How do we come to know things?

[inocente]

I have to stretch English usage a little in order to represent Aristotle’s ideas accurately. I do that to avoid confusing Aristotle’s concept of “real potency” with the Modern (Kantian and Leibnizian) concept of “possibility,” which is not exactly the same thing. “Possibility” is a logical notion; “potency” means “real capacity.”

I can use the adverbs “potentially” and “actually,” instead of “in act” and “in potency” as long as we keep that difference clear.

To illustrate, an injured runner is no longer “potentially” a participant in the race; he has lost that capacity (at least for now).

It still appears contrived, especially if the notion is hard to represent accurately outside his native language.

In those cases, they are not “in potency,” as I mentioned.

But that still tells us nothing, since it wrongly makes the object the possessor. Objects do not fall because they possess the capacity or desire to fall. Rather, they are inert, and fall because they are acted upon. This is surely the main reason why Aristotle’s metaphysics is problematic for modern physics - he has lots of separate natures rather than one universal nature.

*Act and potency on that level is not terribly profound. But that is what Aristotle wants: he wants to start with something so evident that everyone can agree with it. *

And yet you had “to stretch English usage a little in order to represent Aristotle’s ideas accurately”. They don’t seem to be self-evident, children don’t naturally seem to think in that way.

*(I do not think, for example, that we can solve Zeno’s paradoxes satisfactorily without using act and potency.) *

I remembered reading an article stating that act/potency don’t really solve them, hoped the article was to be found in the SEP, and indeed it was:

*“as mathematics developed, and more thought was given to the paradoxes, new difficulties arose from them; these difficulties require modern mathematics for their resolution. These new difficulties arise partly in response to the evolution in our understanding of what mathematical rigor demands: solutions that would satisfy Aristotle’s standards of rigor would not satisfy ours ].” - plato.stanford.edu/entries/paradox-zeno/ *

 

[inocente]

I doubt that anyone on this thread are arguing for a return to Aristotle’s physics. I certainly am not. Most people here are arguing for his metaphysics only.

God bless,
Ut

I think his metaphysics isn’t compatible with modern science. There are various issues, but one is that we now know there is one nature, with one set of universal laws, not the many he has.

(As an aside to Richca, a single universal nature implies a single Creator in a way that multiple natures cannot ).

 

[levinas12]

I am having a difficulty understanding the relationship between form and substance.

I have argued in another thread (“what is a substance”), that substance is a type of intelligibility. But this incorrectly reduces substance to the form. As I understand Thomas, the primary substance is the individual (form, matter and esse) where the form/matter is the essence, and esse is added to the essence.

So form by itself is not the essence, and is certainly not the primary substance.

Now to know Socrates is to know the form (species) plus signate matter plus the esse.
Is the intelligibility of Socrates reducible to the intelligibility of the species (to the form) or is there an intelligibility (Socrates qua Socrates) that is in addition to the intelligibility of the form (the logos or species)? And what is the role of signate matter in the intelligibility of Socrates qua Socrates?

This is where I might invoke the “person” of Socrates as the additional intelligibility.

But what about matter? Matter would seem to have some sort of intelligibility - otherwise, we wouldn’t be able to understand the term “matter” or “signate matter”. But this intelligibility would equate to “potency”, not to “actuality” or “energeia” - or is there some sort of “actuality” attaching to signate matter. And would this “actuality” be sufficient to explain the “person” of Socrates?

 

[Linusthe2nd]

I think his metaphysics isn’t compatible with modern science. There are various issues, but one is that we now know there is one nature, with one set of universal laws, not the many he has.

(As an aside to Richca, a single universal nature implies a single Creator in a way that multiple natures cannot ).

Your observations here are incorrect. But I’ll let the other guys respond first.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

I am having a difficulty understanding the relationship between form and substance.

I have argued in another thread (“what is a substance”), that substance is a type of intelligibility. But this incorrectly reduces substance to the form. As I understand Thomas, the primary substance is the individual (form, matter and esse) where the form/matter is the essence, and esse is added to the essence.

So form by itself is not the essence, and is certainly not the primary substance.

Now to know Socrates is to know the form (species) plus signate matter plus the esse.
Is the intelligibility of Socrates reducible to the intelligibility of the species (to the form) or is there an intelligibility (Socrates qua Socrates) that is in addition to the intelligibility of the form (the logos or species)? And what is the role of signate matter in the intelligibility of Socrates qua Socrates?

This is where I might invoke the “person” of Socrates as the additional intelligibility.

But what about matter? Matter would seem to have some sort of intelligibility - otherwise, we wouldn’t be able to understand the term “matter” or “signate matter”. But this intelligibility would equate to “potency”, not to “actuality” or “energeia” - or is there some sort of “actuality” attaching to signate matter. And would this “actuality” be sufficient to explain the “person” of Socrates?

Here is a good link for you from the Jacques Maritain Center at Notre Dame, it looks as though it may be helpful. www3.nd.edu/~maritain/jmc/etext/walker14.htm

Aristotle defines substance, most properly, as that which exists, but not in another. Thus substances are acutually existiang essences which support a number of essential accidents ( i.e. quantity, qualities, relationships - nine all together.). We never find a substance without accidents ( except in the case of God ). And we never find accidents without a substance, except in the case of the Eucharistic Species after the consecration of the Species.

So the second or underlying substance per se would consist of the composit of essence and *the act of existence ( esse ) *. In the case of material substances, substance proper, or second substance, would be the composit of matter and form. In this case, matter would be designate matter without accidents. But check this with Imelahn.

Linus2nd .

 

[JuanFlorencio]

When I say “real,” I mean, as it exists in the world, so to speak—as opposed to “mental.” Let me try to make my question more precise:

(1) I am used to distinguishing between a thing (such as our favorite examples: our turnip, dog, or pine tree) and the mental representation of that thing (which I have been calling a “notion” or “concept”) that allows us to know it.

Is an “element of interaction” a thing or its representation?

(2) I don’t usually think of an interaction as a “thing” exactly, but I have always assumed that, (say) when a ball hits another ball, what goes on between them happens “for real”—each element has a effect on the other “in the world.” However (by analogy with the “thing”), I usually distinguish that from my mental representation of the change.

Is an “interaction” the actual mutual changes that occur, or is it our representation of those changes?

(3) I take it for granted that when we make relations of relations, that we are relating mental representations. (But please correct me if I am wrong.)

This a difficult matter to deal with, and it is difficult to say, not only for you, but for anyone; but I understand you. I am already expecting a couple of questions.

Those balls that collide are real, and their collision is real as well. And when we say, for example, “let’s suppose that the collision between these balls was elastic” we can say that it is a partial and approximate representation of the collision. If we say, “let’s assume that the balls suffer no deformation during the collision”, that will be a partial and approximate representation of the balls.

When we take a turnip into our hands, prepare it and eat it, we are interacting with it. It is not a mental representation. Mental representations do not interact. You can imagine that you take the turnip into your hands, prepare it and eat it, but you will surely realize that the procedures you follow to finally have the turnip in your stomach are different from the procedures you follow to finally imagine that you have it in your stomach.

Granted: Every relation is a mental link. Relations of relations are high order relations, and so, they are mental links as well.

 

[lmelahn]

It still appears contrived, especially if the notion is hard to represent accurately outside his native language.

But that still tells us nothing, since it wrongly makes the object the possessor. Objects do not fall because they possess the capacity or desire to fall. Rather, they are inert, and fall because they are acted upon.

I agree (assuming Newtonian mechanics here) that objects fall because they are acted upon.

And what is it that permits the agent (the earth, or the sun, or what have you) to act upon those objects?

This is surely the main reason why Aristotle’s metaphysics is problematic for modern physics - he has lots of separate natures rather than one universal nature.

For Aristotle, each object is a “nature.” That, however, is simply his way of saying that objects are capable of acting. It does not seem so unreasonable to me.

And yet you had “to stretch English usage a little in order to represent Aristotle’s ideas accurately”. They don’t seem to be self-evident, children don’t naturally seem to think in that way.

Undoubtedly the terminology is new, but, to quote a previous post:

There’s evidence that people have made controlled fires for tens if not hundreds of thousands of years. Everyone of them knew that if they put something in the fire, it gets hot. None of them needed Aristotle to tell them this.

And that is the idea that is evident to everyone, even children (at least after they have made the experience).

I remembered reading an article stating that act/potency don’t really solve them, hoped the article was to be found in the SEP, and indeed it was:

“as mathematics developed, and more thought was given to the paradoxes, new difficulties arose from them; these difficulties require modern mathematics for their resolution. These new difficulties arise partly in response to the evolution in our understanding of what mathematical rigor demands: solutions that would satisfy Aristotle’s standards of rigor would not satisfy ours ].” - plato.stanford.edu/entries/paradox-zeno/

Of course, if it is in the SEP, it must be the truth . (I am just kidding. The SEP is an excellent resource, and I use it all the time.)

However, Zeno’s paradoxes are not really mathematical problems, but philosophical ones. Using purely mathematical methods, you won’t get far in disproving them, because Zeno is making a presupposition that is, it itself, prior to mathematics (namely, that distances and times are composed of a discreet quantity—albeit an “infinite” one—of “points” or “moments”).

(I am not saying that mathematics is not useful for solving the paradoxes—especially our modern notion of infinite series—but they don’t, in and of themselves, resolve the problem. For example, what justifies saying that 0.111…—with infinite repeating ones—is exactly equal to 1/9? To resolve this problem, we need to distinguish well between divisibility and actually being divided—something that Zeno did not do.)

 

[lmelahn]

This a difficult matter to deal with, and it is difficult to say, not only for you, but for anyone; but I understand you. I am already expecting a couple of questions.

Those balls that collide are real, and their collision is real as well. And when we say, for example, “let’s suppose that the collision between these balls was elastic” we can say that it is a partial and approximate representation of the collision. If we say, “let’s assume that the balls suffer no deformation during the collision”, that will be a partial and approximate representation of the balls.

When we take a turnip into our hands, prepare it and eat it, we are interacting with it. It is not a mental representation. Mental representations do not interact. You can imagine that you take the turnip into your hands, prepare it and eat it, but you will surely realize that the procedures you follow to finally have the turnip in your stomach are different from the procedures you follow to finally imagine that you have it in your stomach.

Granted: Every relation is a mental link. Relations of relations are high order relations, and so, they are mental links as well.

OK. I think I understand you. As you expected, I have a few questions…

When we are talking about things “as they are in the world” I will refer to the “real order;” when were are talking about what is “in our minds,” I will refer to the “mental order.” (I also would like to discuss whether we can distinguish the mental order further into the “sensory” and the “intellectual” order, but let’s leave that for later.)

(Here by “order,” I don’t mean “arrangement in a hierarchy;” I just mean “context we are working with.”)

So, let’s talk first about the “real” order, which include elements of interactions and their interactions.

(1) Would you agree that, in the real order, the elements of interaction have priority over the interactions? Aren’t interactions impossible without “elements” to perform them?

(2) Can all of the characteristics and properties of those elements be reduced to, or explained by real interactions? Take a property like mass: we don’t need sophisticated equipment or models or anything of that kind to perceive that a piece of lead is “heavy.”

Undoubtedly, there is an interaction that takes place (with the hand of the person feeling it) and a “relation” (in your parlance) that has to be established (with other objects one has lifted in the past) in order to come to that conclusion, but isn’t there something intrinsic to the concrete piece of lead that makes it really “heavy”?

I would be tempted to say that there is a property—whatever it is that makes the lead “heavy”—that causes the real interaction of the lead with my hand.

I don’t think that property can be identical with the interaction, because it is the interaction’s cause. I also don’t think it can be a mere relation (in your parlance), because that would be simply mental (if I understood correctly).

So we are left with something real, which (as far as I can see) is neither element of interaction, nor interaction, nor (mental) relation.

How, then, would you characterize this real property that makes the lead “heavy”?

 

[John_Martin]

This a difficult matter to deal with, and it is difficult to say, not only for you, but for anyone; but I understand you. I am already expecting a couple of questions.

Those balls that collide are real, and their collision is real as well. And when we say, for example, “let’s suppose that the collision between these balls was elastic” we can say that it is a partial and approximate representation of the collision. If we say, “let’s assume that the balls suffer no deformation during the collision”, that will be a partial and approximate representation of the balls.

When we take a turnip into our hands, prepare it and eat it, we are interacting with it. It is not a mental representation. Mental representations do not interact. You can imagine that you take the turnip into your hands, prepare it and eat it, but you will surely realize that the procedures you follow to finally have the turnip in your stomach are different from the procedures you follow to finally imagine that you have it in your stomach.

Granted: Every relation is a mental link. Relations of relations are high order relations, and so, they are mental links as well.

I don’t know about turnips (never eaten one) but last night on my birthday I had a steak, which my wife asked me to prepare so it would be as I like. Earlier in the late afternoon we had gone to adoration of the Blessed Sacrament, and during that time which I had in the past tried to see (know) Christ in the host, instead I tried understanding the known object (the exposed Sacrament) being in the knower (myself) as a union, not as the object only, but as the “object consumed by me” being the “known object” I visualized eating the Sacrament of my Lord’s Body, not just understanding that it was his Body. There was an element of a kind of pleasure there, where just knowing it as his body (an object other than me or apart from me) never had that element of pleasure in the visualization.
So, broiling the steak I tried it out consciously, thinking of the chewing and juices on my tongue, and there was also a more real visualization of the physical pleasure of the taste and feeling.

Why? These visualizations of the end result are the principle cause of the movement which makes the collision of my mouth and the food happen, the real physical eating. The movement to make real what is visualized as real (or make real physically what is known as real to the soul). The intelligent knowing about the balls colliding is not in the balls, but in the creator of the balls creating them in motion with their elasticity or not (what He knew in his understanding became a material phenomenon).

Jesus desired with great desire to eat the Passover with his friends, that special Passover, new Passover, meaning he knew himself participating in this doing prior to the doing of taking bread and a chalice and handing it to them to eat and drink with the understanding of his Body and Blood. He knew this ahead of time with a knowing of great pleasure being part of this giving and eating. And so that meal took place materially as he knew it in himself (which was its principle cause of happening, moving him to tell people to arrange for the upper room, etc.)

My physical actuality of the pleasure of the steak matched my soul’s enjoyment of the steak it knew being consumed. The steak is true (an object), me knowing myself as consuming the steak for union with this true object is good (a different object, or myself as and object being true in union with this other true object). And suddenly the will inclines.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

OK. I think I understand you. As you expected, I have a few questions…

When we are talking about things “as they are in the world” I will refer to the “real order;” when were are talking about what is “in our minds,” I will refer to the “mental order.” (I also would like to discuss whether we can distinguish the mental order further into the “sensory” and the “intellectual” order, but let’s leave that for later.)

(Here by “order,” I don’t mean “arrangement in a hierarchy;” I just mean “context we are working with.”)

So, let’s talk first about the “real” order, which include elements of interactions and their interactions.

(1) Would you agree that, in the real order, the elements of interaction have priority over the interactions? Aren’t interactions impossible without “elements” to perform them?

(2) Can all of the characteristics and properties of those elements be reduced to, or explained by real interactions? Take a property like mass: we don’t need sophisticated equipment or models or anything of that kind to perceive that a piece of lead is “heavy.”

Undoubtedly, there is an interaction that takes place (with the hand of the person feeling it) and a “relation” (in your parlance) that has to be established (with other objects one has lifted in the past) in order to come to that conclusion, but isn’t there something intrinsic to the concrete piece of lead that makes it really “heavy”?

I would be tempted to say that there is a property—whatever it is that makes the lead “heavy”—that causes the real interaction of the lead with my hand.

I don’t think that property can be identical with the interaction, because it is the interaction’s cause. I also don’t think it can be a mere relation (in your parlance), because that would be simply mental (if I understood correctly).

So we are left with something real, which (as far as I can see) is neither element of interaction, nor interaction, nor (mental) relation.

How, then, would you characterize this real property that makes the lead “heavy”?

Oh, I feel a little bit disappointed: those weren’t the questions I was expecting; those would be the immediate questions of an ordinary man, but not of a philosopher. Don’t you realize you are asking me to think, that is to say, to establish relations? It is necessary to go slowly, without leaving gaps. I felt you were about to ask me something more fundamental, and that you were preparing it with your previous posts, specially when you asked me if my first example of interactions wasn’t a relation.

I will come at night again.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

OK. I think I understand you. As you expected, I have a few questions…

When we are talking about things “as they are in the world” I will refer to the “real order;” when were are talking about what is “in our minds,” I will refer to the “mental order.” (I also would like to discuss whether we can distinguish the mental order further into the “sensory” and the “intellectual” order, but let’s leave that for later.)

(Here by “order,” I don’t mean “arrangement in a hierarchy;” I just mean “context we are working with.”)

So, let’s talk first about the “real” order, which include elements of interactions and their interactions.

(1) Would you agree that, in the real order, the elements of interaction have priority over the interactions? Aren’t interactions impossible without “elements” to perform them?

(2) Can all of the characteristics and properties of those elements be reduced to, or explained by real interactions? Take a property like mass: we don’t need sophisticated equipment or models or anything of that kind to perceive that a piece of lead is “heavy.”

Undoubtedly, there is an interaction that takes place (with the hand of the person feeling it) and a “relation” (in your parlance) that has to be established (with other objects one has lifted in the past) in order to come to that conclusion, but isn’t there something intrinsic to the concrete piece of lead that makes it really “heavy”?

I would be tempted to say that there is a property—whatever it is that makes the lead “heavy”—that causes the real interaction of the lead with my hand.

I don’t think that property can be identical with the interaction, because it is the interaction’s cause. I also don’t think it can be a mere relation (in your parlance), because that would be simply mental (if I understood correctly).

So we are left with something real, which (as far as I can see) is neither element of interaction, nor interaction, nor (mental) relation.

How, then, would you characterize this real property that makes the lead “heavy”?

Whenever we talk or even just think about the real order we are already establishing relations. Then, you are asking me if I agree with a “model” in which elements of interactions have priority over interactions. Here is what I think: First, every element of interaction within the reach of our direct experience (your pine tree) is constituted by other elements (the cells of the pine tree, for example) which continuously interact in a variety of ways. Second, no element of interaction is alone, but is part of a bigger system or of a set of systems in which interactions are abundant and continuous. Properties and characteristics are results of interactions. Mass, for example, as it is understood in physics, is a relation. Weight is also a relation that represents the result of an interaction between bodies: a body which weighs “A” Newtons on the earth, weighs “B” Newtons on the moon, and has no weight in the space. Therefore, I do not conceive any priority between interactions and elements of interactions. However, I do conceive that something in the real order is being approximated by our notions of mass and weight. Is it hidden or manifest to our senses? I would say that part of it is manifest, and part of it is hidden. Your piece of lead is tangible, earth is there, the effect of the piece when it is put over a scale is visible; but what is happening right in front of us is “hidden”.

Once, one of our teachers asked us why water wets surfaces. Everybody can perceive water and the wetted surfaces, of course. But the “why” we don’t see. The question surprised some of my classmates because it seemed quite obvious to them that water wets; it is water’s nature to wet! But the teacher taught us about interfacial energies and the tendency of systems to move towards minimum states of energy. To me, this was a refined form of saying that water wets because it wets, but which is useful to determine with satisfactory approximation how much a surface will be wetted, how it can be less wetted, and other things like that. Our teacher was sharing with us a system of relations to “imitate” the wetting phenomenon.

 

[inocente]

I agree (assuming Newtonian mechanics here) that objects fall because they are acted upon.

And what is it that permits the agent (the earth, or the sun, or what have you) to act upon those objects?

By using the word agent, I think you’re still making the same assumption. If we take an alternate approach, and say that spacetime curves in the presence of mass, then that’s also the reason why the objects exist in the first place, and hence there is but one single nature.

To Aristotle, the Sun is that bright thing in the sky, but what exactly is it? Does it include its magnetic field? The solar wind? The space around it? The space within it? Is our habit of dividing the world into things just an artifact of our cognition, just a necessary gloss to make sense of our world? (Is Aristotle’s metaphysics up to answering such a question?)

Of course, if it is in the SEP, it must be the truth . (I am just kidding. The SEP is an excellent resource, and I use it all the time.)

However, Zeno’s paradoxes are not really mathematical problems, but philosophical ones. Using purely mathematical methods, you won’t get far in disproving them, because Zeno is making a presupposition that is, it itself, prior to mathematics (namely, that distances and times are composed of a discreet quantity—albeit an “infinite” one—of “points” or “moments”).

(I am not saying that mathematics is not useful for solving the paradoxes—especially our modern notion of infinite series—but they don’t, in and of themselves, resolve the problem. For example, what justifies saying that 0.111…—with infinite repeating ones—is exactly equal to 1/9? To resolve this problem, we need to distinguish well between divisibility and actually being divided—something that Zeno did not do.)

I think the SEP article’s author, one Prof. Nick Huggett, is not so much talking of modern math, but rather that Aristotle’s analysis lacked rigor, and a more rigorous approach shows that Aristotle believed he had solved the paradoxes but hadn’t.

Mulling this over, I think this gets to the heart of the problem with Aristotle’s categories. They work, after a fashion, as long as one doesn’t test them too hard. Then they are found wanting. They are at best qualitative, without any possibility of quantification. Even then there is always much discussion about what the terms might actually mean, as evidenced by this thread. When pushed, they are hard to pin down. This, presumably, is due to their origin as intuitions, for intuitions are unreasoned. When really put to the test, they can vanish before our eyes, which is why modern science dropped them.

So as long as one doesn’t inquire too deeply, Aristotle’s approach seems reasonable, but once it is pushed, cracks appear. The edifice might indeed look magnificent, but it doesn’t meet modern building codes and collapses at the first hint of a summer breeze.

 

[lmelahn]

By using the word agent, I think you’re still making the same assumption. If we take an alternate approach, and say that spacetime curves in the presence of mass, then that’s also the reason why the objects exist in the first place, and hence there is but one single nature.

Forget the word “agent,” then. How, then, does space-time come to be curved? Does it not have something to do with massive objects? Very massive objects curve space-time much more than less massive ones, right?

To Aristotle, the Sun is that bright thing in the sky, but what exactly is it? Does it include its magnetic field? The solar wind?

Aristotle’s metaphysics is not directly interested in these matters. The sun is a substance, or collection of substances, like any other. Its specific structure is a matter of physics to study.

The space around it? The space within it? Is our habit of dividing the world into things just an artifact of our cognition, just a necessary gloss to make sense of our world? (Is Aristotle’s metaphysics up to answering such a question?)

Aristotle is interested in questions such as whether physical bodies have an intrinsic unity, or whether we human beings impose that unity on reality.

I think the SEP article’s author, one Prof. Nick Huggett, is not so much talking of modern math, but rather that Aristotle’s analysis lacked rigor, and a more rigorous approach shows that Aristotle believed he had solved the paradoxes but hadn’t.

Mulling this over, I think this gets to the heart of the problem with Aristotle’s categories. They work, after a fashion, as long as one doesn’t test them too hard. Then they are found wanting. They are at best qualitative, without any possibility of quantification. Even then there is always much discussion about what the terms might actually mean, as evidenced by this thread. When pushed, they are hard to pin down. This, presumably, is due to their origin as intuitions, for intuitions are unreasoned. When really put to the test, they can vanish before our eyes, which is why modern science dropped them.

It seems to me that you are assuming—and Dr. Huggett is assuming—that “rigor” is to be equated with “quantifiability.” Not a few people think that, under the influence of such great thinkers as Descartes and, in a different way, Galileo. However, that is a debatable position that would need to be established. That is, indeed, a task that belongs to philosophy.

I happen to think that Huggett is illegitimately transferring Zeno’s paradoxes from philosophy to mathematics, for the reasons I explained in my earlier post. (Namely, that Zeno’s presuppositions are pre-mathematical, so they need to be dealt with before we even get to the mathematics.)

So as long as one doesn’t inquire too deeply, Aristotle’s approach seems reasonable, but once it is pushed, cracks appear. The edifice might indeed look magnificent, but it doesn’t meet modern building codes and collapses at the first hint of a summer breeze.

Perhaps in a different thread, we could discuss some of these cracks. I am not suggesting that Aristotle is perfect, just that we can work with him.

 

[lmelahn]

I am just trying to understand here…

(I also think that a good test for a philosophical theory is whether it is able to withstand the questions of “ordinary” people, which is why I asked the questions I did.)

Whenever we talk or even just think about the real order we are already establishing relations. Then, you are asking me if I agree with a “model” in which elements of interactions have priority over interactions.

Right, I understood that…

Here is what I think: First, every element of interaction within the reach of our direct experience (your pine tree) is constituted by other elements (the cells of the pine tree, for example) which continuously interact in a variety of ways.

A couple of dumb questions: isn’t the “model” that says that the our pine tree (say) is constituted by cells more “derived” than the “model” that says it is a single organism? Or, put another way, when I apply the cell theory to the pine tree, aren’t the relations that I established more derived or contrived—subject to a greater degree of “construction,” if you like—then when I consider it a single, consolidated entity?

If an element of interaction is—as you say—within reach of direct experience, shouldn’t our model-building and relation-establishment begin with what is accessible to direct experience?

Or, in general, wouldn’t it be better to base our more complex models on simpler ones that are easier to establish?

Second, no element of interaction is alone, but is part of a bigger system or of a set of systems in which interactions are abundant and continuous.

That sounds reasonable; otherwise, it would not an element of interaction.

Properties and characteristics are results of interactions. Mass, for example, as it is understood in physics, is a relation. Weight is also a relation that represents the result of an interaction between bodies: a body which weighs “A” Newtons on the earth, weighs “B” Newtons on the moon, and has no weight in the space.

At this point, I do have a question:

I realize (if I understood your previous answer) that interactions can be “real” or “mental,” depending on what we mean. When one ball hits another, what happens in rerum natura is a “real” interaction. When I model the collision in Newtonian mechanics—or whatever mechanics I choose—I have “idealized” the interactions into forces and whatnot. (Again, please correct me if I am wrong.)

Here is where I get lost: I thought that a relation required us to link two elements (or perhaps also more than two?). What are the “elements of relation” that constitute the relation of mass? (With weight it is a little easier to see, since there are obviously two elements of interaction at play.)

Therefore, I do not conceive any priority between interactions and elements of interactions. However, I do conceive that something in the real order is being approximated by our notions of mass and weight. Is it hidden or manifest to our senses? I would say that part of it is manifest, and part of it is hidden. Your piece of lead is tangible, earth is there, the effect of the piece when it is put over a scale is visible; but what is happening right in front of us is “hidden”.

I was thinking more of the fact that when I pick it up, it simply feels heavy. (Remember, that I am just a simple Aristotelian here, who—let us suppose—has not yet learned Newtonian mechanics.) It feels heavier than the stone of the same size, and that surprises me.

So again, a dumb question: is it possible to have interactions without elements to interact? Could I get any information—approximate or otherwise—about mass and weight, if I didn’t have any objects to weigh?

Once, one of our teachers asked us why water wets surfaces. Everybody can perceive water and the wetted surfaces, of course. But the “why” we don’t see. The question surprised some of my classmates because it seemed quite obvious to them that water wets; it is water’s nature to wet! But the teacher taught us about interfacial energies and the tendency of systems to move towards minimum states of energy. To me, this was a refined form of saying that water wets because it wets, but which is useful to determine with satisfactory approximation how much a surface will be wetted, how it can be less wetted, and other things like that. Our teacher was sharing with us a system of relations to “imitate” the wetting phenomenon.

I can see that…

I simply observe that when you say “it seemed quite obvious to them that water wets; it is water’s nature to wet!” that is an example of abstraction: we apprehend the sort of thing that water is, and therefore, also, what it does by nature.

Then, with the help of physics and chemistry we can investigate more deeply into how and “why” the water does what it does. I don’t think we could do the investigation, however, without first having apprehended the nature of water.

 

[Aloysium]

This starts off slow. But, bear with me; it builds to a crescendo. Just an overview from my perspective:

Elements are composed of atoms having the same chemical properties.
Elements interact with other elements - molecules can result from these interactions.
Molecules exhibit similar types of interactions (chemical) as atoms, but they have far greater diversity and complexity in what they do.

Going deeper into what constitutes atoms, we find they are comprised of particles and processes which determine how atoms and molecules will interact.
These basic “particles”, represent the types of interactions found in nature, such as weak and strong, chemical, gravitational forces.

The next level up from the chemical would be events like the weather, tectonic plates, mountains, volcanoes and such.
Following this we enter the biological, the world of cells and organisms in the form of plants and animals.

At this point one could assert that neither pine trees nor the cells that comprise them exist, that ultimately, there exist only biochemical processes.
Clearly, this sort of reduction results in a huge loss of very important information as to what is occurring in reality.

If we consider man as a collection of subatomic particles, we are not left with much of anything with respect to who we are.
Thinking in terms of biochemistry, we know a little bit more.
Considering the human body as a collection of cells helps us understand even more.
Seeing and distinguishing organ systems, we enter into the realm of Medicine, which truly becomes useful only when it deals with the whole person - the patient who suffers.
Of course, Medicine makes sense only in the societal context of shared knowledge, economics, power and familial/social bonds.
And, our ultimate understanding of who we are comes with the revealed truth of our relationship with our Creator.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

We come to know things because we have an intellectual soul and God has given man, body and soul, a human nature designed to sense the world outside the mind and to know the external world by reflection on the data received by the senses. No amout of discussion about the " relationships " and " interactions " of that external reality is going to change that. What exists outside the mind are real substances, some physical, some spiritual.

The material substances outside the mind cannot be reduced to the " interactions " and " relationships " of nano-" particles. " To assume that the material world is reducible to these " particles " is a prejudiced view. It is to deny the obvious fact that material substances have a definite nature. It is not nano-" particles " which give the world meaning, it is the substances, of which these particles are the material constituents. What is so marvelous about nano-"particles, " what is so marvelous about atoms, molecules, the genes of living substances? Didn’t God have to make his creatures out of something? If it hadn’t been atoms, etc. what could he have made them out of? Was he supposed to make them out of the five elements of Aristotle? The fact is he chose to make them our of atoms, etc. Now comes some modern scinetists, of the materialist, naturalist sort, to tell us that there are no substances, no man, no animal, no mineral, that all is a mere pile of atoms or some other sub-atomic particle. Phew-ee

The meaning, the truth, the significance of world is not reducible to its sub-atomic constituents.

strangenotions.com/body-soul-and-the-mindbrain-question/

Linus2nd

 

[JuanFlorencio]

A couple of dumb questions: isn’t the “model” that says that the our pine tree (say) is constituted by cells more “derived” than the “model” that says it is a single organism? Or, put another way, when I apply the cell theory to the pine tree, aren’t the relations that I established more derived or contrived—subject to a greater degree of “construction,” if you like—then when I consider it a single, consolidated entity?

If an element of interaction is—as you say—within reach of direct experience, shouldn’t our model-building and relation-establishment begin with what is accessible to direct experience?

Or, in general, wouldn’t it be better to base our more complex models on simpler ones that are easier to establish?

To your first paragraph: Yes, no doubt in my mind.

To the second: though that is how we all start, as our interactions become more and more sophisticated we need to take them into account. In general, this implies that our systems of relations might have to be modified. Now, indirect experience do not override direct experience (for example, Sir Eddington’s table does not override mine table). Our modified systems of relations would have to explain all of them.

At this point, I do have a question:

I realize (if I understood your previous answer) that interactions can be “real” or “mental,” depending on what we mean. When one ball hits another, what happens in rerum natura is a “real” interaction. When I model the collision in Newtonian mechanics—or whatever mechanics I choose—I have “idealized” the interactions into forces and whatnot. (Again, please correct me if I am wrong.)

Here is where I get lost: I thought that a relation required us to link two elements (or perhaps also more than two?). What are the “elements of relation” that constitute the relation of mass? (With weight it is a little easier to see, since there are obviously two elements of interaction at play.)

Interactions belong only to the real order. There are no interactions in the mental order. Relations belong to the mental order; and there are no relations in the real order. Interactions happen spontaneously, but in the mental order you need to establish relations (static or dynamic links). You belong to both orders.

In a horizontal plane you push a body A and after x seconds you and the body have reached a speed of 10 m/s. In other occasion you push a body B and after x seconds you and the body have reached a speed of 1 m/s. Then we say that body B is more massive than body A. It is through this differential experience (or through a similar one) that we develop the notion of “mass”. Do you see?

I was thinking more of the fact that when I pick it up, it simply feels heavy. (Remember, that I am just a simple Aristotelian here, who—let us suppose—has not yet learned Newtonian mechanics.) It feels heavier than the stone of the same size, and that surprises me.

So again, a dumb question: is it possible to have interactions without elements to interact? Could I get any information—approximate or otherwise—about mass and weight, if I didn’t have any objects to weigh?

I don’t conceive any interaction without elements which are interacting, Imelahn.

We are surprised when we have an unexpected experience; and it is unexpected to us because we had previously developed certain system of relations which do not match the novel experience.

But I mean, Imelahn, I have already said that there is something real (the whatnot) which we are trying to imitate with the relations that we establish. I don’t say that “mass” nor “weight” are inventions without any correlate in the real order.

I simply observe that when you say “it seemed quite obvious to them that water wets; it is water’s nature to wet!” that is an example of abstraction: we apprehend the sort of thing that water is, and therefore, also, what it does by nature.

Then, with the help of physics and chemistry we can investigate more deeply into how and “why” the water does what it does. I don’t think we could do the investigation, however, without first having apprehended the nature of water.

“It is water’s nature to wet!” was just an expression that I used to recreate what one of those friends of mine said, Imelahn (he actually said: “¡el agua siempre ha tenido esa costumbre!”). If what you are saying is that we need elements that interact and interactions to be able to establish relations, I simply agree.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

This starts off slow. But, bear with me; it builds to a crescendo. Just an overview from my perspective:

…] At this point one could assert that neither pine trees nor the cells that comprise them exist, that ultimately, there exist only biochemical processes.
Clearly, this sort of reduction results in a huge loss of very important information as to what is occurring in reality.

If we consider man as a collection of subatomic particles, we are not left with much of anything with respect to who we are …]

No doubt you are penetrating, Louis; however, I don’t see how I could be logically compelled to conclude such reductionism. Can you tell me how?

 

[lmelahn]

To your first paragraph: Yes, no doubt in my mind.

To the second: though that is how we all start, as our interactions become more and more sophisticated we need to take them into account. In general, this implies that our systems of relations might have to be modified. Now, indirect experience do not override direct experience (for example, Sir Eddington’s table does not override mine table). Our modified systems of relations would have to explain all of them.

OK… (I will resist the temptation to respond to Sir Eddington until later.)

Interactions belong only to the real order. There are no interactions in the mental order. Relations belong to the mental order; and there are no relations in the real order. Interactions happen spontaneously, but in the mental order you need to establish relations (static or dynamic links). You belong to both orders.

So, if you will, our internal representation of an interaction is a relation (but there are other relations besides these).

In a horizontal plane you push a body A and after x seconds you and the body have reached a speed of 10 m/s. In other occasion you push a body B and after x seconds you and the body have reached a speed of 1 m/s. Then we say that body B is more massive than body A. It is through this differential experience (or through a similar one) that we develop the notion of “mass”. Do you see?

Or, more simply, by taking the lead in one hand and the soapstone in the other, I suppose.

So, we establish a relation of—let’s call it “relative weight”—which, if we continue doing more sophisticated experiments (with more accurate equipment, etc.), we can link with a relation called “mass”—which presumably does not have its precise formulation until we get the precise definitions of force and acceleration.

If I understood correctly (based on what you write further on below), there is something inherent in the elements that is responsible for this relation called “mass,” but that “something” is not to be identified with “mass,” which strictly speaking is only the mental relation.

I don’t conceive any interaction without elements which are interacting, Imelahn.

I am still having a hard time getting my head around this: don’t the elements produce those interactions? Is there any conceivable way it could be otherwise?

We are surprised when we have an unexpected experience; and it is unexpected to us because we had previously developed certain system of relations which do not match the novel experience.

But I mean, Imelahn, I have already said that there is something real (the whatnot) which we are trying to imitate with the relations that we establish. I don’t say that “mass” nor “weight” are inventions without any correlate in the real order.

What, in your opinion, is the nature (in the loose sense) of this real foundation for the relation called “mass”? Or is it unknowable? (Presumably, it is not entirely unknowable; otherwise, we would be unable to assert that it is the foundation of that relation.)

“It is water’s nature to wet!” was just an expression that I used to recreate what one of those friends of mine said, Imelahn (he actually said: “¡el agua siempre ha tenido esa costumbre!”). If what you are saying is that we need elements that interact and interactions to be able to establish relations, I simply agree.

In other words, it is through its operari (its actions) that we learn what something is, that is all I meant.

 

[utunumsint]

It seems that JuanFlorencio is substantially in agreement with lmelahn about the correspondence of our knowledge of the external world with the realities they represent. Or at the very least, there is a correlation. But Juan seems to be holding on to an idealist distrust of the naive data of the senses. Still, he seems to agrees with lmelahn that the naive sense impression is the start of all our knowledge.

Am I missing something here? JuanFlorencio - is there something in particular you disagree with Imelahn about, apart from his general tendency to look favorably on the modern applicability of Aristotelian and Thomistic thought.

By the way, thank you both for engaging in this dialog. I’ve learned a great deal from Imelahn, but I am also trying to get a better handle on JuanFlorencio’s perspective. JuanFlorencio - if you would be willing, I would appreciate understanding more about your positive philosophical convictions about how the mind comes to know. Does our knowledge start with the external world? Or do we never get beyond our minds? Or is this a caricature of what you believe?

God bless,
Ut