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prodigalson2011
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A creature is an existing substance, therefore it is not identical to its essence. However, it is only a contingently existing substance, therefore neither is it identical to its existence. It is identical only to what it actually is.A creatures essence is its intrinsic identity and esse is not.
Yet another case of very sloppy logic. Intellectual substances, such as angels or man’s rational soul, are immaterial, and thus it is impossible that matter could the principle of differentiation for those things. Moreover, even in things that are individuated by matter, the matter which individuates them accrues to their being, not their essence. Indeed, as Aquinas says in his “Quaestiones Disputatae De Anima” (Article I):Men can be different because the essence of man is not identical to existence and its principle of differentiation is matter. Thus there can be actual differentiation of the same nature. Esse actualizes natures. Differentiation in turn occurs because of the inherent principles involved in the nature of that which is being created. As far as i can tell you have a flawed understanding of how a universal is differentiated among many substances since you seem to think that esse as distinct from God is the principle of differentiation.
The act of existing (esse) and individuation (individuatio) of a thing are always found together. For universals do not exist in reality inasmuch as they are universals, but only inasmuch as they are individuated.
As for immaterial things, if not by matter, then by what are they individuated? In “De Unitate” (Chapter V) he writes:
Separate substances, therefore, are individual and singular, but they are individuated not by matter but by this: that it is not their nature to exist in another and consequently to be participated in by many.
Let’s stop right here. For here we have it: immaterial things are individuated by their individual existence. This is why Aquinas says, in the same Article of “…De Anima” previously cited, that the rational soul “has a complete act of existing of its own.”
Now, from the previous statement, Aquinas concludes:
*From which it follows that if any form is of a nature to be participated in by something, such that it be the act of some matter, it can be individuated and multiplied by comparison with matter. *
This, by extension, affirms the impossibility of God’s being the esse of created things. That which is an act unto itself (God) cannot be the act of something else. Similarly, each individual intellect must have (though not be) its own act of existence, or else it could have no being, or will, of its own.
Yes, it does. That which is actual is in act. So if the essence of man is identical with actual man, it must include that act.Also it does not follow logically that if the essence of man is identical with that which is actually man that therefore essence is identical with esse.
Do you realize you just supported my argument? Precisely because being actual is not intrinsic to the essence of a thing, the essence of man is not identical to actual man. The actual man has actuality, the essence does not. Therefore, they are not identical.That would only follow if being actual was an intrinsic expression of a things nature,
You’re right. And that’s why the essence of a man is not identical to an actual man.but what sense then does it make for that nature to begin or cease to exist. It makes no sense.
He is immortal, born in the Highlands of Scotland 400 years ago. He is not alone. There are others like him: some good, some evil. For centuries he has battled the forces of darkness with holy ground his only refuge. He cannot die unless you take his head, and with it his power. In the end there can be only one. He is Duncan MacLeod–the Highlander.Esse is God’s essence, and so there can be only one.
But seriously, though. I’m not sure exactly what you’re saying here. Your wording is ambiguous. If it is that there can be only one thing in which essence and existence are identical, then I agree. If you are saying that there can only be one esse, then it amounts to nothing but a baseless assertion.
Acts, in a general sense, can always be multiplied, provided that there is something receptive of such an act. But once it is received into some determinate form, it has been individuated. So, for instance, when one billiard ball strikes another and sets it into motion, the act of rolling has been multiplied, in general, but individuated in a particular thing, i.e. the act of rolling of one ball is not the act of rolling of the other.
Just so, God’s act of existing is His own, and that of His creations is the immediate effect of His activity. For God, who can do anything possible, anything which does not entail a logical contradiction is receptive of His activity. Thus, he may impart unto anything which is not a logical impossibility an act of existing.
In any case, the point to which this was addressed was that nothing is identical to its essence except God, as there is no distinction in Him whatsoever.