How do we come to know things?

[lmelahn]

Correct.

Do you think that the bodies in motion, and their motion, are not the reality itself? Do you think that besides your pine tree there is an associated “reality itself”?

Perhaps the words were badly chosen. But the operation (motion) reveals the quality (mass) that produces it. Both are real, but motion is more directly accessible to the senses.

Still, Imelahn, you are adding nothing to what I said: there is a cause, but we don’t know how it is. The movements are not telling you anything additional.

The knowledge we have of that cause may not be as vivid as knowledge we obtain by direct evidence, but it is valid. It tells is that this quality—let’s call it massa ut qualitas to distinguish it from your concept of mass as a relation (which I will term massa ut relatio)—produces those effects that we know (e.g., the inertial resistance to motion when acted on by a force). In reality, we obtain all of our knowledge of things (and qualities) through their operation, so I don’t see why mass would be any different.

Of course that is the main point!, because you have said that the relation is infallibly impressed on your mind thanks to the action of reality. On my side, I have said that we establish relations, which admits mistakes.

Only when that relation is directly observed, I said.

It would be convenient for you if you look for that passage. What would happen if you discover that you have been defending a non-aristotelian position?

I will look it up if I have time.

To be true? If according to you, truth is the correspondence between your intellect and reality, obviously there is no truth without your intellect (and it is not because your intellect is infallible, ok?).

OK. Actually, truth is a multi-faceted concept, like being.

It is true that the principal meaning of truth is the correspondence of the intellect to the reality that is known. This is so-called “formal” truth.

There is, however, something called “ontological” truth, which is the cause of the former. Namely, things have an intrinsic intelligibility that is independent of whether I know them or not. (This is something we discussed earlier that you were not ready to accept, if I recall correctly.)

You know now that I don’t think there are inherent relations in God. But if you say that there is a “creaturehood” relation inherent in you that refers you to God, I would say that there is no reason to reject a “Creatorhood” relation inherent in God that refers Him to you. Your left hand receives nothing from your right hand, and your right hand receives nothing from your left hand either; still you believe both had inherent relations.

No, but both my left hand and my right hand receive something from me. Moreover, the left had has a position vis-a-vis the right hand, and vice-versa, and both with respect to the body. That is not the case in God: He is not “vis-a-vis” anything.

You had excluded the shape in your previous answers; now you include it again. But I have to make sure that you really mean it. Once the hands are separated from the body, I assume that according to you, they lose their “leftish” and “rightish” relations. So, the impression that they used to make on the mind of the guy who cut them is lost as well. Therefore, when he makes efforts to restore the body, he might put to the right side the hand that was on the left, and to the left the hand that was on the right. But according to you -I assume-, it doesn’t matter, because the hand that used to be on the left side, due to its new position, has been actuated in such a manner that it has now the “rightish” relation, and the other has now the “leftish” relation, so that everybody who sees them infallibly receives the impression of the new relations inherent in their substances. I resist to believe that you think so, but I might be wrong: Is this how you think, Imelahn?

I don’t understand the difficulty, here.

I will repeat what I have said many times: we apprehend something directly only when it is accessible to our senses. It is that apprehension that is infallible, at least per se.

However, there are plenty of things that exist that are not directly accessible to our senses. When we try to investigate these, we can (and often do) make mistakes.

So yes, it might be difficult for someone to reconstruct a dismembered cadaver. But that doesn’t mean that the pieces don’t actually go together. That means they are “related” to one another (which is another way of saying that each one possesses a relation to the others).

There is no need to make real relation more mysterious than it really is.

Think of a less macabre example: a puzzle. The pieces go together. Usually, there is only one “correct” way to put them together. Well, that “correct arrangement,” ontologically speaking, consists in the mutual relations that the puzzle pieces have with one another. In that case, obviously, the relations do not “impress” themselves immediately on our intellects: we need to discover them by trial and error.

 

[utunumsint]

From GIlson’s “A Handbook for Beginning Realists”:

Certain idealists say that our theory of knowledge puts us in the position of claiming to be infallible. We should not take this objection seriously. We are simply philosophers for whom truth is normal and error abnormal; this does not mean it is any easier for us to reach the truth than it is to achieve and conserve perfect health. The realist differs from the idealist, not in being unable to make mistakes, but principally in that, when he does make mistakes, the cause of the error is not a thought which has been unfaithful to itself, but an act of knowledge which has been unfaithful to its object. But above all, the realist only makes mistakes when he is unfaithful to his principles, whereas the idealist is in the right only insofar as he is unfaithful to his.

When we say that all knowledge consists in grasping the thing as it is, we are by no means saying that the intellect infallibly so grasps it, but that only when it does grasp it as it is will there be knowledge. Still less do we mean that knowledge exhausts the content of its object in a single act. What knowledge grasps in the object is something real, but reality is inexhaustible, and even if the intellect had discerned all its details, it would still be confronted by the mystery of its very existence. The person who believed he could grasp the whole of reality infallibly and at one fell swoop was the idealist Descartes. Pascal, the realist, clearly recognized how naive was the claim of philosophers that they could “comprehend the principle of things, and from there - with a presumption as infinite as their object - go on to knowing everything”. The virtue proper to the realist is modesty about his knowledge, and even if he does not practice it, he is committed to it by his calling.

God bless,
Ut

 

[utunumsint]

I wonder if one of the fundamental problems in this discussion is that lmelahn grounds his epistemology in his metaphysics, giving priority to his metaphysics, while JuanFlorencio wants to prioritize the epistemology before moving on to any metaphysics?

God bless,
Ut

 

[lmelahn]

I wonder if one of the fundamental problems in this discussion is that lmelahn grounds his epistemology in his metaphysics, giving priority to his metaphysics, while JuanFlorencio wants to prioritize the epistemology before moving on to any metaphysics?

God bless,
Ut

I don’t want to speak for JuanFlorencio, but that is certainly an important difference between most of ancient philosophy and a good portion of Medieval philosophy, on the one hand, and Modern philosophy, on the other.

I like to use the following image. The human intellect and the cognitive apparatus are something like a window through which we can see the world.

Realist philosophers (Aristotle, Aquinas) look through the window and being making observations about reality (i.e., metaphysics). Later on, they begin to notice that there is a window (the intellect) and ask questions as to how the window permits us to see reality.

Modern philosophers (beginning with Duns Scotus, but in earnest with Descartes and especially Kant) first focus their attention on the window. Is it clean enough for us to see through? How do we know that what we are seeing is really there? Could it not be cleverly painted on the window?

With all the respect to great thinkers such as Descartes and Kant, they forgot that the very existence of the intellect is something that is less obvious than the existence of reality. And still less obvious is the inner working of our intellect. They would never have been in a position to speculate about either, had it not been for the previous work of realist philosophers before them.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

Perhaps the words were badly chosen. But the operation (motion) reveals the quality (mass) that produces it. Both are real, but motion is more directly accessible to the senses.

The knowledge we have of that cause may not be as vivid as knowledge we obtain by direct evidence, but it is valid. It tells is that this quality—let’s call it massa ut qualitas to distinguish it from your concept of mass as a relation (which I will term massa ut relatio)—produces those effects that we know (e.g., the inertial resistance to motion when acted on by a force). In reality, we obtain all of our knowledge of things (and qualities) through their operation, so I don’t see why mass would be any different.

Imelahn, it is clear that any cause causes its effect. To me the point here is that when I said that we don’t know how this specific cause is, you pretended that you could know it from the movements; but so far you have said no more than this: the cause exists (and I agree), and it produces its effect (which is obvious).

Only when that relation is directly observed, I said.

Certainly Imelahn!, it was implicit; and so, my comment is still the same.

OK. Actually, truth is a multi-faceted concept, like being.

It is true that the principal meaning of truth is the correspondence of the intellect to the reality that is known. This is so-called “formal” truth.

There is, however, something called “ontological” truth, which is the cause of the former. Namely, things have an intrinsic intelligibility that is independent of whether I know them or not. (This is something we discussed earlier that you were not ready to accept, if I recall correctly.)

So, your former answer would go like this: “I don’t have to actually understand the fact for it to be intelligible”. Which I would restate as “I don’t have to actually establish the relation for it to be ‘establishable’” (I am sorry for the invention!); and I would entirely agree.

No, but both my left hand and my right hand receive something from me. Moreover, the left had has a position vis-a-vis the right hand, and vice-versa, and both with respect to the body. That is not the case in God: He is not “vis-a-vis” anything.

For a relation to be possible it is not necessary for the relatives to be “vis-a-vis”. You are The Creator’s creature; He is your Creator. It’s very simple: Whenever you think of something as a creature, you refer it to The Creator; and whenever you think of God as Creator, you think about His creatures.

I don’t understand the difficulty, here.

I will repeat what I have said many times: we apprehend something directly only when it is accessible to our senses. It is that apprehension that is infallible, at least per se.

However, there are plenty of things that exist that are not directly accessible to our senses. When we try to investigate these, we can (and often do) make mistakes.

So yes, it might be difficult for someone to reconstruct a dismembered cadaver. But that doesn’t mean that the pieces don’t actually go together. That means they are “related” to one another (which is another way of saying that each one possesses a relation to the others).

There is no need to make real relation more mysterious than it really is.

Think of a less macabre example: a puzzle. The pieces go together. Usually, there is only one “correct” way to put them together. Well, that “correct arrangement,” ontologically speaking, consists in the mutual relations that the puzzle pieces have with one another. In that case, obviously, the relations do not “impress” themselves immediately on our intellects: we need to discover them by trial and error.

There is no difficulty and no mystery here: You only have to answer if the shape of the hands has to do with their “leftishness” or “rightishness” or not. I mean, obviously the hands are directly accessible to your senses, aren’t them? Don’t forget that you have said also that these relations are infallibly impressed in your mind, which is what I am examining (and there are some steps still pending).

 

[JuanFlorencio]

I wonder if one of the fundamental problems in this discussion is that lmelahn grounds his epistemology in his metaphysics, giving priority to his metaphysics, while JuanFlorencio wants to prioritize the epistemology before moving on to any metaphysics?

God bless,
Ut

The original question in this thread is “How do we come to know things?”. I have been trying to respond to it. Had it been “what is an accident?” or “what is a substance?”, I would have responded accordingly.

About the idealism-realism distinction: if in order to be identified as a realist it is indispensable to believe dogmatically that relations belong to the “real order” and that reality impresses them on our mind (infallibly in the case of those for which the relatives are directly accessible to our senses, according to Imelahn), then I am not a realist. However, as I don’t believe there is an unclean window in front of me, separating me from the world, then I am not an idealist either: I am in the world, directly interacting with the things surrounding me; I am interacting with you, with Imelahn and many others. I affect them and they affect me, because I belong to the realm of interactions; and as I try to manage myself among all this, I establish relations and become sophisticated, because I belong to the realm of relations.

 

[lmelahn]

The original question in this thread is “How do we come to know things?”. I have been trying to respond to it. Had it been “what is an accident?” or “what is a substance?”, I would have responded accordingly.

About the idealism-realism distinction: if in order to be identified as a realist it is indispensable to believe dogmatically that relations belong to the “real order” and that reality impresses them on our mind (infallibly in the case of those for which the relatives are directly accessible to our senses, according to Imelahn), then I am not a realist. However, as I don’t believe there is an unclean window in front of me, separating me from the world, then I am not an idealist either: I am in the world, directly interacting with the things surrounding me; I am interacting with you, with Imelahn and many others. I affect them and they affect me, because I belong to the realm of interactions; and as I try to manage myself among all this, I establish relations and become sophisticated, because I belong to the realm of relations.

For the record, I don’t consider Descartes an idealist, either. I think that “essentialist” would best describe his position.

By this I mean, in common with Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, and Leibniz, he thought that the “objective reality” (his own term)—sometimes called “essence” by some of the others on this list, or “being of essence”—has an internal consistency, regardless of whether it actually exists or not. As a result, to continue my analogy, Descartes has a hard time telling the difference between real things and images cleverly painted on the window. (According to Descartes’ theory, if it weren’t for the innate idea of God, we would have to be skeptics, because we would be unable to tell the difference between “real” and “unreal” essences.)

(N.B. These philosophers’ use of the term “essence” is practically diametrically opposed to Aristotle and Aquinas’ use of the term. For Aquinas—at least in his mature thought—an essence is always real; imaginary “things” are figments, not essences.)

An idealist, basically, says there is no reality beyond the window. Everything we see is cleverly painted on it.

 

[lmelahn]

Imelahn, it is clear that any cause causes its effect. To me the point here is that when I said that we don’t know how this specific cause is, you pretended that you could know it from the movements; but so far you have said no more than this: the cause exists (and I agree), and it produces its effect (which is obvious).

Certainly Imelahn!, it was implicit; and so, my comment is still the same.

OK, but that makes a difference. Unless I see both hands at once, in their place, the relation is not directly available to me.

So, your former answer would go like this: “I don’t have to actually understand the fact for it to be intelligible”. Which I would restate as “I don’t have to actually establish the relation for it to be ‘establishable’” (I am sorry for the invention!); and I would entirely agree.

And again, if your “relation” equates to my “composition/division,” then I would also be in agreement.

For a relation to be possible it is not necessary for the relatives to be “vis-a-vis”. You are The Creator’s creature; He is your Creator. It’s very simple: Whenever you think of something as a creature, you refer it to The Creator; and whenever you think of God as Creator, you think about His creatures.

For your kind of relation (my composition/division), I agree.

I think that Aristotelian relations are an entirely different kind of thing, and that is what is causing us difficulty in understanding one another.

There is no difficulty and no mystery here: You only have to answer if the shape of the hands has to do with their “leftishness” or “rightishness” or not.

The shape of the hands is what makes them mirror images of one another, yes. But it is principally their placement on the body that makes them “left” or “right.”

I mean, obviously the hands are directly accessible to your senses, aren’t them?

Sure, but unless they are actually attached to a body, their relationship to one another might be less than obvious.

Don’t forget that you have said also that these relations are infallibly impressed in your mind, which is what I am examining (and there are some steps still pending).

Infallibly impressed when they are directly observable: like when I see both hands, in their proper places, in a healthy human body.

Or take a simpler example: when I see a sheet of paper in its entirely, I see directly that the top left corner is in relation with the top right corner. But it is not directly observable unless I see both of the “terms” of the mutual relations.

Incidentally, I did look up Aristotle on relation, and actually, Aristotle’s term for relation is “to pros ti,” the “toward which,” which is to be understood in parallel with the other accidental categories: the “which” [quality], the “how much” [quantity], the “where” [place], the “when” [time], the “making or doing” [action], the “undergoing” [passion], the “having” [possession], and the “lying down” [position]. Notice how Aristotle uses the interrogative adverbs for most of these categories (present infinitives otherwise).

So, for Aristotle, the pros ti does not primarily refer to “relatives” [the substances that contain the reference] but to the actual reference from one substance to another.**

 

[John_Martin]

The original question in this thread is “How do we come to know things?”. I have been trying to respond to it. Had it been “what is an accident?” or “what is a substance?”, I would have responded accordingly.

About the idealism-realism distinction: if in order to be identified as a realist it is indispensable to believe dogmatically that relations belong to the “real order” and that reality impresses them on our mind (infallibly in the case of those for which the relatives are directly accessible to our senses, according to Imelahn), then I am not a realist. However, as I don’t believe there is an unclean window in front of me, separating me from the world, then I am not an idealist either: I am in the world, directly interacting with the things surrounding me; I am interacting with you, with Imelahn and many others. I affect them and they affect me, because I belong to the realm of interactions; and as I try to manage myself among all this, I establish relations and become sophisticated, because I belong to the realm of relations.

Aristotle (and Aquinas) believed in Windex, that the window could be cleaned, that God knows / understands without a dirty window, and that since “to know” (and be known (by God))" is our final cause that we can know. In fact, the categories lmelahn listed from Aristotle are a kind of Windex for the dirty window.

 

[utunumsint]

I don’t want to speak for JuanFlorencio, but that is certainly an important difference between most of ancient philosophy and a good portion of Medieval philosophy, on the one hand, and Modern philosophy, on the other.

I like to use the following image. The human intellect and the cognitive apparatus are something like a window through which we can see the world.

Realist philosophers (Aristotle, Aquinas) look through the window and being making observations about reality (i.e., metaphysics). Later on, they begin to notice that there is a window (the intellect) and ask questions as to how the window permits us to see reality.

Modern philosophers (beginning with Duns Scotus, but in earnest with Descartes and especially Kant) first focus their attention on the window. Is it clean enough for us to see through? How do we know that what we are seeing is really there? Could it not be cleverly painted on the window?

With all the respect to great thinkers such as Descartes and Kant, they forgot that the very existence of the intellect is something that is less obvious than the existence of reality. And still less obvious is the inner working of our intellect. They would never have been in a position to speculate about either, had it not been for the previous work of realist philosophers before them.

Right. Gilson finds the source of this move away from the grounding in the real in Descartes in the book I quoted, but I am sure there are many more examples that preceded him. I like this quote:

Essentially, it consists in a considered choice between two possible methods, Aristotle’s and Descartes’. Either one begins with being, in which thought is included ab esse ad nosse valet consequentia from a thing’s reality one can be certain of its possibility], or one starts from thought, in which being is included a posse ad esse valet consequentia from its possibility one cannot be certain of its reality]. As the forerunner of Kant, Descartes chose a particular science as the mode for knowledge in general. The difference between them is that instead of choosing physics he chose mathematics, to which he reduced physics. They resemble each other in that, anticipating Kant, Descartes transformed a method into a metaphysics. He still regarded metaphysics as a science, which was no longer possible for Kant, because if mathematics is chosen as the model science, a science of metaphysics remains possible. In contrast, if physics provides the model, metaphysics lacks the sensory intuition necessary for its constitution as a science. Consequently, Descartes, who through as a mathematician, was able to persuade himself that an idealist method not only would not suppress metaphysics, but would on the contrary place it on an unshakeable foundation.

God bless,
Ut

 

[utunumsint]

The original question in this thread is “How do we come to know things?”. I have been trying to respond to it. Had it been “what is an accident?” or “what is a substance?”, I would have responded accordingly.

About the idealism-realism distinction: if in order to be identified as a realist it is indispensable to believe dogmatically that relations belong to the “real order” and that reality impresses them on our mind (infallibly in the case of those for which the relatives are directly accessible to our senses, according to Imelahn), then I am not a realist. However, as I don’t believe there is an unclean window in front of me, separating me from the world, then I am not an idealist either: I am in the world, directly interacting with the things surrounding me; I am interacting with you, with Imelahn and many others. I affect them and they affect me, because I belong to the realm of interactions; and as I try to manage myself among all this, I establish relations and become sophisticated, because I belong to the realm of relations.

My apologies if I have characterized your position incorrectly. In focusing so exclusively on the topic of relations, I am only getting hints at what your broader metaphysical and epistemological convictions are.

For example, your last sentence in the paragraph quoted above suggests to me that relations are purely products of human intelligence. And that is it. You have suggested in other posts that they have some relationship with an external reality filled with interactions. Our mental relations are super-imposed, so to speak, on the interactions we see in the external world. But the relations are not the interactions. And the interactions in no way cause the relations to exist in the human intellect. Is that a fair summary?

God bless,
Ut

 

[JuanFlorencio]

My apologies if I have characterized your position incorrectly. In focusing so exclusively on the topic of relations, I am only getting hints at what your broader metaphysical and epistemological convictions are.

For example, your last sentence in the paragraph quoted above suggests to me that relations are purely products of human intelligence. And that is it. You have suggested in other posts that they have some relationship with an external reality filled with interactions. Our mental relations are super-imposed, so to speak, on the interactions we see in the external world. But the relations are not the interactions. And the interactions in no way cause the relations to exist in the human intellect. Is that a fair summary?

God bless,
Ut

It sounds good; but to see if you understand it in the same way I do, I would like to ask you: according to JuanFlorencio, how is it that we make mistakes?

 

[JuanFlorencio]

Aristotle (and Aquinas) believed in Windex, that the window could be cleaned, that God knows / understands without a dirty window, and that since “to know” (and be known (by God))" is our final cause that we can know. In fact, the categories lmelahn listed from Aristotle are a kind of Windex for the dirty window.

Aristotle’s god does not know anything but himself, John.

Concerning the categories: I wonder if you are acquainted with the difference between the aristotelian and the kantian versions. In particular, I would like to know if you think their versions of the categories have opposite effects over the alleged window.

I am excited about your answer.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

OK, but that makes a difference. Unless I see both hands at once, in their place, the relation is not directly available to me.

You said that the “leftness” relation inheres in one of the hands and the “rightness” in the other. Why do you need to see both?

And again, if your “relation” equates to my “composition/division,” then I would also be in agreement.

My relation includes St. Thomas "composition/division, certainly.

For your kind of relation (my composition/division), I agree.

I think that Aristotelian relations are an entirely different kind of thing, and that is what is causing us difficulty in understanding one another.

My relation includes aristotelian relations as well, but they do not inhere in the substances as you claim.

The shape of the hands is what makes them mirror images of one another, yes. But it is principally their placement on the body that makes them “left” or “right.”

If a person is facing you, which one of his hands is the left? And if he is in front of you but giving you his back, which one of his hands is the right?

Sure, but unless they are actually attached to a body, their relationship to one another might be less than obvious.

So, are you saying that even though they preserve their shape, each one of them definitely lose its inherent relation when it is detached from the body?

Infallibly impressed when they are directly observable: like when I see both hands, in their proper places, in a healthy human body.

…If the body becomes unhealthy, do the hands lose their otherwise inherent relations?

Incidentally, I did look up Aristotle on relation, and actually, Aristotle’s term for relation is “to pros ti,” the “toward which,” which is to be understood in parallel with the other accidental categories: the “which” [quality], the “how much” [quantity], the “where” [place], the “when” [time], the “making or doing” [action], the “undergoing” [passion], the “having” [possession], and the “lying down” [position]. Notice how Aristotle uses the interrogative adverbs for most of these categories (present infinitives otherwise).

So, for Aristotle, the pros ti does not primarily refer to “relatives” [the substances that contain the reference] but to the actual reference from one substance to another.**

So? Do you need to see both hands attached to a living and healthy body to be able to say which one is the right and which is the left or not?

 

[yppop]

Juan, Im
I’m not sure why you are discussing the identification of left and right hands, but the kinetic sense of proprioception allows you to know where every part of the body is located with respect to every other part of the body. You can always tell your left from your right. Furthermore even if you removed the hands from the body the left can be distinguished from the right by placing them palm down and the thumb of the left hand will be on the right side and the converse is true for the right hand. Or have I missed something?

Nice discussion however; a level above the usual stuff found around here.

Yppop

 

[lmelahn]

You said that the “leftness” relation inheres in one of the hands and the “rightness” in the other. Why do you need to see both?

Seeing both makes the mutual relations evident. That is how we first learn about them.

My relation includes St. Thomas "composition/division, certainly.

My relation includes aristotelian relations as well, but they do not inhere in the substances as you claim.

Understood. Obviously I respectfully disagree .

If a person is facing you, which one of his hands is the left? And if he is in front of you but giving you his back, which one of his hands is the right?

With respect to his own body, his left hand is still his left hand.

It happens to be on the “right” with respect to my body, in that case (in both cases, actually).

And vice versa, for the right hand.

So, are you saying that even though they preserve their shape, each one of them definitely lose its inherent relation when it is detached from the body?

The relation certainly changes, because the union of the hand with the body is now broken. However (sort of like the puzzle pieces), the hands still “go” where they used to be on the body, so there is still a relation (albeit a weaker one) with the body (and therefore the other hand) in my opinion.

When it disintegrates, it loses that relation, obviously.

…If the body becomes unhealthy, do the hands lose their otherwise inherent relations?

No, of course not. As long as the body is essentially intact, the relations among its parts remain intact.

What I was getting at is that, if someone has (say) an amputated arm—in that sense, not a fully healthy body—it might be more difficult for us to apprehend the relation of the remaining hand to the rest of the body. Seeing both hands at once, properly connected, makes the relations obvious and manifest.

So? Do you need to see both hands attached to a living and healthy body to be able to say which one is the right and which is the left or not?

No. But seeing a living, fully constituted body makes it much easier to apprehend the hands’ mutual relations, which is a different thing from learning the names of those relations.

I learned what “leftness” is, even before I knew it is called “left.” And I learned it by seeing extremities, such as (but not only) my left and right hands.

 

[lmelahn]

Juan, Im
I’m not sure why you are discussing the identification of left and right hands, but the kinetic sense of proprioception allows you to know where every part of the body is located with respect to every other part of the body. You can always tell your left from your right. Furthermore even if you removed the hands from the body the left can be distinguished from the right by placing them palm down and the thumb of the left hand will be on the right side and the converse is true for the right hand. Or have I missed something?

Nice discussion however; a level above the usual stuff found around here.

Yppop

Yppop,

What you are talking about is an aspect of what Aquinas would call our interior sensation.

I am claiming that we human beings, who are spiritual (i.e., immaterial) beings, take the “data” given to us by our senses and form proper “concepts” or “notions” that are immaterial.

Based on what you are saying here, I think I could go a step further: we form a concept of “left” and “right” (even if we don’t learn the names until later) by the very act of using our left and right hands. (At least once our cognitive apparatus is up and running.)

I was also saying that “leftness” and “rightness” must exist in the real order: that they are real characteristics of our hands (and feet, or what have you). The very arrangement and shape of each hand is in reference to the other.

Those characteristics cannot, it seems to me, be reduced to interactions, because they exist whether our hands “act” on one another (or on our bodies) or not.

Much less can they be substances, obviously: the substances here are the hands.

It follows that they must be something else: Aristotle and Aquinas call them “relations” (ta pros ti, the “towards which”), and I think we can use that name.

 

[John_Martin]

Aristotle’s god does not know anything but himself, John.

Concerning the categories: I wonder if you are acquainted with the difference between the aristotelian and the kantian versions. In particular, I would like to know if you think their versions of the categories have opposite effects over the alleged window.

I am excited about your answer.

Windex cleans a window so that you do not know there is a window (if you do the cleaning well), such that you end up not knowing there is a window.
And, in fact, there is no window needing a painted reality removed; there is only the other and our apprehension of the other with our sensitive powers / faculties in preparation of presenting to our intellect an intelligible object, which it either understands or does not understand, knows as true or not, and therefore rejects and presents the will with an object of not good unknown-ness (with reference to any or all categories), whereupon the will moves the sensible powers to re-examine the image in light of the categories. In the conscious thought appears the sense of not understanding well enough and further examination of the sensed other, to present “more precise detail” (for lack of a better term) to the active intellect, where the spiritual cycle of knowing is repeated as often as needed until “I know” or “this is true” is achieved. And when achieved, there is phantasm and conscious material thought that is manifested / moved in the body of “I understand and know”, such that the body is at rest in knowing as the actualization in the of the soul knowing itself and the other.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

Seeing both makes the mutual relations evident. That is how we first learn about them.

Understood. Obviously I respectfully disagree .

With respect to his own body, his left hand is still his left hand.

It happens to be on the “right” with respect to my body, in that case (in both cases, actually).

And vice versa, for the right hand.

The relation certainly changes, because the union of the hand with the body is now broken. However (sort of like the puzzle pieces), the hands still “go” where they used to be on the body, so there is still a relation (albeit a weaker one) with the body (and therefore the other hand) in my opinion.

When it disintegrates, it loses that relation, obviously.

No, of course not. As long as the body is essentially intact, the relations among its parts remain intact.

What I was getting at is that, if someone has (say) an amputated arm—in that sense, not a fully healthy body—it might be more difficult for us to apprehend the relation of the remaining hand to the rest of the body. Seeing both hands at once, properly connected, makes the relations obvious and manifest.

No. But seeing a living, fully constituted body makes it much easier to apprehend the hands’ mutual relations, which is a different thing from learning the names of those relations.

I learned what “leftness” is, even before I knew it is called “left.” And I learned it by seeing extremities, such as (but not only) my left and right hands.

Don’t you remember that, according to you, it is reality which infallibly impresses these specific relations on your mind, and that each of those relations inheres in each of those hands? Why do you say now that, given certain conditions, it is easier for us to apprehend those mutual relations? Did you change your mind without telling me?

What does it mean, for right and left, to be, but weaker than before?

 

[JuanFlorencio]

John, yppop,

I come back to you at night. Now I need to go to work.

Best regards
JuanFlorencio