How do we come to know things?

[JuanFlorencio]

It seems to me, that kinetic energy is only “measurable” relative to a frame of reference. However, a ball that collides into another ball and sets the latter in motion has, it seems to me, acquired a capacity to set that other ball in motion. Likewise the ball that was at rest (relative to me) has a capacity to arrest the motion of the first ball. As you know, by choosing a different frame of reference, we could represent the motion of the balls as experiencing a head-on collision and then moving straight back from where they came.

That capacity or “active potency” is kinetic energy. How exactly we measure it depends on the choice of frame of reference.

(Partly in response to Feynman, at least in my physics textbooks, energy was always defined as “the ability to do work”—i.e., to apply a force over so-much distance. I think that definiton is fine. It is hardly comprehensive, but I would say it is incorrect to say that “we have no knowledge of what energy is.”)

That is how I would see it: it is a quality (in the technical sense) of a body.

Kinetic energy is not measurable, but computable; and the frame of reference does not only permit to compute it, but its selection determines if it is zero or greater. That is the point: even without any change in the body “its” kinetic energy changes; therefore, it is not a quality of the body.

For the collision of two bodies A and B you can always choose your reference frame in such a way that the momentum of one of the bodies will be zero before the collision. So, just by selecting the reference frame, you will see in one case that it is the ball A which has the “active potency”, and from another reference frame, you will see that it is the body B which has the “active potency”. Therefore, momentum is not a quality of the bodies either.

Energy (either in the form of kinetic, or potential, or electric, or chemical, or any other) understood as “the ability to do work” is not consistent with the first and second laws of thermodynamics. While the ability to do work tends to decrease over time, the total energy is conserved.

And in fact with Special Relativity, the mass depends, like the energy, on the observer’s frame of reference. I think that so-called “inertial mass” is also a quality, in this case a “passive” potency: a body’s resistance to acceleration. Like kinetic energy, how you measure it depends on your point of view (at least when the differences in velocity between you and the object measured are large enough to be able to detect the difference).

That bodies are related in such a way that energy is conserved. (Or mass-and-energy, if we are considering Relativity.) I think that makes the philosophical problem a lot easier, without sacrificing at all the validity of the latest theories.

Again, the reference frame not only influences how you measure the mass, (or “its” kinetic energy) but it determines it’s quantity. Besides, depending on the reference frame, you could see that the body is accelerating, decelerating or in repose. So while an aristotelian observer located in one reference frame would claim that the mass has an “active potency”, another aristotelian observer located in a different reference frame could claim that it “really” has a “passive potency”.

I don’t understand what do you mean with “the philosophical problem” nor how it becomes easier if we give the generic name of “quality” to kinetic energy, mass and others. Could you please explain it to me?

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Seems to me that trying to pin down energy to a specific mode of substance is pretty esoteric. If it is something more than a relationship, quantity, or quality, if it exists on its own, we could call it a substance proper. So until science can positively identify what it is, it is pointless to insist it fit into a specific category. The same might be said of gravity.

Linus2nd

 

[JuanFlorencio]

…(Clearly, when man knows a turnip, he does not turn into a turnip: in other words, he does not become a turnip in every way. However, he becomes a turnip in some way, and that way we call “intention,” from in and tendo, “to tend or move towards”.)

The capacity, or faculty, that is “plastic” like that and permits man to become what he knows, we call the “intellect” (from intus and lego, literally “to read into”)…

We will need to crack the nutshell to see clearly what is inside. You say that to know a turnip is to become a turnip someway. Please, tell me now in which way specifically.

 

[lmelahn]

Kinetic energy is not measurable, but computable; and the frame of reference does not only permit to compute it, but its selection determines if it is zero or greater. That is the point: even without any change in the body “its” kinetic energy changes; therefore, it is not a quality of the body.

By “measurable” I just mean that it is quantifiable; I can apply a value to it. The value, as value, is somewhat conventional—it depends on the frame of reference. But the capacity of one ball to apply force to another is real.

For the collision of two bodies A and B you can always choose your reference frame in such a way that the momentum of one of the bodies will be zero before the collision. So, just by selecting the reference frame, you will see in one case that it is the ball A which has the “active potency”, and from another reference frame, you will see that it is the body B which has the “active potency”. Therefore, momentum is not a quality of the bodies either.

They both have and active potency. The ball at “rest” arrests the motion of the first ball, right? That means it exerts a force equal and opposite to the force applied by the first ball. Hence, both balls act mutually on the other at exactly the same magnitude.

Energy (either in the form of kinetic, or potential, or electric, or chemical, or any other) understood as “the ability to do work” is not consistent with the first and second laws of thermodynamics. While the ability to do work tends to decrease over time, the total energy is conserved.

It is true that entropy increases with every physical process, but, it seems to me, this law only diminishes the ability to get useful work out of a system. It does not affect the fundamental correlation between energy and work. If I have 50J of kinetic energy, with that I can apply a force of 10N over 5 meters. Obviously, I won’t actually convert all of the kinetic energy cleanly; hence the realization of that potential will be less. I certainly won’t be able to do any more work than that.

Again, the reference frame not only influences how you measure the mass, (or “its” kinetic energy) but it determines it’s quantity. Besides, depending on the reference frame, you could see that the body is accelerating, decelerating or in repose. So while an aristotelian observer located in one reference frame would claim that the mass has an “active potency”, another aristotelian observer located in a different reference frame could claim that it “really” has a “passive potency”.

No, they have both an active potency (capacity to apply a force) and an passive potency (resistence to that application). When the objects actually meet, they behave in a predictiable way based on those potencies. How you assign the actual values is somewhat conventional, that is all.

I don’t understand what do you mean with “the philosophical problem” nor how it becomes easier if we give the generic name of “quality” to kinetic energy, mass and others. Could you please explain it to me?

The philosophical problem is how to square modern physical notions with Aristotelian act and potency. Since act and potency are philosophical, not physical, notions, it should be possible apply act and potency even to modern physics, and I think it works, without too many difficulties, although working out the details is a challenge. Anyway, it has not been done systematically.

One possibility is that notions such as energy refer to substances—beings with an independent and definite existence, as we discussed. That is suggested by the first law of themodynamics, the law of conservation of energy, or at least by the way physicists generally refer to that law. (Most physicists will characterize energy as a “quantity”—in the physical, not the Aristotelian sense—that is transferred from one object in a system to another, as if energy were a “thing.”)

There are several problems with this view:
(1) First and foremost, there is no such thing as energy floating around without being the energy of something. There is kinetic energy, potential energy, heat energy, electric energy, electromagnetic energy, and lots of others. But not energy floating around by itself.
(2) The very law of conservation of energy suggestst that energy is not a substance. Substances can be created and destroyed (technically, generated and corrupted) by physical processes. Energy, no. A positron and an electron can annihilate (corrupt) each other and generate a photon. But the energy (or sum total of the mass and equivalent energy) remains the same.

So if energy is not a substance—if it always belongs to something else—it must be an accident. Of the 9 categories of accidents, there are essentially two that could be candidates: quality (a “mode” or “measure”*of the substance) and relation (the reference of one substance to another). I do not have a firm opinion about this, but I would say that something like energy would be best characterized as a quality of the second species: the intrinsic capacity of a substance to apply force to another substance.

I think this works, because when one substance transfers energy to another, a relation is established between them: namely, the conservation of energy. (It is established, however, by the very substances in interaction; we merely discover it, in my view.)

That is what I mean when I say that characterizing energy (at least kinetic energy) as a quality of substances makes the philosophical problem easier. Characterizing energy as a substance seems inconsistent with what we know about energy, and characterizing it is a modus substantiae (quality) makes it serve as the basis for the relations we observe (conservation of energy, etc.).

 

[lmelahn]

Seems to me that trying to pin down energy to a specific mode of substance is pretty esoteric. If it is something more than a relationship, quantity, or quality, if it exists on its own, we could call it a substance proper. So until science can positively identify what it is, it is pointless to insist it fit into a specific category. The same might be said of gravity.

Linus2nd

Regarding kinetic energy, see my anser to JuanFlorencio.

 

[lmelahn]

We will need to crack the nutshell to see clearly what is inside. You say that to know a turnip is to become a turnip someway. Please, tell me now in which way specifically.

We become the turnip intentionally. (See below.)

My soul, which is spiritual—not dependent on matter—is “flexible.” It can take on the form of those beings that it comes in contact with. (That is exactly why Aristotle chooses “form,” morphé, as his metaphor for the principle of definition and unification.)

Remember how we argued back and forth as to whether the creatures we meet have an intrinsic order or logos? I argued, if you remember, that you cannot simply characterize a substance—a dog, say—as a lump of matter, a group of atoms, cells, or organs. Rather those constitutive components are ordered into a unique, undivided, ordered whole that the human intellect understands immediately as such. (Whether the person knows that Aristotle called such things ousia, or understands the theory of matter and form, is another matter altogether.)

(In tongue and cheek, only a scientist or a philoshopher would seriously consider a dog simply a bunch of cells. )

The principle—intrinsic to the substance—that makes it one, whole, and definite, is the substantial form. The principles that give the substance its characteristics or ”perfections” are the accidental forms (or simply “accidents”).

Going back to my soul: it is capable of taking on the forms—both substantial and accidental—of the things that it experiences (without losing its own form, naturally). Being matter-less, it cannot, of course, take on the matter of those things. The capacity, or faculty, that does this conformation we call the intellect.

And in that precise sense, the soul becomes the things that it knows.

That tendency of the the intellect to read into (intus legere)—that is, conform itself to—the things that it encounters, we call intention. Hence, we can say that we become what be know intentionally.

(This is an etymological use of the term intention from in and tendo, as I mentioned yesterday. There is also volutive intention—the intention of the will—which is the kind we are most familiar with in modern parlance, as when we say “I was intendeding to answer that email, but I forgot.”)

 

[Nixbits]

Imelahn:

We become the turnip intentionally.

I suspect that for many, if not most English speakers, myself included, this use of the word ‘become’ causes problems, to quote Sir Humphrey Appleby, “of sufficient magnitude as to lay upon the logical and semantic resources of the English language a heavier burden than they can reasonably be expected to bear.”

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Regarding kinetic energy, see my anser to JuanFlorencio.

Yes, I think that is very good. Still, energy, impetus, etc, if measurable, would seem to be substances of some kind. Science seems convinced that strong-week forces, electromagnetic forces, gravity, etc. are real enough.

Linus2nd

 

[Richca]

Yes, I think that is very good. Still, energy, impetus, etc, if measurable, would seem to be substances of some kind. Science seems convinced that strong-week forces, electromagnetic forces, gravity, etc. are real enough.

Linus2nd

Modern physics claims that when we look inside elemental atoms there are like four fundamental forces, namely, electromagnetic, gravity, strong and weak nuclear forces. In Aristotlelian terms, these are accidents of the elemental substances, specifically, powers of the elemental substances.

 

[lmelahn]

I suspect that for many, if not most English speakers, myself included, this use of the word ‘become’ causes problems, to quote Sir Humphrey Appleby, “of sufficient magnitude as to lay upon the logical and semantic resources of the English language a heavier burden than they can reasonably be expected to bear.”

Well, it is the only term I can think of that sufficiently represents the closeness that the intellect has to the things it unites to. Aristotle puts it this way: “With respect to act, knowledge is the same as the thing known” (De anima, III, 7, 431a 1).

So, it is not that we construct a little image of the thing known; the form that is informing our intellect is the very same form that informs the thing.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

The philosophical problem is how to square modern physical notions with Aristotelian act and potency. Since act and potency are philosophical, not physical, notions, it should be possible apply act and potency even to modern physics, and I think it works, without too many difficulties, although working out the details is a challenge. Anyway, it has not been done systematically.

One possibility is that notions such as energy refer to substances—beings with an independent and definite existence, as we discussed. That is suggested by the first law of themodynamics, the law of conservation of energy, or at least by the way physicists generally refer to that law. (Most physicists will characterize energy as a “quantity”—in the physical, not the Aristotelian sense—that is transferred from one object in a system to another, as if energy were a “thing.”)

There are several problems with this view:
(1) First and foremost, there is no such thing as energy floating around without being the energy of something. There is kinetic energy, potential energy, heat energy, electric energy, electromagnetic energy, and lots of others. But not energy floating around by itself.
(2) The very law of conservation of energy suggestst that energy is not a substance. Substances can be created and destroyed (technically, generated and corrupted) by physical processes. Energy, no. A positron and an electron can annihilate (corrupt) each other and generate a photon. But the energy (or sum total of the mass and equivalent energy) remains the same.

So if energy is not a substance—if it always belongs to something else—it must be an accident. Of the 9 categories of accidents, there are essentially two that could be candidates: quality (a “mode” or “measure”*of the substance) and relation (the reference of one substance to another). I do not have a firm opinion about this, but I would say that something like energy would be best characterized as a quality of the second species: the intrinsic capacity of a substance to apply force to another substance.

Imelahn, if in you effort to square modern physical notions with aristotelian terms you consider just a few data, you cannot succeed. You would need to work hard trying to comprehend those modern notions and how they are applied to explain phenomena and to develop technology. I would advice you to solve enough problems so that you can make sure that you get those notions clear and also you will know what the scope of conventions is. If you work only with a small part of the available information you might feel that your goal is easy to reach and you would be surprised that other competent aristotelian philosophers did not do it before.

Anyway…, you might remember that “kinetic energy” is a mathematical function whose variables are the “mass” of a body and its speed. These two magnitudes are relatively simple relations; but some persons might think that they perceive them. Let’s suppose we all do. If so, we would be able to see the mass of the body (an aristotelian quantity), and it’s speed (an aristotelian action). But we would not be able to perceive “kinetic energy”. It is just a definition that was proposed in the times of Descartes and Leibniz. Still, you wonder if “kinetic energy” is an accident and, if it is, which kind could it be. However, it would be strange that “kinetic energy” could be an additional accident besides “mass” and speed. Naturally, if your imagination is strong you can put it in reality just as you say some physicists use to do (as a thing), you can put it as some tangible object or in some other way that you might please.

Whenever you want to reject the possibility that something which you do not conceive as a “substance” is not an accident, you challenge us requesting us to point to its being “floating around”. Very well,me nergy can be radiant too, and radiation can propagate in the vacuum. You don’t see it, but it certainly is “floating around” without being the energy of anything.

They both have and active potency. The ball at “rest” arrests the motion of the first ball, right? That means it exerts a force equal and opposite to the force applied by the first ball. Hence, both balls act mutually on the other at exactly the same magnitude.

It sounds interesting: It is like a cold object which has the active potency of arresting the thermal energy of a hot object, making it cooler. So, one object A has the active potency to cool down a hot object B, while this one has the active potency to heat A up. This is really new to me. I don’t see its usefulness, but I certainly see how new this is.

It is true that entropy increases with every physical process, but, it seems to me, this law only diminishes the ability to get useful work out of a system. It does not affect the fundamental correlation between energy and work. If I have 50J of kinetic energy, with that I can apply a force of 10N over 5 meters. Obviously, I won’t actually convert all of the kinetic energy cleanly; hence the realization of that potential will be less. I certainly won’t be able to do any more work than that.

Useful work? Do you know some “useless work”?

If you “have” a kinetic energy of 50 J, then, if your mass is 100 Kg, it means that your speed is 1m/s. How would you manage under those conditions to apply a force of 50 N over 5 meters? If it is so obvious to you that you will not convert all the kinetic energy cleanly into work, how were you able to derive the fundamental correlation between energy and work?

 

[lmelahn]

Imelahn, if in you effort to square modern physical notions with aristotelian terms you consider just a few data, you cannot succeed. You would need to work hard trying to comprehend those modern notions and how they are applied to explain phenomena and to develop technology. I would advice you to solve enough problems so that you can make sure that you get those notions clear and also you will know what the scope of conventions is. If you work only with a small part of the available information you might feel that your goal is easy to reach and you would be surprised that other competent aristotelian philosophers did not do it before.

There have been, just not very many in English. One of the best I have seen is Fr. Felippo Selvaggi, S.I. Unfortunately, his works are only available in Italian. He also wrote his works a few years ago, so they would need updating with the latest theories.

Anyway…, you might remember that “kinetic energy” is a mathematical function whose variables are the “mass” of a body and its speed. These two magnitudes are relatively simple relations; but some persons might think that they perceive them. Let’s suppose we all do. If so, we would be able to see the mass of the body (an aristotelian quantity),

Aristotle had no concept of mass. For him, “quantity” is the three-dimensional size of the object—more or less our concept of “volume.” That is why I would argue that mass is also a modus substantiae (quality).

and it’s speed (an aristotelian action).

If by “action” you mean the category that is the antagonist of “passion”—namely, the poiein (literally a “making”)—then velocity would not qualify, in Aristotele’s view. An “action” always has a concrete effect, either in the agent itself (like immanent the actions of our intellect and will), or in something else (like when I swing at a golf ball, or when a billiard ball hits another, and so on).

I think (and again my thought is not perfectly mature on this point) that velocity is best described as a relation of one body with respect to the other bodies in the universe.

But we would not be able to perceive “kinetic energy”.

I agree. But we can see its effects.

It is just a definition that was proposed in the times of Descartes and Leibniz. Still, you wonder if “kinetic energy” is an accident and, if it is, which kind could it be. However, it would be strange that “kinetic energy” could be an additional accident besides “mass” and speed.

Well, if kinetic energy is real, and it is not a substance, then it must be an accident. There is no other possibility (because a being either has to exist independently, or not). One possibility is that the more fundamental modi substantiae (qualities) are actually the mass and the momentum, and that the velocity and kinetic energy are simply relations based on these. (I am speculating here—I have not thought it through thoroughly.)

I don’t think kinetic energy can be reduced to a simple mathematical construct: there is too much empirical evidence that confirms its existence.

In any case, what is wrong with having different qualities inhering in the same substance? Hot iron is both hot and radiant (in addition to having mass, etc.)—those are various active potencies in the same substance.

Naturally, if your imagination is strong you can put it in reality just as you say some physicists use to do (as a thing), you can put it as some tangible object or in some other way that you might please.

Whenever you want to reject the possibility that something which you do not conceive as a “substance” is not an accident, you challenge us requesting us to point to its being “floating around”. Very well,me nergy can be radiant too, and radiation can propagate in the vacuum. You don’t see it, but it certainly is “floating around” without being the energy of anything.

But it is transmitted by photons, in that case, which I would consider substances, I think.

It sounds interesting: It is like a cold object which has the active potency of arresting the thermal energy of a hot object, making it cooler. So, one object A has the active potency to cool down a hot object B, while this one has the active potency to heat A up. This is really new to me. I don’t see its usefulness, but I certainly see how new this is.

There is a difference, however. The hot object “has” something to “give”—its heat—which the cold object lacks. In a collision, the both objects give and receive something.

Useful work? Do you know some “useless work”?

Work is “useless” when it is counteracted by equal and opposite work, as in systems at equilibrium—in other words, when it is not ordered in a particular direction.

If you “have” a kinetic energy of 50 J, then, if your mass is 100 Kg, it means that your speed is 1m/s. How would you manage under those conditions to apply a force of 50 N over 5 meters? If it is so obvious to you that you will not convert all the kinetic energy cleanly into work, how were you able to derive the fundamental correlation between energy and work?

I think I meant to say “10 N over 5 meters.” If I could manage to apply the force during an entire second to an object with a mass of 1 kg, I would apply 10 N of force over 5 meters. I would end up flinging it at a velocity of 10 m/s. Or did I do the calculations wrong?

 

[inocente]

It sounds interesting: It is like a cold object which has the active potency of arresting the thermal energy of a hot object, making it cooler. So, one object A has the active potency to cool down a hot object B, while this one has the active potency to heat A up. This is really new to me. I don’t see its usefulness, but I certainly see how new this is.

The theoretical physicist Richard Feynman, who was also a great teacher, explained that atoms jiggle with kinetic energy. They jiggle more when they have more energy, and we read this as a higher temperature. So, in a hot object the atoms jiggle more than in a cold object, and if we bring them together then some of the jiggling of the hot atoms gets conducted to the cold atoms, which we read as cooling the hot object and warming the cold object. The rate at which this happens is proportional to the temperature difference and the thermal conductivity of the materials.

See for instance youtube.com/watch?v=v3pYRn5j7oI. He then goes on to use the same terminology to explain what fire is and where trees really come from in youtube.com/watch?v=ITpDrdtGAmo.

I think this alone is sufficient to show that act and potency are unnecessary and misleading notions.

Useful work? Do you know some “useless work”?

To get useful work, the atoms in one object need to be jiggling more than in another (there needs to be a large enough temperature gradient). All life sustains itself in this way, for example by “burning” the sunlight stored in food. Once the work is done, the jiggling is evened out, and is no longer of any use. Once the last stars have burned out, it is theorized that eventually all atoms everywhere will jiggle at the same rate and life will be impossible (“heat death”).

I don’t see how Aristotle helps in any of this. The thread is interesting on some of the differences in how Aristotle is interpreted, and his notions may well still be useful as an example of an influential theory of knowledge, but for the most part they seem only to complicate science rather than add any explanatory value. My 5c.

 

[utunumsint]

The theoretical physicist Richard Feynman, who was also a great teacher, explained that atoms jiggle with kinetic energy. They jiggle more when they have more energy, and we read this as a higher temperature. So, in a hot object the atoms jiggle more than in a cold object, and if we bring them together then some of the jiggling of the hot atoms gets conducted to the cold atoms, which we read as cooling the hot object and warming the cold object. The rate at which this happens is proportional to the temperature difference and the thermal conductivity of the materials.

See for instance youtube.com/watch?v=v3pYRn5j7oI. He then goes on to use the same terminology to explain what fire is and where trees really come from in youtube.com/watch?v=ITpDrdtGAmo.

I think this alone is sufficient to show that act and potency are unnecessary and misleading notions.

To get useful work, the atoms in one object need to be jiggling more than in another (there needs to be a large enough temperature gradient). All life sustains itself in this way, for example by “burning” the sunlight stored in food. Once the work is done, the jiggling is evened out, and is no longer of any use. Once the last stars have burned out, it is theorized that eventually all atoms everywhere will jiggle at the same rate and life will be impossible (“heat death”).

I don’t see how Aristotle helps in any of this. The thread is interesting on some of the differences in how Aristotle is interpreted, and his notions may well still be useful as an example of an influential theory of knowledge, but for the most part they seem only to complicate science rather than add any explanatory value. My 5c.

This post makes me laugh - I don’t mean this maliciously at all, its just that, to me at least, your description is chalk full of instances of act and potency. For example:

then some of the jiggling of the hot atoms gets conducted to the cold atoms

That seems to me an instance of a potency in the cold atoms being actualized by the hot atoms. And vice versa, the hot atoms had a potency being actualized by the cold atoms.

Does this add one iota to the scientific description? Not really.

It is a true feature of reality? I think so.

Can it be the foundation for a philosophical analysis of nature, cause and effect, substance, and so on? Obviously.

Is it possible that both this account and the scientific accounts might be true at the same time? I think so.

Might it be the case that a both scientific and philosophical accounts of nature might be brought into dialog? Assuming sufficient humility on both sides to recognize the limits of their perspectives? ???

God bless,
Ut

 

[inocente]

This post makes me laugh - I don’t mean this maliciously at all, its just that, to me at least, your description is chalk full of instances of act and potency. For example:

That seems to me an instance of a potency in the cold atoms being actualized by the hot atoms. And vice versa, the hot atoms had a potency being actualized by the cold atoms.

But that’s wrong, it isn’t at all what happens. That’s what I mean by act and potency having no explanatory value, all it did was send you down the wrong road.

*Does this add one iota to the scientific description? Not really.

It is a true feature of reality? I think so.

Can it be the foundation for a philosophical analysis of nature, cause and effect, substance, and so on? Obviously.

Is it possible that both this account and the scientific accounts might be true at the same time? I think so.

Might it be the case that a both scientific and philosophical accounts of nature might be brought into dialog? Assuming sufficient humility on both sides to recognize the limits of their perspectives? ???

God bless,
Ut*

If the notion of act and potency means nothing more than “stuff can change”, then no child since the stone age needed Aristotle to tell her that, it’s kind of obvious from the fact that she’s now taller than this time last year.

Does the notion tell us what kinds of change can occur? Nope. Does it tell us how they occur? Nope. Does it tell us when they occur? Nope. Does it help us push forward the frontiers of knowledge in any way whatsoever? I wouldn’t have thought so, or surely it would be an essential part of the syllabus in every primary school?

I know Aristotle was worshiped and adored for several centuries. That’s the only reason why some of his ideas lasted so long. All those books in all those libraries couldn’t possibly be wrong, could they? But yes, they were. Three cheers for Galileo et al. Rather than trying to rehabilitate wrong ideas, I think a better philosophy is hang on to what’s useful and chuck out what is not.

 

[utunumsint]

But that’s wrong, it isn’t at all what happens. That’s what I mean by act and potency having no explanatory value, all it did was send you down the wrong road.

If the notion of act and potency means nothing more than “stuff can change”, then no child since the stone age needed Aristotle to tell her that, it’s kind of obvious from the fact that she’s now taller than this time last year.

Does the notion tell us what kinds of change can occur? Nope. Does it tell us how they occur? Nope. Does it tell us when they occur? Nope. Does it help us push forward the frontiers of knowledge in any way whatsoever? I wouldn’t have thought so, or surely it would be an essential part of the syllabus in every primary school?

I know Aristotle was worshiped and adored for several centuries. That’s the only reason why some of his ideas lasted so long. All those books in all those libraries couldn’t possibly be wrong, could they? But yes, they were. Three cheers for Galileo et al. Rather than trying to rehabilitate wrong ideas, I think a better philosophy is hang on to what’s useful and chuck out what is not.

But in no way have you refuted anything that Aristotle or Aquinas say here. You simply state that it has been refuted and propose a that only considerations of practical utility are important. That is pretty much what happened in the enlightenment as well. Must we really be so narrow in our thinking?

God bless,
Ut

 

[Linusthe2nd]

The theoretical physicist Richard Feynman, who was also a great teacher, explained that atoms jiggle with kinetic energy. They jiggle more when they have more energy, and we read this as a higher temperature. So, in a hot object the atoms jiggle more than in a cold object, and if we bring them together then some of the jiggling of the hot atoms gets conducted to the cold atoms, which we read as cooling the hot object and warming the cold object. The rate at which this happens is proportional to the temperature difference and the thermal conductivity of the materials.

See for instance youtube.com/watch?v=v3pYRn5j7oI. He then goes on to use the same terminology to explain what fire is and where trees really come from in youtube.com/watch?v=ITpDrdtGAmo.

I think this alone is sufficient to show that act and potency are unnecessary and misleading notions.

To get useful work, the atoms in one object need to be jiggling more than in another (there needs to be a large enough temperature gradient). All life sustains itself in this way, for example by “burning” the sunlight stored in food. Once the work is done, the jiggling is evened out, and is no longer of any use. Once the last stars have burned out, it is theorized that eventually all atoms everywhere will jiggle at the same rate and life will be impossible (“heat death”).

I don’t see how Aristotle helps in any of this. The thread is interesting on some of the differences in how Aristotle is interpreted, and his notions may well still be useful as an example of an influential theory of knowledge, but for the most part they seem only to complicate science rather than add any explanatory value. My 5c.

Oh, Oh, this should spice things up a bit.

Linua2nd

 

[utunumsint]

A quote from Feser’s The Last Superstition, page 179

The undeniable success of the quantificational approach to the study of the natural world, and especially the technological achievements it has made possible, might seem an obvious retroactive justification of this revolution. But there are three reasons why such an argument in favor of the modems over the Scholastics is no good.

1. 
   *]First of all, it blames the Aristotelian tradition for failing to achieve something it was not, for the most part, trying to achieve in the first place. Classical and medieval philosophy and science aimed at wisdom and understanding, not the prediction and control of nature.
   *]Second, that an emphasis on the mathematically quantifiable aspects of nature has had dramatic technological consequences does not show that there are no other aspects of nature; in particular, it does not show that there are no formal and final causes.
   *]Third, some late Scholastic thinkers did in fact begin to give the quantifiable aspects of nature greater emphasis than their predecessors had; in fact, the work of Galileo and company built on that of these Scholasitcs. And it was not as if the subsequent findings of modern science cannot be incorporated within an Aristotelian framework. What Aristotelianism rules out is not these findings, but only a purely mechanistic or naturalistic interpretation of these findings.

1. 
   God bless,
   Ut

 

[Linusthe2nd]

The theoretical physicist Richard Feynman, who was also a great teacher, explained that atoms jiggle with kinetic energy. They jiggle more when they have more energy, and we read this as a higher temperature. So, in a hot object the atoms jiggle more than in a cold object, and if we bring them together then some of the jiggling of the hot atoms gets conducted to the cold atoms, which we read as cooling the hot object and warming the cold object. The rate at which this happens is proportional to the temperature difference and the thermal conductivity of the materials.

See for instance youtube.com/watch?v=v3pYRn5j7oI. He then goes on to use the same terminology to explain what fire is and where trees really come from in youtube.com/watch?v=ITpDrdtGAmo.

I think this alone is sufficient to show that act and potency are unnecessary and misleading notions.

To get useful work, the atoms in one object need to be jiggling more than in another (there needs to be a large enough temperature gradient). All life sustains itself in this way, for example by “burning” the sunlight stored in food. Once the work is done, the jiggling is evened out, and is no longer of any use. Once the last stars have burned out, it is theorized that eventually all atoms everywhere will jiggle at the same rate and life will be impossible (“heat death”).

I don’t see how Aristotle helps in any of this. The thread is interesting on some of the differences in how Aristotle is interpreted, and his notions may well still be useful as an example of an influential theory of knowledge, but for the most part they seem only to complicate science rather than add any explanatory value. My 5c.

Hey, Juan is probably on your side. But I’m sure he will respond. Just a short comment or two. Aristotelian/Thomistic philosophy are falsely accused as impediments to the development of science. Just because Gallileo was reading the wrong or errant editions of Aristotle you can’t blame Aristotle, nor can you condemn Aristotle just because Gallileo didn’t like him. That is poor logic. Ditto for those mechinists and naturalists of the Renaissance/Enlightenment who were at war any idea or thought which might lead to God, like an immaterial soul. ( oddly, very oddly, there are some Christians who are like minded ).

There is no valid objection which can be raised against Aristotelian/Thomistic philosophy from a scientific point of view. Each studies the world from a different point of view. Neither has a corner on truth. Science studies the quantifiable, philosophy studies the unquantifiable, and both deal with the same reality. Why do some become so vexed at the idea that A/T philosophy should exist or that it should be taken seriously or that it should even be taught at least at the University level.

Linus2nd

 

[lmelahn]

The theoretical physicist Richard Feynman, who was also a great teacher, explained that atoms jiggle with kinetic energy. They jiggle more when they have more energy, and we read this as a higher temperature. So, in a hot object the atoms jiggle more than in a cold object, and if we bring them together then some of the jiggling of the hot atoms gets conducted to the cold atoms, which we read as cooling the hot object and warming the cold object. The rate at which this happens is proportional to the temperature difference and the thermal conductivity of the materials.

See for instance youtube.com/watch?v=v3pYRn5j7oI. He then goes on to use the same terminology to explain what fire is and where trees really come from in youtube.com/watch?v=ITpDrdtGAmo.

I think this alone is sufficient to show that act and potency are unnecessary and misleading notions.

Well, let me put the following challenge to you: take a piece of cold iron, say, that you are about to place in the fire.

An Aristotelian would say that the cold iron is hot “in potency”—which is simply to say, although it is not hot now, it has the capacity to be hot in the future.

Throw the iron into the fire, and a few seconds, it will be hot “in act.”

My challenge is the following: although I concede that temperature is largely explainable by the jiggling of the constituent atoms (although not completely—there are quantum phenomena involved, which is why hot iron radiates light), why is it a problem to say that the cold iron’s atoms are jiggling fast “in potency” (i.e. not now, but they have the capacity to jiggle fast in the future), and that they jiggle fast “in act” once the iron has been heated?

I am curious to know how you would answer this.

To get useful work, the atoms in one object need to be jiggling more than in another (there needs to be a large enough temperature gradient). All life sustains itself in this way, for example by “burning” the sunlight stored in food. Once the work is done, the jiggling is evened out, and is no longer of any use. Once the last stars have burned out, it is theorized that eventually all atoms everywhere will jiggle at the same rate and life will be impossible (“heat death”).

I am substantially in agreement with you about this.

I don’t see how Aristotle helps in any of this. The thread is interesting on some of the differences in how Aristotle is interpreted, and his notions may well still be useful as an example of an influential theory of knowledge, but for the most part they seem only to complicate science rather than add any explanatory value. My 5c.

Keep in mind that Aristotle is trying to solve a different problem than modern physicists do. Physicists, legitimately, seek the material causes of things, or at least the laws that govern them. Aristotle is seeking the ultimate causes and principles, which is a very different thing. For example, modern physics is not sufficient to explain how human beings know (which is the topic of this thread), because it cannot take into account spiritual realities, like our souls.

On the other hand, we need to understand something about the fundamental structure (ontological, not physical) of material beings, because they are the things that our intellect knows most easily.