How does God create "the act of existing" out of nothing?

[utunumsint]

Originally Posted by Linux View Post
From Aquinas’s disputed questions On the Power of God:

“What I call being, esse, is the most perfect of all: and this is apparent because the act is always more perfect than the potency. For a certain form is not understood to be in act unless it is said to be. For humanity or fieriness can be considered either as latent in the potentiality of matter or in the power of an agent, or even just in the mind; but by having esse, it actually comes to exist. From which it is clear that what I call esse is the actuality of all acts, and therefore the perfection of all perfections. And to what I call esse nothing can be added that is more formal, which determines it, in the way that the act determines the potency: for esse, taken in this manner, differs essentially from something to which an addition can be made by way of determining.[14]”

:

The perfection of all perfections is clearly God; and is not being spoken of in reference to some fantasy finite esse.

I don’t think Aquinas would contradict himself. Do you? Therefore Linus has a flawed interpretation, and because God has a sense of humor i am correct.

“For God is the judge. One he putteth down, and another he lifteth up:”

FIrst, you need to understand the objection that Aquinas is responding to in order to understand the context of his response:

1. That which is most imperfect should not be ascribed to God who is most perfect. Now existence is most imperfect like primal matter: for just as primal matter may be determined by any form, so being, inasmuch as it is most imperfect, may be determinated by all the proper predicaments. Therefore as primal matter is not in God, so neither should existence be an attribute of the divine substance.

Aquinas is responding to the objection that the created being should not be ascribed to God because created being seems to be pure potentiality, which would seem to totally contradict God as perfect. Remember, for Aquinas, all we know comes from what we know of the world we live in. We move from knowledge of the world, to knowledge of God. So he need to find a way to defend his move of ascribing to God, the concept of created esse. He is most certainly not identifying Gods esse with created esse because in his response to objection 6, he has clearly distinguished between the divine esse and the created esse of all created beings. He is defending his move to ascribe created being itself as the only appropriate and fitting way of describing Gods essence based on the principle that every cause must also contain its effect eminently - you cannot give what you do not have.

God bless,
Ut

 

[utunumsint]

Besides, you can`t interpret Te Velde in the sense you think since he would be clearly contradicting what he had already said on the matter, which prodigalson2011 quoted in post 549:

If you can find it in a nearby university library, the book “Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas” by Rudi Te Velde is particularly helpful in getting a handle on this particular issue. (You can check here: worldcat.org/title/partic…oclc/185936700)

An excerpt:

Quote:
To say of the divine being that it is tantum esse may give rise to misunderstandings… First, when we say that God is his being itself (ipsummet suum esse), we do not intend to deny an essence in God, so Thomas explains. Although there is no definable (and thus finite) essence in God, he still has a fully determinate essence, namely an essence which consists in pure esse. Another misunderstanding would be to conclude from the expression ‘tantum esse’ that the divine being is the same as “universal being” (esse universale) by which every thing formally is a being. This universal esse is something indeterminate and common, and acquires in each different being a different determination in virtue of the essence. So the danger here is that we take the expression ‘tantum esse’ to mean ‘being without essence,’ pure being that is free of any determinate content. But, Thomas argues, God’s being is fully determined in itself; it is not because his being is received in a distinct essence but by its very purity that the divine being is distinct from all other instances of being… … The designation of God’s being as tantum esse is therefore qualified and explained by the formula ‘bonitas pura’ taken from Liber de causes, ‘pure’ denotes God’s simplicity and ‘goodness’ refers to the fullness and determinate character of God’s being…

And later:

Quote:
Thomas concludes his treatment of God’s simplicity with an article in which he explicitly excludes the identification of the simple God with the simplicity of prime matter or that of common being (esse commune). God’s simplicity is not such that he enters into a composition with others; He cannot be a part of a whole, for in that case he would not be simpliciter prima in entibus.

Altogether, this expounds, in much greater clarity and detail, one of the main points I have been driving: God cannot be a part of something else. It’s a violation of the divine nature. I do intend to reply directly to your last couple of posts, and in fact am currently in the process of doing so, but I wanted to bring this up in the interim.

God bless,
Ut

 

[Linux]

It’s called confirmation bias.

This is just assertion.

This is nothing but sophistry

This two is just an assertion.

In other words, God’s being is God’s being, period. It is not the being of anything else.

No other essence is identical to its act, this is true, but it doesn’t follow from the definition of determinate that God is not the esse of all essences. You haven’t shown that your conclusion does follow.

This statement alone clearly demonstrates you still do not understand what Thomas means by participation.

This is just an assertion asserting superiority.

This particular passage does not, but several others I have cited have.

A superficial reading with no concern for the different senses in which the word being is used and the underlying metaphysical principles upon which the words are based will admittedly yield the results which you represent, and it will also yield to contradictions such as the idea that form ontologically causes actuality, which basically the same as saying that potency causes act.

And “every other commentator I read”…

A red-herring and therefore a fallacious opinion which has no relevance to whether or not my essential argument is correct.

Already you show your ignorance of the subject.

No, actually my argument conclusive and irrefutable without doing damage to the idea of esse (actuality)."

Apart from form, esse is neither actual or distinct.

An assertion. And one that certainly has never been employed by Aquinas. You speak of esse and essence as if it is merely an abstract categorical distinction, which does not make sense of Aquinas at all. Esse logically has to exist first in-order to actualize that which is only potential; otherwise potency cannot be actualized, and even after esse is conjoined to essence, esse remains objectively distinct. It is incoherent for God to create an esse that is not intrinsically the act of existence, it is meaningless and a contradiction in terms,** since the thing is not the act of existence and thus not an esse and therefore not that which makes potency actual**. Therefore the idea of God creating a distinct esse is an impotent concept simply because a finite esse has no meaningful function. It is just as much a potency as essence, which contradicts the fact that God conjoins esse to “potency” in-order to actualize it.

Surely a learned Thomist such a yourself could have seen that for yourself.

Essence does not become objectively the same thing as esse in creatures, otherwise essence would be identical and therefore would be eternal. If they are merely abstract principles describing an actual thing in different respects, then we are not truly talking about a real composite of esse and essence. The fact that esse is a distinct thing in itself is made evident by the fact that there are many distinct essences that are actual. The only esse that exists in and of itself is God since his essence is esse. Esse cannot exist as distinct from essence unless it is its own nature (God). It is meaningless to speak of an esse that is not synonymously an essence (identical). Esse can only be distinct from created essences that are not intrinsically esse.

you are fallaciously conflating transcendent actions and realities with temporal ones.

A red herring and a straw-man.

An esse never exists apart from an essence. They are two principles within one creative act.

That is meaningless and contradictory. You have it the wrong way round; it is essence that cannot exist without esse and certainly cannot be actualized by esse if it is not real and distinct. In you interpretation esse is dependent on a distinct essence for its existence, which is clearly wrong. If esse is that which is necessary in-order to actualize potency then it must necessarily exist before that which is actualized from potency.

It is an important point, but it doesn’t weigh in your favor.

If esse and essence is not objectively distinct when conjoined, then they are objectively identical; which contradicts the very reason that the esse and essence distinction was formed.

Its called the real distinction between esse and essence, not the pure conceptual distinction.

The esse and essence distinction was formed to show why God is objectively pure actuality and creatures are not. Creatures are not pure actuality because they are not objectively identical with esse. hence essences can come in and out of existence.

You are creating a false conundrum by reifying a metaphysical expression.

It is you that is reifying metaphysical expressions to save your faith from what you mistakenly concluded to be pantheism.

The conjunction is an intrinsic principle of the creation.

God creates by conjoining actuality (existence) with potency. This fact i have proven sufficiently. Only your paranoia is standing in the way of accepting it.

 

[utunumsint]

To clarify what I wrote in post 598,

It just seems eminently plain to me that Aquinas teaches that God, the divine being, causes being, is prior to being, is other than being.

What I meant was "It just seems eminently plain to me that Aquinas teaches that God, the divine being, causes created being, is prior to created being, is other than created being. "

God bless,
Ut

 

[Peter_Plato]

This is my attempt to respond to your post 550.

The first thing I want to note here is that the existence received in a thing is contracted. i.e. changed. And basically, it is changed by the form it actualizes. So I don’t think we can read that last sentence to be a split between our essence and God’s esse. Because as he mentions in S.C.G I chapter 26, the the forms that make up all of created reality would be basically contracting God’s esse. He is using the word contract in verb form, so it mean to reduce, in size, number, or range,…

Perhaps because Aquinas uses contracted twice in the same passage further compounds the problem. Your reading of the meaning of “contract” as “change” as in reduce in number, size, etc. is not the only one possible in both instances.

For it is obvious that the first being, which is God, is infinite act, as having in itself the entire fullness of being, [Instance 1]not contracted to any generic or specific nature. Hence its very existence must not be an existence that is, as it were, put into some nature which is not its own existence, because thus it would be limited to that nature. Hence we say that God is His own existence. Now this cannot be said of any other being. For, just as it is impossible to understand that there are many separate whitenesses, but if there were “whiteness” apart from every subject and recipient, there would be but one whiteness, so it is impossible to have a self-subsisting existence unless there is but one. Accordingly, every thing which exists after the first being, because it is not its own existence, has an existence that is received in something, [Instance 2] through which the existence is itself contracted; and thus in any created object the nature of the thing which participates in existence is one thing, and the participated existence itself is another. And because any thing participates in the first act through similitude insofar as it has existence, the participated existence must in each case be related to the nature participating in it, as act is related to potency. Accordingly, in the world of physical objects, matter does not of itself participate in actual existence, but it does participate therein through form; for the form coming upon the matter makes the matter itself actually exist, as the soul does to the body.
From: De Spiritualibus Creaturis - Article 1, Answer Paragraph 4

Instance 1
In the first use of “contracted,” I would argue that Aquinas means in the sense of limiting because he is speaking of God’s “fullness of being” which leads into the use of contracted. Also, he is arguing that God’s existence cannot be “put into” any created being precisely because that would “limit” existence to the nature of that being. He adds “…because thus it would be limited to that nature.” This is pretty clear.

Instance 2

This seems, on first reading, to be simply a repetition of the same use of contracted as in Instance 1, but that is not necessarily so. He prefaces this use with two important observations:

1. “…it is impossible to have a self-subsisting existence unless there is but one.”
2. “Accordingly, every thing which exists after the first being, because it is not its own existence has an existence that is received in something.”

Those two phrases indicate that perhaps Aquinas had a different meaning of the term “contracted” in mind here. In this case it could be that he meant “contracted” in the sense of “mediated” or “the means by which something is transferred or conferred.” In this sense a disease might be “contracted” or transmitted from one entity to another.

If the entire sentence is read with this meaning of “contracted” in mind, the sense of what Aquinas writes is completely changed.

Accordingly, every thing which exists after the first being, because it is not its own existence, has an existence that is received in something through which the existence is itself contracted; and thus in any created object the nature of the thing which participates in existence is one thing, and the participated existence itself is another…

Thus, existence of created things is received through “something” *, which distinguishes existence itself (God) from the mediated or participated existence (subsistent ens) of the created object. This contracted “something” through which participation in existence occurs is the degree of separation that does not “contract” or limit existence itself to the nature of the thing created.

Thus the difficulty exposed by Aquinas in Instance 1, is resolved by him in Instance 2. Existence is mediated or contracted to the creature by the nature or essence of the thing (form) which allows participation (as caused effect) in existence without endowing existence itself on the being, which would be problematic, according to Aquinas, because in that case, existence would be “limited” by the nature of each created thing, which is not only impossible but contradicts the ipsum esse subsistens of God.

If each being had actual existence, which belongs properly only to God, then the identity of existence and nature in God would be compromised, since existence would be limited by the nature of each act of created “existence.” Existence would, then, not be simple, but multiplied and complex.

In this sense, I would argue, that created beings “subsist” or, in a manner of speaking, “contract” their being (subsist) through their created “act of being” mediated in the essential nature of each created thing. They participate in existence as “acts” of existence, but cannot have existence as distinct or separated from God’s existence.*

 

[Peter_Plato]

One more point on the above.

If Aquinas is using the word “contracted” to mean changed or limited in both instances, then he seems to be contradicting himself because he is holding that existence cannot be limited in the first instance, and then saying that it IS limited in the existence of created things in the second.

 

[utunumsint]

Perhaps because Aquinas uses contracted twice in the same passage further compounds the problem. Your reading of the meaning of “contract” as “change” as in reduce in number, size, etc. is not the only one possible in both instances.

Instance 1
In the first use of “contracted,” I would argue that Aquinas means in the sense of limiting because he is speaking of God’s “fullness of being” which leads into the use of contracted. Also, he is arguing that God’s existence cannot be “put into” any created being precisely because that would “limit” existence to the nature of that being. He adds “…because thus it would be limited to that nature.” This is pretty clear.

Instance 2

This seems, on first reading, to be simply a repetition of the same use of contracted as in Instance 1, but that is not necessarily so. He prefaces this use with two important observations:

1. “…it is impossible to have a self-subsisting existence unless there is but one.”
2. “Accordingly, every thing which exists after the first being, because it is not its own existence has an existence that is received in something.”

Those two phrases indicate that perhaps Aquinas had a different meaning of the term “contracted” in mind here. In this case it could be that he meant “contracted” in the sense of “mediated” or “the means by which something is transferred or conferred.” In this sense a disease might be “contracted” or transmitted from one entity to another.

If the entire sentence is read with this meaning of “contracted” in mind, the sense of what Aquinas writes is completely changed.

Accordingly, every thing which exists after the first being, because it is not its own existence, has an existence that is received in something through which the existence is itself contracted; and thus in any created object the nature of the thing which participates in existence is one thing, and the participated existence itself is another…

Thus, existence of created things is received through “something” *, which distinguishes existence itself (God) from the mediated or participated existence (subsistent ens) of the created object. This contracted “something” through which participation in existence occurs is the degree of separation that does not “contract” or limit existence itself to the nature of the thing created.

Thus the difficulty exposed by Aquinas in Instance 1, is resolved by him in Instance 2. Existence is mediated or contracted to the creature by the nature or essence of the thing (form) which allows participation (as caused effect) in existence without endowing existence itself on the being, which would be problematic, according to Aquinas, because in that case, existence would be “limited” by the nature of each created thing, which is not only impossible but contradicts the ipsum esse subsistens of God.

If each being had actual existence, which belongs properly only to God, then the identity of existence and nature in God would be compromised, since existence would be limited by the nature of each act of created “existence.” Existence would, then, not be simple, but multiplied and complex.

In this sense, I would argue, that created beings “subsist” or, in a manner of speaking, “contract” their being (subsist) through their created “act of being” mediated in the essential nature of each created thing. They participate in existence as “acts” of existence, but cannot have existence as distinct or separated from God’s existence.*

Hi Peter Plato,

These are good points, and I’m going to take a while to think about them. I want to see how this interpretation square with my previous posts today. Specifically 596 and on. Any help you can provide would also be welcome.

Thanks for taking the time to respond.

God bless,
Ut

 

[Peter_Plato]

Hi Peter Plato,

These are good points, and I’m going to take a while to think about them. I want to see how this interpretation square with my previous posts today. Specifically 596 and on. Any help you can provide would also be welcome.

Thanks for taking the time to respond.

God bless,
Ut

It is a pleasure trading ideas with you! Looking forward to more great insights.

 

[Peter_Plato]

Hi Peter Plato,

These are good points, and I’m going to take a while to think about them. I want to see how this interpretation square with my previous posts today. Specifically 596 and on. Any help you can provide would also be welcome.

Thanks for taking the time to respond.

God bless,
Ut

It comes to mind that the word “contracted” is actually a translation. It would be interesting to go back to Aquinas’ original wording to see if there is a difference in the two meanings intended by him. You do have some familiarity with Latin, no? Finding a version of the original would be helpful.

 

[utunumsint]

It comes to mind that the word “contracted” is actually a translation. It would be interesting to go back to Aquinas’ original wording to see if there is a difference in the two meanings intended by him. You do have some familiarity with Latin, no? Finding a version of the original would be helpful.

I did that. It is contraho in each case.

**Manifestum est enim quod primum ens, quod Deus est, est actus infinitus, utpote habens in se totam essendi plenitudinem, non contractam **ad aliquam naturam generis vel speciei. Unde oportet quod ipsum esse eius non sit esse quasi inditum alicui naturae quae non sit suum esse; quia sic finiretur ad illam naturam. Unde dicimus, quod Deus est ipsum suum esse. Hoc autem non potest dici de aliquo alio: sicut enim impossibile est intelligere quod sint plures albedines separatae; sed si esset albedo separata ab omni subiecto et recipiente, esset una tantum; ita impossibile est quod sit ipsum esse subsistens nisi unum tantum. Omne igitur quod est post primum ens, cum non sit suum esse, habet esse in aliquo receptum, per quod ipsum esse contrahitur; et sic in quolibet creato aliud est natura rei quae participat esse, et aliud ipsum esse participatum. Et cum quaelibet res participet per assimilationem primum actum in quantum habet esse, necesse est quod esse participatum in unoquoque comparetur ad naturam participantem ipsum, sicut actus ad potentiam. In natura igitur rerum corporearum materia non per se participat ipsum esse, sed per formam; forma enim adveniens materiae facit ipsam esse actu, sicut anima corpori. Unde in rebus compositis est considerare duplicem actum, et duplicem potentiam. Nam primo quidem materia est ut potentia respectu formae, et forma est actus eius; et iterum natura constituta ex materia et forma, est ut potentia respectu ipsius esse, in quantum est susceptiva eius. Remoto igitur fundamento materiae, si remaneat aliqua forma determinatae naturae per se subsistens, non in materia, adhuc comparabitur ad suum esse ut potentia ad actum: non dico autem ut potentiam separabilem ab actu, sed quam semper suus actus comitetur. Et hoc modo natura spiritualis substantiae, quae non est composita ex materia et forma, est ut potentia respectu sui esse; et sic in substantia spirituali est compositio potentiae et actus, et per consequens formae et materiae; si tamen omnis potentia nominetur materia et omnis actus nominetur forma. Sed tamen hoc non est proprie dictum secundum communem usum nominum.

My collins GEM dictionary has the following meanings for contraho:

to draw together
to assemble,
to bring about
to achieve
to contract or make a bargain,
to shorten, narrow
to limit, to depress,
to incure (i.e. blame)
to wrinkle
to shorten (i.e. a sail)
to overcast (i.e. the sky)

God bless,
Ut

 

[Peter_Plato]

I did that. It is contraho in each case.

My collins GEM dictionary has the following meanings for contraho:

to draw together
to assemble,
to bring about
to achieve
to contract or make a bargain,
to shorten, narrow
to limit, to depress,
to incure (i.e. blame)
to wrinkle
to shorten (i.e. a sail)
to overcast (i.e. the sky)

God bless,
Ut

Yikes!

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Prodigalson equivocates between what it means for God to be and for you to be

The “to be” of God is identical, the to be of you is to participle in “to-be”, but to-be is not the identity of your essence; You are not esse.

You essence has an act, that is to say it has an expression as it is actual; but it is not actuality.

I think you should take that up with ProdigalSon, I’m too tired to think right now and he is perfectly capable. I will say that your last two sentences seem a little confusing.

Linus2nd

 

[utunumsint]

Here is the translation with the latin line by line.

Manifestum est enim quod primum ens, quod Deus est,
For it is obvious that the first being, which is God,

est actus infinitus,
is infinite act,

utpote habens in se totam essendi plenitudinem,
as having in itself the entire fullness of being,

non contractam ad aliquam naturam generis vel speciei.
[Instance 1]not contracted to any generic or specific nature.

Accordingly, every thing which exists after the first being,
Omne igitur quod est post primum ens,

because it is not its own existence,
cum non sit suum esse,

has an existence that is received in something,
habet esse in aliquo receptum,

per quod ipsum esse contrahitur;
[Instance 2] through which the existence is itself contracted;

et sic in quolibet creato aliud est natura rei quae participat esse,
and thus in any created object the nature of the thing which participates in existence is one thing,

et aliud ipsum esse participatum.
and the participated existence itself is another.

God bless,
Ut

 

[prodigalson2011]

Perhaps because Aquinas uses contracted twice in the same passage further compounds the problem. Your reading of the meaning of “contract” as “change” as in reduce in number, size, etc. is not the only one possible in both instances.

Instance 1
In the first use of “contracted,” I would argue that Aquinas means in the sense of limiting because he is speaking of God’s “fullness of being” which leads into the use of contracted. Also, he is arguing that God’s existence cannot be “put into” any created being precisely because that would “limit” existence to the nature of that being. He adds “…because thus it would be limited to that nature.” This is pretty clear.

Instance 2

This seems, on first reading, to be simply a repetition of the same use of contracted as in Instance 1, but that is not necessarily so. He prefaces this use with two important observations:

1. “…it is impossible to have a self-subsisting existence unless there is but one.”
2. “Accordingly, every thing which exists after the first being, because it is not its own existence has an existence that is received in something.”

Those two phrases indicate that perhaps Aquinas had a different meaning of the term “contracted” in mind here. In this case it could be that he meant “contracted” in the sense of “mediated” or “the means by which something is transferred or conferred.” In this sense a disease might be “contracted” or transmitted from one entity to another.

If the entire sentence is read with this meaning of “contracted” in mind, the sense of what Aquinas writes is completely changed.

Accordingly, every thing which exists after the first being, because it is not its own existence, has an existence that is received in something through which the existence is itself contracted; and thus in any created object the nature of the thing which participates in existence is one thing, and the participated existence itself is another…

Thus, existence of created things is received through “something” *, which distinguishes existence itself (God) from the mediated or participated existence (subsistent ens) of the created object. This contracted “something” through which participation in existence occurs is the degree of separation that does not “contract” or limit existence itself to the nature of the thing created.

Thus the difficulty exposed by Aquinas in Instance 1, is resolved by him in Instance 2. Existence is mediated or contracted to the creature by the nature or essence of the thing (form) which allows participation (as caused effect) in existence without endowing existence itself on the being, which would be problematic, according to Aquinas, because in that case, existence would be “limited” by the nature of each created thing, which is not only impossible but contradicts the ipsum esse subsistens of God.

If each being had actual existence, which belongs properly only to God, then the identity of existence and nature in God would be compromised, since existence would be limited by the nature of each act of created “existence.” Existence would, then, not be simple, but multiplied and complex.

In this sense, I would argue, that created beings “subsist” or, in a manner of speaking, “contract” their being (subsist) through their created “act of being” mediated in the essential nature of each created thing. They participate in existence as “acts” of existence, but cannot have existence as distinct or separated from God’s existence.*

Excellent post!

I think you’re really onto something here, but I would like to make a few observations. Specifically, I would like to emphasize another part of the passage in question:

For it is obvious that the first being, which is God, is infinite act, as having in itself the entire fullness of being, [Instance 1]not contracted to any generic or specific nature. Hence its very existence must not be an existence that is, as it were, put into some nature which is not its own existence, because thus it would be limited to that nature. Hence we say that God is His own existence. Now this cannot be said of any other being. For, just as it is impossible to understand that there are many separate whitenesses, but if there were “whiteness” apart from every subject and recipient, there would be but one whiteness, so it is impossible to have a self-subsisting existence unless there is but one. Accordingly, every thing which exists after the first being, because it is not its own existence, has an existence that is received in something, [Instance 2] through which the existence is itself contracted; and thus in any created object the nature of the thing which participates in existence is one thing, and the participated existence itself is another. And because any thing participates in the first act through similitude insofar as it has existence, the participated existence must in each case be related to the nature participating in it, as act is related to potency.

 

[prodigalson2011]

Prodigalson equivocates between what it means for God to be and for you to be

The “to be” of God is identical, the to be of you is to participle in “to-be”, but to-be is not the identity of your essence; You are not esse.

You essence has an act, that is to say it has an expression as it is actual; but it is not actuality.

This was a grammatical mistake on my part. I should have said "the to-be of God is God’s; you is yours; it is not mine.

And, yes, the essence does have an act, and that is called its esse! As Aquinas says, esse is to essence as act is to potency.

 

[Linux]

One more point on the above.

If Aquinas is using the word “contracted” to mean changed or limited in both instances, then he seems to be contradicting himself because he is holding that existence cannot be limited in the first instance, and then saying that it IS limited in the existence of created things in the second.

 

[utunumsint]

Accordingly, every thing which exists after the first being, because it is not its own existence, has an existence that is received in something through which the existence is itself contracted; and thus in any created object the nature of the thing which participates in existence is one thing, and the participated existence itself is another…

Thus, existence of created things is received through “something” , which distinguishes existence itself (God) from the mediated or participated existence (subsistent ens) of the created object. This contracted “something” through which participation in existence occurs is the degree of separation that does not “contract” or limit existence itself to the nature of the thing created.

Just a quick question Peter Plato. Based on your interpretation the passages above? You are basically saying that Thomas is repeating himself in these two instance?

has an existence that is received in something,
habet esse in aliquo receptum,

per quod ipsum esse contrahitur;
[Instance 2] through which the existence is itself contracted;

Am I getting your meaning right? So that “received in something” = “existence is itself contracted”?

God bless,
Ut

 

[Linux]

This was a grammatical mistake on my part. I should have said "the to-be of God is God’s; you is yours; it is not mine.

And, yes, the essence does have an act, and that is called its esse! As Aquinas says, esse is to essence as act is to potency.

There are two kinds of act, that which is the expression of what a thing is as it is actual, and then there is the fact that a thing is. They are to different expressions; they are both referred to as an act, but the former only “exists” analogously since its essence is not the fact that it is something. That which is an expression of a things actual nature is only analogously real in so far as it is preserved in actuality, but in-order for that to be coherent and objective it must be the case that actuality is a separate thing in itself since an essence by itself has no actuality in and of itself even when it is actual. If actuality was intrinsic to it instead of a separate distinct and objective thing, actuality would be identical to it, and therefore it would be impossible that it could begin or cease to be actual, since actuality is what it is by nature.

 

[prodigalson2011]

This is just assertion.

I would call it an analyis.

This two is just an assertion.

Again, it’s analysis. To show that it is not simply assertion I will bring forth the analysis that led me to the conclusion. Here is what you said:

when it speaks of the being of creatures it is not speaking of esse in a distinct sense, but rather he is speaking of creatures as they are actual.

That, in my estimation, is completely evasive doublespeak. “Speaking of creatures as they are actual” means speaking of creatures as they are real. That which exists in something else is, at best, accidental, so there is no point in speaking of actual creatures that don’t have their own esse. You simply say the same thing in different ways and try to say they are not the same thing, whether you realize it or not.

No other essence is identical to its act, this is true, but it doesn’t follow from the definition of determinate that God is not the esse of all essences. You haven’t shown that your conclusion does follow.

It is practically self-evident. God’s being (esse) is God. It cannot be, in any formal sense, the being of things that are not God.

This is just an assertion asserting superiority.

No, it is an opinion based on the fact that the Thomistic definition of “participation” has been given to you multiple times on this thread and you continue to use it in a context that does not correspond to that defintion.

A superficial reading with no concern for the different senses in which the word being is used and the underlying metaphysical principles upon which the words are based will admittedly yield the results which you represent, and it will also yield to contradictions such as the idea that form ontologically causes actuality, which basically the same as saying that potency causes act.

I am well aware of the different senses in which “being” is used. And my interpretation does not lead to any such contradiction. God is the cause of all creation, which includes both form and actuality.

A red-herring and therefore a fallacious opinion which has no relevance to whether or not my essential argument is correct.

It was not intended to be a part of the argument, so it is not a red herring. It was a personal aside, and a rather mean-spirited one, at that, so my apologies.

No, actually my argument conclusive and irrefutable without doing damage to the idea of esse (actuality)."

Word to the wise: only a fool thinks his ideas are conclusive and irrefutable, Linux.

An assertion. And one that certainly has never been employed by Aquinas.

Actually, yes, it has.

You speak of esse and essence as if it is merely an abstract categorical distinction, which does not make sense of Aquinas at all. Esse logically has to exist first in-order to actualize that which is only potential; otherwise potency cannot be actualized, and even after esse is conjoined to essence, esse remains objectively distinct.

GOD logically has to exist first in order to actualize what is only potential. God is self-subsisting Esse with the power of creation. The esse and essence of created things remains distinct because they are two separate principles of the created being.

It is incoherent for God to create an esse that is not intrinsically the act of existence, it is meaningless and a contradiction in terms,** since the thing is not the act of existence and thus not an esse and therefore not that which makes potency actual**. Therefore the idea of God creating a distinct esse is an impotent concept simply because a finite esse has no meaningful function. It is just as much a potency as essence, which contradicts the fact that God conjoins esse to “potency” in-order to actualize it.

An esse is intrinsically an act of existence. But it is not self-subsisting existence. That is why Aquinas calls God “Ipsum esse subsistens” and not just “esse.” If there is to be any other “esse”, then there must be an “Ipsum esse subsistens” as the necessary condition and cause of such.

Surely a learned Thomist such a yourself could have seen that for yourself.

I have never called myself a learned Thomist.

Essence does not become objectively the same thing as esse in creatures, otherwise essence would be identical and therefore would be eternal.

I never said it did.

If they are merely abstract principles describing an actual thing in different respects, then we are not truly talking about a real composite of esse and essence.

I did not say that that esse was an abstract principle, I said it was an operative principle. Abstractions have no operative power.

 

[prodigalson2011]

The fact that esse is a distinct thing in itself is made evident by the fact that there are many distinct essences that are actual. The only esse that exists in and of itself is God since his essence is esse.

Agreed thus far.

Esse cannot exist as distinct from essence unless it is its own nature (God). It is meaningless to speak of an esse that is not synonymously an essence (identical).

Not so. Esse cannot exist without being joined to some nature. It need not be synonymous with that nature. It does need, as its foundation and origin, the “Ipsum esse subsistens” that is God. God creates things, from nothing, with both of these principles simultaneously.

A red herring and a straw-man.

It is not a red herring or a straw man: you continously couch God’s creative act in, not only temporal language (which is necessary to a degree), but a temporal context.

That is meaningless and contradictory. You have it the wrong way round; it is essence that cannot exist without esse and certainly cannot be actualized by esse if it is not real and distinct. In you interpretation esse is dependent on a distinct essence for its existence, which is clearly wrong. If esse is that which is necessary in-order to actualize potency then it must necessarily exist before that which is actualized from potency.

The two are inextricably bound up. Neither can exist without the other. I have already answered this seeming dilemma: God, as Ipsum esse subsistens, is a sufficient condition and cause of creation, which means being forth new composites of esse and essence in whole.

If esse and essence is not objectively distinct when conjoined, then they are objectively identical; which contradicts the very reason that the esse and essence distinction was formed.

I never said otherwise.

Its called the real distinction between esse and essence, not the pure conceptual distinction.

I never said it was. When I say that they are not distinct in temporal actuality, I mean that you cannot remove one from the other without destroying both.

The esse and essence distinction was formed to show why God is objectively pure actuality and creatures are not. Creatures are not pure actuality because they are not objectively identical with esse. hence essences can come in and out of existence.

I never said otherwise.

It is you that is reifying metaphysical expressions to save your faith from what you mistakenly concluded to be pantheism.

Show me where I have reified one concept.

God creates by conjoining actuality (existence) with potency. This fact i have proven sufficiently. Only your paranoia is standing in the way of accepting it.

Linux, where do you get the idea that I am paranoid, afraid, threatened or anything of the sort by your argument? Do you really think your intellect is that intimidating? I assure you, at no point during this conversation have I felt my faith was threatened.

As I have continually argued, and will continue to do so, the act of Creation is not a conjunctive act. It is performed ex nihilo. The conjunction of esse and essence is present in the creation, it is not an act prior to creation.