How do we come to know things?

[JuanFlorencio]

No, I think his monism falls by a simple examination of reality. That is how one strain of Sophism arose (Gorgias’). Gorgias’ nihilism arises because he considers Parmenides’ position absurd (when taken to its logical consequences).

(Gorgias is the one who said that there is no reality; that even if there were a reality, there would be unable to know it; and that even if we could know it we would be unable to say it. As a result, he says, the best we can do is use language to persuade people to do what we want them to do. Notice that Gorgias’ threefold denial corresponds to Parmenides’ threefold identification of being, knowledge, and language.)

And we have to admit that Parmenides’ theory makes it very difficult to account for our everyday experience. In logic, there is a principle that says contra factum non argumentum est (there is to be no argument against plain fact). Moreover, there is a further logical inconsistency: if everything is one, how can there be a distinction between reality and illusion?

Also, although “all of reality” is certainly, in a sense, one, I don’t think we can really say that it is homogeneous and that all distinction is illusion. It is the latter point—the extreme homogeneity—that is the problem, not the former.

This is not to deny that Parmenides had good insights. He did. But (as in any first attempt), there are bumps to iron out.

So no, I think there are very good reasons, independent of one’s philosophical school, for rejecting monism (while maintaining Parmenides’ authentic insights).

I would say it falls not by a simple examination of reality, but by certain examination of reality. I am not a monist, but I can understand that being as being does not admit degrees; and that being does not have “voids”. We can see around us objects which are denser than others, and we observe that where one object has its limits, another starts. From that point of view (which is the most common), there is heterogeneity and discontinuity in reality, but from the point of view of a monist nor density nor limits play any role (density is not an attribute of being, and no limits are conceivable for it). Such would be another manner of saying that being as being is continuous and homogeneous.

“Fact” is a difficult term. I know there have been abundant “arguments” against alleged “facts”, and in many occasions the “arguments” have been victorious (let me say it openly, Imelahn: when “A” opposes a “fact” against a discourse of “B”, “B” always has the right to ask “what do you mean?”, and “A” will have to respond with an argument). Also, every doctrine has been discussed and broadly refuted by its opponents. No one has been free of that. So, I never consider the reference to facts nor the reference to refutations a definitive argument against a discourse. But I am always open to hear and analyze a good argument against another.

I think that for a monist there should be no difference between “illusions” and “reality”; but I have never known a consistent monist: Parmenides and Spinoza, for example, intend to correct or even eliminate some discourses. Why should they, being monists? It makes no sense. They seem not to believe enough on their own monism.

So, please let’s go on: Share with us the resolutive development of the meaning of being as esse.

 

[lmelahn]

(3) At this point, we pick up where Aristotle left off and begin to follow St. Thomas Aquinas.

Aquinas notes that neither the substance/accident composition, nor the matter/form composition are sufficient to explain certain phenomena. For example, prime matter can explain why there are many individuals in a single species; but it cannot explain why there is a diversity of species. Nor can it explain why there is diversity in creatures that do not have any matter at all (namely, angels).

Act as such is “generous” (an idea that Aquinas gets from Neoplatonism). Unless it is limited by something distinct from itself—a potency—it is limitless per se. If there were such a thing as “separate” whiteness (whiteness that inheres in no subject whatsoever), it would be infinitely intense.

Hence, when we see that there are different ontological degrees (as is evident among, say, plants, animals, and men), it must mean that the active principle in them is present to a greater or lesser degree. It is limited by something other than itself—by a potency—otherwise, it would be infinitely intense (which it evidently is not).

Aquinas calls that active principle, present in all creatures without exception (including the angles) the actus essendi or “act of being,” and the potential principle the “essence" (which is the very substance, but considered in composition with the active principle that actuates it).

The act of being is, for Aquinas, the inner core, in which all the “power” of the substance ultimately resides. From it springs forth, like a fountain from its source, a threefold “cascade” of being (esse): the being that actuates the substance itself (the same thing as the to einai that Aristotle speaks about—e.g., in his “definition” of substance as to ti en einai); the being (esse) that actuates the substance’s most intimate properties (for example, in human beings, our intellect and will); and finally, the being (esse) that actuates our concrete actions or operari.

If the act of being were not defined and limited by an essence, it would be infinite, and hence, not distinct from God Himself. Hence, the composition of act of being with essence is a necessary condition for there to be creatures at all.

There is a lot more that could be said, but that, in summary, is the point of arrival of what Aquinas calls resolutio secundum rationem, roughly, the search for the intrinsic causes of being, the causes that cannot be really separated from the beings that are studied. In summary: a substance draws all of its being, as a fountain from its source, from an original active principle called the act of being. That, and the various kinds of esse that flow from it, constitute that second meaning of the term “being” that Parmenides intuited in his poem.

Arriving at this conception of being is extremely difficult—probably practically impossible without the guide of Revelation to help us out. (However, in my opinion, it is accessible as such to unaided reason.) Hence, it is no surprise to me that Parmenides did not get there.

As I said, this would be a subject for an entire semester of philosophy, or more, so I can’t do it justice in a single post.

There is, actually, a third notion of being that I already hinted at: the infinite and un-composed Being of God, who is Being Itself (Ipsum Esse). But that would be the subject of at least another semester-long course…

 

[JuanFlorencio]

(3) At this point, we pick up where Aristotle left off and begin to follow St. Thomas Aquinas…

Imelahn, is this the application of the resolutive method, or we still have to wait for your next post?

 

[Linusthe2nd]

(3) At this point, we pick up where Aristotle left off and begin to follow St. Thomas Aquinas.

Aquinas notes that neither the substance/accident composition, nor the matter/form composition are sufficient to explain certain phenomena. For example, prime matter can explain why there are many individuals in a single species; but it cannot explain why there is a diversity of species. Nor can it explain why there is diversity in creatures that do not have any matter at all (namely, angels)…[snip]…

relatio secundum rationes: " Aquinas on the Ontological and Theological Foundation of the Transcentintals "
uprait.org/sb/index.php/ao/article/viewFile/838/606

P.S. Ever since Gilson mentioned the act of being I have had no problem grasping it as an act, pure and simple. It is like watching a man running. There is a man. What is he doing? He is running. He is doing something. Now I see something on a dark knight and I say to myself, " There is something. " What is it? I don’t know. But I do know it exists, its act is to exist. That act is its act of being.. This " something " is engaged in the act of existing. What is it doing? It is existing.

P.P.S. To get to your Master’s thesis one has to " register. " I couldn’t figure out how to do that. Any pointers?

Linus2nd

 

[JuanFlorencio]

(3) At this point, we pick up where Aristotle left off and begin to follow St. Thomas Aquinas.

Aquinas notes that neither the subtstance/accident composition, nor the matter/form composition are sufficient to explain certain phenomena. For example, prime matter can explain why there are many individuals in a single species; but it cannot explain why there is a diversity of species. Nor can it explain why there is diversity in creatures that do not have any matter at all (namely, angels).

Act as such is “generous” (an idea that Aquinas gets from Neoplatonism). Unless it is limited by something distinct from itself—a potency—it is limitless per se. If there were such a thing as “separate” whiteness (whiteness that inheres in no subject whatsoever), it would be infinitely intense.

Hence, when we see that there are different ontological degrees (as is evident among, say, plants, animals, and men), it must mean that the active principle in them is present to a greater or lesser degree. It is limited by something other than itself—by a potency—otherwise, it would be infinitely intense (which it evidently is not).

Aquinas calls that active principle, present in all creatures without exception (including the angles) the actus essendi or “act of being,” and the potential principle the “essence" (which is the very substance, but considered in composition with the active principle that actuates it).

The act of being is, for Aquinas, the inner core, in which all the “power” of the substance ultimately resides. From it springs forth, like a fountain from its source, a threefold “cascade” of being (esse): the being that actuates the substance itself (the same thing as the to einai that Aristotle speaks about—e.g., in his “definition” of substance as to ti en einai); the being (esse) that actuates the substance’s most intimate properties (for example, in human beings, our intellect and will); and finally, the being (esse) that actuates our concrete actions or operari.

If the act of being were not defined and limited by an essence, it would be infinite, and hence, not distinct from God Himself. Hence, the composition of act of being with essence is a necessary condition for there to be creatures at all.

There is a lot more that could be said, but that, in summary, is the point of arrival of what Aquinas calls resolutio secundum rationem, roughly, the search for the intrinsic causes of being, the causes that cannot be really separated from the beings that are studied. In summary: a substance draws all of its being, as a fountain from its source, from an original active principle called the act of being. That, and the various kinds of esse that flow from it, constitute that second meaning of the term “being” that Parmenides intuited in his poem.

Arriving at this conception of being is extremely difficult—probably practically impossible without the guide of Revelation to help us out. (However, in my opinion, it is accessible as such to unaided reason.) Hence, it is no surprise to me that Parmenides did not get there.

As I said, this would be a subject for an entire semester of philosophy, or more, so I can’t do it justice in a single post.

There is, actually, a third notion of being that I already hinted at: the infinite and un-composed Being of God, who is Being Itself (Ipsum Esse). But that would be the subject of at least another semester-long course…

Please, Imelahn, correct me if I make any mistake in my interpretation:

So, you say that besides “prime matter”, “form”, “substance” and “accident”, a new concept is necessary for you to “explain” the existence of -for instance- rabbits, dogs and giraffes. Because with the notion of “prime matter” you can explain why there are many rabbits, or many dogs, or many giraffes; but you cannot “explain” why there are all those three different species of animals.

Then, you say that such new concept is the “act of being”; but you don’t say how it does allow you to explain the phenomena that you have just mentioned generically. It would be convenient if you provide the explanation.

When you describe the “act of being” you use several metaphors (“the inner core”, “the fountain”, “the cascade”…). In my opinion, this is unavoidable, but at the same time you should use certain contrasts to allow us to get the idea; otherwise what we get is just poetry (in the worse sense).

When you say that without Revelation it would be practically impossible to arrive at the conception of the “act of being”, you probably mean that you cannot elaborate certain speculations based on a peculiar interpretation of the Sacred Scriptures if you don’t have first such “concept”. I would ask you to describe those speculations and the role of the “act of being” in them.

You say that the “act of being” is infinite unless it is limited by an essence. Probably you wanted to mean indefinite instead of infinite. Anyway, your use of metaphors prevents me from making any sense out of your words (the essence appears to be like a box that gives “size and form” to an otherwise unintelligible “don’t know what”). I don’t see how an essence can limit an infinite “act of being”, or how it can determine an indefinite “act of being”. Besides, either way the essence would be playing the role of act, while the “act of being” would rather be a passive potency. How many “acts of being” are there anyway? Or is it a notion that belongs to a pantheistic doctrine?

Please, let me know.

Now, any concept can be grasped if you show why it is necessary in the context of a system of relations, and how does it work in it. If you don’t, it will be not only difficult, but impossible to grasp simply because it makes no sense at all.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

What does Aristotle do then? While Parmenides focused on his notion of Being, and based on that notion he wanted to regulate what was said, distinguishing between opinion and wisdom, Aristotle focused on the multitude of things that surrounded him, and he wants to use those things to regulate the way in which we talk about them. He says in another part of the Physics (Book III, Chapter 8): “To rely on mere thinking is absurd, for then the excess or defect is not in the thing but in the thought”.

Part of what Parmenides said is acknowledged by Aristotle as true, but he considers it necessary to impose some limits on it:

“We ourselves are in agreement with them in holding that nothing can be said without qualification to come from what is not. But nevertheless we maintain that a thing may ‘come from what is not’ -that is, in a qualified sense. For a thing comes to be from the privation, which in its own nature is not-being”.

But he adds immediately: “Yet this causes surprise, and it is thought impossible that something should come to be in the way described from what is not”.

There was a problem with the notion of Being. In its simplicity, this notion prevented a consistent thought about change. Apparently, it was necessary to introduce certain plurality within it.

While Parmenides says that “being” is homogeneous, Aristotle seems to be ambiguous. He says that “There is a science which investigates being as being and the attributes which belong to this in virtue of its own nature” (Metaphysics, Book IV, Part I), as if the “attributes of being” were not being too. While Parmenides says that “being” is uncreated and indestructible, Aristotle says that the science of “being as being” concerns its first causes and principles, as if those causes and principles were not being too. The explanation of these ambiguities is that Aristotle acknowledges many senses for the term “be”, but he mentions that all those senses are related to a principal one, which is “substance” (Metaphysics, Book IV, Part II):

“There are many senses in which a thing may be said to ‘be’, but all that ‘is’ is related to one central point, one definite kind of thing, and is not said to ‘be’ by a mere ambiguity. Everything which is healthy is related to health, one thing in the sense that it preserves health, another in the sense that it produces it, another in the sense that it is a symptom of health, another because it is capable of it. And that which is medical is relative to the medical art, one thing being called medical because it possesses it, another because it is naturally adapted to it, another because it is a function of the medical art. And we shall find other words used similarly to these. So, too, there are many senses in which a thing is said to be, but all refer to one starting-point; some things are said to be because they are substances, others because they are affections of substance, others because they are a process towards substance, or destructions or privations or qualities of substance, or productive or generative of substance, or of things which are relative to substance, or negations of one of these thing of substance itself. It is for this reason that we say even of non-being that it is nonbeing. As, then, there is one science which deals with all healthy things, the same applies in the other cases also. For not only in the case of things which have one common notion does the investigation belong to one science, but also in the case of things which are related to one common nature; for even these in a sense have one common notion. It is clear then that it is the work of one science also to study the things that are, qua being.-But everywhere science deals chiefly with that which is primary, and on which the other things depend, and in virtue of which they get their names. If, then, this is substance, it will be of substances that the philosopher must grasp the principles and the causes.”

Now, it is clear from this text that Aristotle doesn’t believe that the whole reality is only one substance, but that there are many substances; however, in terms of “being as being”, what is the difference between one substance and another? On the one side, in order for the science of “being as being” to be possible, Aristotle needs that the term “be” possesses unity, but on the other hand he seems to feel as well the need to recognize a plurality of substances.

I think it is very important to notice the point of divergence between Parmenides and Aristotle concerning their notions of “being as being”: It is not clear that such divergence was due to a mistake that Parmenides had made; at least not yet.

We already know that it is attributed to Aristotle the thought of substances as composites of prime matter and form. So, we are close to the notion of “prime matter”. But for the moment, we would need to find out how does Aristotle arrive at the notion of “substance”.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

The problem is that this is enough material for an entire year of philosophy class, but I will attempt to give a summary here.

I you would like to read about it in painful detail (and rather technical language), then I recommend reading my master’s thesis, especially the Chapter 3. (If you want to skip the historical overview, go straight to section 3.2.)

(There are much better sources than that, but I am not aware of any in English that deal with it systematically.)

Basically, there are three stages:

(1) A logical analysis of how the verb to be is used in language. We use language, because it is the best representation of the notions we have grasp spontaneously through our experience.

(2) Seeking the ontological foundation of what the logical analysis brings to light.

(3) Bringing those foundations to their ultimate consequences.

So, let’s go through them succinctly.

(1) The notion of ”being” is the most fundamental notion. There is no way to “prove” or demonstrate that proposition, precisely because it is so basic and fundamental. However, it can be amply defended by what Aristotle calls elenchós, by reducing the contrary proposition to the absurd. If we did not grasp to on, we would be unable to have any logical discourse at all.

Therefore, the notion of ens or to on acts as a mediator, logically speaking, implicitly or explicitly, for every logical expression. If I can formulate a proposition in terms of subject and verb, it is always grasped by my intellect as “subject is predicate”—that is the structure of my intellect; it composes or divides, and “to be” represents the copula. (Hence this argument is valid even for languages that do not have the verb to be—the notion of ens is always there implicitly somehow.)

Aristotle discovered four ways that this predication can be done (and I think his list is exhaustive): one way that is per accidens, and three ways that are per se.

Per accidens means that there is no link of necessity whatsoever between the subject and the predicate. The predicate just “happens” (Latin: accidit) to be attributable to the subject. Aristotle gives the example of a musician who builds a house: the fact that the man is a musician has no bearing whatsoever on his capacity to build houses. He is a builder who just “happens to be” a musician.

Per se, on the other hand, means that there is a link of necessity. And this can occur in three ways: (a) when we are speaking of to on according to the figures or modes of attribution (the famous ten categories)—substance or the nine kinds of accidents—for example, when I say “Snow is white;” (b) when “being” is used to assert truth or falsehood—for example, when we make use of “to be” in logic or math, where the emphasis is not on the actual existence, but on the correspondence; (c) when “being” means act or potency; this is just Aristotle’s way of saying that “to be” can be applied to things that are real and actual (as with the example of snow above), or things that are potential (in the way that Michaelangelo’s David “was” in the marble even before he carved it).

For Aristotle, there is no science of anything that is not necessary (at least partially necessary), and so if we are going to use “to be” as a springboard for the science of being qua being, we can’t make use of its per accidens meaning. Nor is its meaning as “true or false” any use at the moment, because it is the subject of epistemology, not the First Science (the science of being) as such.

So we are left with “being,” when used according to the figures of attribution (categories); and it can be used to predicate something as actual or potential.

(2) Among the figures of attribution (categories), the nine categories of accidents can be brought back to substance (ousia). Aristotle offers both an experiential argument and a more rigorous one for asserting this, and for the details, I would refer you to the thesis (sec. 3.2.2.1). For the moment, it suffices to note that accidents are always inherent in substance. There are no colors or quantities floating around without subjects to reside in.

Likewise, potency can be brought back to act. Potency is for the sake of act, and is even knowable because of act. (Again, for Aristotle’s precise arguments, see the thesis, 3.2.2.2.)

So, by analyzing the notion of “being” (to on), we have effectively resolved it (hence the name of the method: “resolutive”) into two key notions: substance and act. Aristotle further specifies in exactly what way substance is related to “being” (to on), as I mentioned in a previous post: substance is what something is, simply because it is (to ti en einai). Moreover, for Aristotle “existence” is the highest kind of act there is—although Aristotle mentions that in a line or two and hardly broaches the subject again.

So, “being” can be brought back to substance and act. Can we do better? Can we bring these principles to a unique underlying principle (which was the dream of all the Greek Physicists)? Indeed we can, but it is not the kind of principle that the Ionic Physicists were think of—a kind of material arché.

(Stay tuned for (3).)

Dear Imelahn,

Strangely, I hadn’t seen your post. I an reading it now.

I am sorry for that.

JuanFlorencio

 

[JuanFlorencio]

The problem is that this is enough material for an entire year of philosophy class, but I will attempt to give a summary here…

Basically, there are three stages:

(1) A logical analysis of how the verb to be is used in language. We use language, because it is the best representation of the notions we have grasp spontaneously through our experience…

An analysis of language through language… Language, notions, experience; experience, notions, and language…

Probably language is not necessarily the best representation we have (why should it be?), but it is the most common way to pretend that we become transparent to each other.

If you were the first man over the earth and you had spontaneously experienced something, and spontaneously formed a notion, and spontaneously made a sound, I would tend to think that such sound possessed a special value, because it might be intimately related to the “something” that you had experienced. But as you are not the first man, I tend to think that your experiences are molded by the language you have learned from your people. Perhaps to be able to experience “being” (if that can be said) instead of becoming sophisticated in the use of languages you would need to get rid of them. But that is an illusion: you belong to the realm of relations (through language), and you cannot avoid it.

No, it is not through the analysis of language through language that you will conquer “being”, unless you are satisfied with a rough imitation of it.

 

[lmelahn]

Sorry, I had a deadline to meet, so I wasn’t able to answer until now.

So, you say that besides “prime matter”, “form”, “substance” and “accident”, a new concept is necessary for you to “explain” the existence of -for instance- rabbits, dogs and giraffes. Because with the notion of “prime matter” you can explain why there are many rabbits, or many dogs, or many giraffes; but you cannot “explain” why there are all those three different species of animals.

I think it is less clear among different species of animals, but that is the idea. The gradation of being is more obvious between man and sub-human creatures, and between, say, plants and animals.

Then, you say that such new concept is the “act of being”; but you don’t say how it does allow you to explain the phenomena that you have just mentioned generically. It would be convenient if you provide the explanation.

Well, act of being is a metaphysical principle, like Aristotle’s prime matter and form. We can form a concept of it after rigorous study (as we are attempting to do now).

In reality, we are doing things backwards: we should start with the justification of the substance/accident composition (which furnishes us with the tools to understand act and potency in general), and then move on to the matter/form composition, and only then to the act-of-being/essence composition.

So, let’s look at matter-and-form (which is what we are supposed to be discussing anyhow).

Why does Aristotle think the distinction is so important? Because he needs to explain two phenomena: generation-and-corruption (the conversion of something from one substance to another, as when an animal dies and becomes a cadaver); and the plurality of material things.

(Note how these are aspects of the very same problems first brought up by Heraclitus and Parmenides—plurality and change.)

Probably “substantial change”—generation-and-corruption—is the easier place to start with. When an animal dies, say, there is evidently some type of change that takes place. It is not, however, reducible to a mere accidental change. It is not just that the animal stops breathing; its entire principle of unity disintegrates. All of its organs become a disassociated aggregate, and the body begins to decompose.

Hence, we must conclude that there is some kind of active principle—something that provides unity to what would otherwise be a loosely associated set of organs—that is lost at the moment of the animal’s death.

On the other hand, there is actually very little visible change over the animal’s body at the moment of the change. The change is very profound, on one level—for the animal’s unity completely and irreversibly disintegrates—and yet, the cadaver remains without much outward difference in appearance.

So, we surmise that there is an element, or principle, that provides unity and coherence to the animal while it lives; and a distinct principle that is receptive of the first one.

The first principle is an “active” one, because it provides unity, definition—indeed, being (esse)—to the animal. The other is “potential,” because it is indefinite; it can receive many active principles (as is evidenced by the substantial change, in which the object in question changes from an animal into a cadaver).

Aristotle calls the active principle “substantial form” (“substantial” because it defines the very substance; “form” because he is recalling Plato’s doctrine of Ideas—he is saying, in essence, that the forms are not “out there”*in the Hyperuranion, but in the very substances themselves). He calls the potential principle “prime matter.”

(Note that there is no such thing as matter without form, although there is such a thing as form without matter.)

Similarly, let’s consider two substances that are clearly of the same species: let’s say, two cats. Clearly (as Plato understood correctly in that passage of the Sophist), in one respect they are the same, and a different respect, they are different. In what respects?

It can’t be their accidental differences, because even cats that seem exactly the same in every respect (that never happens in reality, but we can get close, as in identical twins), except for the fact that they are separate substances, would still be different in some way. They would still both be, at a minimum, both concrete and separate from each other.

Before we jump the gun and say that the substantial form is the aspect that is the same, and the prime matter that is different, we must keep in mind that if there is a composition, it would be entirely intrinsic to each substance. Hence each substance has its own substantial form, and each one has its own prime matter.

What permits the distinction between one cat and the other, however, has to be a principle that, per se, is perfectly indefinite and “potential”—remember it is the only thing preventing two cats, so to speak, from being one and the same. And yet each cat is both definite and separate from the other, so there must be a principle that “actuates” the potency and makes it definite. Those principles are prime matter and substantial form.

There is more that can be said, but suffice it to say that Aquinas uses similar reasoning to discover the composition between act of being and essence: there is a diversity that needs to be explained as well as a kind of change. The diversity is that demonstrated by beings that demonstrate a greater or lesser intensity of being (those that produce intellectual acts, for example, as opposed to those that do not), or, say between angels, who do not have any matter whatsoever. And the “change” in studied is that of creation, which is truly ex nihilo—unlike generation and corruption. Even non-material creatures (angels) are created, and so they must receive their being (their act of being) from God.

 

[lmelahn]

When you describe the “act of being” you use several metaphors (“the inner core”, “the fountain”, “the cascade”…). In my opinion, this is unavoidable, but at the same time you should use certain contrasts to allow us to get the idea; otherwise what we get is just poetry (in the worse sense).

We can only know about the act of being (in fact, all metaphysical principles) through analogy. The metaphors are just metaphors to help people understand the idea, but there is a rigorous reasoning process behind it.

When you say that without Revelation it would be practically impossible to arrive at the conception of the “act of being”, you probably mean that you cannot elaborate certain speculations based on a peculiar interpretation of the Sacred Scriptures if you don’t have first such “concept”. I would ask you to describe those speculations and the role of the “act of being” in them.

Aquinas seems to have got the idea for God as Being Itself (Ipsum Esse) from the famous passage in Exodus 3:14, in which God names Himself “I Am Who I Am.” From there, I think it occurred to him that God communicates being (with a small “b”) to His creatures—that is the act of being that is inherent in every creature.

(Aquinas is very much a Neoplatonist at heart—being extremely careful to remove anything that would be incompatible with the Faith—although he is also a fabulous interpreter of Aristotle, in my opinion.)

Nevertheless, it seems to me that the truth of the act of being is accessible to reason. A nonbeliever in theory could come to it (e.g., Aristotle comes surprisingly close in book 10 of his Metaphysics), but as a practical matter the great “hint” from Exodus 3 was probably indispensable.

You say that the “act of being” is infinite unless it is limited by an essence. Probably you wanted to mean indefinite instead of infinite.

No, I meant infinite. Being springs from the very goodness and power of God, so it will, so to speak, fill all of the potency available to it. In order for there to be a creature, its act of being must be limited in some way: otherwise—if it had no potency whatsoever—the “act of being” could not be distinct from God (Being Itself)—hence the creature would not exist at all.

Anyway, your use of metaphors prevents me from making any sense out of your words (the essence appears to be like a box that gives “size and form” to an otherwise unintelligible “don’t know what”). I don’t see how an essence can limit an infinite “act of being”, or how it can determine an indefinite “act of being”. Besides, either way the essence would be playing the role of act, while the “act of being” would rather be a passive potency. How many “acts of being” are there anyway? Or is it a notion that belongs to a pantheistic doctrine?

No, the act of being plays the role of act, and the essence is the potency. Every substance has its own act of being, which participates in the very Being of God. (It participates, however, not the way that a piece of pie participates in the whole pie, but in the way, say, iron participates in the heat of the fire.) The act of being is both an imitation of God (as Being Itself), and the proper effect of God, so there is nothing indefinite about it.

The role of the essence is to determine how “intensely” that act of being is present in a creature. Creatures with a greater intensity of being are capable of greater operation (e.g., man can use intellect and will, whereas sub-human animals cannot; angels are superior by nature to man, because they do not depend on matter, etc.).

Please, let me know.

Now, any concept can be grasped if you show why it is necessary in the context of a system of relations, and how does it work in it. If you don’t, it will be not only difficult, but impossible to grasp simply because it makes no sense at all.

In this case, the system of relations is the compositions and participations that we have been talking about. It really does hold together, but it is difficult to “get” at first.

 

[lmelahn]

quote=lmelahn;12839040 At this point, we pick up where Aristotle left off and begin to follow St. Thomas Aquinas.

Aquinas notes that neither the substance/accident composition, nor the matter/form composition are sufficient to explain certain phenomena. For example, prime matter can explain why there are many individuals in a single species; but it cannot explain why there is a diversity of species. Nor can it explain why there is diversity in creatures that do not have any matter at all (namely, angels)…[snip]…

relatio secundum rationes
[/quote]

: " Aquinas on the Ontological and Theological Foundation of the Transcentintals "
uprait.org/sb/index.php/ao/article/viewFile/838/606

Good find. That is my colleague here at our university.

P.S. Ever since Gilson mentioned the act of being I have had no problem grasping it as an act, pure and simple. It is like watching a man running. There is a man. What is he doing? He is running. He is doing something. Now I see something on a dark knight and I say to myself, " There is something. " What is it? I don’t know. But I do know it exists, its act is to exist. That act is its act of being.. This " something " is engaged in the act of existing. What is it doing? It is existing.

That is a good insight, but there is a difference, however. The act of being cannot be in the same order as the act of running, because it is prior to all of our particular actions (operari). It is even prior to our essence, in the sense that it is act, whereas essence plays the role of potency.

To understand how Aquinas reasons, I recommend another article from my colleague on the Triplex Via: academia.edu/2060689/Resolutio_secundum_rem_the_Dionysian_triplex_via_and_Thomistic_Philosophical_Theology

I mention that, because to get to the act of being, in a way, you have to use the same kind of reasoning you use to get to God: the act of being is like other acts, but it is not the same as acts we are more familiar with, and it is more excellent.

P.P.S. To get to your Master’s thesis one has to " register. " I couldn’t figure out how to do that. Any pointers?

Linus2nd

Yes, I guess you will need to create an account on Academia.edu. You just go to the home page, and log out if necessary. The main screen is the signup screen. You just put in an e-mail address and a password, or else connect through Facebook or Google+.

Otherwise, I could send a private link.

 

[lmelahn]

Good old Metaphysics Gamma 2: I have studied that passage ad nauseam .

While Parmenides says that “being” is homogeneous, Aristotle seems to be ambiguous.

No, I don’t think he is ambiguous at all. He actually explains himself very well: being (to on) does not have a single, one-size-fits-all meaning, but is an analogical term, the same way that “health” can be applied in different ways (healthy food, healthy skin color; all of which can be referred to the healthy man or animal).

So, to on can be applied analogically: sometimes it means substance (which is the primary meaning), other times affectations of substance, qualities of substance, and so on. Aristotle does not get into detail in this passage; he does his real analysis in Book V. Aristotle knows very well that there is not just one substance: that is what he is critiquing Parmenides for.

He says that “There is a science which investigates being as being and the attributes which belong to this in virtue of its own nature” (Metaphysics, Book IV, Part I), as if the “attributes of being” were not being too.

The attributes of being are being (to on legetai pollachos, “being is said in many senses”); it is just that they refer to a principal meaning (substance).

While Parmenides says that “being” is uncreated and indestructible, Aristotle says that the science of “being as being” concerns its first causes and principles, as if those causes and principles were not being too.

Strictly speaking, the causes and principles are not being (to on). The object of his science is to on. However, he is seeking the causes and principles of to on, and so they are strictly speaking not the “object” he is studying. (Just as zoology studies animals; zoologists are interested in the chemical processes that occur in animals because these are causes of animal life and behavior, but it is not their object of study as such.)

The explanation of these ambiguities is that Aristotle acknowledges many senses for the term “be”, but he mentions that all those senses are related to a principal one, which is “substance” (Metaphysics, Book IV, Part II):

OK, but see my explanation above.

Now, it is clear from this text that Aristotle doesn’t believe that the whole reality is only one substance, but that there are many substances; however, in terms of “being as being”, what is the difference between one substance and another?

That is why he needs to investigate the principles of being. That is what accounts for the differences and similarities, as I mentioned in another post.

On the one side, in order for the science of “being as being” to be possible, Aristotle needs that the term “be” possesses unity, but on the other hand he seems to feel as well the need to recognize a plurality of substances.

It is a unity of universality: just as zoology studies animals (and there are many animals), the First Science studies being (and there are many beings).

I think it is very important to notice the point of divergence between Parmenides and Aristotle concerning their notions of “being as being”: It is not clear that such divergence was due to a mistake that Parmenides had made; at least not yet.

We already know that it is attributed to Aristotle the thought of substances as composites of prime matter and form. So, we are close to the notion of “prime matter”. But for the moment, we would need to find out how does Aristotle arrive at the notion of “substance”.

Right, that is basically in Book IX. He also deals with the principles of material substance earlier in the Physics.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

I think it is less clear among different species of animals, but that is the idea. The gradation of being is more obvious between man and sub-human creatures, and between, say, plants and animals.

In reality, we are doing things backwards: we should start with the justification of the substance/accident composition (which furnishes us with the tools to understand act and potency in general), and then move on to the matter/form composition, and only then to the act-of-being/essence composition.
So, let’s look at matter-and-form (which is what we are supposed to be discussing anyhow).

Why does Aristotle think the distinction is so important? Because he needs to explain two phenomena: generation-and-corruption (the conversion of something from one substance to another, as when an animal dies and becomes a cadaver); and the plurality of material things.

(Note how these are aspects of the very same problems first brought up by Heraclitus and Parmenides—plurality and change.)

Probably “substantial change”—generation-and-corruption—is the easier place to start with. When an animal dies, say, there is evidently some type of change that takes place. It is not, however, reducible to a mere accidental change. It is not just that the animal stops breathing; its entire principle of unity disintegrates. All of its organs become a disassociated aggregate, and the body begins to decompose.

Hence, we must conclude that there is some kind of active principle—something that provides unity to what would otherwise be a loosely associated set of organs—that is lost at the moment of the animal’s death.

It is clear that there are different types of changes, and that one of them consists in a process that Aristotle called corruption, during which certain unity is lost. However, if you understand your so called “active principle” as something that in general comes from “outside” matter, I respond that you don’t have set the basis for such conclusion. Based on the fact that an animal is disintegrated when it dyes, we cannot say that it possessed something (a “principle of unity”) that was lost and disintegrated to. Besides, if such principle cannot subsist without the organism, it cannot come to it from outside.

On the other hand, there is actually very little visible change over the animal’s body at the moment of the change. The change is very profound, on one level—for the animal’s unity completely and irreversibly disintegrates—and yet, the cadaver remains without much outward difference in appearance.

So, we surmise that there is an element, or principle, that provides unity and coherence to the animal while it lives; and a distinct principle that is receptive of the first one.

Yes, the existence of such element is a mere supposition. Certainly matter and organization are not the same, but the difference between them does not imply that the organization is associated to a semi-independent element, able to exist before the organism, but unable to subsist “when the body decomposes”.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

The first principle is an “active” one, because it provides unity, definition—indeed, being (esse)—to the animal. The other is “potential,” because it is indefinite; it can receive many active principles (as is evidenced by the substantial change, in which the object in question changes from an animal into a cadaver).

What do you say? Is there a form of the animal, and a form of the cadaver?

Aristotle calls the active principle “substantial form” (“substantial” because it defines the very substance; “form” because he is recalling Plato’s doctrine of Ideas—he is saying, in essence, that the forms are not “out there”*in the Hyperuranion, but in the very substances themselves). He calls the potential principle “prime matter.”

(Note that there is no such thing as matter without form, although there is such a thing as form without matter.)

I understand that for Aristotle, those forms are not “out there” nor before the formation of the organism nor after its corruption.

Similarly, let’s consider two substances that are clearly of the same species: let’s say, two cats. Clearly (as Plato understood correctly in that passage of the Sophist), in one respect they are the same, and a different respect, they are different. In what respects?

It can’t be their accidental differences, because even cats that seem exactly the same in every respect (that never happens in reality, but we can get close, as in identical twins), except for the fact that they are separate substances, would still be different in some way. They would still both be, at a minimum, both concrete and separate from each other.

Before we jump the gun and say that the substantial form is the aspect that is the same, and the prime matter that is different, we must keep in mind that if there is a composition, it would be entirely intrinsic to each substance. Hence each substance has its own substantial form, and each one has its own prime matter.

You mean that two individuals (the cats) are organized very similarly. That is it. Plato’s explanation has been left behind: he used to say that forms are “out there”, but that there is only one form of each kind, so to say; then, the two cats would participate of the same form. But you are not platonic, are you?

What permits the distinction between one cat and the other, however, has to be a principle that, per se, is perfectly indefinite and “potential”—remember it is the only thing preventing two cats, so to speak, from being one and the same. And yet each cat is both definite and separate from the other, so there must be a principle that “actuates” the potency and makes it definite. Those principles are prime matter and substantial form.

Actually, Imelahn, the matter of which the cats are made is not indefinite at all (you know, it is carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen oxygen…). Without that matter, not only the cats would not be the same: they would not be at all!

There is more that can be said, but suffice it to say that Aquinas uses similar reasoning to discover the composition between act of being and essence: there is a diversity that needs to be explained as well as a kind of change. The diversity is that demonstrated by beings that demonstrate a greater or lesser intensity of being (those that produce intellectual acts, for example, as opposed to those that do not), or, say between angels, who do not have any matter whatsoever. And the “change” in studied is that of creation, which is truly ex nihilo—unlike generation and corruption. Even non-material creatures (angels) are created, and so they must receive their being (their act of being) from God.

It does not suffice, Imelahn. You mentioned that it was the concept of “act of being” which allowed you to explain why there are many different species, and you have said also that an “act of being” would be infinite if it not were for the essence which limits it. Accordingly, you would be able to distinguish between two “acts of being” until they were limited by different forms. Therefore, it is not the “act on being” the principle that allows you to explain the diversity of species.

 

[lmelahn]

It is clear that there are different types of changes, and that one of them consists in a process that Aristotle called corruption, during which certain unity is lost. However, if you understand your so called “active principle” as something that in general comes from “outside” matter, I respond that you don’t have set the basis for such conclusion. Based on the fact that an animal is disintegrated when it dyes, we cannot say that it possessed something (a “principle of unity”) that was lost and disintegrated to. Besides, if such principle cannot subsist without the organism, it cannot come to it from outside.

The active principle (the substantial form) is not outside matter, but in composition with it. In fact, there can be no matter at all unless it is informed.

The form “comes from outside” in the sense that the parents of animals (say) generate offspring of the same kind as they themselves are—so in a sense, offspring (of sub-human animals, not men) receive their substantial form from their parents. But the form of an animal is fully material: as you point out correctly, that form—called the “soul” in living things—cannot persist once the matter that sustains it disintegrates (e.g., at death).

When I say the the form is the principle of unity, I mean the following: before the animal’s death, all of its parts were ordered to a single end, which was the good of the organism as a whole. Brain, heart, stomach, and blood vessels all moved with a single purpose. (Not that they always functioned correctly, but the point is, the animal was recognizably one and whole.) After its death, the organs remain, and they may even function to some extent, but they no longer constitute a single organism.

The point to take home is that an animal is more than just an aggregate of organs. It displays what could be termed substantial unity. Whatever it is that holds the animal together like that cannot be exactly identified with its matter (which evidently remains in place even after its death); we must conclude that there is an active principle really distinct from the matter.

Yes, the existence of such element is a mere supposition. Certainly matter and organization are not the same, but the difference between them does not imply that the organization is associated to a semi-independent element, able to exist before the organism, but unable to subsist “when the body decomposes”.

Ah, but the form does not exist before the organism does. It is perfectly concurrent with the organism. What you are calling “organization” is the same thing as the substantial form.

 

[lmelahn]

What do you say? Is there a form of the animal, and a form of the cadaver?

Forms are intrinsic, not extrinsic (as in Plato).

There is certainly the form of an animal, because an animal clearly displays substantial unity.

It is less clear that there is a single substantial form of a cadaver, because that unity has disintegrated. In any event, the cadaver an aggregate of various substances; each substance would have its own substantial form.

I understand that for Aristotle, those forms are not “out there” nor before the formation of the organism nor after its corruption.

That is correct.

When I said that there is form without matter, I was referring to creatures that subsist without any matter at all: i.e., angels. Then there is man, who is sort of in the middle: he is capable of subsisting without matter (that is, when his matter is taken away from him, he does not ease to exist, as animals would), but in that state he is at a severe disadvantage.

You mean that two individuals (the cats) are organized very similarly. That is it. Plato’s explanation has been left behind: he used to say that forms are “out there”, but that there is only one form of each kind, so to say; then, the two cats would participate of the same form. But you are not platonic, are you?

I do not hold that there is a subsistent, separate form of “cat” as Plato did.

But each cat, you say, is organized similarly. Indeed, in some respects, they are not just similar, but exactly the same (otherwise, they could not both be members of the species “cat”).

What accounts for their similar “organization” (which is a type of order—of logos)? Order does not just “appear” without a principle—that principle, we simply call the substantial form.

Actually, Imelahn, the matter of which the cats are made is not indefinite at all (you know, it is carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen oxygen…). Without that matter, not only the cats would not be the same: they would not be at all!

First of all, I completely agree that without their matter, the cats could not exist at all. I hope I have not given the impression that the substantial forms of material creatures are independent of their matter. They are not.

However, carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, and so on are not the cats’ prime matter (the antagonist of their substantial forms). Carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, and the rest, if they were not incorporated into the body of the cat, would be capable of subsisting on their own—hence in that condition, they would also have a substantial form, and their own prime matter. (While incorporated into the cat they retain their substantial forms virtually—i.e., they are ready to take on substantial forms of their own, once they separate from the cat’s bodies, or the cats die or something.)

It does not suffice, Imelahn. You mentioned that it was the concept of “act of being” which allowed you to explain why there are many different species, and you have said also that an “act of being” would be infinite if it not were for the essence which limits it.

So, what I meant was, it is the composition between substance and accident (sometimes called “secondary matter” and “accidental form”) that explains accidental change and accidental plurality.

That composition is insufficient to explain substantial change (generation and corruption) and plurality among substances of the same species. Hence, we conclude that there must be a second composition: that between prime matter and substantial form.

In a similar way, the prime matter / substantial form distinction is insufficient to explain creation (creatio ex nihilo) and the diversity of species, especially since there are creatures (namely, angels) that do not have any matter. What permits the diversity of species is the plurality of essences, which permit a greater or lesser intensity of the act of being.

Accordingly, you would be able to distinguish between two “acts of being” until they were limited by different forms. Therefore, it is not the “act on being” the principle that allows you to explain the diversity of species.

I assume you meant “unable to distinguish.” In reality—just as the form in material creatures does not exist without the matter—the act of being does not exist without its essence.

It is not that there would be indistinct “acts of being” floating around; rather, there be no creation at all unless the Creator co-creates an essence together with its act of being.

Just as prime matter is the “principle of individuation” of members of a species, the essence is the “principle of individuation” of species among each other.

Or look at it this way: in order for there to be many accidents, we need a subject (a subiectum, an underlying potential principle)—the substance (which functions as the “secondary matter” for the accidents).

Likewise, in order for there to be many individuals in a species, there needs to be a subject that can receive many “instances” of that species—the prime matter.

Finally, in order for there to be many species, of diverse ontological degrees, there needs to be a subject that can receive the being (which is present at an intensity that depends on the capacity of that subject)—the essence.

In a similar way, accidental changes all occur in a subject—the substance; generation and corruption is possible because the substantial form of a substance is composed with a subject capable of remaining behind—its prime matter; creation is possible because God can impart being (being as act) on His creatures—the essences—as He creates them.

(The subject in each case is never separate from the act that actuates it; indeed, the act cannot exist independently of its subject.)

 

[JuanFlorencio]

The active principle (the substantial form) is not outside matter, but in composition with it. In fact, there can be no matter at all unless it is informed.

The form “comes from outside” in the sense that the parents of animals (say) generate offspring of the same kind as they themselves are—so in a sense, offspring (of sub-human animals, not men) receive their substantial form from their parents. But the form of an animal is fully material: as you point out correctly, that form—called the “soul” in living things—cannot persist once the matter that sustains it disintegrates (e.g., at death).

When I say the the form is the principle of unity, I mean the following: before the animal’s death, all of its parts were ordered to a single end, which was the good of the organism as a whole. Brain, heart, stomach, and blood vessels all moved with a single purpose. (Not that they always functioned correctly, but the point is, the animal was recognizably one and whole.) After its death, the organs remain, and they may even function to some extent, but they no longer constitute a single organism.

The point to take home is that an animal is more than just an aggregate of organs. It displays what could be termed substantial unity. Whatever it is that holds the animal together like that cannot be exactly identified with its matter (which evidently remains in place even after its death); we must conclude that there is an active principle really distinct from the matter.

Ah, but the form does not exist before the organism does. It is perfectly concurrent with the organism. What you are calling “organization” is the same thing as the substantial form.

I still find your answer ambiguous. On the one side, you say that in the animals the form is fully material; on the other you say we must conclude that it is an active principle really distinct from the matter.

You can consider the way in which an animal is actually generated. It is not its parents who provide its organization. We could even say that they are just instruments in the process of generation: two independent cells coming from the parents integrate an initial complex which gradually becomes more and more like a new entity, and more and more sophisticated as time goes on. The process involves a great amount of interactions between the “becoming entity” and its surroundings, through which it develops new interaction modes and varying organizations as it selectively assimilates part of its surroundings. I have known at least one interpretation of the Aristotelian doctrine of substances in which the “form” is assumed to be already there from the starting point directing the development of the animal. I would say that that is a rather violent interpretation of Aristotle. But on the other hand, it seems that the marvelous development of the animal demands no less than that as an explanation. Henri Bergson proposed his appealing doctrine of the “élan vital”, which greatly differs from the Aristotelian model, but which provides an alternative understanding of the generation processes (very well documented by the way; just as Aristotle used to document his own theories).

 

[JuanFlorencio]

…However, carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, and so on are not the cats’ prime matter (the antagonist of their substantial forms). Carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, and the rest, if they were not incorporated into the body of the cat, would be capable of subsisting on their own—hence in that condition, they would also have a substantial form, and their own prime matter. (While incorporated into the cat they retain their substantial forms virtually—i.e., they are ready to take on substantial forms of their own, once they separate from the cat’s bodies, or the cats die or something.)…

…In a similar way, the prime matter / substantial form distinction is insufficient to explain creation (creatio ex nihilo) and the diversity of species, especially since there are creatures (namely, angels) that do not have any matter. What permits the diversity of species is the plurality of essences, which permit a greater or lesser intensity of the act of being…

…Finally, in order for there to be many species, of diverse ontological degrees, there needs to be a subject that can receive the being (which is present at an intensity that depends on the capacity of that subject)—the essence…

I guess you are now using the term “essence” with a different meaning. You had before stressed that essence should be understood as substance. But if “essence” is “substance” your two assertions

“what permits the diversity of species is the plurality of essences (substances), which permit greater or lesser intensity of the act of being”,

And

“There needs to be a subject that can receive the being (which is present at an intensity that depends on the capacity of that subject) - the essence”

make no sense. Do you realize it?

 

[lmelahn]

I still find your answer ambiguous. On the one side, you say that in the animals the form is fully material; on the other you say we must conclude that it is an active principle really distinct from the matter.

Like most metaphysical term “material” is analogous. I say that the form is “material” in reference to the fact that (in the case of sub-human creatures) the form depends on the matter it is composed with for its very existence.

Properly, the term “material” applies to the substance as a whole.

However, neither the form nor the substance itself can be identified completely with the prime matter.

You can consider the way in which an animal is actually generated. It is not its parents who provide its organization. We could even say that they are just instruments in the process of generation: two independent cells coming from the parents integrate an initial complex which gradually becomes more and more like a new entity, and more and more sophisticated as time goes on. The process involves a great amount of interactions between the “becoming entity” and its surroundings, through which it develops new interaction modes and varying organizations as it selectively assimilates part of its surroundings. I have known at least one interpretation of the Aristotelian doctrine of substances in which the “form” is assumed to be already there from the starting point directing the development of the animal.

The substantial form is certainly there from the moment of conception. Otherwise the animal would not be a member of its species. That is a straightforward reading of Aristotle: every substance has a substantial form.

(I realize that Aristotle knew nothing about ontogenesis, and proposed a theory of progressive animation—he thought that embryonic development entailed several discontinuities—but it doesn’t take away the main point: once the creature begins to be a member of its species, it has the substantial form proper to its species. If we hold to the theory of progressive animation—which I don’t, because I think that modern science has demonstrated that it is untenable—then an embryo would undergo two generations-and-corruptions, not just one: the “seed” of the male would be planted in the female, and it would acquire a vegetative soul, and then only later on an animal soul. So there are two distinct substances, according to this theory: the seed, which grows into the vegetative embryo; and the animal embryo. Hence, the actual generation of the animal is only—in this theory—the very last stage. However, each substance in question would have its substantial form, which would change over to the successive one. Modern embryology convincingly shows that there is, in fact, no such discontinuity in embryonic development, so in fact the animal possesses its substantial form from the moment of conception.)

I would say that that is a rather violent interpretation of Aristotle. But on the other hand, it seems that the marvelous development of the animal demands no less than that as an explanation. Henri Bergson proposed his appealing doctrine of the “élan vital”, which greatly differs from the Aristotelian model, but which provides an alternative understanding of the generation processes (very well documented by the way; just as Aristotle used to document his own theories).

What I find unsatisfying about theories like vitalism is that, although they offer a genuine insight that was lost in late Scholasticism and Modern philosophy, they generally do not explain where the élan vital or similar things come from. They tend to remain on the level of phenomenon, without seeking the foundation (at least not convincingly or thoroughly).

I agree that Aristotle’s hylomorphism—much as I value it—is insufficient for explaining the drive of living things to attain their perfection. That is another reason why Aquinas’ theory of actus essendi (act of being) is important.

 

[lmelahn]

I guess you are now using the term “essence” with a different meaning. You had before stressed that essence should be understood as substance. But if “essence” is “substance” your two assertions

“what permits the diversity of species is the plurality of essences (substances), which permit greater or lesser intensity of the act of being”,

And

“There needs to be a subject that can receive the being (which is present at an intensity that depends on the capacity of that subject) - the essence”

make no sense. Do you realize it?

Essence and substance are basically synonyms, but (as with most metaphysical notions) they are analogical concepts. They can mean slightly different things depending on the context.

Sometimes, “substance” (“essence”) refers to the concrete individual, taken as a whole. This is, if you will, its root or most proper meaning. The term “supposit” or “hypostasis” is used to signify this meaning.

Other times, we need to consider the underlying substrate (or subject) that is actuated by active principles (e.g., the accidents and the act of being). We also call that substrate the “substance” (the term’s etymology in Latin refers to that usage: sub-stare, to underpin or undergird) or “essence.” It is perhaps an unfortunate accident of history that for both meanings we use the same terms, but it is not entirely inappropriate, because the two meanings are intimately related. For this meaning, the term “essence” is often preferred over “substance.” (It certainly is for the essence/being composition.)

Both of my statements had in mind the second meaning of substance/essence: understood as a metaphysical principle, a “substrate” or “subject”:

what permits the diversity of species is the plurality of essences (substances), which permit greater or lesser intensity of the act of being

Naturally, where there are substances in the second sense, there must also be substances in the first sense (supposits).

There needs to be a subject that can receive the being (which is present at an intensity that depends on the capacity of that subject)—the essence

Note that each supposit (individual considered as a whole) possesses its own essence (substance considered as substrate/subject) and its own act of being (which actuates that subject). There is nothing resembling pantheism here.