How do we come to know things?

[inocente]

It seems to me that if we have learned anything from the science of the last hundred years or so is not how simple things are such as organisms, for example, the human body, but the marvelous complexity and order of them. Quantum mechanics is far from being simply simple, but shows a marvelous complexity and order and we are very far from knowing everything about it and probably never will. The natural sciences seem to come out daily with new theories and findings.

As far as the philosophical tradition of Aristotelianism/Thomism having any explanatory value, this is far from the truth. The metaphysics of St Thomas will lead one to the ultimate cause and explanation of all reality which is none other than God. This, St Thomas did, and even Aristotle in some degree, centuries before the rise of modern science. Can modern physics claim that the ultimate cause of reality is God? No, this is beyond their field of study, some physicists are even atheists and this is far from knowing the truth. According to these last mentioned physicists, modern physics is of no help to man. That God is the ultimate cause of reality according to the natural light of reason is the domain of true metaphysics which we find in St Thomas, not the domain of physics.

The catholic philosophical/metaphysical tradition of Aristotelianism/Thomism cannot be reduced to modern physics, chemistry, etc. These modern sciences are certainly a help to us in gaining knowledge of the inner workings of nature and the particular causes of things. Philosophy, as the word implies, is the love and pursuit of wisdom or truth by the natural light of reason. The highest field of study of philosophy, as Aristotle says, is metaphysics which is concerned not just with the particular causes of things which we find in the natural sciences but with the ultimate causes of things and of reality. The science of metaphysics is not just concerned with particular beings but being as being whether material or immaterial. It begins with the observable, the physical and material, and ends in the immaterial. Indeed, the end of metaphysics is immaterial being and the ultimate cause of all, namely, God. Now, the ultimate cause and explanation of all is, indeed, what mankind desires to know.

It is easily done, to lose the amazement of amazing grace, to forget that God is Almighty, and I think Aristotelianism and Thomism cannot help but do that because of the way they try to analyze both us and God. The entire approach, to me, is badly flawed, but rather than go off-topic I’ll just point to Isaiah 55:8-9 and 1 Cor 1:18-31 - For my thoughts are not Aristotle’s thoughts, nor are his ways my ways, says the Lord, for the foolishness of God is wiser than Aristotle’s wisdom, and the weakness of God is stronger than Aristotle’s strength.

 

[utunumsint]

I mentioned Galileo et al as amongst those who refuted various aspects of Aristotle’s physics. While some of his methodical approach worked, some didn’t, in particular his lack of testing of ideas against empirical evidence. Yes, we should narrow our thinking to throw out wrong ideas, what’s the point of hoarding ideas which have been proven wrong?

I doubt that anyone on this thread are arguing for a return to Aristotle’s physics. I certainly am not. Most people here are arguing for his metaphysics only.

God bless,
Ut

 

[Richca]

It is easily done, to lose the amazement of amazing grace, to forget that God is Almighty, and I think Aristotelianism and Thomism cannot help but do that because of the way they try to analyze both us and God. The entire approach, to me, is badly flawed, but rather than go off-topic I’ll just point to Isaiah 55:8-9 and 1 Cor 1:18-31 - For my thoughts are not Aristotle’s thoughts, nor are his ways my ways, says the Lord, for the foolishness of God is wiser than Aristotle’s wisdom, and the weakness of God is stronger than Aristotle’s strength.

Yes, it is written that God’s thoughts are not our thoughts, nor his ways our ways. However, I don’t think that when Aristotle was alive and teaching his doctrine, God was thinking to himself “this man is foolish, for the foolishness of God is wiser than human wisdom.” God created Aristotle and gifted him with a very keen and sharp intellect for a purpose, more so than most men, and Aristotle used this gift. Aristotle did not have the benefit of divine revelation to guide him so he made some errors. However, I think it would be an error on our part to not recognize that Aristotle was not one of the greatest philosophical thinkers the world has seen. God created human beings with an intellect and reason and so it is natural for us to use it; and so Aristotle said “Man by nature desires to know.” St Thomas Aquinas used the philosophy of Aristotle as well as Plato’s in his theological teaching in expounding the catholic faith where that philosophy was not in contradiction to Sacred Doctrine or Holy Scripture and the teaching of the Catholic Church in accord with what St Peter says “Always be ready to give an explanation to anyone who asks you for a reason for your hope” (1 Peter 3:15).

 

[JuanFlorencio]

It is my understanding that the very concept of kinetic energy depends that of work produced. I don’t have my old physics textbooks in front of me, but I seem to recall deriving the formula for kinetic energy from the definition of work exerted by a constant force.

As regards the problem at hand, I calculated that there is no way for me, at 1 m/s, to apply 50J of work to a 1-kg object at rest. Assuming an elastic collision, and based on the law of conservation of momentum, to effect a 50-J transfer of energy, I would have to be going originally at least 5.05 m/s (a fast run). Presumably, the more likely scenario is an inelastic collision, so I would have to be going even faster, and “lose” some of the kinetic energy as heat.

So, I stand corrected for my poor illustration .

(It does illustrate, in my opinion, that the relations of energy and momentum between bodies are real relations. They actually affect the behavior of those bodies.)

I do think that you need to draw a few free-body diagrams for yourself; and if you want to show them to me, great. And when you be working on them, ask yourself why in those diagrams bodies are represented as dimensionless particles, and “forces” as arrows; remember that I have said that through relations (do not restrict yourself at that moment to the aristotelian notion of relation, please) we are imitating reality. You will find in a textbook how those diagrams have to be done, and what do they mean; but it would be fantastic if you could find out how they were conceived by the individual who used them the first time (before any teacher could teach them): were they impressed by reality in the mind of that individual? Did he discovered them by looking attentively to reality? Or what?

Plato thought that our world was certain imitation of ideal objects (our world is appearance). Aristotle put those objects at the very core of our world, and thought that we intentionally become them (appearance arises from a bad judgement). I say that we develop systems of relations with which we imitate reality more or less successfully (our knowledge is a powerful appearance).

The other day we mentioned the ideal gas law. There was a time when this law was considered “real”. It was because they did not have the chance to deal with gases at high pressures and very low temperatures. When those new experiences were possible, people realized the “ideality” of that “law”. It was necessary to develop new equations of state (equations that relate temperature, pressure and volume, and some even add other parameters) to get better results. There is a great variety of those equations with important differences between them; however each one of them provides better results than the ideal gas law (that is to say, empirical evidence supports each one of them). Given the variety of those equations, which one of them was impressed by reality on the mind of the researcher? This question makes absolutely no sense (As you say: only a philosopher can ask that question).

As we usually learn about science from textbooks, we never even imagine how all the stuff that we find there was developed. Once I commented to some of my friends that the development of the principles of conservation of energy and conservation of momentum was originally based on the fundamental idea that “God is perfect; therefore…”. And they looked at me incredulous… But that is the historical “fact”.

If you read Galileo’s or Newton’s works, Imelahn, you might notice how these great men used their imagination for the development of their theories. Consider for instance what Galileo says here:

“Imagine any particle projected along a horizontal plane without friction; then we know, from what has been more fully explained in the preceding pages, that this particle will move along this same plane with a motion which is uniform and perpetual, provided the plane has no limits. But if the plane is limited and elevated, then the moving particle, which we imagine to be a heavy one, will on passing over the edge of the plane acquire, in addition to its previous uniform and perpetual motion, a downward propensity due to its own weight; so that the resulting motion which I call projection [projectio], is compounded of one which is uniform and horizontal and of another which is vertical and naturally accelerated.” (Dialogue concerning two new sciences, fourth day)

Of course, someone could try to hide this and will urge Galileo to correct himself: "but what are you saying Galileo? You didn’t need to imagine anything; reality impressed on your mind the irrefutable existence of the infinite frictionless plane (which is clearly accessible to everybody, provided they pay careful attention), and the undeniable fact of perpetual uniform movement. Please, never say again that you imagine something, because it is misleading; instead, say you have discovered it… And so on…

Then, you might think: “it is not surprising that this happens in natural science, because scientists ignore aristotelian philosophy. Aristotle would help them a lot. And if he doesn’t, at least we can be sure that his prime philosophy is absolutely infallible”. However, I can show you that the fundamental rational procedures that natural scientists use for the development of their theories, are the same that Aristotle used to formulate his prime philosophy.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

I think any supposed war between philosophy and science is as spurious as the supposed war between religion and science. Truth cannot contradict truth. Every field of human endeavor is littered with ideas which have been proven wrong, and any discipline which lovingly hangs on to them rather than discard them is dead, and serve it right, it is no longer searching for truth, it is merely nostalgically gazing at its navel. Ideas are not people, wrong ideas feel no pain when we let them die.

I’d say a good philosophy is to rigorously keep what has not been disproved from your favorite philosophers and rigorously throw out what has been discredited. Keep a tidy ship, be unsentimental, then surely there is no reason to be on the defensive.

No modern A/T philosopher has hung on to any outmoded philosophical notions, A’s notion of Celestial movers, the light and the heavy have been abondoned. Even Aquinas accepted the Celestial movers only provisionally and only then as he had modified them,

Linus2nd

 

[Richca]

No modern A/T philosopher has hung on to any outmoded philosophical notions, A’s notion of Celestial movers, the light and the heavy have been abondoned. Even Aquinas accepted the Celestial movers only provisionally and only then as he had modified them,

Linus2nd

It is true that the first proof for the existence of God from the argument from motion which we find in Aquinas’ Summa Theologica does not hinge on the debated questions of celestial mechanics of his time. Aquinas, following the teaching of the holy doctors such as Augustine, Gregory, Damascene, Origin, does state that the corporeal creatures are ruled by the spiritual creature or angels. For example, St Augustine says “Every visible thing in this world has an angelic power placed over it.” Aquinas thinks that according to the ordering of divine providence, it is reasonable to hold that lower creatures are ruled or presided over by higher creatures and we find such to be the case such as human beings have dominion over the brute animals and the higher powers of the human soul rule over the lower powers. And we know from Holy Scripture that the angels are sent by God on various missions concerning mankind and the physical universe. I think then, that we cannot outright conclude that the motion of the heavenly bodies is not presided over by angels unless we want to put ourselves in a position to contradict the teaching of the holy fathers and doctors of the Church which I, myself, am not prepared or want to do. If the angels are not directly moving the heavenly bodies, they could use the forces of nature such as gravity or the momentum of massive bodies in presiding over these motions. All this they do under the direction and providence of God.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

The substantial form is the principle of all that order. It gives the turnip, and its order, their being.

The question that philosophy asks is, “where does that order—that unity-in-plurality—come from”? And my answer is, “from a principle, unique and intrinsic to each material substance, that I call ‘substantial form.’ ”

Do you mean that the turnip, on the one side, and its order, on the other side, are somehow, but not really, and then the turnip’s substantial form (which we have agreed before -many posts ago-, is not before nor after the turnip) gives them their being (which would not be really theirs, because they received it from the substantial form)? What a mess! For the moment, I am not interested on this metaphysical inventions. Please, let’s start from the point when you find the turnip in front of you.

Remember what I am claiming: it is easy for us to apprehend whole, unified, material substances. I am not claiming that we readily understand the principle (i.e., the substantial form) that unifies such a substance. In fact, I think it is difficult for us to do so.

The order of our understanding is as follows: first, we discover that the thing exists, then that it is one, and only then that it is “plural” in various ways.

Upon reflection, we note that the plurality is unified by various kinds of order (like the ones you mention).

So, briefly, what you are saying here -if I understood correctly-, is that we find the turnip in front of us. Then, we need to go to school and read books to understand the various kinds of order in the turnip. I would add that we can also make direct observations and possibly add something to the existing discourses.

Bear in mind that we take on most readily the turnip’s substantial form—that is what happens when I know and realize that “such-and-such a thing is a turnip.” In that case, your first three expressions are exactly equivalent.

I want to extract this part of your comment above, so that you can contrast it with what you are saying here: “I am not claiming that we readily understand the principle (i.e., the substantial form) that unifies such a substance. In fact, I think it is difficult for us to do so.”

Please, explain yourself before I make further comments: “We readily take on the turnip’s substantial form, but we do not understand it”. I am very sorry, but it makes no sense to me.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

It is true that the first proof for the existence of God from the argument from motion which we find in Aquinas’ Summa Theologica does not hinge on the debated questions of celestial mechanics of his time. Aquinas, following the teaching of the holy doctors such as Augustine, Gregory, Damascene, Origin, does state that the corporeal creatures are ruled by the spiritual creature or angels. For example, St Augustine says “Every visible thing in this world has an angelic power placed over it.” Aquinas thinks that according to the ordering of divine providence, it is reasonable to hold that lower creatures are ruled or presided over by higher creatures and we find such to be the case such as human beings have dominion over the brute animals and the higher powers of the human soul rule over the lower powers. And we know from Holy Scripture that the angels are sent by God on various missions concerning mankind and the physical universe. I think then, that we cannot outright conclude that the motion of the heavenly bodies is not presided over by angels unless we want to put ourselves in a position to contradict the teaching of the holy fathers and doctors of the Church which I, myself, am not prepared or want to do. If the angels are not directly moving the heavenly bodies, they could use the forces of nature such as gravity or the momentum of massive bodies in presiding over these motions. All this they do under the direction and providence of God.

That is true, but he did not think the existence of angels could be demonstrated philosophically. That is why I described his argument as provisional as regards the movers of this world. That is; if there were not angels who moved parts of this world, then we arrive directly at God.

Linus2nd

 

[lmelahn]

OK. I am going to have to dissect this one:

Do you mean that the turnip, on the one side, and its order, on the other side, are somehow, but not really,

Both the turnip (substance) and its various kinds of order (accidents) exist. One of them (the turnip) subsists; the rest inhere. There is not other kind of existence except real existence, so yes, they are real.

and then the turnip’s substantial form (which we have agreed before -many posts ago-, is not before nor after the turnip) gives them their being (which would not be really theirs, because they received it from the substantial form)?

Let’s try this again.

The turnip is a single, unified, substance—let’s use the term “supposit” to avoid confusion. That supposit has a twofold composition: (1) there is principle that receives and is the origin of the accidents (we could also call that principle “substance,” but like Aristotle, let’s call it the “secondary matter” for now, to avoid confusion). The accidents (or accidental forms) are inherent in it. (2) That secondary matter, in turn, is composed of prime matter and substantial form.

Both of these compositions have their justifications in various phenomena that we see, as we discussed earlier.

What is a turnip? A supposit—that is, a unified whole. What is that supposit composed of? Secondary matter and accidental forms; and the secondary matter, in turn, is composed of prime matter and substantial form.

Note that, of all these things that we have mentioned, the only one that actually “is” in the full sense of that word is the turnip; that is, the supposit. The rest are principles of being, but they only exist when composed with the others.

Likewise, it is also the turnip that we know and understand immediately.

However, if we ask ourselves, “how come we know and understand the turnip immediately?” The answer is “through the turnip’s substantial form.”

The reason is that the substantial form is the active principle.

What a mess! For the moment, I am not interested on this metaphysical inventions. Please, let’s start from the point when you find the turnip in front of you.

It is in front of me right now. These compositions are perfectly simultaneous and last as long as the turnip lasts.

So, briefly, what you are saying here -if I understood correctly-, is that we find the turnip in front of us. Then, we need to go to school and read books to understand the various kinds of order in the turnip. I would add that we can also make direct observations and possibly add something to the existing discourses.

No, I mean, we understand it is a turnip even before we start to examine its properties (by direct observation). We don’t have to go to school in order to observe it directly.

I want to extract this part of your comment above, so that you can contrast it with what you are saying here: “I am not claiming that we readily understand the principle (i.e., the substantial form) that unifies such a substance. In fact, I think it is difficult for us to do so.”

Please, explain yourself before I make further comments: “We readily take on the turnip’s substantial form, but we do not understand it”. I am very sorry, but it makes no sense to me.

Our experience is knowing and recognizing a turnip. (Imagine a mother showing a young child a turnip: “Johnny, what is this?” Johnny answers correctly, “It’s a turnip, mommy.”)

What was the thing that Johnny has just come to know and recognize? The turnip. Was it principally the turnips colors, smells, shape, or other characteristics that he knew and recognized? He probably saw those too, but what he has principally apprehended is a turnip. (Otherwise, he could not answer the question “what is it?”)

Another question—which Johnny is certainly not asking himself at the moment—is how Johnny comes to know the turnip.

And he does it through the substantial form of the turnip, which informs the child’s intellect, much as it informs the prime matter that it is composed with.

Obviously, the child has no idea that this is how his knowledge works (anymore than he knows how his brain and senses function).

That is what I meant: we know the supposit (or substance taken as a whole)—in this case, the turnip. We know it through that supposit’s substantial form, but (just like the internal workings of our brain and so forth) it is difficult for us to know how our knowledge works.

(I will have to answer your other messages later.)

 

[lmelahn]

The turnip is a single, unified, substance—let’s use the term “supposit” to avoid confusion. That supposit has a twofold composition: (1) there is principle that receives and is the origin of the accidents (we could also call that principle “substance,” but like Aristotle, let’s call it the “secondary matter” for now, to avoid confusion). The accidents (or accidental forms) are inherent in it. (2) That secondary matter, in turn, is composed of prime matter and substantial form.

Note that the principle that causes all the others is the substantial form. From the substantial form, the supposit receives its being.

(But this causality is simultaneous, not prior in time.)

That is why I said that I liked your idea of substance as a kind of enérgeia, or act.

 

[levinas12]

There is something peculiar about Aristotle’s to ti en einai. Why is the “en” in the past tense?

 

[lmelahn]

There is something peculiar about Aristotle’s to ti en einai. Why is the “en” in the past tense?

I found the following fascinating link a while ago: Aristotle’s Essence: τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι

 

[lmelahn]

I do think that you need to draw a few free-body diagrams for yourself; and if you want to show them to me, great. And when you be working on them, ask yourself why in those diagrams bodies are represented as dimensionless particles, and “forces” as arrows; remember that I have said that through relations (do not restrict yourself at that moment to the aristotelian notion of relation, please) we are imitating reality. You will find in a textbook how those diagrams have to be done, and what do they mean; but it would be fantastic if you could find out how they were conceived by the individual who used them the first time (before any teacher could teach them): were they impressed by reality in the mind of that individual? Did he discovered them by looking attentively to reality? Or what?

Plato thought that our world was certain imitation of ideal objects (our world is appearance). Aristotle put those objects at the very core of our world, and thought that we intentionally become them (appearance arises from a bad judgement). I say that we develop systems of relations with which we imitate reality more or less successfully (our knowledge is a powerful appearance).

The other day we mentioned the ideal gas law. There was a time when this law was considered “real”. It was because they did not have the chance to deal with gases at high pressures and very low temperatures. When those new experiences were possible, people realized the “ideality” of that “law”. It was necessary to develop new equations of state (equations that relate temperature, pressure and volume, and some even add other parameters) to get better results. There is a great variety of those equations with important differences between them; however each one of them provides better results than the ideal gas law (that is to say, empirical evidence supports each one of them). Given the variety of those equations, which one of them was impressed by reality on the mind of the researcher? This question makes absolutely no sense (As you say: only a philosopher can ask that question).

As we usually learn about science from textbooks, we never even imagine how all the stuff that we find there was developed. Once I commented to some of my friends that the development of the principles of conservation of energy and conservation of momentum was originally based on the fundamental idea that “God is perfect; therefore…”. And they looked at me incredulous… But that is the historical “fact”.

If you read Galileo’s or Newton’s works, Imelahn, you might notice how these great men used their imagination for the development of their theories. Consider for instance what Galileo says here:

“Imagine any particle projected along a horizontal plane without friction; then we know, from what has been more fully explained in the preceding pages, that this particle will move along this same plane with a motion which is uniform and perpetual, provided the plane has no limits. But if the plane is limited and elevated, then the moving particle, which we imagine to be a heavy one, will on passing over the edge of the plane acquire, in addition to its previous uniform and perpetual motion, a downward propensity due to its own weight; so that the resulting motion which I call projection [projectio], is compounded of one which is uniform and horizontal and of another which is vertical and naturally accelerated.” (Dialogue concerning two new sciences, fourth day)

Of course, someone could try to hide this and will urge Galileo to correct himself: "but what are you saying Galileo? You didn’t need to imagine anything; reality impressed on your mind the irrefutable existence of the infinite frictionless plane (which is clearly accessible to everybody, provided they pay careful attention), and the undeniable fact of perpetual uniform movement. Please, never say again that you imagine something, because it is misleading; instead, say you have discovered it… And so on…

Then, you might think: “it is not surprising that this happens in natural science, because scientists ignore aristotelian philosophy. Aristotle would help them a lot. And if he doesn’t, at least we can be sure that his prime philosophy is absolutely infallible”. However, I can show you that the fundamental rational procedures that natural scientists use for the development of their theories, are the same that Aristotle used to formulate his prime philosophy.

What is your definition of relation, before I continue? (You might have given it somewhere in previous posts, but I don’t recall it at the moment.)

 

[JuanFlorencio]

What is your definition of relation, before I continue? (You might have given it somewhere in previous posts, but I don’t recall it at the moment.)

If even a definition is a relation, can there be a definition of “relation”? I don’t have any. However, I can describe a relation as a static or dynamic link that we establish mentally between elements. In my post #72 I proposed a number of examples in contrast with examples of interactions. Here is what I wrote:

EXAMPLES OF INTERACTIONS:

1. A moving ball “X” hits a stationary ball “Y”. As a result, the status of movement of each of them changes: Ball “X” accelerates ball “Y”; ball “Y” des-accelerates ball “X”.
2. A hot body is submerged into cold water. As a result, the hot body becomes colder, and water becomes hotter.
3. A crystal of sucrose is submerged into pure water. As a result, the crystal grows smaller and smaller until it disappears (provided there is enough water); the water becomes colder.
4. Two massive bodies are suspended close to each other, and after stabilizing them they are left alone. It happens that they move closer and closer to each other.
5. Someone hits a bell in my presence. As a result, among some other things, the bell vibrates, the air around it vibrates too, the vibration reaches my ears…, so and so and so…, and I hear.
6. A battery is electrically connected to a lamp in an obscure room. As a result, the lamp turns on and emits light and heat, the air around it becomes hotter, it’s density decreases, convective currents of air are formed…, and I see the lamp and the objects around it.

EXAMPLES OF RELATIONS:

1. I determine the momentum of the system above, composed of balls “X” and “Y”, before and after the impact and say: “the momentum of this system remained constant”.
2. I measure the temperatures of the body and the water above, before and after the immersion of the body in the water. I measure also the mass of both bodies. Then I practice certain calculations and say: “the specific heat of water is “z” times the specific heat of the body”.
3. I measure the mass of the sucrose crystal and the mass of water, and after performing certain calculations I say: “the concentration of sugar in the water is “k” in weight percent”.
4. I compare the relative movement of the massive bodies with the movement of the handles of a clock, and after performing certain calculations I say: there was a force of attraction of “f” units between them".
5. I say, “sound is a longitudinal wave”.
6. I say, “light is a transverse wave”.
7. Extra example I: I compare bodies A and B, and say “A is bigger than B”.
8. Extra example II: I touch the hot body and the cold water and say “the body is hotter that the water”.
9. Extra example III: I look at the ceiling in my room and say “the ceiling is above me”.
10. Extra example IV: I read the premises of an argument and conclude even before reading the conclusion.
11. Extra example V: but, it might happen too that I read the premises of an argument and don’t conclude even after reading the conclusion (I don’t establish the relation).

 

[lmelahn]

If even a definition is a relation, can there be a definition of “relation”? I don’t have any. However, I can describe a relation as a static or dynamic link that we establish mentally between elements. In my post #72 I proposed a number of examples in contrast with examples of interactions. Here is what I wrote:

EXAMPLES OF INTERACTIONS:

1. A moving ball “X” hits a stationary ball “Y”. As a result, the status of movement of each of them changes: Ball “X” accelerates ball “Y”; ball “Y” des-accelerates ball “X”.
2. A hot body is submerged into cold water. As a result, the hot body becomes colder, and water becomes hotter.
3. A crystal of sucrose is submerged into pure water. As a result, the crystal grows smaller and smaller until it disappears (provided there is enough water); the water becomes colder.
4. Two massive bodies are suspended close to each other, and after stabilizing them they are left alone. It happens that they move closer and closer to each other.
5. Someone hits a bell in my presence. As a result, among some other things, the bell vibrates, the air around it vibrates too, the vibration reaches my ears…, so and so and so…, and I hear.
6. A battery is electrically connected to a lamp in an obscure room. As a result, the lamp turns on and emits light and heat, the air around it becomes hotter, it’s density decreases, convective currents of air are formed…, and I see the lamp and the objects around it.

EXAMPLES OF RELATIONS:

1. I determine the momentum of the system above, composed of balls “X” and “Y”, before and after the impact and say: “the momentum of this system remained constant”.
2. I measure the temperatures of the body and the water above, before and after the immersion of the body in the water. I measure also the mass of both bodies. Then I practice certain calculations and say: “the specific heat of water is “z” times the specific heat of the body”.
3. I measure the mass of the sucrose crystal and the mass of water, and after performing certain calculations I say: “the concentration of sugar in the water is “k” in weight percent”.
4. I compare the relative movement of the massive bodies with the movement of the handles of a clock, and after performing certain calculations I say: there was a force of attraction of “f” units between them".
5. I say, “sound is a longitudinal wave”.
6. I say, “light is a transverse wave”.
7. Extra example I: I compare bodies A and B, and say “A is bigger than B”.
8. Extra example II: I touch the hot body and the cold water and say “the body is hotter that the water”.
9. Extra example III: I look at the ceiling in my room and say “the ceiling is above me”.
10. Extra example IV: I read the premises of an argument and conclude even before reading the conclusion.
11. Extra example V: but, it might happen too that I read the premises of an argument and don’t conclude even after reading the conclusion (I don’t establish the relation).

OK, so to make sure I have your system correct, I will attempt to re-state it. Please correct me if I am wrong.

Take, e.g., example 1 among the interactions:

1. A moving ball “X” hits a stationary ball “Y”. As a result, the status of movement of each of them changes: Ball “X” accelerates ball “Y”; ball “Y” des-accelerates ball “X”.

You would term the two balls “elements of interaction” (this is based on post number 172). The “interaction” properly so-called is the mutual acceleration and deceleration effected by each “element” on the other.

And similarly for the other examples: the mutual heating and cooling; the dissolution (of the sucrose) and the acquisition of solvent (by the water); the mutual attraction; the chain of mutual actions that makes you hear the bell; the chain of mutual actions that makes you see the light and causes convection in the room. All of these mutual actions are interactions. So far so good?

As far as relations go—if I understood correctly—every time we link two elements mentally (not necessarily elements of interactions, but whatever it is we are linking), that link is a relation.

So, at this point, I have a couple of questions:

(1) Is the statement, or mental observation, “moving ball x hits a stationary ball y,” itself a relation?

(2) More generally, what are the possible candidates that could be “elements” of relations? If I understood correctly (please correct me if I am wrong), these include:

(a) Elements of interaction themselves (as in my example, immediately above).
(b) Other relations.

Are there any others?

 

[levinas12]

I found the following fascinating link a while ago: Aristotle’s Essence: τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι

Here’s another discussion which points to a “past tense” interpretation of “en” while preserving a timeless dimension (I’m not sure if I agree with this approach):

arlieferguson.wordpress.com/2011/10/20/on-aristotles-to-ti-en-einai-and-its-translation/

 

[JuanFlorencio]

OK, so to make sure I have your system correct, I will attempt to re-state it. Please correct me if I am wrong.

Take, e.g., example 1 among the interactions:

You would term the two balls “elements of interaction” (this is based on post number 172). The “interaction” properly so-called is the mutual acceleration and deceleration effected by each “element” on the other.

And similarly for the other examples: the mutual heating and cooling; the dissolution (of the sucrose) and the acquisition of solvent (by the water); the mutual attraction; the chain of mutual actions that makes you hear the bell; the chain of mutual actions that makes you see the light and causes convection in the room. All of these mutual actions are interactions. So far so good?

As far as relations go—if I understood correctly—every time we link two elements mentally (not necessarily elements of interactions, but whatever it is we are linking), that link is a relation.

So, at this point, I have a couple of questions:

(1) Is the statement, or mental observation, “moving ball x hits a stationary ball y,” itself a relation?

(2) More generally, what are the possible candidates that could be “elements” of relations? If I understood correctly (please correct me if I am wrong), these include:

(a) Elements of interaction themselves (as in my example, immediately above).
(b) Other relations.

Are there any others?

So far so good, Imelahn.

“Is the statement, or mental observation, “moving ball x hits a stationary ball y,” itself a relation?”

Yes

The elements of relations can be

(a) Elements of interactions
(b) Interactions
(c) Relations of any order

 

[lmelahn]

So far so good, Imelahn.

“Is the statement, or mental observation, “moving ball x hits a stationary ball y,” itself a relation?”

Yes

The elements of relations can be

(a) Elements of interactions
(b) Interactions
(c) Relations of any order

OK, good. Now, next question: in your opinion, are any of these elements of relations real, or are they all mental?

If I had to venture a guess, a relation—understood as an element of an ulterior relation—is strictly a mental object, but I am not positive about the elements of interactions and the interactions themselves.

In other words, does term “element of interaction” refer primarily to the thing itself, or to our mind’s representation of it? And likewise for “interaction.” Or am I introducing a distinction I should not be?

 

[JuanFlorencio]

OK, good. Now, next question: in your opinion, are any of these elements of relations real, or are they all mental?

If I had to venture a guess, a relation—understood as an element of an ulterior relation—is strictly a mental object, but I am not positive about the elements of interactions and the interactions themselves.

In other words, does term “element of interaction” refer primarily to the thing itself, or to our mind’s representation of it? And likewise for “interaction.” Or am I introducing a distinction I should not be?

Your first question: by “real” do you mean “identity” with the interaction they intend to “represent” (when the elements are interactions)? If so, the answer is that relations are just imitations.

I come back at night, Imelahn.
Best regards
JuanFlorencio

 

[lmelahn]

Your first question: by “real” do you mean “identity” with the interaction they intend to “represent” (when the elements are interactions)? If so, the answer is that relations are just imitations.

I come back at night, Imelahn.
Best regards
JuanFlorencio

When I say “real,” I mean, as it exists in the world, so to speak—as opposed to “mental.” Let me try to make my question more precise:

(1) I am used to distinguishing between a thing (such as our favorite examples: our turnip, dog, or pine tree) and the mental representation of that thing (which I have been calling a “notion” or “concept”) that allows us to know it.

Is an “element of interaction” a thing or its representation?

(2) I don’t usually think of an interaction as a “thing” exactly, but I have always assumed that, (say) when a ball hits another ball, what goes on between them happens “for real”—each element has a effect on the other “in the world.” However (by analogy with the “thing”), I usually distinguish that from my mental representation of the change.

Is an “interaction” the actual mutual changes that occur, or is it our representation of those changes?

(3) I take it for granted that when we make relations of relations, that we are relating mental representations. (But please correct me if I am wrong.)