How do we come to know things?

[JuanFlorencio]

That opens up the whole question of God’s knowledge. Since that is a huge topic, I would prefer to deal with it on its own at a later moment.

The short answer (which will probably not seem satisfactory without delving deeper into it) is that God knows everything He knows through His own Essence. Hence, he sees, simultaneously, His own perfection as it is, and also how it is communicated (as well as how it could be communicated) to His creatures. But it is best to deal with it step-by-step. (Question 14 of the First Part, as well as De Veritate, q. 2, if you are interested.)

As you say, it is preferable to deal with this topic at some other moment. We can construct impressive systems of relations starting from relatively simple experiences; but pretending to know how God’s mind works (starting from those simple experiences!) is beyond my comprehension.

“Imitation” here should be understood in the Platonic sense (mimesis). It does not require a conscious imitation of the exemplar (although conscious imitation is one kind of mimesis).

Every perfection in a creature is a participation in a Divine Perfection, in some way. Aquinas is not saying that the creature is necessarily striving to be like the Creator. Rather, from the very fact that the Creator communicates a perfection to His creature, the creature resembles the Creator in some way.

I didn’t mean that the creature were consciously imitating God. I was just saying that as the creature doesn’t exist yet, but is being created, it does not imitate in the moment of its creation. The important point is that, being God simple, He could not be the exemplar of impure perfections.

Anyway, as far as impure perfections go, I can’t remember if Aquinas ever dealt with your particular question directly (I will look around a bit).

However, taking a cue from what he says about the Divine Ideas, I would say that an “impure” perfection is “impure” precisely because of the admixture of potency. The perfection, however, still reflects some of the richness that is found in God. Take, for example, heat. It only makes sense in material creature, and clearly its likeness to God is very, very remote. However, like God, hot things are active, and can produce effects in other things, and can make other things hot like themselves.

Put another way, the “impure” perfections are the ones that are furthest from the Source of all perfections (i.e., God), and hence are the ones that bear the least resemblance to that Source.

This is a topic that could be developed further, obviously.

I can only say this: It is impossible for me to comprehend God. And when I try to follow St. Thomas on this specific subject I cannot avoid but being aware of the numerous tricks that my mind has to do. I rather prefer to say that I simply don’t know how God is.

If you want, let’s stop here this digression. Let’s go back to your demonstration: what other statement do you think we are allowed to add to the set we already have?

 

[lmelahn]

I’ve put these two points together because in the first you claim that people in the past had knowledge of your morality, and in the second you claim that thereby your morality transcends cultural boundaries. They knew what we think is right but didn’t have our courage, or they were confused, or misled by others.

But this, it seems to me, is a kind of cultural colonialism. We, claim the colonialists, aka the moral absolutists, know the One True Morality, and past ages and others who disagree with us must obviously be either ignorant, cowardly, misled or confused, mere children who, in our paternal munificence, we have no choice but judge and rule over.

Of course, by the same token future colonialists will judge us now as immoral, since they will have their own, different, One True Morality.

Our modern culture is certainly not a model of morality, so I would say that we have essentially the same problem as previous generations. just with other issues.

I never said, incidentally, that back when slavery was legal, everyone knew it was wrong. There are probably many people who didn’t. We have the same problem nowadays with other moral issues.

That was a laudable attempt to rescue Thomas, but in the first quote which you made he says " woman is not misbegotten, but is included in nature’s intention as directed to the work of generation". This follows his I answer that section, in which he argues that “It was necessary for woman to be made, as the Scripture says, as a “helper” to man; not, indeed, as a helpmate in other works, as some say, since man can be more efficiently helped by another man in other works; but as a helper in the work of generation”. Woman exists only to provide a passive womb in which to grow the man’s active seed, that’s the sole reason she is “included in nature’s intention”. But “there is a vital operation nobler than generation”, which is why “the male sex is not found in continual union with the female”, and that “nobler vital action” is “intellectual operation”. It’s hard to see how Thomas could make woman any more inferior.

And, by the by, his “the superior makes use of his subjects for their own benefit and good” argument, which he claims is a subjection which “existed even before sin”, is not exactly a reasonable argument for those who are so subjected. Such as, for instance, women.

It is easy to read in a modern narrative where it was never intended.

Aquinas never said that women’s only purpose in life is the bear children (in fact, he explicitly denies that a few lines away—read below). He is simply explaining in that when Genesis describes the first woman as a “helper” that it must mean primarily refer to the help she gives in generating children. I think that is a reasonable exegesis.

(The only thing that I could possibly see as objectionable is the affirmation that “man can be more efficiently helped by another man in other works;” which I think is true for some works, but not others. Aquinas makes a blanket statement here that is, I think, too broad. Nevertheless, I think his exegetical argument is sound: for which particular work, out of all the possible works, is the woman being singled out for, here? For the very noble task of being a mother.)

Moreover, Aquinas is not denying that women are capable of intellectual operation. That is characteristic of all human beings without exception, and Aquinas is well aware of it. Here, it pays to read it in Latin:

Homo autem adhuc ordinatur ad nobilius opus vitae, quod est intelligere.

Man, however, is further ordered to a more noble work of life, which is intellection.

Note carefully the word he uses for “man”: homo. In Latin (unlike English), we distinguish between man in general (homo) and man as male (vir). (Look a few lines before this passage, and you will see that Aquinas carefully uses the word vir when speaking of males.)

Hence, Aquinas is simply saying that it is because man (homo—i.e., both men and women) has an intellectual nature, it is fitting for man and women not to be in constant physical union (as happens in some lower animals). In other words, because men and women must consciously decide to enter a sexual union, that union is actually ennobled by their rationality.

So, on the contrary, Aquinas is actually affirming the equality of dignity between the sexes in this very passage. Both sexes are perfectly capable of intellection, and Aquinas says so quite explicitly.

Now, modern culture might chafe at the idea that the husband should have authority over his wife, but then again we tend to chafe at any kind of authority, even when it is obviously necessary and appropriate. It is perfectly possible to hold Aquinas’ opinion and affirm women’s equality in dignity, just as we can affirm the equality in dignity of a soldier with respect to the general who commands him.

The only thing I want to get across here is that Aquinas is not intending any misogyny here: he fully affirms (in at least two places in this very article, with nothing to contradict it) the equality in dignity of the sexes.

 

[lmelahn]

As you say, it is preferable to deal with this topic at some other moment. We can construct impressive systems of relations starting from relatively simple experiences; but pretending to know how God’s mind works (starting from those simple experiences!) is beyond my comprehension.

Fair enough.

I didn’t mean that the creature were consciously imitating God. I was just saying that as the creature doesn’t exist yet, but is being created, it does not imitate in the moment of its creation. The important point is that, being God simple, He could not be the exemplar of impure perfections.

The creature does not imitate God until it exists, obviously. But, of course, it exists in the very moment of creation.

I can only say this: It is impossible for me to comprehend God. And when I try to follow St. Thomas on this specific subject I cannot avoid but being aware of the numerous tricks that my mind has to do. I rather prefer to say that I simply don’t know how God is.

If we want to talk about God, I think we will need to introduce the so-called triplex via (via causalitatis or affirmationis, via negationis, and via eminentiae) that helps sort out these “mental tricks.” I suggest saving that for another moment.

If you want, let’s stop here this digression. Let’s go back to your demonstration: what other statement do you think we are allowed to add to the set we already have?

Well, I was trying to show that the principle

[D]e potentia autem non potest aliquid reduci in actum, nisi per aliquod ens in actu, sicut calidum in actu, ut ignis, facit lignum, quod est calidum in potentia, esse actu calidum, et per hoc movet et alterat ipsum.

is not in contradiction with the will being free.

And my point was that

(1) Aquinas has a very broad understanding of the term “act” with includes both being (esse) and operation.
(2) This principle is only intended to work “backwards,” from the effect to the cause. If I have, in my hands (metaphorically, obviously; i.e., something that is present to my intellect), something that exists, it is also “in act,” according to Aquinas’ conception. If that thing is not the First Cause, it must have got there because of something that is, itself, in act.
(3) The principle proves nothing, however, about the nature of the thing in question. The same principle applies both to non-free things (or, since we are talking about powers, non-free powers such as the concupiscible appetite) and free things (such as the will).

That is by way of background. The next statements that I propose to add are as follows:

• The will is “in act” both inasmuch as it is or exists (esse), and inasmuch as it is in operation (operari).
• The former act (esse) is an agent (efficient) cause of the latter act (operari).
• The esse of the will is not constrained to operate; the will has full discretion to operate or not.

 

[inocente]

I never said, incidentally, that back when slavery was legal, everyone knew it was wrong. There are probably many people who didn’t. We have the same problem nowadays with other moral issues.

There you go again . Because you think it wrong, anyone who disagrees with you must be ignorant. To place it in a modern context, there is a moral disagreement between the Church and the majority of people in Ireland, most of whom were educated in schools run by the Church. Suggesting that one side or the other is ignorant or confused or evil is very easy, as it avoids the need to acknowledge genuine sincerely held and reasoned differences or to question our own values.

Perhaps we better stop on this point as we’re repeatedly failing to communicate.

*It is easy to read in a modern narrative where it was never intended.

Aquinas never said that women’s only* purpose in life is the bear children (in fact, he explicitly denies that a few lines away—read below). He is simply explaining in that when Genesis describes the first woman as a “helper” that it must mean primarily refer to the help she gives in generating children. I think that is a reasonable exegesis.

Thinking of gay marriage, it’s interesting that opponents often fixate on bodily functions in the bedroom, while supporters tend to emphasize affection and equality. Thus presumably, when reading Genesis, some think of “helper” primarily in terms of enabling propagation while others think of it primarily in terms of companionship.

But Thomas doesn’t say primarily, he states bluntly that the only purpose of woman is propagation - “not, indeed, as a helpmate in other works, as some say, since man can be more efficiently helped by another man in other works; but as a helper in the work of generation.”

Even then woman is little more than an incubator for the male seed - “Among perfect animals the active power of generation belongs to the male sex, and the passive power to the female.”

(The only thing that I could possibly see as objectionable is the affirmation that “man can be more efficiently helped by another man in other works;” which I think is true for some works, but not others. Aquinas makes a blanket statement here that is, I think, too broad. Nevertheless, I think his exegetical argument is sound: for which particular work, out of all the possible works, is the woman being singled out for, here? For the very noble task of being a mother.)

Moreover, Aquinas is not denying that women are capable of intellectual operation. That is characteristic of all human beings without exception, and Aquinas is well aware of it. Here, it pays to read it in Latin:

Homo autem adhuc ordinatur ad nobilius opus vitae, quod est intelligere.

Man, however, is further ordered to a more noble work of life, which is intellection.

Note carefully the word he uses for “man”: homo. In Latin (unlike English), we distinguish between man in general (homo) and man as male (vir). (Look a few lines before this passage, and you will see that Aquinas carefully uses the word vir when speaking of males.)

Hence, Aquinas is simply saying that it is because man (homo—i.e., both men and women) has an intellectual nature, it is fitting for man and women not to be in constant physical union (as happens in some lower animals). In other words, because men and women must consciously decide to enter a sexual union, that union is actually ennobled by their rationality.

So, on the contrary, Aquinas is actually affirming the equality of dignity between the sexes in this very passage. Both sexes are perfectly capable of intellection, and Aquinas says so quite explicitly.

Now, modern culture might chafe at the idea that the husband should have authority over his wife, but then again we tend to chafe at any kind of authority, even when it is obviously necessary and appropriate. It is perfectly possible to hold Aquinas’ opinion and affirm women’s equality in dignity, just as we can affirm the equality in dignity of a soldier with respect to the general who commands him.

The only thing I want to get across here is that Aquinas is not intending any misogyny here: he fully affirms (in at least two places in this very article, with nothing to contradict it) the equality in dignity of the sexes.

But since Thomas has already argued “not, indeed, as a helpmate in other works” and only “as a helper in the work of generation”, he has already ruled that woman cannot be a helper in “intellectual operation”.

When reading scripture, it’s a Baptist principle to respect what is written and try to understand it as if we are the original audience, rather than impose our own worldview upon the author. I can see that you’re a fan of Thomas and Aristotle, and that you might wish that they held with your modern morals, but they had their own reasoned views, whether or not we agree. A man who bracketed together “children, imbeciles and women” did not have our morals.

 

[lmelahn]

There you go again . Because you think it wrong, anyone who disagrees with you must be ignorant. To place it in a modern context, there is a moral disagreement between the Church and the majority of people in Ireland, most of whom were educated in schools run by the Church. Suggesting that one side or the other is ignorant or confused or evil is very easy, as it avoids the need to acknowledge genuine sincerely held and reasoned differences or to question our own values.

Perhaps we better stop on this point as we’re repeatedly failing to communicate.

Just something to think about: if the majority of people supported slavery in the future, would that make it right? If not, why not?

Thinking of gay marriage, it’s interesting that opponents often fixate on bodily functions in the bedroom, while supporters tend to emphasize affection and equality. Thus presumably, when reading Genesis, some think of “helper” primarily in terms of enabling propagation while others think of it primarily in terms of companionship.

But Thomas doesn’t say primarily, he states bluntly that the only purpose of woman is propagation - “not, indeed, as a helpmate in other works, as some say, since man can be more efficiently helped by another man in other works; but as a helper in the work of generation.”

He is saying that the woman is not specifically needed for other works. He does not say she is incapable of those other works. Motherhood is her prerogative, what makes her stand out, but it would be a serious misreading to say that it is her only purpose.

Even then woman is little more than an incubator for the male seed - “Among perfect animals the active power of generation belongs to the male sex, and the passive power to the female.”

That is his biological theory, yes.

But since Thomas has already argued “not, indeed, as a helpmate in other works” and only “as a helper in the work of generation”, he has already ruled that woman cannot be a helper in “intellectual operation”.

No, I don’t think so: he is saying that she is called “helper”*because that is the kind of help that only she can give. (Which is very different saying that it is the only kind of help she can give.)

When reading scripture, it’s a Baptist principle to respect what is written and try to understand it as if we are the original audience, rather than impose our own worldview upon the author.

That is reasonable, although the ultimate goal, it seems to me, is to understand also how it applies to us, here and now.

I can see that you’re a fan of Thomas and Aristotle, and that you might wish that they held with your modern morals, but they had their own reasoned views, whether or not we agree. A man who bracketed together “children, imbeciles and women” did not have our morals.

I do not, of course, agree with every conceivable affirmation of Aristotle or Aquinas. I mentioned earlier that Aquinas was not immune from the prejudices of his times. If Aquinas had been more coherent with his own theory, he might have avoided saying that women have a “defect in reason.”

(Remember what I said, too, about reason: for Aquinas, it has a very specific meaning. Having a “defect in reason” does not mean having a “defective intellect.” Intellect means our capacity to know; reason means our capacity to deduce or infer something new from what we already know.)

It is important to read Aquinas in his own context, too. I guess it was common back then to think that women could not be relied on as witnesses. The fact that we recognize this now as an error is a positive thing, don’t you think? And if the new notion is “good,” whereas the old prejudice was “bad,” then there must me some morality that transcends cultures.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

Well, I was trying to show that the principle

[D]e potentia autem non potest aliquid reduci in actum, nisi per aliquod ens in actu, sicut calidum in actu, ut ignis, facit lignum, quod est calidum in potentia, esse actu calidum, et per hoc movet et alterat ipsum.

is not in contradiction with the will being free.

And my point was that

(1) Aquinas has a very broad understanding of the term “act” with includes both being (esse) and operation.
(2) This principle is only intended to work “backwards,” from the effect to the cause. If I have, in my hands (metaphorically, obviously; i.e., something that is present to my intellect), something that exists, it is also “in act,” according to Aquinas’ conception. If that thing is not the First Cause, it must have got there because of something that is, itself, in act.
(3) The principle proves nothing, however, about the nature of the thing in question. The same principle applies both to non-free things (or, since we are talking about powers, non-free powers such as the concupiscible appetite) and free things (such as the will).

That is by way of background. The next statements that I propose to add are as follows:

• The will is “in act” both inasmuch as it is or exists (esse), and inasmuch as it is in operation (operari).
• The former act (esse) is an agent (efficient) cause of the latter act (operari).
• The esse of the will is not constrained to operate; the will has full discretion to operate or not.

I think that it would be convenient to discuss that principle. And to do that we should start with the basic experiences on which it is based. Could you say which are they?

As for the statements that you would like to add, if in the first two you distinguish one type of act from the other, naming -for example- “act1” to one of them and “act2” to the other (so that you don’t fall into a logical fallacy), I accept them . If the third means something different from “My will is free” (which is already in the set), please explain it.

 

[Thomas_White]

In general, the result of an experiment does not demonstrate a hypothesis; but it shows its plausibility.

I don’t know about those experiments in particular. Please, tell us more, so that we can see what was shown with them.

Very briefly stated, it concerns the way nature works in patterns, which are caused by the sum of many tiny pulses. These appear as random rather than cause-effect events. It’s loosely related to the reason why weather forecasts remain inaccurate more than a day or so into the future. And that concerns the difficulty of getting instead of an accurate fix on the present situation only an approximation of it. This involves how we perceive nature and the way we give names to things that are really complex events. This is more obvious when for instance a name is given to a hurricane, but it also applies to other phenomena that are not nearly so obvious. This is sometimes referred to as chaos theory, though that is a more general term.

I will look for an experiment that could be briefly explained. But there have been experiments with photons in quantum physics that appear to show than an effect not only can appear random but also seem to occur, in time, before its cause.

 

[lmelahn]

I think that it would be convenient to discuss that principle. And to do that we should start with the basic experiences on which it is based. Could you say which are they?

Do you mean the principle of act-from-act?

Well, that principle is simply a re-statement, in terms of act and potency, of the principle of causality: namely, that every effect is dependent on a cause. The “act-from-act” principle properly has to do only with true reduction of potency to act: cases in which a pre-existing potency—one that is already partially in act, therefore—is transformed into something else.

So the type of phenomenon from which we get the principle is transformations. Of these, I think we can divide them epistemologically into three categories:

1. 
   *]The effects that outside objects have on me.
   *]The effects that I have on outside objects (and also on myself).
   *]The effects that outside objects have on each other.
   
   We learn about the principle of causality by induction, if you like. The difference between this and other inductions (like in the empirical sciences) is that there does not seem to be any exception to the principle. Analyzing a little:
   
   1. 
      *]When an outside object affects me (e.g., when I touch a hot stove by accident), in order for it to affect me at all, it must exist and have the active potency (or power) necessary to affect me. (E.g., the stove has to be hot in order for it to burn me.)
      *]I clearly exist and have certain powers (a tip of the hat to Descartes ). My ability to affect things outside (or within) me depends on that state of affairs.
      *]By analogy, I can see that other things act on each other, and that unless the agent exists and has certain powers, it is unable to produce its effect. (E.g., I can’t boil water without a source of heat.)
      
      In all these cases, the effect is a reduction of potency to act, and in no case is that reduction accomplished by a being (ens) that is not in act (i.e, that does not exist or that lacks the power to produce the effect).
      
      That is exactly what is meant by the principle of act-from-act.
      

      As for the statements that you would like to add, if in the first two you distinguish one type of act from the other, naming -for example- “act1” to one of them and “act2” to the other (so that you don’t fall into a logical fallacy), I accept them .

      That is exactly correct, and in fact, Aquinas uses the terms actus primus and actus secundus to describe this type of situation. (In Aquinas, actus secundus almost always refers to operation, whereas actus primus refers to the necessary conditions that need to be in place in order for the operation to take place.)
      

      If the third means something different from “My will is free” (which is already in the set), please explain it.

      No, it does not mean anything different. I just want to emphasize that it is this distinction in acts that allows the operation of the will to be discretionary.

 

[Sacred_Heart_1]

We come to know things when the mind receives sense data from the outside world through the senses, collates this data into a sense image and stores it for reference. These images are then retrieved when needed by the intellect and forms an idea of it and then judges it to be something which really exists in particular objects the senses are contacting now or did in the past.
.
For example, each time the senses encounter a flower, data is transferred through our sense receptors ( eyes, nose, touch, taste, sound ) to a common sense ( the intellect )… All kinds of data is received over a period of time, data on nutrition, growth, reproduction, color, reaction to sun, rain, temperature, etc. Each time we receive data, a phantasm or sense image is formed by the active intellect ( agent intellect ) and stored in memory. Each time we receive new data the passive intellect ( possible intellect ) takes a look at the phantasms the active intellect has stored and begins to form an idea ( concept or universal ) of that object being sensed. This act by the passive intellect is called abstraction because the passive intellect is abstracting phantasms from memory and forming an idea or concept ( which are known formally as universals ). The universal is called universal because it represents the nature or essence of this particular species of flower and has been gained through an examination of many such flowers.

( Essence or nature is a wide topic. Let it suffice to say that every substance has an essence or nature, it is real and actual. In material substances it is the matter-form composite. Each material substance is an example of Aristotle’s hylomorphic theory, which is based on the principles of potency and act. Thomas said, “Potency and Act divide being in such a way that whatever is, is either pure act, or of necessity it is composed of potency and act as primary and intrinsic principles.” )

And from the essence/nature flow all the characteristics and behaviors of a substance, including its accidents.

Now the will enters the picture and judges that the particular flower we are now looking at has the particular nature the passive intellect has abstracted. But the flower has this nature, not in a universal way but in a particular way, as the nature of all flowers is instantiated in this particular flower. Just as Socrates and Plato are both men, but each is a man in a particular way.

Now as to how we know the flower is beautiful, that is a little more mysterious. God has given human nature, our intellect the capacity to recognize what is good, it is in built. Obviously beauty is something good. So when we meet something in the world that is beautiful, we instinctively recognize it. This in built ability is closely connected to the intellect’s ability to recognize truth as seen when the will judges as to the nature of the flower…

Obviously we don’t begin life with a perfect ability to know the essence of a particular substance. We develop the ability with time, experience, and education. But even with the first moment that we become aware of the essential difference between substances ( between Dad and a tree ) we have true knowledge in its nascent stage. We at least know there is something essentially different.

The outlines of this explanation is based on Edward Fewer’s book Aquinas, pgs 143-148, which, in turn, is based on the teaching of Thomas Aquinas.

Linus2nd

We come to know things when we believe they are true. Does this mean what we know is absolutely true. Absolutely not.

Even in science. Science is ‘blown apart’ all the time. We believe something is true for a while, scientifically speaking; and then there comes the genius to turn it over. We know things because of belief, however, no one has been able to extinguish the Light that came into the world. Because the Lord is God.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

Do you mean the principle of act-from-act?

Well, that principle is simply a re-statement, in terms of act and potency, of the principle of causality: namely, that every effect is dependent on a cause. The “act-from-act” principle properly has to do only with true reduction of potency to act: cases in which a pre-existing potency—one that is already partially in act, therefore—is transformed into something else.

So the type of phenomenon from which we get the principle is transformations. Of these, I think we can divide them epistemologically into three categories:

1. 
   *]The effects that outside objects have on me.
   *]The effects that I have on outside objects (and also on myself).
   *]The effects that outside objects have on each other.
   
   We learn about the principle of causality by induction, if you like. The difference between this and other inductions (like in the empirical sciences) is that there does not seem to be any exception to the principle. Analyzing a little:
   
   1. 
      *]When an outside object affects me (e.g., when I touch a hot stove by accident), in order for it to affect me at all, it must exist and have the active potency (or power) necessary to affect me. (E.g., the stove has to be hot in order for it to burn me.)
      *]I clearly exist and have certain powers (a tip of the hat to Descartes ). My ability to affect things outside (or within) me depends on that state of affairs.
      *]By analogy, I can see that other things act on each other, and that unless the agent exists and has certain powers, it is unable to produce its effect. (E.g., I can’t boil water without a source of heat.)
      
      In all these cases, the effect is a reduction of potency to act, and in no case is that reduction accomplished by a being (ens) that is not in act (i.e, that does not exist or that lacks the power to produce the effect).
      
      That is exactly what is meant by the principle of act-from-act.
      
      That is exactly correct, and in fact, Aquinas uses the terms actus primus and actus secundus to describe this type of situation. (In Aquinas, actus secundus almost always refers to operation, whereas actus primus refers to the necessary conditions that need to be in place in order for the operation to take place.)
      
      No, it does not mean anything different. I just want to emphasize that it is this distinction in acts that allows the operation of the will to be discretionary.

1. 1. 
      So, which would be the principle?:
      
      The act1-potency-act1’ principle?
      The act1-potency-act2 principle?
      The act2-potency-act1 principle?
      The act2-potency-act2’ principle?
      The act1-potency-act2-potency-act2’ principle?
      
      Or some other?

 

[lmelahn]

So, which would be the principle?:

The act1-potency-act1’ principle?
The act1-potency-act2 principle?
The act2-potency-act1 principle?
The act2-potency-act2’ principle?
The act1-potency-act2-potency-act2’ principle?

Or some other?

Perhaps better put it like this:

Act 0 → potency-to-act-1 → Act 1 → potency-to-act-2 → Act 2 …

I made a diagram that (I hope) makes it easier to see what Aquinas is getting at:

(Please Note: This uploaded content is no longer available.)

A couple of observations:

• The moving arrow represents the operation of each being-(ens)-in-act, which reduces the next ens from potency to act (i.e. “moves” it).
• The will works exactly the same way. It is a being-in-act that can operate (i.e., bring some potency to act).
• At each stage, the being-in-act could simply refuse to do anything, or else it could be impeded from operating somehow.
• When we make use of this principle, epistemologically speaking, we always start out somewhere near the bottom and try to work our way up. Logically speaking, working downward is not guaranteed to work, because each operation is contingent, not necessary.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

Very briefly stated, it concerns the way nature works in patterns, which are caused by the sum of many tiny pulses. These appear as random rather than cause-effect events. It’s loosely related to the reason why weather forecasts remain inaccurate more than a day or so into the future. And that concerns the difficulty of getting instead of an accurate fix on the present situation only an approximation of it. This involves how we perceive nature and the way we give names to things that are really complex events. This is more obvious when for instance a name is given to a hurricane, but it also applies to other phenomena that are not nearly so obvious. This is sometimes referred to as chaos theory, though that is a more general term.

I will look for an experiment that could be briefly explained. But there have been experiments with photons in quantum physics that appear to show than an effect not only can appear random but also seem to occur, in time, before its cause.

I see… It seems that every phenomenon directly accessible to us is the result of a huge amount of interactions between tiny elements. But there are some phenomena which do not appear to be random. For example, the behavior of gases. A gas in a vessel is a physical system composed of a great amount of very small particles, and every particle of it contributes to what we can observe. The way the gas behaves when we vary macroscopic variables like pressure and temperature is reasonably predictable. We don’t know what happens to each individual particle, but I don’t think we could say that the variations in their movements are not caused by anything. Do you know something which could make us think the contrary?

On the other hand, there are other physical systems which are very simple, like the double pendulum, and their behavior can be modeled with well known mathematical models. However, their behavior is unpredictable. For the double pendulum, the movements look regular at first, but suddenly they start to seem capricious. It doesn’t mean however that at the moments when the movement loses its regularity it occurs without a cause.

In the case of weather there are many variables involved. The atmosphere is certainly a very complex and big system. But if the values of enough variables are known, some mathematical models allow us to make forecasts which are reasonably good in the relatively short term. Is the long term behavior unpredictable because there are non-caused changes in the atmosphere? I don’t think so, because if a new set of measurements is made and the results are introduced into the model we can make a reasonably good forecast for the next five days or so. What do you think?

Please, if you can tell me where can I get information about those effects that occur before their cause, I will appreciate it.

 

[Abba]

Dear Linus and Alloysium:

I had no idea that you did not know about philosophy. There is nothing wrong with that. Billions of people haven’t known it. So, to me you are ok!

Philosophers do not have the intention of offending anyone. They just follow an inclination that is in them previous to any conscious desire. To be rigorous is one of their traits, but without any ill will against anybody. Socrates teachings resulted offensive to certain powerful guys, and they promoted a trial against him. He has declared “non-innocent”, and was condemned to death. But he never intended to cause any harm to their fellow men. Aristotle had to run away from Athens to escape the same destiny. But Aristotle was a fine man.

However, when philosophers discuss among them, their arguments would seem like mortal weapons to anyone of you. Still, they don’t think the same. They just are as rigorous as they can, and it is what they have to do.

I do not have any intention to offend any of you either. So, I will find it acceptable if you quit.

Good night
JuanFlorencio

Boy! What arrogance! So you are the only philosopher on this forum? And you can equate yourself with Socrates and Aristotle? Really? What theories have you come up with that provides to humanity a possible answer to questions that have gone unanswered? What has been your contribution to philosophy? Please let me know.

Socrates and Aristotle were Lovers of Wisdom. They sought to understand existence and the universe. All human beings who seek understanding are philosophers - yes, even that ‘2 year old child’ you disdained.

You seem to be well read and could share your knowledge but you make too much noise about yourself and so I cannot listen.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

Perhaps better put it like this:

Act 0 → potency-to-act-1 → Act 1 → potency-to-act-2 → Act 2 …

I made a diagram that (I hope) makes it easier to see what Aquinas is getting at:

https://farm1.staticflickr.com/463/18771472951_f6d57d6763_d.jpg

A couple of observations:

• The moving arrow represents the operation of each being-(ens)-in-act, which reduces the next ens from potency to act (i.e. “moves” it).
• The will works exactly the same way. It is a being-in-act that can operate (i.e., bring some potency to act).
• At each stage, the being-in-act could simply refuse to do anything, or else it could be impeded from operating somehow.
• When we make use of this principle, epistemologically speaking, we always start out somewhere near the bottom and try to work our way up. Logically speaking, working downward is not guaranteed to work, because each operation is contingent, not necessary.

I think I say similarly that elements of interaction have their interaction modes, and these are certain dispositions. We know a variety of elements of interactions and a variety of interaction modes. In very many cases it is enough for an interaction to take place that the elements of interaction come sufficiently close to each other. To use one of your examples, if you touch the hot stove you will be inevitably affected by it; if you put snow on it, the snow will inevitably fuse; if you put a glass of water within a functional microwave oven and turn it on, the water will inevitably become hot, and so on.

We too are elements of interaction, and for many of our interaction modes the same that I have said above applies: as soon as we are sufficiently exposed to other elements of interaction, the interaction takes place. But for some of our actions there are important differences. Our reactions in front of determined objects are not always the same. It could be said that our complexity involves continuous modifications in our dispositions, and that it explains our different responses to the same stimulus at different times. It might well be like that. We can struggle with our various tendencies. We can also modify our approaches to situations by considering broader and broader contexts. We can develop certain behavioral patterns (habits) that we didn’t have before, etcetera. I would say this is a general example of what you refer to when you say above that “working downward is not guaranteed to work, because each operation is contingent, not necessary”. We can be close to a given object and certain set of interactions might take place, but they will not happen necessarily. It depends on the context that I am considering.

Taking into account the limits that were imposed on the act-potency-act’ above, I am adding a new statement to our set. Besides, I am rearranging the set. Please feel free to modify it if you think it should be arranged differently.

My will actually exists.
My will is a capacity through which I love.
I love through my will inasmuch as it exists and is in operation.
My will is free.
My will has not existed eternally.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

Boy! What arrogance! So you are the only philosopher on this forum? And you can equate yourself with Socrates and Aristotle? Really? What theories have you come up with that provides to humanity a possible answer to questions that have gone unanswered? What has been your contribution to philosophy? Please let me know.

Socrates and Aristotle were Lovers of Wisdom. They sought to understand existence and the universe. All human beings who seek understanding are philosophers - yes, even that ‘2 year old child’ you disdained.

You seem to be well read and could share your knowledge but you make too much noise about yourself and so I cannot listen.

I appreciate your sincere words; and I think I understand your feelings.

God bless you.
JuanFlorencio

 

[JuanFlorencio]

Well, it seems that there was no possible demonstration of the compatibility of our free will and an external efficient cause producing our free actions. It would be exactly the same with the alleged actualization of our intelligence by an external efficient cause concerning the establishing of relations. It is us who establish them, and that explains why our knowledge is simultaneously powerful and weak, and why we constantly disagree between us, and why as we add new experiences our knowledge of the same things changes.

 

[Richca]

Perhaps better put it like this:

Act 0 → potency-to-act-1 → Act 1 → potency-to-act-2 → Act 2 …

I made a diagram that (I hope) makes it easier to see what Aquinas is getting at:

https://farm1.staticflickr.com/463/18771472951_f6d57d6763_d.jpg

A couple of observations:

• The moving arrow represents the operation of each being-(ens)-in-act, which reduces the next ens from potency to act (i.e. “moves” it).
• The will works exactly the same way. It is a being-in-act that can operate (i.e., bring some potency to act).
• At each stage, the being-in-act could simply refuse to do anything, or else it could be impeded from operating somehow.
• When we make use of this principle, epistemologically speaking, we always start out somewhere near the bottom and try to work our way up. Logically speaking, working downward is not guaranteed to work, because each operation is contingent, not necessary.

Imelahn, do you have any comments on post #788 I made?

 

[lmelahn]

St Thomas is clear that the will can reduce itself to potentiality to act in regard to actually willing the means. This the will can do as it is in act or motion prior to actually willing the means. It is of the very nature of the will that it can do this and it we look at the will objectively and what it does and our own actions than this appears reasonable and I think St Thomas is not contradicting any metaphysical principles here as I think he would notice it if he did.

Metaphysically though, I do not see how we can escape that this very act of choice from the will which is a kind of being and a new event is not dependent on God as the first efficient cause and the first mover. There are many texts from the corpus of St Thomas’ writings that appear to me to hold this.
“But it is clear that as all corporeal movements are reduced to the motion of the heavenly body as to the first corporeal mover, so all movements, both corporeal and spiritual, are reduced to the simple First Mover, Who is God. And hence no matter how perfect a corporeal or spiritual nature is supposed to be, it cannot proceed to its act unless it be moved by God” (Pt. I-II, Q. 109, art. 1).

“Moreover, a more perfect order is found in spiritual things than in corporeal ones. Among bodies however, every motion is caused by the first motion. Therefore, among spiritual things, also, every movement of the will must be caused by the first will, which is the will of God.” (SCG, Book 3, Pt. II, chapter 89, 6).

(De Malo, On Human Choice)
Objection 17: The will sometimes begins to choose when it did not previously choose. Therefore, the disposition in which it previously was either was or was not altered. If not, then the will no more chooses now than it did previously. And so the will not choosing would choose, and this is impossible. And if the will’s disposition is changed, something needs to change it, since everything moved is moved by something else. But a cause of movement imposes necessity on the movable thing, otherwise the cause would be insufficient to move the thing. Therefore, the will is necessarily moved.

Reply to objection 17: The will, when it freshly begins to choose, is transformed from its prior disposition regarding its previous potentiality to choose and its subsequent actual choice. And a cause indeed effects this change as the will moves itself to act and also as an external cause, namely, God moves the will. And yet the will is not moved necessarily, as I have said [answer in body of article and in other replies].

So, it is my opinion if I’m understanding St Thomas correctly, that the very act of choice or any act of the will is dependent on God as the first efficient cause and the first mover which means that the will’s acts are not outside the scope of God’s universal causality. For God is the first efficient cause while the will is a second agent cause. This does not mean that God predetermines our choices for us. The choice is in our power and up to us but to actually will the choice we depend on God as He is the first efficient cause and the first mover. Actually willing a choice is a kind of being and all being, whatever mode or manner of being, is reduced to God as the first Being and the first cause of being. God operates in us according to the nature He created us with and He created our will to be subject to its own free choice.

Now, according to Holy Scripture, it is evident that human actions are not outside of God’s providence and control. St Paul says “for God is at work in you, both to will and to work [accomplish] for his good pleasure.” (2 Philippians 2:13). “Not that we are sufficient of ourselves to claim anything as coming from us; our sufficiency is from God” (2 Corinthians 3:5). " for without me you can do nothing" (John 15:5). “The human heart plans the way, but the LORD directs the steps” (Proverbs 16:9).

Yes, I think you have the right idea.

God is the first and universal cause of all being, and the operation of the will is a kind of being (esse).

My purpose in going through this was to show that just because God moves the will does not mean that he compels the will. Aquinas goes to great pains to show that this cannot be the case. He moves the will specifically by giving it the power, or capacity, to act.

I suggesting reading the responsum to question 6 in De malo, which explains it more fully. (Have a look at books.google.com/books?id=NADxLDu1KeoC.)

 

[JuanFlorencio]

Yes, I think you have the right idea.

God is the first and universal cause of all being, and the operation of the will is a kind of being (esse).

My purpose in going through this was to show that just because God moves the will does not mean that he compels the will. Aquinas goes to great pains to show that this cannot be the case. He moves the will specifically by giving it the power, or capacity, to act.

I suggesting reading the responsum to question 6 in De malo, which explains it more fully. (Have a look at books.google.com/books?id=NADxLDu1KeoC.)

What combination of words could convey the idea -though free of contradiction-, that an intelligent all powerful agent (that is to say, one that acts for an end) , moves a creature from state A to state B without, at the same time, being compelling?

But if in this very specific case, “to move” (or better, “to have moved”) means “to give the power to act”, which would be equivalent to say that the creature is created as a being which can act by itself, then we are the real authors of our poor actions.

 

[lmelahn]

What combination of words could convey the idea -though free of contradiction-, that an intelligent all powerful agent (that is to say, one that acts for an end) , moves a creature from state A to state B without, at the same time, being compelling?

In the case of God moving the human will, look at it this way:

Unless God were acting on the will, sustaining its being, the will would be in state A: unable to desire anything or to operate. (I am not sure that Aquinas intends “state A” as different from the very existence of the will. In fact, I suspect that he does not.)

God “moves”*the will in such a way that it can now desire the things that will make the person happy. (However, in reality, this “movement” is taken in a very broad sense; it is not necessarily posterior in time to the existence of the will, or for that matter, to the existence of the person himself.) That state of being capable of desiring and operating is state B.

So the “movement” from state A to state B is irresistible. However state B is one that gives the will freedom of action: freedom to act or not to act, and also—with the help of the intellect—the freedom to choose “this” action or “that” one.

But if in this very specific case, “to move” (or better, “to have moved”) means “to give the power to act”, which would be equivalent to say that the creature is created as a being which can act by itself, then we are the real authors of our poor actions.

We are indeed real authors of our own actions. Just not the only authors. God is also their author. God gives us a capacity, and we decide whether to exercise it or not.

(This is, by the way, the only way I can think of to reconcile God’s universality in causation, His omnipotence, and our freedom.)