How do we come to know things?

[Robert_Sock]

“How do we come to know things?”

The most sure way of coming to know things is through Contemplative Prayer. All knowledge, I believe, comes from God. We think we are learning by thinking and analyzing, but it’s really the Holy Spirit working from within us.

 

[lmelahn]

So, what was the origin of the concept “prime matter”? How did Aristotle develop it? Did he follow an intellectual procedure that is essentially different to the procedures of modern scientists?

I think it would be convenient if we proceed step by step.

First of all we have to realize that there were already certain discussions about change before Aristotle came on the scene. In the Physics, Book I, Chapter 8, he says

“The first of those who studied science were misled in their search for truth and the nature of things by their inexperience, which as it were thrust them into another path. So they say that none of the things that are either comes to be or passes out of existence, because what comes to be must do so either from what is or from what is not, both of which are impossible. For what is cannot come to be (because it is already), and from what is not nothing could have come to be (because something must be present as a substratum). So too they exaggerated the consequence of this, and went so far as to deny even the existence of a plurality of things, maintaining that only Being itself is. Such then was their opinion, and such the reason for its adoption.”

What was the problem? The first of those who studied science could not figure out how to conceive change and plurality in view of the concept they had of Being. They conceived it as simple and, therefore, identical to itself. So, the problem was not that they were unable to perceive change and plurality, but that they lacked the elements to think them (this is the “inexperience” that Aristotle points out: not a lack of perception, but of “experience”).

Do you agree up to this point, Imelahn?

I am well aware of the discussions between the Eleatic and Heraclitan schools, and how Aristotle attempted to resolve them (which I think he basically did correctly). Indeed, that takes up most of the Physics.

I think the translator is being kinder than Aristotle, here. Aristotle is basically accusing the Eleatics (i.e., Parmenides’ school) of being stupid for not seeing what everyone can see plainly: that there is change and plurality in things. The word translated “inexperience” is ἀπειρία, which in this context is stronger that just “lack of experience;” it is more like inexcusable ignorance. (Aristotle was actually rather biting when he criticized his opponents.)

Aristotle is doubtless being a little unfair here, because Parmenides was really the first to investigate being as such, and so it is to be expected that he should take a few wrong terms.

Anyway, to answer your question, I agree with you that doubtless Parmenides perceived change and plurality.

However, I would have to hold (and I think Aristotle would agree with me on this) that Parmenides also grasped that change and plurality with his intellect. That means he would have apprehended that change and plurality and made judgments (composition/division) about them. These are realities that everyone has access to spontaneously.

The fact that he did not include them in his theory shows the weakness of his reasoning—of his theory, which is a product of discursive reason—not of his apprehension or composition/division.

So no, I would have to say that Parmenides had all the elements to think change and plurality. He simply attempted to remove them from his system. (In fact, if you read Parmenides’ writings, he did think about change and plurality. He thought he could reduce them to mere appearance, but he obviously knew what they were.)

(That is what I mean when I say Aristotle always tries to start with everyday reality: change and plurality, he argues, are givens that everyone can see, and that we need to explain—and he does so with his theory of act and potency.)

 

[lmelahn]

Dear Imelahn:

Actually, I distinguish between several kinds of relations. Among them there are those whose elements are elements of interactions, like when we say that an elephant is bigger than a rat (elephants and rats being elements of interactions); other kind are those whose elements are relations, like when we say that acceleration is the rate of change of velocity (velocity and time being relations themselves). The first relations are those whose elements are elements of interactions, and every system of relations is finally based on them. I understand this is what you are saying. I agree with that.

Abstraction! There have been several uses of this term through the history of philosophy… I prefer not to use it. When someone says for example that Calculus is very “abstract”, I say “it is a system of relations of high order”; which means that it contains relations of relations of relations of relations…

Concerning substance… there is a parallel between “element of interaction” and “substance”. At least, when I read Aristotle saying “substance” I translate it as “element of interaction”. I have said several times already that we deal with them every moment of our lives. No thinking is needed at all for that. But both “substance” and “element of interaction” as concepts can only be reached through a sophisticated reasoning (in other words, they are relations of high order). Both concepts are imitations of that which we directly deal with every moment of our lives.

So, I don’t deny that we can reach to the concept of substance. Obviously, Aristotle did it, and many people after him, me included (it is a fact, so it is possible); and I don’t deny either (but affirm) that we directly interact with the objective correlate of such intellectual imitation.

I would like that we continue with the elaboration of the concept “prime matter”, if you don’t have any objection. It was supposed that there is something peculiar to metaphysical reasoning that is not found anywhere else. I would like it to be clarified.

Best regards!
JuanFlorencio

I agree that the concept of substance (or anyway explicit knowledge of it) is only arrived at after rigorous reasoning.

However, we know, without any thinking, what it is that we know: whether that be a bird, another human being, or a piece of paper. (But it still makes use of our intellect—“thinking” properly refers to the use of discursive reasoning.)

That which answers the question “What is it?” (Aristotle’s ti estí) we call “substance.” Knowing substances is easy and spontaneous. Explicitly knowing the concept of substance is difficult.

I guess I hesitate to call substance a mere “element of interaction,” because I think it is much richer than that. It is more like a source of interactions, it seems to me.

Anyway, I agree. Let us move on to the discussion on prime matter (and I assume we will also discuss its counterpart, substantial form).

 

[lmelahn]

Imelahn, I seem to always be asking questions that are peripheral to the main discussion. Apologies for that. I don’t mean to de-rail this interesting thread, so please feel free not to respond.

This intrigued me. You seem to draw a distinction between the brain and the intellect. To me, the intellect is a term for a collection of processes that are performed by the brain. Is this not what Aquinas believed?

No, Aquinas specifically said that intellectual actions are not performed by any organ. Rather, those actions are produced directly by the soul.

Man (at least before he dies) needs his organs (brain and sense organs) in order to express those actions, but intellectual acts as such have their origin directly in the soul.

(The intellect and will, for Aquinas, are a kind of “quality”—in the technical sense of that term—of the soul, whose purpose is to produce acts of knowledge and volition.)

 

[JuanFlorencio]

I am well aware of the discussions between the Eleatic and Heraclitan schools, and how Aristotle attempted to resolve them (which I think he basically did correctly). Indeed, that takes up most of the Physics.

I think the translator is being kinder than Aristotle, here. Aristotle is basically accusing the Eleatics (i.e., Parmenides’ school) of being stupid for not seeing what everyone can see plainly: that there is change and plurality in things. The word translated “inexperience” is ἀπειρία, which in this context is stronger that just “lack of experience;” it is more like inexcusable ignorance. (Aristotle was actually rather biting when he criticized his opponents.)

Aristotle is doubtless being a little unfair here, because Parmenides was really the first to investigate being as such, and so it is to be expected that he should take a few wrong terms.

Anyway, to answer your question, I agree with you that doubtless Parmenides perceived change and plurality.

However, I would have to hold (and I think Aristotle would agree with me on this) that Parmenides also grasped that change and plurality with his intellect. That means he would have apprehended that change and plurality and made judgments (composition/division) about them. These are realities that everyone has access to spontaneously.

The fact that he did not include them in his theory shows the weakness of his reasoning—of his theory, which is a product of discursive reason—not of his apprehension or composition/division.

So no, I would have to say that Parmenides had all the elements to think change and plurality. He simply attempted to remove them from his system. (In fact, if you read Parmenides’ writings, he did think about change and plurality. He thought he could reduce them to mere appearance, but he obviously knew what they were.)

(That is what I mean when I say Aristotle always tries to start with everyday reality: change and plurality, he argues, are givens that everyone can see, and that we need to explain—and he does so with his theory of act and potency.)

Dear Imelahn:

Please be aware that there is a subtle twist on the subject. I have no basis to assume that Parmenides had an inferior intelligence. On the contrary, I think he was a remarkable man. So, when I say that he did not have the elements to think “change”, I am limiting the scope of my assertion to the precision of the Aristotelian remark “The first of those who studied science…”. The question would be: Did Parmenides produce an episteme (or a wisdom) of change? And he didn’t. That is why he just exposed opinions about it. It is Aristotle who will develop such epistle or wisdom (what is the Greek term that Aristotle uses here, Imelahn? Do you know?).

I am not talking about composition/division here. What is important now is to identify any fundamental difference between the methods of Aristotelian metaphysics and modern science, ok?

If you consider things from this point of view, do you still believe that Parmenides possessed the elements to think “change”?

Kind regards
JuanFlorencio

 

[lmelahn]

Dear Imelahn:

Please be aware that there is a subtle twist on the subject. I have no basis to assume that Parmenides had an inferior intelligence. On the contrary, I think he was a remarkable man.

I agree. I was just saying that Aristotle could sometimes be a little biting. As a matter of fact, I think he is being unfair.

So, when I say that he did not have the elements to think “change”, I am limiting the scope of my assertion to the precision of the Aristotelian remark “The first of those who studied science…”. The question would be: Did Parmenides produce an episteme (or a wisdom) of change? And he didn’t. That is why he just exposed opinions about it.

It is Aristotle who will develop such epistle or wisdom (what is the Greek term that Aristotle uses here, Imelahn? Do you know?).

“Science” is episteme, and wisdom (one of Aristotle’s names for the First Science—what we call metaphyiscs) is sophía. For Aristotle sophía means investigation regarding causes (aitíai). That, for Aristotle, is the difference between opinion (dóxa) and science (episteme). Opinion is the kind of knowledge that is gained from experience (like what a carpenter learns by trial and error); science is gained once we know the causes (e.g., by learning that it is the grain of the wood that makes it easy to split in one direction and not the other).

I am not talking about composition/division here. What is important now is to identify any fundamental difference between the methods of Aristotelian metaphysics and modern science, ok?

OK, so we are speaking about discursive reason. Fair enough.

If you consider things from this point of view, do you still believe that Parmenides possessed the elements to think “change”?

Kind regards
JuanFlorencio

As you point out, Parmenides did not really have an episteme of change or plurality, because he did not seek their causes or principles.

(He did have a theory, but it was a copout, so to speak: he considered them to be pure appearance. There is no such thing, according to Aristotle as false science; it is only episteme to the degree that it is true. Since Parmenides’ theory has a very serious flaw—namely, that it does not account for some very obvious phenomena—I could not consider it “episteme.”)

Suffice it to say, Parmenides certainly did not have the elements to do real science (episteme) of change or plurality.

 

[lmelahn]

I didn’t get a chance to respond to the following, which I think is important (even at the risk of a slight digression):

Fire produces expansion on gases, but it is not expansion; it liquifies metals, but it is not liquid; it makes wood turn black, but it is not black… The idea that “whatever produces operation must be similar to the operation it produces” seems to me a strange desire.

Notice, however, that heat is the proper effect of fire (not necessarily the only proper effect), and these other effects that you mention are only a consequence of the first.

Fire is not, of course, a substance (something that the ancients and even St. Thomas were mistaken about), but consists, as you know, in the rapid oxidation of the combustible. The consequence of that oxidation is the production of a lot of heat.

The gases expand, because they are heated. The wood turns black, because of pyrolysis (again, because of the heat, which decomposes the carbohydrates into pure carbon). The metal liquifies, because it is heated. Even its light is a consequence of its heat (from the blackbody radiation of the coals and the carbon particles in the flames).

All of the effects that seem different from the proper effect take place because of the confluence of other causes: in this case, mostly having to do with the composition of the material in question.

So, name your cause its proper effect, and you will see that the effect is similar to the cause, at least in some way. (Not in every way; for one thing, the cause is always greater than the effect. I realize that this is a much-debated position, so I suggest leaving it for another time .)

 

[lmelahn]

“Form”, as a concept, is the imitation of a certain set of sets of phenomena. In other words, there is in reality something that allowed, first Plato, then Aristotle, to conceive the complex notion of “form” (and it still allows it).

This will have a bearing on our discussions, so I will mention the following:

I agree that form as a concept is compound, because the notion is formed through a judgment; it is not taken (as a concept) from material realities (in technical terms, it is not “abstracted”).

However, a thing’s form—the form itself, not the concept—is simple. A thing has parts (in the physical sense) because of its matter.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

I agree that the concept of substance (or anyway explicit knowledge of it) is only arrived at after rigorous reasoning.

However, we know, without any thinking, what it is that we know: whether that be a bird, another human being, or a piece of paper. (But it still makes use of our intellect—“thinking” properly refers to the use of discursive reasoning.)

That which answers the question “What is it?” (Aristotle’s ti estí) we call “substance.” Knowing substances is easy and spontaneous. Explicitly knowing the concept of substance is difficult.

Wouldn’t it be more true to say that a substance is " that which exists " and exists in no other. Where as " What is it? " would be a question directed at the nature, the " what, " that exists.

I guess I hesitate to call substance a mere “element of interaction,” because I think it is much richer than that. It is more like a source of interactions, it seems to me.

I would do more than that. I would say it is absolutely false to say that a substance is a mere " element of interaction. " Certainly there are " interactions " in material substances and between angels and between God and his creation. But each substance has its own undivided nature. And it is that undivided nature we know as a substance. It is that of which we have a concept. first as a substnace.e

Anyway, I agree. Let us move on to the discussion on prime matter (and I assume we will also discuss its counterpart, substantial form).

By all means, we have about beat this horse to death!

Pax
Linus2nd

 

[JuanFlorencio]

I didn’t get a chance to respond to the following, which I think is important (even at the risk of a slight digression):

Notice, however, that heat is the proper effect of fire (not necessarily the only proper effect), and these other effects that you mention are only a consequence of the first.

Fire is not, of course, a substance (something that the ancients and even St. Thomas were mistaken about), but consists, as you know, in the rapid oxidation of the combustible. The consequence of that oxidation is the production of a lot of heat.

The gases expand, because they are heated. The wood turns black, because of pyrolysis (again, because of the heat, which decomposes the carbohydrates into pure carbon). The metal liquifies, because it is heated. Even its light is a consequence of its heat (from the blackbody radiation of the coals and the carbon particles in the flames).

All of the effects that seem different from the proper effect take place because of the confluence of other causes: in this case, mostly having to do with the composition of the material in question.

So, name your cause its proper effect, and you will see that the effect is similar to the cause, at least in some way. (Not in every way; for one thing, the cause is always greater than the effect. I realize that this is a much-debated position, so I suggest leaving it for another time .)

Dear Imelahn:

I think you should never abandon the big to keep the small. In order to save the hylomorphic principle “whatever produces operation must be similar to the operation it produces”, you are replacing hylomorphism by a mechanistic approach. But by doing so you are throwing the whole thing away. Besides that, if you go ahead a step further in the mechanistic approach you would have to admit that in the combustion reaction the “energy” of certain chemical bonds is transformed into kinetic energy and radiation; but none of them bears any similarity to the “energy” of a chemical bond.

Best regards
JuanFlorencio

 

[JuanFlorencio]

As you point out, Parmenides did not really have an episteme of change or plurality, because he did not seek their causes or principles.

(He did have a theory, but it was a copout, so to speak: he considered them to be pure appearance. There is no such thing, according to Aristotle as false science; it is only episteme to the degree that it is true. Since Parmenides’ theory has a very serious flaw—namely, that it does not account for some very obvious phenomena—I could not consider it “episteme.”)

Suffice it to say, Parmenides certainly did not have the elements to do real science (episteme) of change or plurality.

What does Aristotle do then? While Parmenides focused on his notion of Being, and based on that notion he wanted to regulate what was said, distinguishing between opinion and wisdom, Aristotle focused on the multitude of things that surrounded him, and he wants to use those things to regulate the way in which we talk about them. He says in another part of the Physics (Book III, Chapter 8): “To rely on mere thinking is absurd, for then the excess or defect is not in the thing but in the thought”.

Part of what Parmenides said is acknowledged by Aristotle as true, but he considers it necessary to impose some limits on it:

“We ourselves are in agreement with them in holding that nothing can be said without qualification to come from what is not. But nevertheless we maintain that a thing may ‘come from what is not’ -that is, in a qualified sense. For a thing comes to be from the privation, which in its own nature is not-being”.

But he adds immediately: “Yet this causes surprise, and it is thought impossible that something should come to be in the way described from what is not”.

There was a problem with the notion of Being. In its simplicity, this notion prevented a consistent thought about change. Apparently, it was necessary to introduce certain plurality within it. I remember that Plato said (I am sorry, Imelahn, but right now I don’t remember where exactly) that perhaps the non-being had certain reality: the non-being might be. This sounded so tremendous that was considered by Plato as the murder of father Parmenides (I am translating from my bad memory in Spanish into English. Most probably I am very inaccurate).

How could such notion of Being be formed in Parmenides mind? Can you form it in your mind, Imelahn?

 

[lmelahn]

Wouldn’t it be more true to say that a substance is " that which exists " and exists in no other. Where as " What is it? " would be a question directed at the nature, the " what, " that exists.

I would do more than that. I would say it is absolutely false to say that a substance is a mere " element of interaction. " Certainly there are " interactions " in material substances and between angels and between God and his creation. But each substance has its own undivided nature. And it is that undivided nature we know as a substance. It is that of which we have a concept. first as a substnace.e

By all means, we have about beat this horse to death!

Pax
Linus2nd

For Aristotle, anyway, as I think we discussed earlier, substance, essence, and nature are basically the same thing. He sometimes likes to use the expression “ti esti” to refer to it, which is literally translated “What is it?” but Aristotle uses it as if it were a noun. That is what I was referring to.

 

[lmelahn]

What does Aristotle do then? While Parmenides focused on his notion of Being, and based on that notion he wanted to regulate what was said, distinguishing between opinion and wisdom, Aristotle focused on the multitude of things that surrounded him, and he wants to use those things to regulate the way in which we talk about them. He says in another part of the Physics (Book III, Chapter 8): “To rely on mere thinking is absurd, for then the excess or defect is not in the thing but in the thought”.

Part of what Parmenides said is acknowledged by Aristotle as true, but he considers it necessary to impose some limits on it:

“We ourselves are in agreement with them in holding that nothing can be said without qualification to come from what is not. But nevertheless we maintain that a thing may ‘come from what is not’ -that is, in a qualified sense. For a thing comes to be from the privation, which in its own nature is not-being”.

But he adds immediately: “Yet this causes surprise, and it is thought impossible that something should come to be in the way described from what is not”.

There was a problem with the notion of Being. In its simplicity, this notion prevented a consistent thought about change. Apparently, it was necessary to introduce certain plurality within it. I remember that Plato said (I am sorry, Imelahn, but right now I don’t remember where exactly) that perhaps the non-being had certain reality: the non-being might be. This sounded so tremendous that was considered by Plato as the murder of father Parmenides (I am translating from my bad memory in Spanish into English. Most probably I am very inaccurate).

How could such notion of Being be formed in Parmenides mind? Can you form it in your mind, Imelahn?

Plato said that in the Sophist. It is the famous (in philosophical circles) “parricide of Parmenides.” (If you are curious, it is found at around 254b–257a, in which Plato describes the five “meta-ideas” of movement, rest, sameness, difference, and being.)

There are several things to consider. The first is that “being” as a term is “polysemic.” It means a lot of different things.

Its most basic meaning is what Aristotle called to on, in Aquinas ens: something that is. That concept (in Aquinas referred to as the ratio entis [the notion of being]) is apprehended by everyone without exception: otherwise knowledge as such would be impossible. People may not be able to refer to it explicitly, but it is at the base of every coherent judgment. As Aquinas says, id quod primo cadit in intellectu, est ens (what first falls into the intellect is being, I-Iae, q. 55, a. 4, ad 1). Hence it is impossible that Parmenides did not have this most basic notion of being correct, at least in his intellect, if not in his words.

However “being” can also mean, not something that is, but the principle or perfection that makes it be. (In this case, better rendered as the infinitive esse or to einai.) For example, “being” is an intrinsic perfection or “act” of every creature. It is also the very nature of God, who is Ipsum Esse (Being Itself). That meaning of “being” is extremely difficult for us to reach. It is not abstracted from material things, but must be obtained through very carefully thought out judgments. (The reasoning process is that resolutive method that I spoke about earlier.)

So, it is not surprising that Parmenides did not get it right. It was the very first attempt.

If we examine his theory, we see that his error was not in apprehending the concept of to on—to prove that, it is sufficient to note that his thoughts are coherent. Rather, it was an error in reasoning.

If we look, we see that he committed the classic logical error of using four terms, rather than three. Parmenides’ argument for the radical uniqueness of Being can be summarized by the following syllogism:

• Being is the only thing that exists (i.e., Being is unique).
• All things are Being.
• Therefore, all things are unique.

I have highlighted the so-called middle term that makes the syllogism (seem to) work. What did Parmenides do? He did not notice that he was using the term being in two different senses. When he says “Being is unique” he is considering being as a quasi-mystical Principle that underlies all reality. However, when he says “All things are Being,” in reality, he should have said “everything is a being (to on*)”—which is a slightly different concept.

This is simply an error in his reasoning process.

I do suggest reading the Sophist from about 251b to 259a. There, you will see the first serious attempt to critique Parmenides’ monism. I think that Aristotle improves quite a bit on Plato’s critique by discovering act and potency, and the related notion of privation.*

 

[lmelahn]

I have highlighted the so-called middle term that makes the syllogism (seem to) work. What did Parmenides do? He did not notice that he was using the term being in two different senses. When he says “Being is unique” he is considering being as a quasi-mystical Principle that underlies all reality. However, when he says “All things are Being,” in reality, he should have said “everything is a being (to on)”—which is a slightly different concept.

Notice that Parmenides’ first notion is not exactly false, either. The attributes that he ascribes to Being in his famous “hymn to Being” would apply fairly well to God.

His monism arises by an error in his reasoning.

 

[lmelahn]

Dear Imelahn:

I think you should never abandon the big to keep the small. In order to save the hylomorphic principle “whatever produces operation must be similar to the operation it produces”, you are replacing hylomorphism by a mechanistic approach. But by doing so you are throwing the whole thing away. Besides that, if you go ahead a step further in the mechanistic approach you would have to admit that in the combustion reaction the “energy” of certain chemical bonds is transformed into kinetic energy and radiation; but none of them bears any similarity to the “energy” of a chemical bond.

Best regards
JuanFlorencio

In its most proper sense, cause and effect are between one substance and another, whereas the different kinds of energy are actually operations (technically “active potencies”) of substance.

However, there is a relationship similar to causality between a substance and its operation. And it is especially there that we expect to see this similarity. We expect a star to be hot, an animal to use his sensory powers, a plant to grow, a human being to use his intellect, and so on.

In the case of fire, if you examine the actual action/passion pairs that are involved in the chain of causes (the direct or “essential” causes, not the events that succeed each other in time), I am not so sure that they are not, in fact, similar.

This is not a hylomorphic, or a mechanistic, principle, but a Platonic one.

But this is a digression, which I will return to if necessary in our conversation.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

Plato said that in the Sophist. It is the famous (in philosophical circles) “parricide of Parmenides.” (If you are curious, it is found at around 254b–257a, in which Plato describes the five “meta-ideas” of movement, rest, sameness, difference, and being.)

There are several things to consider. The first is that “being” as a term is “polysemic.” It means a lot of different things.

Its most basic meaning is what Aristotle called to on, in Aquinas ens: something that is. That concept (in Aquinas referred to as the ratio entis [the notion of being]) is apprehended by everyone without exception: otherwise knowledge as such would be impossible. People may not be able to refer to it explicitly, but it is at the base of every coherent judgment. As Aquinas says, id quod primo cadit in intellectu, est ens (what first falls into the intellect is being, I-Iae, q. 55, a. 4, ad 1). Hence it is impossible that Parmenides did not have this most basic notion of being correct, at least in his intellect, if not in his words.

However “being” can also mean, not something that is, but the principle or perfection that makes it be. (In this case, better rendered as the infinitive esse or to einai.) For example, “being” is an intrinsic perfection or “act” of every creature. It is also the very nature of God, who is Ipsum Esse (Being Itself). That meaning of “being” is extremely difficult for us to reach. It is not abstracted from material things, but must be obtained through very carefully thought out judgments. (The reasoning process is that resolutive method that I spoke about earlier.)

So, it is not surprising that Parmenides did not get it right. It was the very first attempt.

If we examine his theory, we see that his error was not in apprehending the concept of to on—to prove that, it is sufficient to note that his thoughts are coherent. Rather, it was an error in reasoning.

If we look, we see that he committed the classic logical error of using four terms, rather than three. Parmenides’ argument for the radical uniqueness of Being can be summarized by the following syllogism:

• Being is the only thing that exists (i.e., Being is unique).
• All things are Being.
• Therefore, all things are unique.

I have highlighted the so-called middle term that makes the syllogism (seem to) work. What did Parmenides do? He did not notice that he was using the term being in two different senses. When he says “Being is unique” he is considering being as a quasi-mystical Principle that underlies all reality. However, when he says “All things are Being,” in reality, he should have said “everything is a being (to on**)”—which is a slightly different concept.

This is simply an error in his reasoning process.

I do suggest reading the Sophist from about 251b to 259a. There, you will see the first serious attempt to critique Parmenides’ monism. I think that Aristotle improves quite a bit on Plato’s critique by discovering act and potency, and the related notion of privation.

Marvelous, Imelahn! Thank you for the links.

Even though it will be a new digression, I would like to ask you:

1. Among the different meanings of the term “being”, which one is using Parmenides in his poem?
2. I could not identify in the poem any place where Parmenides offered an argument for the uniqueness of “being” that could be summarized as you have mentioned. Could you please bring the text here and comment on it?
3. Could you please develop the meaning of “being” as esse using the resolutive method?

JuanFlorencio

 

[lmelahn]

Marvelous, Imelahn! Thank you for the links.

Even though it will be a new digression, I would like to ask you:

1. Among the different meanings of the term “being”, which one is using Parmenides in his poem?
2. I could not identify in the poem any place where Parmenides offered an argument for the uniqueness of “being” that could be summarized as you have mentioned. Could you please bring the text here and comment on it?
3. Could you please develop the meaning of “being” as esse using the resolutive method?

JuanFlorencio

As regards the poem, keep in mind that it is not the only source of information we have on Parmenides. There are commentators (e.g., Aristotle himself and Plato), as well as some fragments from his followers (Zeno, Melissus of Samo). Also the hymn is, obviously, not at all systematic, nor is it complete.

But in any case, to answer your questions:

(1) He uses both. Here is an example of the first meaning, being as “what which is” as to on:

Χρὴ τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῖν τ’ ἐὸν ἔμμεναι· ἔστι γὰρ εἶναι

It is necessary that what is ἐὸν] be spoken, known, and that it be ἔμμεναι]. For it is **being εἶναι] **(No. VI).

Note that Parmenides wrote with a rather archaic Greek, so he uses the old, un-contracted forms (ἐόν rather than ὄν, sometimes ἔμμεναι rather than εἶναι).

Actually in the very same sentence he uses his second meaning (sort of a cross between esse as intrinsic perfection of a substance, and being is Ipsum Esse).

I think we can all agree with the first sentence (at least if we take out the part about speaking and knowing):

It is necessary that what is be spoken, known, and that it be.

We don’t have to be in agreement as to whether to einai is an intrinsic perfection or not; but I think it is outside of any possible argument that that which is in fact is.

The what is more difficult to accept is the second sentence:

For it to on] is being (or “to be”).

He is not simply repeating the first sentence; the Greek does not allow that. (Greek, like Latin, Spanish, and Italian has understood subjects. The phrase could be translated est autem esse; sin embargo, es ser; or tuttavia, è essere.)

He has identified something that exists (to on) with a principle by which it exists (to einai)—even if we are not in agreement as to what kind of principle that is.

Anyway, he oscillates between to (e)on and to einai throughout the poem. He sometimes uses the form “it is” (estín) improperly as a noun. (Look at number II: “The first, namely, that It is [this whole phrase renders *estín], and that it is impossible for anything not to be.”) In effect, in so doing, he is able to fuse the two meanings together.

(2) In VIII. 5, he says the following:

οὐδέ ποτ’ ἦν οὐδ’ ἔσται, ἐπεὶ νῦν ἔστιν ὁμοῦ πᾶν,
ἕν, συνεχές

It [being] never was, neither will it be, for it is now, all at once,
a continuous one.

(He is arguing, essentially, that being neither comes into being, nor goes out of being, but simply is; that it is unique and eternal, in other words.)

Parmenides is well known to have argued that plurality is an appearance (hence that being is one). I showed above an example of how he essentially identifies being as to on with being as to einai, but there are others as you look down the poem.

Obviously, Parmenides never wrote a systematic treatise. But I think my syllogism fairly represents his reasoning. Perhaps it could be improved, but there is no doubt that Parmenides identified to on and to einai, and that such an identification is the basis, or anyway his justification, of his monism.

(3) I think this will require a separate post.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

As regards the poem, keep in mind that it is not the only source of information we have on Parmenides. There are commentators (e.g., Aristotle himself and Plato), as well as some fragments from his followers (Zeno, Melissus of Samo). Also the hymn is, obviously, not at all systematic, nor is it complete.

But in any case, to answer your questions:

(1) He uses both. Here is an example of the first meaning, being as “what which is” as to on:

Note that Parmenides …

Don’t you think that we don’t accept his thoughts because we are not monistic? If you adopt his position for a moment, thinking of reality as a whole, you will probably see that he is right: that which is not, cannot be; and that which is, cannot but be. Also, being a monist, both meanings of the term “being” necessarily become the same to him. Actually, every one of his thesis about “being” follow necessarily from his initial position; but how does one arrive to such position? It is necessary to distrust our senses, and favor only reason. Then, you conceive “being” as continuous, homogeneous, etcetera. But Aristotle is very fond of our senses.

 

[lmelahn]

Don’t you think that we don’t accept his thoughts because we are not monistic? If you adopt his position for a moment, thinking of reality as a whole, you will probably see that he is right: that which is not, cannot be; and that which is, cannot but be. Also, being a monist, both meanings of the term “being” necessarily become the same to him. Actually, every one of his thesis about “being” follow necessarily from his initial position; but how does one arrive to such position? It is necessary to distrust our senses, and favor only reason. Then, you conceive “being” as continuous, homogeneous, etcetera. But Aristotle is very fond of our senses.

No, I think his monism falls by a simple examination of reality. That is how one strain of Sophism arose (Gorgias’). Gorgias’ nihilism arises because he considers Parmenides’ position absurd (when taken to its logical consequences).

(Gorgias is the one who said that there is no reality; that even if there were a reality, there would be unable to know it; and that even if we could know it we would be unable to say it. As a result, he says, the best we can do is use language to persuade people to do what we want them to do. Notice that Gorgias’ threefold denial corresponds to Parmenides’ threefold identification of being, knowledge, and language.)

And we have to admit that Parmenides’ theory makes it very difficult to account for our everyday experience. In logic, there is a principle that says contra factum non argumentum est (there is to be no argument against plain fact). Moreover, there is a further logical inconsistency: if everything is one, how can there be a distinction between reality and illusion?

Also, although “all of reality” is certainly, in a sense, one, I don’t think we can really say that it is homogeneous and that all distinction is illusion. It is the latter point—the extreme homogeneity—that is the problem, not the former.

This is not to deny that Parmenides had good insights. He did. But (as in any first attempt), there are bumps to iron out.

So no, I think there are very good reasons, independent of one’s philosophical school, for rejecting monism (while maintaining Parmenides’ authentic insights).

 

[lmelahn]

1. Could you please develop the meaning of “being” as esse using the resolutive method?

JuanFlorencio

The problem is that this is enough material for an entire year of philosophy class, but I will attempt to give a summary here.

I you would like to read about it in painful detail (and rather technical language), then I recommend reading my master’s thesis, especially the Chapter 3. (If you want to skip the historical overview, go straight to section 3.2.)

(There are much better sources than that, but I am not aware of any in English that deal with it systematically.)

Basically, there are three stages:

(1) A logical analysis of how the verb to be is used in language. We use language, because it is the best representation of the notions we have grasp spontaneously through our experience.

(2) Seeking the ontological foundation of what the logical analysis brings to light.

(3) Bringing those foundations to their ultimate consequences.

So, let’s go through them succinctly.

(1) The notion of ”being” is the most fundamental notion. There is no way to “prove” or demonstrate that proposition, precisely because it is so basic and fundamental. However, it can be amply defended by what Aristotle calls elenchós, by reducing the contrary proposition to the absurd. If we did not grasp to on, we would be unable to have any logical discourse at all.

Therefore, the notion of ens or to on acts as a mediator, logically speaking, implicitly or explicitly, for every logical expression. If I can formulate a proposition in terms of subject and verb, it is always grasped by my intellect as “subject is predicate”—that is the structure of my intellect; it composes or divides, and “to be” represents the copula. (Hence this argument is valid even for languages that do not have the verb to be—the notion of ens is always there implicitly somehow.)

Aristotle discovered four ways that this predication can be done (and I think his list is exhaustive): one way that is per accidens, and three ways that are per se.

Per accidens means that there is no link of necessity whatsoever between the subject and the predicate. The predicate just “happens” (Latin: accidit) to be attributable to the subject. Aristotle gives the example of a musician who builds a house: the fact that the man is a musician has no bearing whatsoever on his capacity to build houses. He is a builder who just “happens to be” a musician.

Per se, on the other hand, means that there is a link of necessity. And this can occur in three ways: (a) when we are speaking of to on according to the figures or modes of attribution (the famous ten categories)—substance or the nine kinds of accidents—for example, when I say “Snow is white;” (b) when “being” is used to assert truth or falsehood—for example, when we make use of “to be” in logic or math, where the emphasis is not on the actual existence, but on the correspondence; (c) when “being” means act or potency; this is just Aristotle’s way of saying that “to be” can be applied to things that are real and actual (as with the example of snow above), or things that are potential (in the way that Michaelangelo’s David “was” in the marble even before he carved it).

For Aristotle, there is no science of anything that is not necessary (at least partially necessary), and so if we are going to use “to be” as a springboard for the science of being qua being, we can’t make use of its per accidens meaning. Nor is its meaning as “true or false” any use at the moment, because it is the subject of epistemology, not the First Science (the science of being) as such.

So we are left with “being,” when used according to the figures of attribution (categories); and it can be used to predicate something as actual or potential.

(2) Among the figures of attribution (categories), the nine categories of accidents can be brought back to substance (ousia). Aristotle offers both an experiential argument and a more rigorous one for asserting this, and for the details, I would refer you to the thesis (sec. 3.2.2.1). For the moment, it suffices to note that accidents are always inherent in substance. There are no colors or quantities floating around without subjects to reside in.

Likewise, potency can be brought back to act. Potency is for the sake of act, and is even knowable because of act. (Again, for Aristotle’s precise arguments, see the thesis, 3.2.2.2.)

So, by analyzing the notion of “being” (to on), we have effectively resolved it (hence the name of the method: “resolutive”) into two key notions: substance and act. Aristotle further specifies in exactly what way substance is related to “being” (to on), as I mentioned in a previous post: substance is what something is, simply because it is (to ti en einai). Moreover, for Aristotle “existence” is the highest kind of act there is—although Aristotle mentions that in a line or two and hardly broaches the subject again.

So, “being” can be brought back to substance and act. Can we do better? Can we bring these principles to a unique underlying principle (which was the dream of all the Greek Physicists)? Indeed we can, but it is not the kind of principle that the Ionic Physicists were think of—a kind of material arché.

(Stay tuned for (3).)