation of our judgement should not be “the best theories”, but the sets of experiences that “the best theories” intend to explain (imitate).<…>

What you are saying is reasonable, but see my comments above for my full thoughts.

There is nothing unusual on starting with what we believe are sound statements, but we should always remain conscious of our being humans, that is, creatures who simultaneously belong to two realms: the realm of interactions and the realm of relations. If you base all your intellectual work on systems that you received already done, you could build something more complex, but you will lose your chance to make it more powerful. Aristotle is dead, and as a consequence, he is pure relation now. You are alive (you interact), but you can make the mistake of behaving like a dead man.

I treat Aristotle as a good starting point, that is all. We can expand on his insights, and correct him if necessary.

 

[utunumsint]

That is why I think the foundation of our judgement should not be “the best theories”, but the sets of experiences that “the best theories” intend to explain (imitate).

I treat Aristotle as a good starting point, that is all. We can expand on his insights, and correct him if necessary.

I also think we can build on the foundation of Aristotle and Aquinas with great fruitfulness, as Pope John Paul II did with his personalism (Phenomenology). I’m currently re-reading Love and Responsibility, and I found it interesting to see how Thomistic he is in his metaphysics, grounding the sexual urge in the transmission of existence, thus taking the discussion out of the merely biological realm into the existential philosophical realm. I believe Edith Stein also merged Husserl’s phenomenology with Thomistic thinking, although I have not read her works yet.

In all of these examples, I find Thomism as providing a firm metaphysical grounding that keeps, at least Pope John Paul II, well routed in traditional thinking. He even mentions personalism in a few encyclicals, such as Ut Unum Sint in paragraph 28.

Others seem to go much further afield, seemingly conceding too much to the modern philosophies. For example, some of the transcendental Thomists seem to get criticized in this way, such as Rahner, Lonergan. I don’t know if this is fair or not.

What I appreciate about Saint Thomas is his grounding in things most easily known to the senses. (What Juan might call “sets of experiences”). All his metaphysics ultimately has this grounding. This grounding keeps him accountable (and those that fallow him). If you look at the data he collects, it ends up being fairly modest in scope, and tends to exclude more than it includes. But what he can glean from this little data becomes vast in its applicability. His Metaphysics, for instance, can applied to any science. Aristotle’s rules of logic are still foundational, and still taught today in 1st year philosophy classes. Aristotle and Aquinas’ teachings can be brought into dialogue with the thinking of other cultures and religions.

I certainly don’t think he is infallible, but he is certainly worth learning. For a variety of reasons. Not the least of which is how foundational he is to many catholic thinkers throughout history, and how his theology and philosophy can help in providing a starting point for understanding earlier writers, theologians, and philosophers.

God bless,
Ut

 

[inocente]

When we evaluate a theory of any kind—philosophical, theological, scientific—there are objective epistemological criteria we can use to see if it is correct, or at least viable, or not. For example:

(1) It should not contradict anything that is evident to all people. Contra factum non argumentum est. (See below for more comments on this idea.)

(2) It should be logically coherent. No patent contradictions, or circular reasoning, or any other logical fallacies.

(3) More derived and difficult conclusions (relations, in your parlance) should be based on the ones that are more direct and easily known.

(4) A discipline should respect its ambit and method. The First Science (philosophy) should deal with the most fundamental causes and properties of reality; second sciences (empirical sciences, mathematics, history, grammar, or whatever it is) should seek the causes and properties of their object of study. Neither level should interfere with the other (although they can, of course, mutually illuminate one another).

Using the categories of transactional analysis rather than those of Aristotle, “should” signifies a parent state in critic mode, and rules can tend to generate games.

Rule (1) would prevent any theory from overthrowing received dogma. Suppose it was evident to all people that the earth is the center of the world or that "from the hour of their birth, some are marked out for subjection, others for rule” (to quote Aristotle on the nature of slavery in Politics). Perhaps instead of this rule, evaluation is more about substantiation, where what substantiates depends on the discipline.

I suggest rules (2) and (3) are unnecessary since a theory must be logically consistent or by definition it isn’t a theory.

Rule (4) would impose a regulatory hierarchy, including a court, since one man’s illumination is another mans’ interference. Nor is it clear why other disciplines would agree to the philosophy department’s notion of what is primary and secondary, or why philosophers alone are allowed to cogitate on the most fundamental causes and properties of reality, and what grievous penalties await playwrights (and taxi drivers) who dare cross that line. Perhaps instead of authorities, it’s about whether a theory is more powerful (simpler or more embracing) than alternatives.

 

[Richca]

I really don’t think so. It would be comparable to the situation in which a body receives an impetus and without the influence of any other body it continues moving along a rectilinear path with uniform speed. But in that case, we wouldn’t say that after receiving the impetus the body moves itself. So with the intellect: retaining an intelligible species wouldn’t be “moving itself”. That is not what St. Thomas said.

It is said in the Thomist doctrines that the will follows the intellect. But if the intellect is passive, so that it always needs to be actuated, then the will is also actuated indirectly. Therefore, the will is not free. Is this what you think?

No, St Thomas says the will is free and this is what Holy Scripture says and the catholic faith. St Thomas holds to the catholic faith in all things as well as what Holy Scripture says as Sacred Doctrine is the highest truth. The will and intellect interplay on each other, i.e., the will moves the intellect and the intellect moves the will. St Thomas says the intellect moves the will as an end moves an agent and the will moves the intellect as an agent cause. An agent cause is an efficient cause so the will moves the intellect as an efficient cause. An end or final cause is the cause of causes or the first of causes for the end moves the agent to act. The intellect does not move the will as an efficient cause but as an end moves an agent to act.

The object of the will is the good and the intellect presents to the will its object which in the life are particularized goods formed by the judgement of the intellect. In the absence of the beatific vision which is the vision of the universal good and which necessarily moves the will as it is the perfect good, the will is not necessarily moved by any of the particular goods that the intellect presents to it in this life. Although, if it is to will anything it must choose some object presented to it by the intellect under the aspect of good. Choice is substantially an act of the will but formally an act of the reason (cf, ST, Pt. I-II, Q. 13, art.1).

 

[JuanFlorencio]

No, St Thomas says the will is free and this is what Holy Scripture says and the catholic faith. St Thomas holds to the catholic faith in all things as well as what Holy Scripture says as Sacred Doctrine is the highest truth. The will and intellect interplay on each other, i.e., the will moves the intellect and the intellect moves the will. St Thomas says the intellect moves the will as an end moves an agent and the will moves the intellect as an agent cause. An agent cause is an efficient cause so the will moves the intellect as an efficient cause. An end or final cause is the cause of causes or the first of causes for the end moves the agent to act. The intellect does not move the will as an efficient cause but as an end moves an agent to act.

I would like to see where does St. Thomas says that “the intellect moves the will as an end moves an agent and the will moves the intellect as an agent cause. An agent cause is an efficient cause so the will moves the intellect as an efficient cause”. This sounds like the “perpetual motion machine”. While you let me know where does St. Thomas says it, please tell me: is the intellect the object of the will (because you say that it moves the will as an end moves an agent)? And, if the will moves the intellect as its efficient cause, what is the act with which the will actualizes the intellect?

The object of the will is the good and the intellect presents to the will its object which in the life are particularized goods formed by the judgement of the intellect. In the absence of the beatific vision which is the vision of the universal good and which necessarily moves the will as it is the perfect good, the will is not necessarily moved by any of the particular goods that the intellect presents to it in this life. Although, if it is to will anything it must choose some object presented to it by the intellect under the aspect of good. Choice is substantially an act of the will but formally an act of the reason (cf, ST, Pt. I-II, Q. 13, art.1).

“The object of the will is the good and the intellect presents to the will its object which in the life are particularized goods formed by the judgement of the intellect” means the same as “the will follows the intellect”. So, you say that the intellect moves the will as a final cause, and not necessarily; and I understand your expression “particularized goods” as “alternative goods”. Even though bottom line the will is moved by the intellect, the movement is not necessarily this way or that way. Sounds good!

So, the conclusion would be that the will moves itself. Still, this would not prove that the will moves the intellect efficiently; and if it does, it would imply that, as volitive-cognitive beings, we move ourselves.

On the other hand, look how St. Thomas insists on the idea that the intellect moves itself (ST, Pt. I-II, Q. 9, art.3): “I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), it belongs to the will to move the other powers, by reason of the end which is the will’s object. Now, as stated above (Question 8, Article 2), the end is in things appetible, what the principle is in things intelligible. But it is evident that the intellect, through its knowledge of the principle, reduces itself from potentiality to act, as to its knowledge of the conclusions; and thus it moves itself. And, in like manner, the will, through its volition of the end, moves itself to will the means.”

 

[lmelahn]

Using the categories of transactional analysis rather than those of Aristotle, “should” signifies a parent state in critic mode, and rules can tend to generate games.

Naturally, I mean “should” in the ordinary sense that the context gives it: i.e., in order to have a viable theory, we need to follow these common-sense rules.

Rule (1) would prevent any theory from overthrowing received dogma. Suppose it was evident to all people that the earth is the center of the world or that "from the hour of their birth, some are marked out for subjection, others for rule” (to quote Aristotle on the nature of slavery in Politics). Perhaps instead of this rule, evaluation is more about substantiation, where what substantiates depends on the discipline.

I think we need to define our terms carefully. That which is “evident” is absolutely not the same thing as “that which everyone thinks is true.” It means that which can be known, either by direct observation (like when I look out my window and see the green pine tree; I cannot truthfully say it is red), or simply by examining the notions involved (as when I say a square has four sides).

A so-called dogma like saying that the earth is the center is not at all evident. If fact, it is a good example of jumping to conclusions. (How can someone determine his relative position in a system without first knowing the general layout of the system?) Similarly with slavery: its so-called “naturalness”*is not at all evident, because, in fact, all men look and act alike. Rather, the acceptance of slavery by Aristotle and his contemporaries shows what can happen when get attached to evil behavior and seek excuses to perpetuate it.

(This is a weakness in Aristotle: he does not follow his own principles to their ultimate consequences.)

I suggest rules (2) and (3) are unnecessary since a theory must be logically consistent or by definition it isn’t a theory.

I agree in principle. However, the problem is that there have been plenty of logically contradictory pseudo-theories out there, and we need way of distinguishing a quack theory from a real one.

Rule (4) would impose a regulatory hierarchy, including a court, since one man’s illumination is another mans’ interference. Nor is it clear why other disciplines would agree to the philosophy department’s notion of what is primary and secondary, or why philosophers alone are allowed to cogitate on the most fundamental causes and properties of reality, and what grievous penalties await playwrights (and taxi drivers) who dare cross that line. Perhaps instead of authorities, it’s about whether a theory is more powerful (simpler or more embracing) than alternatives.

The hierarchy is there by the very nature of the sciences involved. The very question of what distinguishes a primary from a secondary science is one that is beyond the scope of something like physics, chemistry, or biology. Hence, if we do entertain such questions, it is part of the First Science (philosophy).

It is not question of only allowing philosophers to philosophize; it is just an acknowledgment that, when philosophical questions are being considered, the person (whether he has a degree in philosophy or not) is engaging in philosophy.

If I were to say (as not a few scientists have said) that empirically verifiable data are the only source of valid knowledge, then I am making a philosophical affirmation. If one examines that principle, one realizes that there is a problem, because the affirmation is itself not empirically verifiable. Be that as it may, it is not an issue that pertains to physics, chemistry, or biology, nor even exactly to psychology. Rather, it is a neatly epistemological issue.

Moreover, it would be an example of empirical science overstepping its bounds. Clearly, physical knowledge (the knowledge proper to the science of physics) depends ultimately on that which is empirically verifiable. It is does not follow that other knowledge, outside the ambit of physics, cannot be obtained by other means.

 

[inocente]

I think we need to define our terms carefully. That which is “evident” is absolutely not the same thing as “that which everyone thinks is true.” It means that which can be known, either by direct observation (like when I look out my window and see the green pine tree; I cannot truthfully say it is red), or simply by examining the notions involved (as when I say a square has four sides).

A so-called dogma like saying that the earth is the center is not at all evident. If fact, it is a good example of jumping to conclusions. (How can someone determine his relative position in a system without first knowing the general layout of the system?) Similarly with slavery: its so-called “naturalness”*is not at all evident, because, in fact, all men look and act alike. Rather, the acceptance of slavery by Aristotle and his contemporaries shows what can happen when get attached to evil behavior and seek excuses to perpetuate it.

(This is a weakness in Aristotle: he does not follow his own principles to their ultimate consequences.)

But evidently the earth is the center of the world. Not only does it explain why things fall, it explains the locations of heaven and hell, and our special place, and a creator God, and our relationship to Him and to each other - as in Schiller’s “Gladly, just as His suns hurtle / through the glorious universe, / So you, brothers, should run your course, / joyfully, like a conquering hero. / Be embraced, you millions! / This kiss is for the whole world! / Brothers, above the canopy of stars / must dwell a loving father. / Do you bow down before Him, you millions? / Do you sense your Creator, o world? / Seek Him above the canopy of stars! / He must dwell beyond the stars”.

In many ways that’s far more evident than Douglas Adams’ description of Earth as “an utterly insignificant little blue-green planet far out in the uncharted backwaters of the unfashionable end of the western spiral arm of the galaxy”, yet we buy into Lemaître’s bizarre notion that what is now trillions upon trillions of suns and planets once fitted into a space as small as a man’s hand.

It isn’t just that Aristotle got some things wrong, nor that his categories have to be contorted somewhat to fit in with modern knowledge. There is a broader issue that what was once evident to (say) Native Americans was not evident to Aristotle, and his reality is not our reality.

I agree in principle. However, the problem is that there have been plenty of logically contradictory pseudo-theories out there, and we need way of distinguishing a quack theory from a real one.

Agreed.

*The hierarchy is there by the very nature of the sciences involved. The very question of what distinguishes a primary from a secondary science is one that is beyond the scope of something like physics, chemistry, or biology. Hence, if we do entertain such questions, it is part of the First Science (philosophy).

It is not question of only allowing philosophers to philosophize; it is just an acknowledgment that, when philosophical questions are being considered, the person (whether he has a degree in philosophy or not) is engaging in philosophy.

If I were to say (as not a few scientists have said) that empirically verifiable data are the only* source of valid knowledge, then I am making a philosophical affirmation. If one examines that principle, one realizes that there is a problem, because the affirmation is itself not empirically verifiable. Be that as it may, it is not an issue that pertains to physics, chemistry, or biology, nor even exactly to psychology. Rather, it is a neatly epistemological issue.

Moreover, it would be an example of empirical science overstepping its bounds. Clearly, physical knowledge (the knowledge proper to the science of physics) depends ultimately on that which is empirically verifiable. It is does not follow that other knowledge, outside the ambit of physics, cannot be obtained by other means.

Personally, the great thing about philosophies is there are so many to choose from. Perhaps none are correct, but to me the value is in exploring how they each reach their differing conclusions.

So I’d bracket philosophy with the arts rather than the sciences. We only need one theory of gravity, while it’s absolutely necessary to have a thousand philosophies, just as it’s necessary to have a thousand love sonnets, because no single one can capture the entirety. I see why philosophers might long to settle on one, but would question whether their methodology even allows them access to the whole of the human condition.

As for scientism, back in the stone age, hunters developed tactics to bring down their prey, not caring whether they were logically consistent, but only in the empirical evidence of a full belly. There is value in pragmatism. Of course, they probably thought dancing around the campfire the previous evening also had something to do with success, which is where my analogy breaks down.

Or maybe not, because in addition to reason and intuition, a modern theory of knowledge would speak of knowledge from emotion, imagination and faith, areas which Aristotle, and perhaps philosophers in general, appear to devalue. We live in a scientific age, an age of reason, but a lot of what we know is unreasonable. We may not agree with all of Schiller’s words, but at a deep level we know for sure that the music of Ode to Joy is in some sense true, youtube.com/watch?v=kbJcQYVtZMo

 

[JuanFlorencio]

But evidently the earth is the center of the world. Not only does it explain why things fall, it explains the locations of heaven and hell, and our special place, and a creator God, and our relationship to Him and to each other - as in Schiller’s “Gladly, just as His suns hurtle / through the glorious universe, / So you, brothers, should run your course, / joyfully, like a conquering hero. / Be embraced, you millions! / This kiss is for the whole world! / Brothers, above the canopy of stars / must dwell a loving father. / Do you bow down before Him, you millions? / Do you sense your Creator, o world? / Seek Him above the canopy of stars! / He must dwell beyond the stars”.

In many ways that’s far more evident than Douglas Adams’ description of Earth as “an utterly insignificant little blue-green planet far out in the uncharted backwaters of the unfashionable end of the western spiral arm of the galaxy”, yet we buy into Lemaître’s bizarre notion that what is now trillions upon trillions of suns and planets once fitted into a space as small as a man’s hand.

It isn’t just that Aristotle got some things wrong, nor that his categories have to be contorted somewhat to fit in with modern knowledge. There is a broader issue that what was once evident to (say) Native Americans was not evident to Aristotle, and his reality is not our reality.

Agreed.

Personally, the great thing about philosophies is there are so many to choose from. Perhaps none are correct, but to me the value is in exploring how they each reach their differing conclusions.

So I’d bracket philosophy with the arts rather than the sciences. We only need one theory of gravity, while it’s absolutely necessary to have a thousand philosophies, just as it’s necessary to have a thousand love sonnets, because no single one can capture the entirety. I see why philosophers might long to settle on one, but would question whether their methodology even allows them access to the whole of the human condition.

As for scientism, back in the stone age, hunters developed tactics to bring down their prey, not caring whether they were logically consistent, but only in the empirical evidence of a full belly. There is value in pragmatism. Of course, they probably thought dancing around the campfire the previous evening also had something to do with success, which is where my analogy breaks down.

Or maybe not, because in addition to reason and intuition, a modern theory of knowledge would speak of knowledge from emotion, imagination and faith, areas which Aristotle, and perhaps philosophers in general, appear to devalue. We live in a scientific age, an age of reason, but a lot of what we know is unreasonable. We may not agree with all of Schiller’s words, but at a deep level we know for sure that the music of Ode to Joy is in some sense true, youtube.com/watch?v=kbJcQYVtZMo

Oh, beautiful! (The music too).

 

[JuanFlorencio]

Yes, Feuerbach, Marx, Engels…

Curiously, Hegel’s philosophy works kind of like the “Borg” in Star-Trek: it just assimilates all of its adversaries, instead of refuting them.

Does he do that? It is very interesting: That is precisely what a pantheistic thinker has to do to be consistent.

But there are objective reasons for rejecting Hegel’s system: for one thing, it permits patent contradictions; it is a true “ideology” that allows nothing to contradict it; it makes affirmations that go against simple, everyday experience.

Yes, Imelahn; and it is not more than what I have said before: based exclusively on the experiences that gave birth to a system of relations, it is possible to see its viability; but if you consider some additional experiences it may happen that you are even forced to reject the system.

What I am trying to say is that those relations need to be grounded ultimately in—if I can use the term—first-order relations: i.e., ones that are taken directly from sensory evidence.

Absolutely!

Now, in the development of the various existing discourses, it is necessary to distinguish the first higher order relations that are “derived” starting from a set of first order relations. Those relations are extremely important. It is essential to determine how they are established. For example: you and I might very well be starting from the same first order relations, but while you say that we discover them or even that reality impresses them on our mind (which are different interpretations, if you notice; though they coincide in the idea that relations belong to the “real order”), I say that we establish them (that relations belong to the “mental order”).

What is it that produces the divergence?

I can tell you that there are many points of divergence like this one, and the high order relations that appear at those points constitute the originality of the different doctrines.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

When we evaluate a theory of any kind—philosophical, theological, scientific—there are objective epistemological criteria we can use to see if it is correct, or at least viable, or not. For example:

(1) It should not contradict anything that is evident to all people. Contra factum non argumentum est. (See below for more comments on this idea.)

(2) It should be logically coherent. No patent contradictions, or circular reasoning, or any other logical fallacies.

(3) More derived and difficult conclusions (relations, in your parlance) should be based on the ones that are more direct and easily known.

(4) A discipline should respect its ambit and method. The First Science (philosophy) should deal with the most fundamental causes and properties of reality; second sciences (empirical sciences, mathematics, history, grammar, or whatever it is) should seek the causes and properties of their object of study. Neither level should interfere with the other (although they can, of course, mutually illuminate one another).

(That is why, more often than not, the particular findings of physics or chemistry do not fundamentally alter the findings of philosophy: they do not place the ultimate causes in doubt, just the proximate or secondary causes. Moreover, philosophy has the role of discovering the foundation for the second sciences; however, people can legitimately conduct those second sciences even when they do not know the foundation.)

When we examine Aristotle’s system, we find that it fairs rather well against these criteria. It needs some purification in order to pass criterion 4, and there are cases in which Aristotle fails to follow his own logic. However, on the whole the system is coherent and squares with the notions that are evident to everyone. We can work with Aristotle and improve his system.

On the other hand, Hegel, for example, has a lot of far-fetched ideas that do not square with our experience, uses highly circular reasoning, admits flat-out contradictions, and frequently draws strictly scientific (as in empirical science) conclusions (many of which have since been convincingly refuted). Hence, although some of his ideas are interesting, his system, as a whole, does not work.

1. 
   *]You never make a poll to determine if a theory is viable. You certainly can benefit from the discussion with others about the viability of a system, but in the end it is you alone who judge. In the first step you superimpose the doctrine under revision (which you should know thoroughly, as George Berkeley demanded) upon your basic set of first order relations. Then, you are missing the analysis of the possible points of divergence, in which second order relations originate.
   *]Yes, the analysis of higher order relations is a logical analysis (in which, from what I have seen, you are wanting at some difficult moments).
   *]This is not different from 2.
   *]This is not different from 2 either. Look how people working on different disciplines produce new second order relations, and some times they are even able to promote novel interactions. If any system must be based ultimately on first order relations, I don’t see why we should not consider some of them just because they belong (as a result of scientific traditions) to other disciplines. Also, I think that we are forced to consider carefully the second order relations which belong to those same disciplines (for example, those that belong to the relativistic and quantum physics) and which might be relevant to the subject under our investigation.
   
   If logics is still to be considered a philosophical discipline, then I think that it belongs to philosophy the logical analysis of theories (your point #2); but more fundamentally, the analysis of second order relations, which is not based on logics.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

Perhaps not, but Aquinas did. He says that things can be evident in themselves (per se nota), but that does not necessarily mean that they can be easily known by all men. For example, that the square of 854 is 729316 is per se notum, but because of its difficulty, it is only known to experts. To found a science, we have to begin with things that are not only per se nota, but also easily known by all men (quoad nos).

Aquinas makes a great analogy on this score. What is more luminous per se? A lamp, or the sun? The sun, of course. But which one is easier for us to look at? The lamp, because the sun is actually too bright for our eyes. On the other hand, a stone in a dark room would be impossible to see, because it produces no light at all.

In the same way, some things are difficult to know because they are so poor, so lacking in consistency (one thinks in modern physics of quantum indeterminism). Other things are difficult to know because they are too rich, and they overpower our intellects (that is the case, for example, with God). In order to get to either extreme, we need to begin with what is most easily knowable by us (quoad nos): which is the things that are accessible to our senses.

It is part of my view that there is nothing like things evident by themselves. The analogy between the light and the truth is poetically beautiful, but misleading. It is the kind of tools that marketing experts use to sell their products or services, especially when they are bad.

Whenever you have had certain experiences, or are used to certain relations, you are enabled to establish new relations between them (though you don’t establish them necessarily). If you, for example, follow a complete course on physics (you will need to spend some years), and cover quantum physics, it will be possible for you to understand the conclusions that the experts obtain in this field, which means that they will make sense to you.

God! I just know what some mystics say about their mystical experiences. I tend to think (based on my comprehension of relations) that mystics don’t know what to say about God not because of His immense richness, but because our language does not serve to those purposes. Which words should we use!? Orange, soil, rain, milk, bones, matter, sky, flesh, light, air, spirit; justice, truth, good, love… Which relations could we establish? It seems that absolutely nothing is comparable to Him.

If there is something difficult for you to understand, it is because you don’t “have” at least one of the elements which are being related (either an experience or a relation).

I treat Aristotle as a good starting point, that is all. We can expand on his insights, and correct him if necessary.

Yes! And as I said, that is nothing unusual. Based on your experiences you can find that Aristotle is a good starting point, but I think it would be suspicious if you took him as your end point too. If Hegel, or any other thinker, offers some interesting ideas to you, it means that some of his second order relations promise to serve as the nucleation centers for many of your own experiences.

 

[Richca]

I would like to see where does St. Thomas says that “the intellect moves the will as an end moves an agent and the will moves the intellect as an agent cause. An agent cause is an efficient cause so the will moves the intellect as an efficient cause”. This sounds like the “perpetual motion machine”. While you let me know where does St. Thomas says it, please tell me:

Confer ST, Pt. 1, Q. 82, art.4. Look in the body of the article. St Thomas says the same in the SCG too, I can’t recall the exact book or chapter of this work where he talks about this right at the moment.

is the intellect the object of the will (because you say that it moves the will as an end moves an agent)?

 

[lmelahn]

But evidently the earth is the center of the world.

It is not evident to me. I have no way of telling the earth’s relative position without special instruments and laborious calculations.

“Evident” means I can observe it directly, like the brown color of my desk (which I am looking at right now).

Not only does it explain why things fall, it explains the locations of heaven and hell, and our special place, and a creator God, and our relationship to Him and to each other - as in Schiller’s “Gladly, just as His suns hurtle / through the glorious universe, / So you, brothers, should run your course, / joyfully, like a conquering hero. / Be embraced, you millions! / This kiss is for the whole world! / Brothers, above the canopy of stars / must dwell a loving father. / Do you bow down before Him, you millions? / Do you sense your Creator, o world? / Seek Him above the canopy of stars! / He must dwell beyond the stars”.

Well, we are not, of course, expecting An die Freude

to be a scientific treatise. (This happens to be the most beautiful part of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony, in my opinion, but that is another story.) I am sure that Schiller (who wrote this in the lat 18th century) was aware of the advances of astronomy and fundamentally accepted them; he just chose to use classical imagery in his poem.

I hope it is clear to readers that God is not “located” in a place “above”*the earth; He is a completely different kind of being. The Aristotelian/Ptolemaic cosmological model had the disadvantage of lending itself to these kinds of misinterpretations.

None of them, however, is “evident,” because neither Heaven nor Hell, nor even God, is accessible to our senses. Not even the fact that things fall to the center of the earth: the earth is not obviously a sphere; it took the Greeks quite some time to figure that out.

In many ways that’s far more evident than Douglas Adams’ description of Earth as “an utterly insignificant little blue-green planet far out in the uncharted backwaters of the unfashionable end of the western spiral arm of the galaxy”, yet we buy into Lemaître’s bizarre notion that what is now trillions upon trillions of suns and planets once fitted into a space as small as a man’s hand.

Which is likewise not evident.

It isn’t just that Aristotle got some things wrong, nor that his categories have to be contorted somewhat to fit in with modern knowledge. There is a broader issue that what was once evident to (say) Native Americans was not evident to Aristotle, and his reality is not our reality.

I don’t think we mean the same thing by “evident.” Evidence does not mean “that which everyone agrees to” but “that which is directly visible.” It has to be something on a much more basic level than any of these things. Our conclusions—scientific systems and so forth—are based on data that we can see and certain principles that are undeniable.

Personally, the great thing about philosophies is there are so many to choose from. Perhaps none are correct, but to me the value is in exploring how they each reach their differing conclusions.

So I’d bracket philosophy with the arts rather than the sciences. We only need one theory of gravity, while it’s absolutely necessary to have a thousand philosophies, just as it’s necessary to have a thousand love sonnets, because no single one can capture the entirety. I see why philosophers might long to settle on one, but would question whether their methodology even allows them access to the whole of the human condition.

The problem is that such affirmations are themselves philosophical (epistemological). We can’t really avoid asserting that the opinion we think is true is the “correct” one.

As for scientism, back in the stone age, hunters developed tactics to bring down their prey, not caring whether they were logically consistent, but only in the empirical evidence of a full belly. There is value in pragmatism. Of course, they probably thought dancing around the campfire the previous evening also had something to do with success, which is where my analogy breaks down.

They may not have cared about logical consistency as such, but they did care about being logical consistent. If the hunter says, “There are buffalo tracks here; therefore, there have been buffalo here,” he is making a syllogism (without, obviously, knowing what a syllogism is).

Or maybe not, because in addition to reason and intuition, a modern theory of knowledge would speak of knowledge from emotion, imagination and faith, areas which Aristotle, and perhaps philosophers in general, appear to devalue. We live in a scientific age, an age of reason, but a lot of what we know is unreasonable. We may not agree with all of Schiller’s words, but at a deep level we know

for sure that the music of Ode to Joy is in some sense true, youtube.com/watch?v=kbJcQYVtZMo

Aquinas certainly did consider all of those factors in his theory of knowledge. In particular, he has quite a well developed philosophy of the passions (which includes the modern concept of emotion). Both Aristotle and Aquinas consider the imagination an important part of acquiring knowledge. Naturally, Aristotle knew nothing about faith, but Aquinas has an excellent epistemology of faith.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

Confer ST, Pt. 1, Q. 82, art.4. Look in the body of the article. St Thomas says the same in the SCG too, I can’t recall the exact book or chapter of this work where he talks about this right at the moment.

 

[utunumsint]

Greetings,

My primary concern, Juan and inocente, is that your views seem to favour a certain relativism and fideism. This may not be a problem for you inocente, but the Catholic church rejects fideism, primary through our belief that God’s existence can be established by reason. Juan, if human reason is all representation of external interactions as relations, then is there any way of being reasonably sure of the existence of God? Can you provide a concrete example of a rational proof of the existence of God that would suit your epistemology?

God bless,
Ut

 

[JuanFlorencio]

Greetings,

My primary concern, Juan and inocente, is that your views seem to favour a certain relativism and fideism. This may not be a problem for you inocente, but the Catholic church rejects fideism, primary through our belief that God’s existence can be established by reason. Juan, if human reason is all representation of external interactions as relations, then is there any way of being reasonably sure of the existence of God? Can you provide a concrete example of a rational proof of the existence of God that would suit your epistemology?

God bless,
Ut

I appreciate your concerns, Ut.

I am not a relativist. Of course it is clear to me that there is an abundance of heterogeneous discourses in the world. In that sense, relativism is a fact. But to be considered a relativist it is necessary to affirm that whatever anyone thinks is true, or perhaps that there is no true at all; and I don’t think like that. What I have said implies that, based on a limited set of experiences, you can elaborate a system of relations which you could reject afterwards, once you add new experiences. This applies even to the development of my personal understanding of Catholic Dogma. I am sure it applies to you as well. At each stage of your development you might have the certainty that you are right, but if I knew something that was additional to your current knowledge, I would propose it to you so that you could move on. Is that equivalent to relativism in your opinion, Ut?

Regarding rational proofs for the existence of God: in one of my previous comments to your posts, I have said that the principle of causality is well founded on reality, which should be enough to lead us to the conclusion of God’s existence, though not to develop an understanding of His Nature.

I have also questioned you if you think that to be a Cause is a relation inherent in God (which by the way you didn’t answer). Given the fact that for Thomists a relation is an accident, and there are no accidents in God, the answer should be “No”. My answer, as you could expect, would be “No” as well, though for different reasons. In any case, denying that relations inhere in God does not invalidate a causality argument to demonstrate His existence.

Nevertheless, frankly speaking, I am not afraid to say that I regard faith as a stronger energeia than reason…, much stronger.

 

[utunumsint]

I appreciate your concerns, Ut.

Thanks Juan.

I am not a relativist. Of course it is clear to me that there is an abundance of heterogeneous discourses in the world. In that sense, relativism is a fact. But to be considered a relativist it is necessary to affirm that whatever anyone thinks is true, or perhaps that there is no true at all; and I don’t think like that.

I did not think so. Thank you for clarifying.

What I have said implies that, based on a limited set of experiences, you can elaborate a system of relations which you could reject afterwards, once you add new experiences. This applies even to the development of my personal understanding of Catholic Dogma. I am sure it applies to you as well. At each stage of your development you might have the certainty that you are right, but if I knew something that was additional to your current knowledge, I would propose it to you so that you could move on. Is that equivalent to relativism in your opinion, Ut?

I am a technical writer. My position is always that of a learner. I convert documentation written by highly technical, and sometimes highly intelligent people, and I make the ideas more accessible so that readers at different levels of understanding can quickly grasp the concepts.

As a learner, I am always learning about software, what a particular software can do, how you can use it, what you can build with it, and what different types of users are expected to do with the software. The complexity of the software I work with means that there is rarely one type of user that I write for. Some are interested only in administrative tasks, some are modeling solutions with the integrated development environments we provide, some are involved in coding and working with APIs. Each one of these approaches the product from a different perspective. And this is only the application level. There is also the transport layer, the hardware layer, the database layer, and the middleware layer. Each one of these domains has a vast learning curve. One can generally find more things to learn depending on the scope of the solution you are working with. Different problems require different configurations, different topologies, and so on.

In addition, there are different types of learners. Some learn in a top down way, from concept to procedure. Some can only learn in a bottom up way, from demonstrations or going through procedures to concepts.

For myself, I have sometimes had false understandings of concepts, functionality, or processes which subject matter experts latter corrected me about, or I figured out on my own through trial and error. In some areas, my understanding was solid from the beginning. I did not make errors. What I understood soundly then, I still understand the same way. In other areas of knowledge, my understanding has grown considerably over the last 10 years I have been in this field. There is a large body of knowledge that I am now absolutely certain about. I know my knowledge corresponds to reality. I am not worried that something will happen down the road that will prove me wrong.

Certainly, there are different levels of reality that I could analyze the software at. For example, I will never be able to comprehend how my software works at the binary level. Although, I suppose, in principle, I could. In theory, I know what is happening at this level, but the reality is really beyond my grasp.

But it is interesting how when I finally grasp something and understand that thing, what had been complex becomes much simpler to me. It is like my brain is a shape shifting key, and the object I am trying to understand is hidden within a thousand layers of boxes with locks. As each lock opens, I get a little further along. And sometimes the process is daunting, because as I open on one box, I can start to get a better understanding of how many more boxes I have to unlock. But eventually, I open that last box. And I have clarity. The thousands of keys I needed to use to get to that final box are all but forgotten. This knowledge I have, it is more than merely a representation, or a facsimile. It is something real.

After all this, I will admit, that I am still learning about Aquinas and Aristotle’s epistemology. But I have this intuition that real knowledge is more than just representation.

Regarding rational proofs for the existence of God: in one of my previous comments to your posts, I have said that the principle of causality is well founded on reality, which should be enough to lead us to the conclusion of God’s existence, though not to develop an understanding of His Nature.

Ok.

I have also questioned you if you think that to be a Cause is a relation inherent in God (which by the way you didn’t answer). Given the fact that for Thomists a relation is an accident, and there are no accidents in God, the answer should be “No”. My answer, as you could expect, would be “No” as well, though for different reasons. In any case, denying that relations inhere in God does not invalidate a causality argument to demonstrate His existence.

Yes, but we previously discussed logical versus real relations. We perceive God’s creative power as a relation, but it is not so in reality. Only logically.

Nevertheless, frankly speaking, I am not afraid to say that I regard faith as a stronger energeia than reason…, much stronger.

Agreed. But the rational preambles can open the door to make the choice of faith much easier to make.

God bless,
Ut

 

[John_Martin]

…
I am a technical writer. My position is always that of a learner. I convert documentation written by highly technical, and sometimes highly intelligent people, and I make the ideas more accessible so that readers at different levels of understanding can quickly grasp the concepts.

As a learner, I am always learning about software, what a particular software can do, how you can use it, what you can build with it, and what different types of users are expected to do with the software. The complexity of the software I work with means that there is rarely one type of user that I write for. Some are interested only in administrative tasks, some are modeling solutions with the integrated development environments we provide, some are involved in coding and working with APIs. Each one of these approaches the product from a different perspective. And this is only the application level. There is also the transport layer, the hardware layer, the database layer, and the middleware layer. Each one of these domains has a vast learning curve. One can generally find more things to learn depending on the scope of the solution you are working with. Different problems require different configurations, different topologies, and so on.

In addition, there are different types of learners. Some learn in a top down way, from concept to procedure. Some can only learn in a bottom up way, from demonstrations or going through procedures to concepts.

For myself, I have sometimes had false understandings of concepts, functionality, or processes which subject matter experts latter corrected me about, or I figured out on my own through trial and error. In some areas, my understanding was solid from the beginning. I did not make errors. What I understood soundly then, I still understand the same way. In other areas of knowledge, my understanding has grown considerably over the last 10 years I have been in this field. There is a large body of knowledge that I am now absolutely certain about. I know my knowledge corresponds to reality. I am not worried that something will happen down the road that will prove me wrong.

Certainly, there are different levels of reality that I could analyze the software at. For example, I will never be able to comprehend how my software works at the binary level. Although, I suppose, in principle, I could. In theory, I know what is happening at this level, but the reality is really beyond my grasp.

But it is interesting how when I finally grasp something and understand that thing, what had been complex becomes much simpler to me. It is like my brain is a shape shifting key, and the object I am trying to understand is hidden within a thousand layers of boxes with locks. As each lock opens, I get a little further along. And sometimes the process is daunting, because as I open on one box, I can start to get a better understanding of how many more boxes I have to unlock. But eventually, I open that last box. And I have clarity. The thousands of keys I needed to use to get to that final box are all but forgotten. This knowledge I have, it is more than merely a representation, or a facsimile. It is something real.

After all this, I will admit, that I am still learning about Aquinas and Aristotle’s epistemology. But I have this intuition that real knowledge is more than just representation.
…

God bless,
Ut

Ut,
You have very beautifully described your experiencing of the actual and habitual knowing of the intellect, how it is not part of time (sort of aeviternal after the box is open, yet accidentally temporal with the recognition of a key where the will moves you to work temporally at opening each lock), and the metadata about your own knowing - the intuition that knowing, the species you know actually or habitually are real, and also either are actual outside you, or you actualize the known object outside you in your technical writing (when you know how your writing should be formed, temporally actualizing the external object word by word into individual equality to the aeviternal known specific object), with the result that what is outside for sensitive experience is, in the end, equal to what you know in intelligible species within your intellect… And what is known, habitually or in act in the passive intellect, is not in any way obscure.

 

[inocente]

It is not evident to me. I have no way of telling the earth’s relative position without special instruments and laborious calculations.

“Evident” means I can observe it directly, like the brown color of my desk (which I am looking at right now).

It isn’t evident to me either. But we both regard reality as having something to do with special instruments and laborious calculations. Cultures which did not, and which had other priorities, would not agree on what is evident. (The OED has evident = clearly seen or understood from Old French or Latin obvious to the eye or mind, so the mindset is an important factor).

Well, we are not, of course, expecting An die Freude to be a scientific treatise. (This happens to be the most beautiful part of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony, in my opinion, but that is another story.) I am sure that Schiller (who wrote this in the lat 18th century) was aware of the advances of astronomy and fundamentally accepted them; he just chose to use classical imagery in his poem.

Sure, but all the same that worldview was once evident to many people. It all fitted together, it all made perfect sense to them. It isn’t evident to us products of modernity, we have other myths. Our criteria are scientific, theirs were not. We can argue that we are closer to our notion of truth, but they would argue our notion is wrong.

*I hope it is clear to readers that God is not “located” in a place “above”the earth; He is a completely different kind of being. The Aristotelian/Ptolemaic cosmological model had the disadvantage of lending itself to these kinds of misinterpretations.

If you stand at the entrance to a shopping mall and ask people where God lives, I think you’ll find most will look upwards. Where are our loved ones? They’re looking down on us, they’re in the heavens with God. I don’t know whether that’s a natural trait of all people, or just ingrained into our culture. It’s certainly not a misinterpretation of the bible either. I did a keyword search, and to pick out just a few from many verses:

*He had a dream in which he saw a stairway resting on the earth, with its top reaching to heaven, and the angels of God were ascending and descending on it. - Gen 28

Then the Lord said to Moses, “I will rain down bread from heaven for you." - Ex 16

After Jesus said this, he looked toward heaven - and prayed - John 17

until the day he was taken up to heaven - Acts 1*

*The problem is that such affirmations are themselves philosophical (epistemological). We can’t really avoid asserting that the opinion we think is true is the “correct” one.

They may not have cared about logical consistency as such, but they did care about being logical consistent. If the hunter says, “There are buffalo tracks here; therefore, there have been buffalo here*,” he is making a syllogism (without, obviously, knowing what a syllogism is).

That’s probably not how it works though. The hunters learn that certain indentations are associated with animals, and then learn to differentiate between indentations made by various kinds of animal, and so on. Deduction isn’t necessary, it can be done by inference, from patterns built up by experience. A classic example of this in other species is birds learning to raid foil tops on British milk bottles - brefigroup.co.uk/resources/view_product/product/details_9.do

Either those birds, and the hunters, along with wolf packs and so on are all doing philosophy, or else philosophy is not necessary to a full belly.

Aquinas certainly did consider all of those factors in his theory of knowledge. In particular, he has quite a well developed philosophy of the passions (which includes the modern concept of emotion). Both Aristotle and Aquinas consider the imagination an important part of acquiring knowledge. Naturally, Aristotle knew nothing about faith, but Aquinas has an excellent epistemology of faith.

If “naturally Aristotle knew nothing about faith” then faith could not be part of human nature, QED my friend.

Perhaps Aristotle’s concept of man as a rational animal, when connected to Genesis’ concept that we are made in the image of God, causes some to believe that the non-rational aspects of our minds are base traits we must work to overcome.