How does God create "the act of existing" out of nothing?

[Linusthe2nd]

Disputed Questions on Spiritual Creatures, Article 1, para 4 dhspriory.org/thomas/QDdeSpirCreat.htm#4

"…First part omitted… For it is obvious that the first being, which is God, is infinite act, as having in itself the entire fullness. of being, not contracted to any generic or specific nature. Hence its very existence must not be an existence that is, as it were, put into some nature which is not its own existence, because thus it would be limited to that nature. Hence we say that God is His own existence. Now this cannot be said of any other being. For, just as it is impossible to understand that there are many separate whitenesses, but if there were “whiteness” apart from every subject and recipient, there would be but one whiteness,so it is impossible to have a self-subsisting existence unless there is but one. Accordingly, every thing which exists after the first being, because it is not its own have a self-subsisting existence unless there is but one. Accordingly, every thing which exists after the first being, because it is not its own existence, has an existence that is received in something, through which the existence is itself contracted; and thus in any created object the nature of the thing which participates in existence is one thing, and the participated existence itself is another. And because any thing participates in the first act through similitude insofar as it has existence, the participated existence must in each case be related to the nature participating in it, as act is related to potency. Accordingly, in the world of physical objects, matter does not of itself participate in actual existence, but it does participate therein through form; for the form coming upon the matter makes the matter itself actually exist, as the soul does to the body. "

Analysis

1."…For it is obvious that the first being, which is God, is infinite act, as having in itself the entire fullness. of being, not contracted to any generic or specific nature…"

The word " contracted, " means not limited by or to or circumscribed by a generic or specific nature.

2."…Hence its very existence must not be an existence that is, as it were, put into some nature which is not its own existence, because thus it would be limited to that nature. Hence we say that God is His own…"

God’s existence or act of existence cannot be put into the nature of, or shared by any created creature. It cannot be limited to or " contracted " to the nature ( essence, form) of a creature.

1. “…so it is impossible to have a self-subsisting existence unless there is but one…”

This refers to God, it does not mean there cannot be beings which subsist through God’s creative and fecund power. But it does mean that such beings would not be self-subsistent. Their subsistence would depend on the continuous application of God’s creative power ( which is what Thomas and the Church both teach.)

4."…Accordingly, every thing which exists after the first being, because it is not its own existence, has an existence that is received in something, through which the existence is itself contracted …"

Created being receives an act of existence form God as its own and which is not God’s Act of Existence or any part thereof. It is received through their essence or form to which and by which it is limited ( contracted ). Its existence is contracted ( limited ) by its form.

1. “… and thus in any created object the nature of the thing which participates in existence is one thing, and the participated existence itself is another…”

The nature ( essence, form ) has an existence which it has received and which is similar to God’s existence and, because of this similarity to its Creator, it is said to participate in existence. It is also said to participate in existence because each creature has an act of existence to which each beings own existence is similar, differing only in degree or perfection.

But the existence of the created being, though similar to the Existence of God, its Creator, is another existence. That is, it is different from God’s own Existence. The two are not mixed in any ontological way, they are different realities altogether.

In the same way humans can be said to participate in the existence of God because we are created in God’s image, we participate because our intelligence and will and spirit reflect the same Perfections of God, our Creator.

1. “…and the participated existence itself is another…”

The created essence ( nature, form) is distinct from its existence ( but Thomas explains in other places that the two are inseparable, they are unified in one being.

1. “…And because any thing participates in the first act through similitude insofar as it has existence, the participated existence must in each case be related to the nature participating in it, as act is related to potency…”

Created being is thus said to participate in God’s Existence because it reflects, or is similar to the Existence of its Creator. In the same way, a child reflects or is similar to its parents which are the cause of its " coming to be, " but not of its existence, which it gets from God ,and by which it can be said to participate in God’s own Being or Existence.

And the created being is related to its existence as potency to act, because its existence is its very act of to be.

End Part 1

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Disputed Questions on Spiritual Creatures, Article 1, para 4

Part II
dhspriory.org/thomas/QDdeSpirCreat.htm#4

Yet on the other hand if we use the terms “matter” and “form” to mean any two things which are related to each other as potency and act, there is no difficulty in saying (so as to avoid a mere dispute about words) that matter and form exist in spiritual substances. For in a created spiritual substance there must be two elements, one of which is related to the other as potency is to act. This is clear from the following. For it is obvious that the first being, which is God, is infinite act, as having in itself the entire fullness. of being, not contracted to any generic or specific nature. Hence its very existence must not be an existence that is, as it were, put into some nature which is not its own existence, because thus it would be limited to that nature. Hence we say that God is His own existence. Now this cannot be said of any other being. For, just as it is impossible to understand that there are many separate whitenesses, but if there were “whiteness” apart from every subject and recipient, there would be but one whiteness,so it is impossible to have a self-subsisting existence unless there is but one. Accordingly, every thing which exists after the first being, because it is not its own have a self-subsisting existence unless there is but one. Accordingly, every thing which exists after the first being, because it is not its own existence, has an existence that is received in something, through which the existence is itself contracted; and thus in any created object the nature of the thing which participates in existence is one thing, and the participated existence itself is another. And because any thing participates in the first act through similitude insofar as it has existence, the participated existence must in each case be related to the nature participating in it, as act is related to potency. Accordingly, in the world of physical objects, matter does not of itself participate in actual existence, but it does participate therein through form; for the form coming upon the matter makes the matter itself actually exist, as the soul does to the body. "

Analysis Cont.

8."… Accordingly, in the world of physical objects, matter does not of itself participate in actual existence, but it does participate therein through form; for the form coming upon the matter makes the matter itself actually exist, as the soul does to the body… "

Thomas must be speaking of prime matter which he considers as pure potency. It has no actual existence separate from its form through which it receives existence. In actuality the whole being/substance/essence is created all at once as a complete being.

Summary. There is nothing in this paragraph, nor in the entire article which suggests that the act of existence of created beings is the Act of Existence of God. Indeed, just the opposite. And many quotations from Thomas given above have shown that God creates an act of existence for each created being. All one has to do is read them.

Over the spand of three or four threads in this forum the following positions have been proposed as true.

1.That the Esse of God is the only esse.
2.That the esse of creatures is the esse of God
3.That there is no creation ex nihilo.
4.That we exist, ontologically, in the mind of God.
5.that the universe exists, ontologically, in the mind of God

We have shown that none of these positions are tenable

1. That the Esse of God is the only esse was an assumption which was not proven. Whereas we have shown that this could not be the case for a number of reasons. Futher, it is contrary to Catholic Doctrine and the meaning of Scriptures.

2.That the esse of creatures is the esse of God, we have shown by numerous references from Thomas Aquinas to be untrue. Not only that, but this would bring into question many Cathoic Doctrines and is contrary to the clear meaning of Scriptures. Futher, those who proposed this position have not been able to offer any reasonable proof of their position.

3.That there is no creation ex nihilo we have demonstrated to be false from the works of St. Thomas. Futher, such a position would be contrary to Catholic Doctrine and contrary to the clear meaning of the Scriptures.

4.That we exist ontologically in the Mind of God, has been shown to untenable and unsupportable. No solid reasons have been advanced in its support. And of course such a position would be contrary to Catholic Doctrine and to the clear meaning of the Scriptures.

5.That the universe exists ontologically in the Mind of God cannot be held for the same reasons given for denying position #4.

Linus2nd

 

[Aloysium]

I could not have said it better. Precisely (i love your analogy) if God’s esse was like being whiteness itself, then what logical sense does it make to say that other beings have their own distinct whiteness? Its a contradiction.

if Whiteness created whiteness it might

i am no philosopher, so it makes sense to me to say that ideas and analogies struggle to point to the Truth

all i see here is:
God creates the universe
Aquinas explains it
those explanations can be twisted and combined to form illusions

 

[Peter_Plato]

Disputed Questions on Spiritual Creatures, Article 1, para 4 dhspriory.org/thomas/QDdeSpirCreat.htm#4

"…First part omitted… For it is obvious that the first being, which is God, is infinite act, as having in itself the entire fullness. of being, not contracted to any generic or specific nature. Hence its very existence must not be an existence that is, as it were, put into some nature which is not its own existence, because thus it would be limited to that nature. Hence we say that God is His own existence. Now this cannot be said of any other being. For, just as it is impossible to understand that there are many separate whitenesses, but if there were “whiteness” apart from every subject and recipient, there would be but one whiteness,so it is impossible to have a self-subsisting existence unless there is but one. Accordingly, every thing which exists after the first being, because it is not its own have a self-subsisting existence unless there is but one. Accordingly, every thing which exists after the first being, because it is not its own existence, has an existence that is received in something, through which the existence is itself contracted; and thus in any created object the nature of the thing which participates in existence is one thing, and the participated existence itself is another.
Linus2nd

The blue part is an addition/repetition/error. It should simply be:

Accordingly, every thing which exists after the first being, because it is not its own existence, has an existence that is received in something, through which the existence is itself contracted; and thus in any created object the nature of the thing which participates in existence is one thing, and the participated existence itself is another. And because any thing participates in the first act through similitude insofar as it has existence, the participated existence must in each case be related to the nature participating in it, as act is related to potency.

 

[Peter_Plato]

But the existence of the created being, though similar to the Existence of God, its Creator, is another existence. That is, it is different from God’s own Existence. The two are not mixed in any ontological way, they are different realities altogether.

No, the created being is another ens or being, but not another esse or existence. There is only one existence. A being is an entity that participates in existence to a degree made possible by its nature, but that nature does not create another “existence,” since, as Aquinas shows with the whiteness analogy, there can only be one existence, that cannot be distributed or multiplied, it creates “a being” which is a particular participation in existence.

 

[utunumsint]

I am not clear that Aquinas would hold that being can be created because being essentially is God.

Let me take another tack using the passage from De Spiritualibus Creaturis.

1. God as “first being” (having in itself the entire fullness of being) cannot be described as “having being” because God is “Being Itself” or simply “to be,” Pure Act (Actus Purus.) If God has the “entire fullness of being” then in what sense can other beings have being, except “in” that fullness?
2. Aquinas uses the example of whiteness as follows:

What he seems to be doing here is showing that a “transcendent” property such as whiteness that is “one” could not be separated into “whitenesses” that inhere separately in different things but one whiteness that, in a sense, is apart from every subject and recipient.

I think Aquinas is here pointing out a problem with regard to existence or being.

He is demonstrating that if existence (esse) can be used in the same way as “whiteness” there is a problem. We cannot say that existence can be, like whiteness one “property” that can be used to describe existing things, as in, “Trees exist,” “Pianos exist,” and “God also exists.”
The reason we cannot do this is because we have already committed ourselves to a metaphysical claim. We do not claim that God exists in the sense that God has being, we have claimed that God is being itself, existence itself - the fullness of being, complete being in himself.

That would be like claiming, not that God has the property of whiteness, but that God is Whiteness itself. If that were true, then other things could not be “white” without sharing an aspect of God himself. Things could not “be” white, without, likewise, being God.

That is the quandary we find ourselves in when we, Aquinas included, hold that God is ipsum esse subsistens. God is not a being that exists, but rather the fullness of being, Existence Itself. Existence is what God is. He does not have existence, he is existence.

Whiteness, can be predicated of different things because whiteness is transcendent, it is an accidental quality that different things can have without affecting whiteness itself. Whiteness is an ontological accident. However, “being” is not a quality, being is what is, and “to be” means that whatever exists has being or “isness.” If that “isness” is God, then beings have God. There is no way around that.

The quandary that Aquinas is pointing out is that being (self-subsisting existence), unlike whiteness, cannot be one and, at the same time, many. Being cannot be parceled out or distributed in the way that whiteness can be because being is not accidental, it is essential. However, because God is existence itself, being itself, and not merely some other thing that “has being” then being is, in a sense, “reserved” to God.

So, how do we reconcile the fact that other beings “exist” with the fact that God is being itself? Aquinas is attempting to do exactly that in the passage. The question is: "How does he do it without compromising the divine nature, without compromising that existence is one?

Here is the passage again, which I think is crucial to Aquinas’ entire metaphysic and theology:

I think Aquinas is distinguishing between God who is existence in an “active” sense and creation that receives existence by participation or “contracts” it as mediated through form, which is the creative action of God that “forms” creation or gives it substance in the very act of creating.

Continued…

Hey Peter Plato,

I think you make some good points about the initial passage we were talking about, but I don’t think you are addressing the other passages I quoted at all. I can understand your point of view on this topic based on your original quote, but I don’t think you have addressed my quotes I introduced into the discussion. Your point has been mainly (correct me if I am wrong) Aquinas cannot possibly mean what he says in those quotes because it would contradict what he says in my quote. Another possible way of looking at it is that you are interpreting your original quote in a way that Aquinas would see as wrong. (The same possibility applies to me, of course).

But I would like you to address my points more directly, if you have the time. How is it that we can interpret Aquinas’ comments about the distinction between universal and divine esse, and maintain your interpretation of the your original quote?

Going back to your distinction about whiteness, my original counterargument was that there is indeed, only one whiteness being discussed here: subsistent being. My counter claim was that contingent whiteness is not identical to subsistent whiteness.

But setting that aside, maybe you can return to the quotes I was mentioning.

God bless,
Ut

 

[Linusthe2nd]

The blue part is an addition/repetition/error. It should simply be:

Accordingly, every thing which exists after the first being, because it is not its own existence, has an existence that is received in something, through which the existence is itself contracted; and thus in any created object the nature of the thing which participates in existence is one thing, and the participated existence itself is another. And because any thing participates in the first act through similitude insofar as it has existence, the participated existence must in each case be related to the nature participating in it, as act is related to potency.

I got lost on the split screen. It doesn’t change anything.

Linus2nd

 

[shoe]

God is a Spirit and in order for Him to communicate with His human creatures on a personal basis, and His human creatures with Him, God has created human beings as spirit beings: “…there is a spirit in men, and the inspiration of the Almighty giveth understanding” (Job 32:8). In other words, God created mankind and made them individuals by giving each human being his or her own personal spirit. God did not create human beings by giving them a piece of Himself, since God is indivisible. God created human beings in (not of or from) His own image.

 

[Peter_Plato]

To clarify what I wrote in post 598,

Quote:
It just seems eminently plain to me that Aquinas teaches that God, the divine being, causes being, is prior to being, is other than being.

I noticed that you changed this likely because you realized that it would not make sense to say that God creates being because that would be to say that God creates what he himself is.

However, I would hold that created “being” is not a viable concept because that would mean being (existence) is of two kinds and Aquinas would definitely not concur.

By differentiating being from created being we seem to have another quandary. In what sense is created being the same as being? In what way does created being exist? Does it really exist or pseudo-exist? If it exists in some ontologically real way then it must exist apart or distinct from existence because God is, for Aquinas, existence itself. So the question then is, "In what way does created being participate in existence? Does it have a completely “other” kind of existence or does created being participate in real existence in order to be? If “other,” then existence cannot be one and Aquinas wasted his breath and had no reason to write the passage I quoted. If participated, then Aquinas has addressed how created beings can exist in a participatory way in that passage.

I would support an amendment to your statement that went something like this:

It just seems eminently plain to me that Aquinas teaches that God, Divine Being, creates beings, is prior to created beings, is other than created beings, but does not create Being itself, precisely because God qua Being is not created but simply is.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

No, the created being is another ens or being, but not another esse or existence. There is only one existence. A being is an entity that participates in existence to a degree made possible by its nature, but that nature does not create another “existence,” since, as Aquinas shows with the whiteness analogy, there can only be one existence, that cannot be distributed or multiplied, it creates “a being” which is a particular participation in existence.

" For, just as it is impossible to understand that there are many separate whitenesses, but if there were “whiteness” apart from every subject and recipient, there would be but one whiteness,so it is impossible to have a self-subsisting existence unless there is but one."

This is refering to God, who is self-subsistent. Created beings are subsistent but not self-substent. Because their act of existence is created, their subsistence is a dependent subsitence.

4."…Accordingly, every thing which exists after the first being, because it is not its own existence, has an existence that is received in something, through which the existence is itself contracted …"

Created being receives an act of existence form God as its own and which is not God’s Act of Existence or any part thereof. It is received through their essence or form to which and by which it is limited ( contracted ). Its existence is contracted ( limited ) by its form.

Your argument doesn’t hold. How many examples do you need, a dozen? I’m not sure I can find that many.

Your assertion that there is only one Esse is completely unfounded, Thomas does not teach that, you have not proven that. Futher, Catholics cannot hold that view, it is contrary to Catholic Doctrine which teaches that God and His Creatures are two different realities.
---------------------
" .God transcends creation and is present to it

300 God is infinitely greater than all his works: "You have set your glory above the heavens."156 Indeed, God’s “greatness is unsearchable”.157 But because he is the free and sovereign Creator, the first cause of all that exists, God is present to his creatures’ inmost being: "In him we live and move and have our being."158 In the words of St. Augustine, God is “higher than my highest and more inward than my innermost self”.159

God upholds and sustains creation

301 With creation, God does not abandon his creatures to themselves. He not only gives them being and existence, but also, and at every moment, upholds and sustains them in being, enables them to act and brings them to their final end. Recognizing this utter dependence with respect to the Creator is a source of wisdom and freedom, of joy and confidence: " ( CCC, paras 300,301)

Linus2nd

Linus2nd

 

[Linux]

Going back to your distinction about whiteness, my original counterargument was that there is indeed, only one whiteness being discussed here: subsistent being. My counter claim was that contingent whiteness is not identical to subsistent whiteness.

But setting that aside, maybe you can return to the quotes I was mentioning.

God bless,
Ut

I think you are failing to understand the problem. Creation is finite only because its nature is not identical to esse. That’s what determines a natures contingency and finiteness as an actual thing. God is pure being because his esse is identical with his nature and therefore he is eternal as opposed to finite. That fact allows us to call God “self subsistent being”; he is called self subsistent being because his esse is identical with his nature. To speak of a finite esse and then say that it is distinct from subsistent being on that basis, and that therefore there can be many distinct esse, is a fallacy for two reasons…

1. Because in the first place the finiteness of a created being is determined only by the fact that its nature is not identical with esse, and not because its esse is finite. Otherwise there would be no rational reason for Aquinas to introduce the esse and essence distinction if one can simply say that the esse of a frog is finite. I don’t think Aquinas would make such an obvious mistake.
2. Finite or not, esse is esse, the act of existence is the act of existence, and such does not change by calling it finite. Finite or not, whiteness is whiteness and does not change simply by introducing a comparison between a finite whiteness and self subsistent whiteness, because it is still white. Since esse is not a genus, there cannot be different kinds or species of existence. If whiteness was not a genus only one thing could be whiteness since the only difference to white is that which is not white, and the only difference to esse is that which is not esse. Thus it is obviously incoherent to speak of many differentiations of esse. If God is whiteness Itself, how can something distinct from God have its own whiteness? The problem is glaringly obvious.

I don’t think Aquinas would make such an obvious mistake.

Either your interpretation is wrong or both you and Aquinas is wrong. You choose.

In any case Peter Plato has given you another way of interpreting Aquinas that at least salvages the basis of his acclaim as a great philosopher.

I for one applaud Peter Plato.

 

[utunumsint]

I noticed that you changed this likely because you realized that it would not make sense to say that God creates being because that would be to say that God creates what he himself is.

However, I would hold that created “being” is not a viable concept because that would mean being (existence) is of two kinds and Aquinas would definitely not concur.

Well that is just the problem. Aquinas seems to be doing that very thing in his distinction between universal esse and divine esse. If you can explain to me what he means in these passages, then maybe I could accept what you are saying.

By differentiating being from created being we seem to have another quandary. In what sense is created being the same as being? In what way does created being exist? Does it really exist or pseudo-exist? If it exists in some ontologically real way then it must exist apart or distinct from existence because God is, for Aquinas, existence itself.

One way he clearly distinguishes esse is by measure: aviternal and temporal. As far as I understand him, only God is, properly speaking, eternal.

So the question then is, "In what way does created being participate in existence? Does it have a completely “other” kind of existence or does created being participate in real existence in order to be? If “other,” then existence cannot be one and Aquinas wasted his breath and had no reason to write the passage I quoted. If participated, then Aquinas has addressed how created beings can exist in a participatory way in that passage.

I’m not claiming to be an expert in Aquinas, but he does seem to be saying there are two kinds of existences: God’s existence and created existence. You can’t just claim he doesn’t say this because it doesn’t fit in with your interpretation of the original passage. You can, if you want, claim that he is being inconsistent. You can, if you want to spend the time, investigate the passages that myself, Prodigalson2011, and Linus have been providing you, and show us how we have not understood them properly. That would help your case.

I would support an amendment to your statement that went something like this:

It just seems eminently plain to me that Aquinas teaches that God, Divine Being, creates beings, is prior to created beings, is other than created beings, but does not create Being itself, precisely because God qua Being is not created but simply is.

I would say then that this would mean we either are God, or are not really created in his image, because we do not have our own proper esse. I can’t accept either alternative.

On another note, I’m wondering what you kind of influence you have apart from Aquinas. He is one theologian among many, perhaps you are more Augustinian, or someone more contemporary? I am new to Aquinas myself.

God bless,
Ut

 

[utunumsint]

I think you are failing to understand the problem. Creation is finite only because its nature is not identical to esse. That’s what determines a natures contingency and finiteness as an actual thing. God is pure being because his esse is identical with his nature and therefore he is eternal as opposed to finite. That fact allows us to call God “self subsistent being”; he is called self subsistent being because his esse is identical with his nature. To speak of a finite esse and then say that it is distinct from subsistent being on that basis, and that therefore there can be many distinct esse, is a fallacy for two reasons…

1. Because in the first place the finiteness of a created being is determined only by the fact that its nature is not identical with esse, and not because its esse is finite. Otherwise there would be no rational reason for Aquinas to introduce the esse and essence distinction if one can simply say that the esse of a frog is finite. I don’t think Aquinas would make such an obvious mistake.
2. Finite or not, esse is esse, the act of existing is the act of existing, and such does not change by calling it finite. Finite or not, whiteness is whiteness and does not change simply by introducing a comparison between a finite whiteness and self subsistent whiteness, because it is still white. Since esse is not a genus, there cannot be different kinds or species of existence. If whiteness was not a genus only one thing could be whiteness since the only difference to white is that which is not white, and the only difference to esse is that which is not esse. Thus it is obviously incoherent to speak of many differentiations of esse. If God is whiteness Itself, how can something distinct from God have its own whiteness? The problem is glaringly obvious.

I don’t think Aquinas would make such an obvious mistake.

Either your interpretation is wrong or both you and Aquinas is wrong. You choose.

In any case Peter Plato has given you another way of interpreting Aquinas that at least salvages the basis of his acclaim as a great philosopher.

I for one applaud Peter Plato.

Understood. Then can you address the points that Aquinas made that I provided in my quotes and show me how, either I am interpreting Aquinas wrong, or he is wrong. Both you and Peter Plato seem to be ignoring the counter evidence that Linus, ProdigalSon2011, and myself have been providing. For my part, I would like a clear response to post 623, 624, and 625. Or just 623 if you have time for only one.

God bless,
It

God bless,
Ut

 

[Linux]

Understood. Then can you address the points that Aquinas made that I provided in my quotes and show me how, either I am interpreting Aquinas wrong, or he is wrong. Both you and Peter Plato seem to be ignoring the counter evidence that Linus, ProdigalSon2011, and myself have been providing. For my part, I would like a clear response to post 623, 624, and 625. Or just 623 if you have time for only one.

God bless,
It

God bless,
Ut

It has been addressed, and there is no counter evidence. You, linus, and prodigalson, are simply taking the distinction between Gods being and the being of creation as presented in these quotes at face value, and interpreting them as literally saying that God creates a distinct finite esse which is simultaneously created with and conjoined to an essence. But once you realise why God is called a self subsistent being as opposed to a finite contingent being (which is clearly presented through the esse and essence distinction) and the fact that the act of existence is not a genus, it becomes irrecoverably impossible to interpret Aquinas as saying that God creates finite esse unless he contradicting himself.

Notice Aquinas speaks of the “esse and essence distinction” and not the “self subsistent esse and finite esse distinction”. That is something that you guys have made up in your heads as it is not found in the mouth of Aquinas.

 

[utunumsint]

It has been addressed, and there is no counter evidence.

I must have missed where you did this. I have only seen you assert your interpretation again and again as the only possible way of understanding Aquinas.

You, linus, and prodigalson, are simply taking the distinction between Gods being and the being of creation as presented in these quotes at face value,

As opposed to what???

and interpreting them as literally saying that God creates a distinct finite esse which is simultaneously created with and conjoined to an essence. But once you realise why God is called a self subsistent being as opposed to a finite contingent being (which is clearly presented through the esse and essence distinction) and the fact that the act of existence is not a genus, it becomes irrecoverably impossible to interpret Aquinas as saying that God creates finite esse unless he contradicting himself.

Or, there is more to it than that, and you now have your blinders on with regard to anything else presented to you.

Notice Aquinas speaks of the “esse and essence distinction” and not the “self subsistent esse and finite esse distinction”. That is something that you guys have made up in your heads as it is not found in the mouth of Aquinas.

Please just look at my post 623. What is the difference between divine esse and universal esse. Please go through it line by line.

God bless,
Ut

 

[Peter_Plato]

Please just look at my post 623. What is the difference between divine esse and universal esse. Please go through it line by line.

God bless,
Ut

I am in the process of reading through the entire body of DE POTENTIA DEI to try to put your quoted sections in perspective. Unfortunately, I also have a busy evening tonight and tomorrow. I will get back to you because your concerns are legitimate ones and I see a need to reconcile the text to my position or concede to yours.

Thanks for your patience.

PP

 

[utunumsint]

Peter Plato and Linux, here is another quote that reinforces my understanding:

This error is set aside by the teaching of Holy Scripture, which confesses God lofty and high (Isa. vi, 1), and that He is above all (Rom. ix, 5). For if He is the being of all, then He is something of all, not above all. The supporters of this error are also cast out by the same sentence which casts out idolaters, who gave the incommunicable name of God to stocks and stones (Wisd. xiv, 8, 21). For if God were the being of all, it would not be more truly said, A stone is a being,' than A stone is God.’

What has led men into this error is a piece of faulty reasoning. For, seeing that what is common to many is specialised and individualised by addition, they reckoned that the divine being, to which no addition is made, was not any individual being, but was the general being of all things: failing to observe that what is common or universal cannot really exist without addition, but merely is viewed by the mind without addition. Animal' cannot be without rational’ or irrational' as a differentia, although it may be thought of without these differentias. [61] Moreover, though the universal be thought of without addition, yet not without susceptibility of addition. Animal’ would not be a genus if no differentia could be added to it; and so of other generic names. But the divine being is without addition, not only in thought, but also in rerum natura; and not only without addition, but without even susceptibility of addition. Hence from this very fact, that He neither receives nor can receive addition, we may rather conclude that God is not being in general, but individual being: for by this very fact His being is distinguished from all other beings, that nothing can be added to it. (Chap. [24]XXIV).

Again, universal esse and divine esse. One can be added to, the other cannot!

How am I getting this wrong?

God bless,
Ut

 

[Linusthe2nd]

From small errors in Philosophy arise positions contrary to Faith.

In spite of the fact that I have shown numerous times that Thomas teaches that God creates existence, that it is the effect of His causal power, some still argue that this is wrong. So let’s begin there once again. From S.T. Part 1, Ques 45, art 5 we have the following:

" I answer that, It sufficiently appears at the first glance, according to what precedes (1), that to create can be the action of God alone. For the more universal effects must be reduced to the more universal and prior causes. Now among all effects the most universal is being itself: and hence it must be the proper effect of the first and most universal cause, and that is God. Hence also it is said (De Causis prop., iii) that “neither intelligence nor the soul gives us being, except inasmuch as it works by divine operation.” Now to produce being absolutely, not as this or that being, belongs to creation. Hence it is manifest that creation is the proper act of God alone.

It happens…( second para omitted as not pertinent to this discussion…

( Third para shortend to eliminate on pertinent material…Now the proper effect of God creating is what is presupposed to all other effects, and that is absolute being…( omitted to end)

Comment: From the above we see that Thomas teaches that universal existence ( esse absolute) is the effect produced by God’s creative act. That which is the effect of God’s creative act cannot be God Himself, that is nonsensical, it is a violation of the principle of non-contradiction. It should also be noted that Thomas is not talking here about " ens " or " entis, " ( a being ), he is talking about esse, he intentionally uses esse where he could just as well have used ens, had he had " a being " in mind. He had in mind existence itself, and that is the way the Blackfriars translation of the S.T. translates it.

It can only be concluded that Thomas is saying that creatures have their own existence, given to them in creation. Furthermore, had Thomas had anything so earth shattering in mind as to propose that the Act of Existence of God was the act of existence of created being, don’t you think he would have made that absolutely clear? And if the Church was aware of this and believed it to be the Truth, don’t you think the Church would have Defined the fact in one of her solemn Definitions. Neither is the case, therefore Thomas never taught such nonsense and the Church never has either. After nearly 900 years of study you would have thought someone would have uncovered this astounding fact. The truth is that Thomas never taught it and the Church would have rejected it had he done so.

And again, in S.T, Part 1, Ques 45, art 4 we have:

" I answer that, To be created is, in a manner, to be made, as was shown above (44, 2, ad 2,3). Now, to be made is directed to the being of a thing. Hence to be made and to be created properly belong to whatever being belongs; which, indeed, belongs properly to subsisting things, whether they are simple things, as in the case of separate substances, or composite, as in the case of material substances. For being belongs to that which has being–that is, to what subsists in its own being. But forms and accidents and the like are called beings, not as if they themselves were, but because something is by them; as whiteness is called a being, inasmuch as its subject is white by it. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vii, text 2) accident is more properly said to be “of a being” than “a being.” Therefore, as accidents and forms and the like non-subsisting things are to be said to co-exist rather than to exist, so they ought to be called rather “concreated” than “created” things; whereas, properly speaking, created things are subsisting beings.

Once again, note that it is existence per se that is the thrust point of creation. Note also that " being belongs to that which has being ( existence)." Once again we see Thomas saying that it is existence, which is being created. So, as far as Thomas is concerned there can be no doubt. For him there is the Existence of God and there is the existence of creatures. The former is the Creator, the latter is an effect of God’s creative act and is a separate act altogether. Each is distinct from the other. All other questions must take these facts into account. They cannot be parsed away to make room for some foreign ideology.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Putting another error to rest. Creatures can subsist but not on their own.

One or more of our posters has said only God is self-substent. And that creatures cannot subsist. The first sentence is correct, the second is incorrect. The poster failed, even after being advised otherwise, to acknolwledge the fact that there is a difference between the self-subsistence of God and the dependent subsistence of creatures.

I could give many examples but this one will suffice. In S.T., Part 1, Ques 45, art 4 we find:

" I answer that, To be created is, in a manner, to be made, as was shown above (44, 2, ad 2,3). Now, to be made is directed to the being of a thing. Hence to be made and to be created properly belong to whatever being belongs; which, indeed, belongs properly to subsisting things, whether they are simple things, as in the case of separate substances, or composite, as in the case of material substances. For being belongs to that which has being–that is, to what subsists in its own being. But forms and accidents and the like are called beings, not as if they themselves were, but because something is by them; as whiteness is called a being, inasmuch as its subject is white by it. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vii, text 2) accident is more properly said to be “of a being” than “a being.” Therefore, as accidents and forms and the like non-subsisting things are to be said to co-exist rather than to exist, so they ought to be called rather “concreated” than “created” things; whereas, properly speaking, created things are subsisting beings.

The answer is so clear that it hardly needs explanation. Created creatures subsist, but their subsistence is obviously a dependent subsistence as opposed to God’s self-substence. I hope this clears up this misunderstanding.

Linus2nd

 

[prodigalson2011]

Assertion. First of all Aquinas has never said anything like that,

Do you mean to claim that have read the entirety of Aquinas’ corpus? Forgive me if I doubt that. Sorry, but actually, yes, he did say something like that.

secondly whether or not Aquinas thinks this is true is besides the point since it cannot be concluded metaphysically.

I beg to differ.

By saying that esse cannot exist without essence is to reduce esse from the level of that which actually gives actuality to that which is mere potency;

Nothing exists which does not have nature and existence. Even God has a nature, as was pointed out previously. Both esse and essence are principles of anything that exists, including God. Only in the case of God, his essence is identical to his existence.

and also you subordinate esse to the essences which contradicts the fact that esse is that which perfects potency; which makes no real objective sense of perfection if it is not already an act in and of its self. Potency cannot perfect anything, which leaves only God as that which perfects potency.

This does not prevent God from creating things that exist separately from Him. “An agent effects its like.” God effects existence. But without God, who is the Ipsum esse subsistens, no other existence is possible.

Secondly your reasoning clearly results in denying a real objective distinction between esse and essence in creatures because if esse cannot exist without essence then esse is not a thing in and of itself and therefore not truly distinct from an essence, just like the three sides of a triangle is not truly distinct from the essence of a triangle. It makes the whole concept of esse being conjoined to potency objectively meaningless since esse isn’t actually a thing but merely an categorical abstraction describing one object in two senses.

No, it is not. A single created thing contains esse and essence simultaneously in the moment of its creation. There is no true subordination of one to the other. They are interdependent. An act of existence is meaningless without some nature that exists by it. To deny this is absurd.

The fact is only natures exist,

No, only beings exist, which are composites of esse (act of existence) and essence (nature). A being is not simply a nature.

and thus esse is either a nature in and of itself (which can only describe God - self-subsistent being) or it is nothing at all - it is a meaningless concept.

On the contrary, there must be something whose nature is existence in order for there to be acts of existence outside of that nature. Ipsum esse subsistens causes other things to exist.

Since we can see in creatures that actuality is a real distinct thing that is not intrinsic to the essense of that which is in act, we must therefore say that the act of existence is a nature in and of itself and is therefore identical to the concept of a self-subsistent being.

We must therefore say that there exists something whose existence is its essence. In other words, something which is perfect existence and thus capable of effecting its likeness. As fire effects fire, God effects existence.

Thus Ipsum esse subsistens is that which is conjoined to created essences since the essence of creation cannot exist otherwise and neither can potency be meaningfully perfected in act.

The essence of creation exists because Ipsum esse subsistens effects existence upon its creation, not because it conjoins it to Himself. You are effectively denying the creative power of God.

If we assume that esse and Ipsum esse subsistens are two distinct things, then a dilemma does surely arise since it is either Ipsum esse subsistens that perfects potency or it is esse that perfects potency.

There is no dilemma. Ipsum esse subsistens effects created esse which perfects the potency of created things. It is a case of primary and secondary causation, wherein all effects trace their ultimate origin to the first cause: Ipsum esse subsistens.

It cannot coherently be both. As i said, your interpretation of esse leaves it functionally useless and objectively meaningless.

Actually, as I just explained, it can. Created esse serves the function of giving things their own existence. But it derives its own power to actualize from the first cause. God is still the ultimate cause of all actualization.

I know you will continue, but your continuation is not based on metaphysical logic; and i doubt it is based on a genuine correct interpretation of Aquinas.

Why do you feel the need to belittle everyone who disagrees with you? Admitted, this was tame compared to some of your other remarks, but given your consistently derogatory behavior I have to ask: can’t you talk to someone who holds a different opinion without implying that they are idiots?

As for whether my argument is not in line with a genuine Thomistic understanding: tell that to the volumes of references I, Linus and ut have provided you (and which you continually ignore) which make explicit reference to created esse. Particularly this one: "the esse of a thing is through creation."