How do we come to know things?

[lmelahn]

Exactly. It seems incredible, right? However, actually it is very easy: You might remember that once you were a small boy, and one day you saw a guy. He or someone else told you that he was your “daddy”. Time went on, and listening to all those persons around you, you learnt that he was your “dad” and your “father” and I don’t know what else. There were certain interactions between you and him going on, and you learnt to associate them with “fatherhood”, because those were the words available to you. Was there a “fatherhood” relation inhering in the substance of that guy which acting on your own substance infallibly impressed the “fatherhood” relation on your mind? Of course not! Surely you know there are different conceptions about “fatherhood”; and it is not because the same “accidental form” impresses different conceptions on different minds, but because those different “minds” listened different things over the years and had different interactions with the “daddy” guy. It is not that complex.

As someone (I think UtUnumSint) pointed out, the relations of fatherhood and sonship are not immediately accessible to the senses (unlike the relation between my hands). Hence they are not “impressed” in my mind in exactly the way you characterize it here.

(An important point here, that perhaps I did not make clear: only direct experience is “impressed” in our minds. Naturally I mean something different from Locke and Hume, who also used the term “impression,” but tended to reduce all knowledge to sensory knowledge. For me—following Aquinas—the “impression”*is not only sensory but also intellectual; that is, it has a spiritual or immaterial character. So you are right: simply by looking at my dad, I can’t tell that he is my father.)

Don’t you think, however, is accounted for by the fact that we need to learn about the relations?

What is wrong with affirming that “fatherhood” is an accidental form that has been inherent in my father ever since I was conceived? (And vice versa: that sonship has been inherent in me ever since I was conceived?)

I agree that I learned the fact that my dad is my father through various interactions. However, the fact that he is my father is prior to that discovery, don’t you think? Didn’t that fact exist before I came to learn it? And if so, that “fact” is the type of being that I (and Aquinas and Aristotle) call “relation.”

I had another classmate who was taught as you say: “your right hand is the one with which you write”; but he was left handed. So, it was until the secondary school, “thanks” to the ridicule of his peers, that he learnt. Such is life; what can we do?

When I was in seminary, we had a number of Spanish-speaking classmates. One of my companions was a real comedian, and he had bright idea of teaching his classmates all the wrong words. His companions would ask him, “what does ‘salt’ mean?” and he would point to the water; and “what does ‘water’ mean?” and he would point to the sugar, and so on. They figured it out pretty quickly, when they started asking for “salt” and someone would pass them the water instead. I think they found a suitable way to repay our comedian, but I don’t remember what it was. All that I know is that he didn’t repeat his trick.

 

[lmelahn]

All this time I have understood that, according to you, reality impresses relations on our mind. Is there something easier for us than receiving an impression? But never mind, that is ok now!

Only direct experience impresses directly on our minds. Remember what I affirmed from the beginning: we apprehend first being (the fact that something exists), then substance (that it is a “something”), and only then the various accidental forms (including relation, which is presumably one of the last things we understand of a substance).

My example of a relation that impresses itself on our minds was the left and right hand, because we can see it directly. (Again, we might mix up which one is which, but the fact of the mutual opposition of relation is evident.)

The other thing that you still keep saying is that relations are there to be discovered. But you add, “sometimes it is not so easy”. Let’s suppose for the moment that those relations are “there”. Then, sometimes you have to make efforts to “discover” them (as if they were hidden somehow, right?). Do you grant, as St. Thomas did, that you can make mistakes, believing that there is a relation which actually is not “there” (in particular in those cases when it is difficult to discover it)?

Of course we can make mistakes, regarding all knowledge that is not directly accessible to our senses (unless there is some other guarantee, as with faith).

As regards relations, mistakes are possible in both senses: thinking that a relation exists, when in reality it does not (e.g., thinking that God has a real relation with respect to His creatures—not a few theologians affirm that); or that a relation does not exist, when in reality it does (e.g., not realizing that a certain man is my father).

To use a real world example: the process for declaring the nullity of marriage exists precisely to determine whether a certain pair of mutual relations (namely, the marriage bond) really exists or not.

 

[utunumsint]

I have been looking into this topic of real relations versus purely mental relations and stumble across something called the theory of distinctions in Ed Feser’s book, Scholastic Metaphysics. Here is a short paraphrase:

• Real distinctions: A distinction that reflects an extra mental reality.
• Logical distinction: Reflects only a difference in the ways of thinking about an extra mental reality.

Logical distinctions are further subdivided into the following:

• Purely logical: This is when the logical distinction is purely verbal, without any foundation in reality. Human being and rational animal is one example. I suppose most synonyms fall under this category.
• Virtual: This is when the logical distinction has some basis in reality. For example, rational animal is one thing, but the concept of animal can be separated from rationality and there are non rational animals.

Virtual distinctions are further subdivided into **major **(perfect) when the difference is between concepts that do not include one another, such as animal and rational, and **minor **(imperfect) when the concepts do include one another, for example, when one is a subset definition within another, for example being includes substance, but also accidents.

Real distinctions are further subdivided into the following:

• Major (absolute): These are distinctions between realities such that lmelahn is distinct from JuanFlorencio, or one cat from another cat, and one rock from another rock. Real distinctions also include parts of a whole, like branch, leaf, and trunk, hands, fingers, and so on. Also included in real distinctions are those between substance and accidents, for example, stone and its colours, and between quantity and quality.
• Minor (modal): These are distinctions between realities that have no being apart from a thing. For example, location, rest, or motion.

In real distinctions, the intellectual activity is not really necessary. They are just given and we don’t have to think about it much. Key hallmarks are:

• Separability
• Contrariness. For example, being soft or hard, material or immaterial, and so on.
• Efficient causality. A causes B. Although perhaps this one just presupposes a real relation. Often causality is very difficult to determine but once it is, you know you have a real relation. Not just a logical one.

---

End of summary from the book.

I wonder then how relations fit into this scheme? I suppose a relation could be either a logical or real distinction, and again either major or minor in both category, no?

It is interesting how Aquinas divides up our intellectual landscape.

God bless,
Ut

 

[JuanFlorencio]

I guess this is a good moment to respond to your question “What, in your opinion, is the nature (in the loose sense) of this real foundation for the relation called “mass”? Or is it unknowable? (Presumably, it is not entirely unknowable; otherwise, we would be unable to assert that it is the foundation of that relation.)”

The real foundation for the relation called “mass” is certain way in which systems of bodies move: When you push a body “A” starting from a relative resting position, you reach a speed “v” after a time “t”. You can notice that, for some bodies, after pushing them for the same length of time, the final speed is much lower than with others. Let’s call those bodies “class W”, and “class L” those with which you reach higher speeds. When a body of “class W” is suspended close to a body of “class L” (which is suspended too) leaving them at rest, they start moving closer and closer to each other. This kind of behaviors have been enough to propose the notion of “mass” and another which is correlative to it: “force”.

I think you will insist asking me: “what is the cause of those movements?”, and my answer is “we don’t know”. However, I think I can tell you that “mass” does not represent that cause, but the observable behaviors.

Only direct experience impresses directly on our minds. Remember what I affirmed from the beginning: we apprehend first being (the fact that something exists), then substance (that it is a “something”), and only then the various accidental forms (including relation, which is presumably one of the last things we understand of a substance).

My example of a relation that impresses itself on our minds was the left and right hand, because we can see it directly. (Again, we might mix up which one is which, but the fact of the mutual opposition of relation is evident.)

So, you say that the relations which inhere in each of your hands infallibly impress on your mind; but, regardless of this infallibility, sometimes you might mix them up (involuntarily, I suppose).

Besides, you seem to think that those relations inhere in hands as long as these are living, and as long as they are yours. Do you mean that the relations inhering in the hands of your neighbor do not have enough virtue to impress your mind? Is it a matter of distance?

Of course we can make mistakes, regarding all knowledge that is not directly accessible to our senses (unless there is some other guarantee, as with faith).

As regards relations, mistakes are possible in both senses: thinking that a relation exists, when in reality it does not (e.g., thinking that God has a real relation with respect to His creatures—not a few theologians affirm that); or that a relation does not exist, when in reality it does (e.g., not realizing that a certain man is my father).

To use a real world example: the process for declaring the nullity of marriage exists precisely to determine whether a certain pair of mutual relations (namely, the marriage bond) really exists or not.

Once you have said that relations might not be easy to understand, you could not say validly “I don’t discover the relation Creator-creature inhering in God’s substance; therefore it is not real”. Instead, you need to follow a complex reasoning path (you know that I am simplifying it quite a lot):

1. 
   *]Relations are accidents.
   *]Accidents inhere in substances.
   *]There are no accidents in God.
   *]Therefore, no relations inhere in God.
   *]Therefore, the relation “Creator-creature” is not real.
   
   However, don’t we really depend on God?
   

   ---

   Don’t realizing that a certain man is your father? How could you come to know for sure that he is your father?
   
   I would like you to explain how is it determined that a marriage bond does not exist. Please…

 

[lmelahn]

I have been looking into this topic of real relations versus purely mental relations and stumble across something called the theory of distinctions in Ed Feser’s book, Scholastic Metaphysics. Here is a short paraphrase:

• Real distinctions: A distinction that reflects an extra mental reality.
• Logical distinction: Reflects only a difference in the ways of thinking about an extra mental reality.

Logical distinctions are further subdivided into the following:

• Purely logical: This is when the logical distinction is purely verbal, without any foundation in reality. Human being and rational animal is one example. I suppose most synonyms fall under this category.
• Virtual: This is when the logical distinction has some basis in reality. For example, rational animal is one thing, but the concept of animal can be separated from rationality and there are non rational animals.

Virtual distinctions are further subdivided into **major **(perfect) when the difference is between concepts that do not include one another, such as animal and rational, and **minor **(imperfect) when the concepts do include one another, for example, when one is a subset definition within another, for example being includes substance, but also accidents.

Real distinctions are further subdivided into the following:

• Major (absolute): These are distinctions between realities such that lmelahn is distinct from JuanFlorencio, or one cat from another cat, and one rock from another rock. Real distinctions also include parts of a whole, like branch, leaf, and trunk, hands, fingers, and so on. Also included in real distinctions are those between substance and accidents, for example, stone and its colours, and between quantity and quality.
• Minor (modal): These are distinctions between realities that have no being apart from a thing. For example, location, rest, or motion.

In real distinctions, the intellectual activity is not really necessary. They are just given and we don’t have to think about it much. Key hallmarks are:

• Separability
• Contrariness. For example, being soft or hard, material or immaterial, and so on.
• Efficient causality. A causes B. Although perhaps this one just presupposes a real relation. Often causality is very difficult to determine but once it is, you know you have a real relation. Not just a logical one.

---

End of summary from the book.

I wonder then how relations fit into this scheme? I suppose a relation could be either a logical or real distinction, and again either major or minor in both category, no?

It is interesting how Aquinas divides up our intellectual landscape.

God bless,
Ut

There is material here that comes from Aquinas’ commentators (and perhaps Francisco Suárez), not Aquinas himself. Aquinas is actually a lot simpler: he admitted two types of distinctions: real and “of reason” (denominated “logical distinction” in this outline).

He also distinguished distinction from separation. To illustrate: the matter is distinct from the form, but not separate. However, I am separate from you. Both distinction and separation are, in turn, distinct from diversity, which is the difference proper to different species: man and sub-human animals are “diverse,” but two human beings (or two animals of the same species) are not.

In any case, a “distinction of reason” for Aquinas occurs when we employ two different concepts for the same reality. An example illustrates: we can refer to the planet Venus either as the “morning star” or as the “evening star.” The concepts are different (in essence: “bright star-like object that appears just before dawn;” vs. “bright star-like object that appears just after sunset”). However, the reality is the same: it is the same planet, Venus.

You are correct when you say that “relations of reason” are similar in concept to “distinctions of reason.” In both cases, neither distinction nor relation exists in reality; it is a purely mental construct.

 

[lmelahn]

I guess this is a good moment to respond to your question “What, in your opinion, is the nature (in the loose sense) of this real foundation for the relation called “mass”? Or is it unknowable? (Presumably, it is not entirely unknowable; otherwise, we would be unable to assert that it is the foundation of that relation.)”

The real foundation for the relation called “mass” is certain way in which systems of bodies move: When you push a body “A” starting from a relative resting position, you reach a speed “v” after a time “t”. You can notice that, for some bodies, after pushing them for the same length of time, the final speed is much lower than with others. Let’s call those bodies “class W”, and “class L” those with which you reach higher speeds. When a body of “class W” is suspended close to a body of “class L” (which is suspended too) leaving them at rest, they start moving closer and closer to each other. This kind of behaviors have been enough to propose the notion of “mass” and another which is correlative to it: “force”.

I think, strictly speaking, the behavior of the bodies is the epistemological foundation.

I think you will insist asking me: “what is the cause of those movements?”, and my answer is “we don’t know”. However, I think I can tell you that “mass” does not represent that cause, but the observable behaviors.

But does the cause of those movements exist? If so, don’t the movements tell us something about that cause? If not, how did the movements get there?

So, you say that the relations which inhere in each of your hands infallibly impress on your mind; but, regardless of this infallibility, sometimes you might mix them up (involuntarily, I suppose).

That one hand is opposed to the other hand, and vice versa, we know immediately and infallibly. That is what the two mutual relations consist in.

What name we give for the left hand (or right hand) is conventional. It can be difficult for us to remember, because the two relations are essentially equivalent (but opposite in direction).

See the difference?

Besides, you seem to think that those relations inhere in hands as long as these are living, and as long as they are yours. Do you mean that the relations inhering in the hands of your neighbor do not have enough virtue to impress your mind? Is it a matter of distance?

Sure. I can see my neighbor’s hands, and where they are with respect with his body. Therefore, I see their mutual relationship just as easily as I see it in my own hands.

Once you have said that relations might not be easy to understand, you could not say validly “I don’t discover the relation Creator-creature inhering in God’s substance; therefore it is not real”. Instead, you need to follow a complex reasoning path (you know that I am simplifying it quite a lot):

1. 
   *]Relations are accidents.
   *]Accidents inhere in substances.
   *]There are no accidents in God.
   *]Therefore, no relations inhere in God.
   *]Therefore, the relation “Creator-creature” is not real.

1. 
   

   However, don’t we really depend on God?

   There is no relation in God that refers Him to His creatures. However, we have a real relation of “creature” that refers us to Him. So, sure we depend on God, and therefore in us there is an inherent relation of “creature.”
   

   Don’t realizing that a certain man is your father? How could you come to know for sure that he is your father?

   I suppose on my part, there is never what Descartes called “metaphysical” certainty, but only “moral” certainty in a case like this. It relies heavily on the testimony of witnesses: what my family members have told me, my birth and Baptismal records, my mother and father’s marriage certificate, and so on. Then there is evidence such as the obvious physical and psychological traits that my father and I share in common. It if came to be necessary, a genetic test would determine paternity with a rather high level of accuracy.
   
   Of course for my mother and father it is different: they experienced my conception and birth, and the actions leading to them, first-hand. So they have direct evidence of my father’s paternity.
   

   I would like you to explain how is it determined that a marriage bond does not exist. Please…

   Well, there are essentially two ways to do so: either by demonstrating the existence of an impediment at the time of marriage (such as lack of canonical form, disparity of cult, or some other impediment, either natural or canonical), or by demonstrating a lack of consent (for example, because of grave fear, immaturity, mistaken identity, or the exclusion of an essential end of marriage).
   
   Declaring a marriage bond non-existent is what a so-called “annulment” consists in. (That is why it is better to call it a “declaration of nullity,” as Canon Law does.)

 

[utunumsint]

There is material here that comes from Aquinas’ commentators (and perhaps Francisco Suárez), not Aquinas himself. Aquinas is actually a lot simpler: he admitted two types of distinctions: real and “of reason” (denominated “logical distinction” in this outline).

Right. Ed Feser’s book is on Scholastic Metaphysics. Presumably that includes the last 500 years of Thomism.

He also distinguished distinction from separation. To illustrate: the matter is distinct from the form, but not separate. However, I am separate from you.

But mater can lose its form in exchange for another. Right? So aren’t they, at least in principle, separable? In the same way essence and existence can be distinguished, but can also be separated.

Both distinction and separation are, in turn, distinct from diversity, which is the difference proper to different species: man and sub-human animals are “diverse,” but two human beings (or two animals of the same species) are not.

Hmmm… all these definitions - it is hard to keep track.

In any case, a “distinction of reason” for Aquinas occurs when we employ two different concepts for the same reality. An example illustrates: we can refer to the planet Venus either as the “morning star” or as the “evening star.” The concepts are different (in essence: “bright star-like object that appears just before dawn;” vs. “bright star-like object that appears just after sunset”). However, the reality is the same: it is the same planet, Venus.

Right.

You are correct when you say that “relations of reason” are similar in concept to “distinctions of reason.” In both cases, neither distinction nor relation exists in reality; it is a purely mental construct.

Understood.

God bless,
ut

 

[lmelahn]

Right. Ed Feser’s book is on Scholastic Metaphysics. Presumably that includes the last 500 years of Thomism.

But mater can lose its form in exchange for another. Right? So aren’t they, at least in principle, separable? In the same way essence and existence can be distinguished, but can also be separated.

Not in Aquinas’ lingo. There is no such thing as formless matter (regardless of the kind of matter we are talking about: prime matter, which receives the substantial form; or secondary matter, which receives the accidental forms).

Perhaps the following example can illustrate: I can separate two Lego pieces. But I cannot separate the shape of the Lego piece (its accidental form) from its substance (the secondary matter; i.e., the plastic). Much less can I separate the substantial form from the prime matter. (If I could do that, the Lego would simply cease to exist.)

The best I can do is attempt to change its form. I could change its accidental form, say, by melting it; or its substantial form, say, by burning it. But separating the form from the matter is impossible.

Hmmm… all these definitions - it is hard to keep track.

I still think we are better off with Aquinas than with later Scholastics: just three kinds of “difference”: distinction, separation, and diversity. And among distinctions, some that are real, and others that are purely mental or conceptual.

With Duns Scotus and Suárez (and even Cajetan) there is a whole alphabet soup. Not really necessary, in my opinion.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

I think, strictly speaking, the behavior of the bodies is the epistemological foundation.

No doubt, and no doubt too that this epistemological foundation is real.

But does the cause of those movements exist? If so, don’t the movements tell us something about that cause? If not, how did the movements get there?

I think the cause exist. What do the movements tell you about it?

That one hand is opposed to the other hand, and vice versa, we know immediately and infallibly. That is what the two mutual relations consist in.

What name we give for the left hand (or right hand) is conventional. It can be difficult for us to remember, because the two relations are essentially equivalent (but opposite in direction).

See the difference?

I was not talking about names, and I don’t believe you were; so, let’s focus on the relation and though we need to use the names, let’s pay no attention to them, ok?

Also, the question is not whether we know or don’t know if our hands are “opposed”. The question is this: does the relation “left hand-right hand” belong to the “real order” or not? You say it does, and also you say that it inheres in the substance of each hand as an accidental form. I say that we bring relations into the world, because we establish them; for instance, we introduce the relation “left hand-right hand” when we compare our hands; because the relation does not exist without the act of comparison. But if, as you believe, relations inhere in substances and you discover them with your intellect, the “leftish” accidental form should inhere in one of your hands, and the “rightish” accidental form should inhere in the other; and you should be able to define each one of them in a different way showing us their differences. So, how do you define each one of them?

Sure. I can see my neighbor’s hands, and where they are with respect with his body. Therefore, I see their mutual relationship just as easily as I see it in my own hands.

And if your neighbor dies? Do the hands lose its virtue to impress your mind?

There is no relation in God that refers Him to His creatures. However, we have a real relation of “creature” that refers us to Him. So, sure we depend on God, and therefore in us there is an inherent relation of “creature.”

Do you mean that we are His creatures, but He is not our Creator?

I suppose on my part, there is never what Descartes called “metaphysical” certainty, but only “moral” certainty in a case like this. It relies heavily on the testimony of witnesses: what my family members have told me, my birth and Baptismal records, my mother and father’s marriage certificate, and so on. Then there is evidence such as the obvious physical and psychological traits that my father and I share in common. It if came to be necessary, a genetic test would determine paternity with a rather high level of accuracy.

Of course for my mother and father it is different: they experienced my conception and birth, and the actions leading to them, first-hand. So they have direct evidence of my father’s paternity.

Well, there are essentially two ways to do so: either by demonstrating the existence of an impediment at the time of marriage (such as lack of canonical form, disparity of cult, or some other impediment, either natural or canonical), or by demonstrating a lack of consent (for example, because of grave fear, immaturity, mistaken identity, or the exclusion of an essential end of marriage).

Declaring a marriage bond non-existent is what a so-called “annulment” consists in. (That is why it is better to call it a “declaration of nullity,” as Canon Law does.)

There are cases where sharing of physical and psychological traits are not evident between father and son. So, in order to apprehend the inherent “fatherhood” accidental form in the substance of your father, we need to look for evidences somewhere else. That is an interesting way of being something inherent on a substance, don’t you think?.. This applies to your example of the marriage bond too.

 

[Richca]

In real distinctions, the intellectual activity is not really necessary. They are just given and we don’t have to think about it much. Key hallmarks are:

• Separability
• Contrariness. For example, being soft or hard, material or immaterial, and so on.
• Efficient causality. A causes B. Although perhaps this one just presupposes a real relation. Often causality is very difficult to determine but once it is, you know you have a real relation. Not just a logical one.

God bless,
Ut

About the aspect of separability as Feser points out in the book, St Thomas and the Thomists and Scotus and Suarez are not in agreement. For Scotus and Saurez, a real distinction entails separability such that if you plucked an apple from a tree, the apple can exist apart from the tree. For them, act and potency, the act of being or existence and essence or substance, substance and powers of the substance, etc., are not real distinctions because it is not claimed that they are separable. For Scotus, they are formal distinctions and for Saurez they are virtual distinctions. For St Thomas, a real distinction does not necessarily entail separability. Act and potency, the act of being and the essence, substance and powers are real distinctions but inseparable.

 

[lmelahn]

No doubt, and no doubt too that this epistemological foundation is real.

Before I answer, I will note that I consider mass a real quality of (most) physical substances. (I say “most,” because there seem to be some massless substances; e.g., photons.) It is the “noumenon” that is the basis for the “phenomenon” we observe (i.e., certain behaviors in physical bodies).

If I understood correctly, you consider “mass” to be a mental construct—i.e., a relation, in your parlance.

I just clarify this to avoid a misunderstanding, here.

Hence, to answer your question: the movement is certainly real, but it is not the foundation of mass in the real order. Rather, it is the mass that causes that behavior. Mass is, therefore, the ontological foundation of that behavior.

I think the cause exist. What do the movements tell you about it?

The movements—the behavior of the bodies—has the role of revealing that physical property (i.e., mass). Hence, that behavior is the logical or epistemological foundation. It is what we observe, and through it we resolve to the property that causes it (mass).

I was not talking about names, and I don’t believe you were; so, let’s focus on the relation and though we need to use the names, let’s pay no attention to them, ok?

OK, just that it is the names, not the relations, that we mix up, that is all. I only brought it up because one of your arguments for saying that the left-right relations do not exist, or that we don’t apprehend it directly, was that we frequently get “left” and “right” confused. My answer is that we never confuse the actual notion of left and right—for we can see it with our own eyes—but only what everyone calls those relations.

Also, the question is not whether we know or don’t know if our hands are “opposed”. The question is this: does the relation “left hand-right hand” belong to the “real order” or not? You say it does, and also you say that it inheres in the substance of each hand as an accidental form.

Correct. (Each hand is what is called an “incomplete substance,” because it is an integral part of a larger substance; namely, you or me. Like the branches in a tree, or our organs, and so on.)

Another difference is that I consider left-and-right as two relations, each one inhering in one of the hands: “left,” which refers the left hand to the right hand; and “right,” which refers the right hand to the left hand.

I say that we bring relations into the world, because we establish them; for instance, we introduce the relation “left hand-right hand” when we compare our hands; because the relation does not exist without the act of comparison.

I think this is the punctum dolens. Why do I need to do an act of comparison, in order for my hands to be positioned the way they are?

But if, as you believe, relations inhere in substances and you discover them with your intellect, the “leftish” accidental form should inhere in one of your hands, and the “rightish” accidental form should inhere in the other; and you should be able to define each one of them in a different way showing us their differences. So, how do you define each one of them?

I don’t really need to define what I can apprehend directly. Left and right are too basic for a classic definition; rather, more derived relations are defined on the basis of left and right.

And if your neighbor dies? Do the hands lose its virtue to impress your mind?

No, of course not, because the relations between his hands depend on the layout of his body. So long as my neighbor’s cadaver is basically intact (may he rest in peace!), the hands will retain the relations they have with each other.

Do you mean that we are His creatures, but He is not our Creator?

God is Creator, and we are His creatures, but “creature” can signify a relation, whereas “Creator” cannot.

There are cases where sharing of physical and psychological traits are not evident between father and son. So, in order to apprehend the inherent “fatherhood” accidental form in the substance of your father, we need to look for evidences somewhere else. That is an interesting way of being something inherent on a substance, don’t you think?.. This applies to your example of the marriage bond too.

In neither case does the relation depend on the physical or psychological characteristics of the individuals involved (except insofar as they are necessary for that relation to come into being—e.g., for a marriage bond to exist, the two persons must be a man and a woman).

Fatherhood comes into being in a man the moment he conceives a child. He may not even know he is a father, but as soon has he has brought another human being into existence, he is a father. The mere fact that I have my father’s nose, or even his DNA does not “make” me his son; they only prove or confirm that I am his son.

Likewise, it is the exchange of consent that brings the marriage bond into existence (provided all the other conditions are met: both parties are free to marry, no impediments, etc). As soon as the marriage comes into existence, the man acquires the relation of “husband” with respect to his wife, and the wife acquires the relation of “wife” with respect to her husband.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

Before I answer, I will note that I consider mass a real quality of (most) physical substances. (I say “most,” because there seem to be some massless substances; e.g., photons.) It is the “noumenon” that is the basis for the “phenomenon” we observe (i.e., certain behaviors in physical bodies).

If I understood correctly, you consider “mass” to be a mental construct—i.e., a relation, in your parlance.

I just clarify this to avoid a misunderstanding, here.

Hence, to answer your question: the movement is certainly real, but it is not the foundation of mass in the real order. Rather, it is the mass that causes that behavior. Mass is, therefore, the ontological foundation of that behavior.

The movements—the behavior of the bodies—has the role of revealing that physical property (i.e., mass). Hence, that behavior is the logical or epistemological foundation. It is what we observe, and through it we resolve to the property that causes it (mass).

I guess you are not pretending to use the words “noumenon” and “phenomenon” rigorously. I understand that you are just telling me that the quality is hidden somehow. This is not more than my “we don’t know” as an answer to your hypothetical question: “what is the cause of those movements?”. On the other hand, when I ask you “what do the movements tell you about its cause?” your answer “they reveal it”, is a pseudo-response.

OK, just that it is the names, not the relations, that we mix up, that is all. I only brought it up because one of your arguments for saying that the left-right relations do not exist, or that we don’t apprehend it directly, was that we frequently get “left” and “right” confused. My answer is that we never confuse the actual notion of left and right—for we can see it with our own eyes—but only what everyone calls those relations.

Probably you have never had the experience; maybe in the future…, if you pay attention; or you could study some cognitive psychology.

Correct. (Each hand is what is called an “incomplete substance,” because it is an integral part of a larger substance; namely, you or me. Like the branches in a tree, or our organs, and so on.)

Another difference is that I consider left-and-right as two relations, each one inhering in one of the hands: “left,” which refers the left hand to the right hand; and “right,” which refers the right hand to the left hand.

Aristotle calls them “relatives”, not “relations”. Perhaps yours is an improvement on his incomplete doctrines about relatives and relations.

I think this is the punctum dolens. Why do I need to do an act of comparison, in order for my hands to be positioned the way they are?

---

God is Creator, and we are His creatures, but “creature” can signify a relation, whereas “Creator” cannot.

Your hands are where they are without your intervention; and they are what they are without your consideration, but there is no relation inhering in them. Is it too difficult to understand? I think you really don’t have any problem with it: you say that there is no relation in God; and if I tell you “God is our Creator”, you will say “such relation does not inhere in God”, and it will make all sense to you. If I ask you: “are you saying that there is no ‘Creator-creature’ relation?”; you will have no difficulty in responding that it is merely mental, that such relation is a “relation of reason”. If I insist, “why do I need to establish a relation for God to become my Creator?”, you might respond that my relation does not introduce any change in God, but that it is just the way I have to understand something about Him.

If you were one of those who think that relatives like “Creator”, attributed to God, are really inherent in Him, I would understand your difficulties in understanding what I say, but you are clearly not.

I don’t really need to define what I can apprehend directly. Left and right are too basic for a classic definition; rather, more derived relations are defined on the basis of left and right.

It is fine, Imelahn; if you can’t, there is no problem.

No, of course not, because the relations between his hands depend on the layout of his body. So long as my neighbor’s cadaver is basically intact (may he rest in peace!), the hands will retain the relations they have with each other.

May he rest in peace, Imelahn!.. And… if, due to a mistake, someone cuts his hands but almost immediately he manages to put them in their original place, shall those hands lose the relation they had? Perhaps they will lose their relations while they are separated from the body, but once they are in place again, will they recover their inherent relations again?

 

[JuanFlorencio]

In neither case does the relation depend on the physical or psychological characteristics of the individuals involved (except insofar as they are necessary for that relation to come into being—e.g., for a marriage bond to exist, the two persons must be a man and a woman).

Fatherhood comes into being in a man the moment he conceives a child. He may not even know he is a father, but as soon has he has brought another human being into existence, he is a father. The mere fact that I have my father’s nose, or even his DNA does not “make” me his son; they only prove or confirm that I am his son.

Likewise, it is the exchange of consent that brings the marriage bond into existence (provided all the other conditions are met: both parties are free to marry, no impediments, etc). As soon as the marriage comes into existence, the man acquires the relation of “husband” with respect to his wife, and the wife acquires the relation of “wife” with respect to her husband.

Is it necessary to follow the traditional procedures for the “fatherhood” accidental form to become inherent in a man’s substance, or a novel procedure will do as well (for example, an in-vitro procedure)?

In your opinion, in the case of the marriage bond, is it a physical, metaphysical, or contractual relation?

 

[lmelahn]

Is it necessary to follow the traditional procedures for the “fatherhood” accidental form to become inherent in a man’s substance, or a novel procedure will do as well (for example, an in-vitro procedure)?

Even if the father uses illicit means (such as in-vitro fertilization), he is still the father of the child.

In your opinion, in the case of the marriage bond, is it a physical, metaphysical, or contractual relation?

Marriage cannot be reduced to a merely contractual relation, nor to a merely physical one. Rather, it is one that is based on human nature: on the need that men and women have for love and companionship in their mutual complementarity, as well as the need that the human species has in general to continue. If you want to call that a “metaphysical” relation, that is fine, although I tend to equate “metaphysical” with “real,” and in that case all real relations are “metaphysical.”

In the case of two baptized persons, the relations are, in addition, supernatural: they are based on grace. (That is why a consummated marriage between two baptized persons is indissoluble except by the death of one of the parties.)

Note that contractual relations and physical relations are still real relations: when I sign a contract with a business partner, I enter into relation with him (and he with me). Likewise, when two animals become mates, they enter into a mutual relationship, albeit, obviously, a much weaker one than the marriage bond.

 

[lmelahn]

I guess you are not pretending to use the words “noumenon” and “phenomenon” rigorously. I understand that you are just telling me that the quality is hidden somehow. This is not more than my “we don’t know” as an answer to your hypothetical question: “what is the cause of those movements?”. On the other hand, when I ask you “what do the movements tell you about its cause?” your answer “they reveal it”, is a pseudo-response.

Perhaps borrowing from Kant was a mistake, because he regards the “noumenon” as unknowable. I only meant to use it to mean “the reality itself,” as opposed to those operations produced by that reality (i.e., the “phenomenon”) that permit us to know that reality.

The movements reveal their cause. I could not know there was such a thing as “mass” unless I observed its effects in bodies. But having observed those effects, I can now know that “mass” exists.

Probably you have never had the experience; maybe in the future…, if you pay attention; or you could study some cognitive psychology.

Of course I have mixed up my left and right hands. But I think that isn’t the main point. Their reference to each other exists independently of my cognition of it.

Aristotle calls them “relatives”, not “relations”. Perhaps yours is an improvement on his incomplete doctrines about relatives and relations.

Aquinas did complete Aristotle’s idea of relation. I think (without recalling that passage exactly) that a “relative” is the substance in which the relation inheres, whereas “relation” is the accidental form itself.

Your hands are where they are without your intervention; and they are what they are without your consideration, but there is no relation inhering in them. Is it too difficult to understand?

I think we may have a semantic issue here. My “hands are where they are” whether I know it or not. That is an example of what I call an accidental form that inheres in the substance: namely, the location. What makes my left hand possess an inherent relation is that it refers to my right hand. There is something about its location, position, and structure that makes it inherently the antagonist of the other hand. I don’t have to actually understand that fact for it it to be true.

I think you really don’t have any problem with it: you say that there is no relation in God; and if I tell you “God is our Creator”, you will say “such relation does not inhere in God”, and it will make all sense to you. If I ask you: “are you saying that there is no ‘Creator-creature’ relation?”; you will have no difficulty in responding that it is merely mental, that such relation is a “relation of reason”. If I insist, “why do I need to establish a relation for God to become my Creator?”, you might respond that my relation does not introduce any change in God, but that it is just the way I have to understand something about Him.

But there is nothing in God that actually refers Him to me: He owes nothing at all to me; my existence does not affect Him in the least. On the other hand, since I owe my very existence to Him, there is indeed something in me that refers me to Him. That constitutes the relation of creature.

If you were one of those who think that relatives like “Creator”, attributed to God, are really inherent in Him, I would understand your difficulties in understanding what I say, but you are clearly not.

I do understand your position better now. Said in Thomistic terms, for you all relations are “of reason.”

It is fine, Imelahn; if you can’t, there is no problem.

May he rest in peace, Imelahn!.. And… if, due to a mistake, someone cuts his hands but almost immediately he manages to put them in their original place, shall those hands lose the relation they had? Perhaps they will lose their relations while they are separated from the body, but once they are in place again, will they recover their inherent relations again?

No, I don’t think they lose their mutual relation until they corrupt to such a degree that they lose their original shape and link to the body.

 

[utunumsint]

The movements—the behavior of the bodies—has the role of revealing that physical property (i.e., mass). Hence, that behavior is the logical or epistemological foundation. It is what we observe, and through it we resolve to the property that causes it (mass).

Isn’t mass simply the amount of atoms (and more specifically, atomic mass in terms of the number of protons and neutrons (and somehow the higgs boson is involved as well, but I don’t pretend to understand how)) and their density? As opposed to weight which is a measurement of the force of gravity on an object? Mass is invariable, but weight is variable depending, for example, between the earth and the moon, or even between a supper massive object on the earth and a much smaller object, although the difference is very small.

God bless,
Ut

 

[Ignatius]

We come to know things when

Epistemology is the study of how we come to knowledge. Sever major universities offer graduate studies in the subject.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Epistemology is the study of how we come to knowledge. Sever major universities offer graduate studies in the subject.

We have been answering that question for about two or three months now . Read through it and make a comment.

Linus2nd

 

[JuanFlorencio]

I do understand your position better now. Said in Thomistic terms, for you all relations are “of reason.”

Correct.

Perhaps borrowing from Kant was a mistake, because he regards the “noumenon” as unknowable. I only meant to use it to mean “the reality itself,” as opposed to those operations produced by that reality (i.e., the “phenomenon”) that permit us to know that reality.

Do you think that the bodies in motion, and their motion, are not the reality itself? Do you think that besides your pine tree there is an associated “reality itself”?

The movements reveal their cause. I could not know there was such a thing as “mass” unless I observed its effects in bodies. But having observed those effects, I can now know that “mass” exists.

Still, Imelahn, you are adding nothing to what I said: there is a cause, but we don’t know how it is. The movements are not telling you anything additional.

Of course I have mixed up my left and right hands. But I think that isn’t the main point. Their reference to each other exists independently of my cognition of it.

Of course that is the main point!, because you have said that the relation is infallibly impressed on your mind thanks to the action of reality. On my side, I have said that we establish relations, which admits mistakes.

Aquinas did complete Aristotle’s idea of relation. I think (without recalling that passage exactly) that a “relative” is the substance in which the relation inheres, whereas “relation” is the accidental form itself.

It would be convenient for you if you look for that passage. What would happen if you discover that you have been defending a non-aristotelian position?

I think we may have a semantic issue here. My “hands are where they are” whether I know it or not. That is an example of what I call an accidental form that inheres in the substance: namely, the location. What makes my left hand possess an inherent relation is that it refers to my right hand. There is something about its location, position, and structure that makes it inherently the antagonist of the other hand. I don’t have to actually understand that fact for it it to be true.

To be true? If according to you, truth is the correspondence between your intellect and reality, obviously there is no truth without your intellect (and it is not because your intellect is infallible, ok?).

But there is nothing in God that actually refers Him to me: He owes nothing at all to me; my existence does not affect Him in the least. On the other hand, since I owe my very existence to Him, there is indeed something in me that refers me to Him. That constitutes the relation of creature.

You know now that I don’t think there are inherent relations in God. But if you say that there is a “creaturehood” relation inherent in you that refers you to God, I would say that there is no reason to reject a “Creatorhood” relation inherent in God that refers Him to you. Your left hand receives nothing from your right hand, and your right hand receives nothing from your left hand either; still you believe both had inherent relations.

No, I don’t think they lose their mutual relation until they corrupt to such a degree that they lose their original shape and link to the body.

You had excluded the shape in your previous answers; now you include it again. But I have to make sure that you really mean it. Once the hands are separated from the body, I assume that according to you, they lose their “leftish” and “rightish” relations. So, the impression that they used to make on the mind of the guy who cut them is lost as well. Therefore, when he makes efforts to restore the body, he might put to the right side the hand that was on the left, and to the left the hand that was on the right. But according to you -I assume-, it doesn’t matter, because the hand that used to be on the left side, due to its new position, has been actuated in such a manner that it has now the “rightish” relation, and the other has now the “leftish” relation, so that everybody who sees them infallibly receives the impression of the new relations inherent in their substances. I resist to believe that you think so, but I might be wrong: Is this how you think, Imelahn?

 

[JuanFlorencio]

Isn’t mass simply the amount of atoms (and more specifically, atomic mass in terms of the number of protons and neutrons (and somehow the higgs boson is involved as well, but I don’t pretend to understand how)) and their density? As opposed to weight which is a measurement of the force of gravity on an object? Mass is invariable, but weight is variable depending, for example, between the earth and the moon, or even between a supper massive object on the earth and a much smaller object, although the difference is very small.

God bless,
Ut

No, Ut. Though very small, atomic particles behave in such a manner that we also talk about mass in relation to them. Following the same reasoning, you would have to say that their mass would be the amount of other particles even smaller than them. But my observation would be the same again.

Density is another mathematical relation which comprises mass and volume. It is not more fundamental than mass, but derived.

It seems that mass is not invariable, but at high speed it increases (the amount of particles remaining the same).