How does God create "the act of existing" out of nothing?

[prodigalson2011]

No it does not; it means creating something from nothing, and thus no materials.

That is exactly what I said.

 

[prodigalson2011]

No it does not; it means creating something from nothing, and thus no materials.

That is exactly what I said, in different words.

And it’s completely at odds with your argument that “every change is creation ex nihilo,” seeing as the very word change implies something already existing in one state moving to another state.

Alright. This time I’m done, seriously.

 

[Linux]

Natures do not behave; things behave according to their natures. They behave by virtue of their existence. As I said to Peter Plato:

Things are actual natures; otherwise what are they?

You say that things move by virtue of their intrinsic existence which does not make sense of the act and potency distinction, it is also just something you made up.

God does not actualize all potentials, otherwise creation would not have, as the Catechism says, “the dignity of acting on its own.” There is no meaningful freedom if creation plays no active (actualizing) part in its unfolding. God actualizes everything that exists, but he does not actualize every passive power (potency) contained in those things. That is left to secondary causes. That is precisely where the freedom of creation, and consequently, freedom of the will, enters in.

I don’t understand why you think that a thing cannot act according to its nature while being powered by something external to its nature in order to do so. In any case, more power cannot come from less or nothing (non-power), and God’s power cannot be distinct from himself. Its really irrelevant what problems you might have understanding freewill because the alternative is metaphysically impossible which has been made evident.

It makes no sense to speak of anything “behaving” in any way unless it its own power to act. And it can only act if it has its own act.

That is not true and it is not hard to see why.

A creature’s power does not come from nothing;

I agree.

it comes from the same place its existence does: God.

I agree

And, yes, it can be distinct from God,

No it can’t as that would mean God has done the Metaphysically impossible feat of getting power from non-power, more from less/nothing. Nothing is the antithesis of power.

because God has infinite creative power.

Saying that a being has infinite creative power does not make it evident that God can produce power from the absence of reality. You haven’t showed any logical connection between the two concepts at all. You are just asserting it just like much of everything else you have written so far on this thread.

God creates secondary powers, because he can create whatever he wants.

God can do something because you say he can. Great logical argument:thumbsup:

There is power in that which is in act. Every act is a kind of power, pure and simple. A power may be active (act) or passive (potency).

That is simply a misunderstanding and an assertion on you part. First of all Potency is not a real power; in and of itself it is nothing at all in reference to actuality. Everything that has an act is not an “intrinsic power”; that is to say that its power to act is not something generated from its own nature, but is instead something received just like its actuality. Its activity is completely contingent upon the power of God.

Why?

More cannot ontologically come from less.

Even then, by your argument, God still has to treat “nothing” as a distinct object which he then conjoins to Himself. So your argument makes no more sense out of things. But as I have already said:

God conjoins his actuality with the abstract conception of that which is only potential, the idea of a thing. The abstract conception itself is a simultaneous manifestation of his self knowledge.

God’s act of existing is His own, and that of His creations is the immediate effect of His activity.

That is meaningless, since more reality cannot come from less.

For God, who can do anything possible, anything which does not entail a logical contradiction is receptive of His activity.

Creating esse from the antithesis of esse is a contradiction. Esse is not a genus

An act cannot be a passive power, for “passive power” is just another term for “potency”.

Or it can just mean something receptive.

The act of existing

of a creature must be actualized by God; so long as God sustains the existence of that creature.

How can it be the act of existence if it requires God to keep it in existence? Your words just don’t add up. Like I said this finite esse you speak of is impotent and pointless. You are not really talking about the act of existence. It is your own meaningless invention.

 

[Linux]

That is exactly what I said, in different words.

And it’s completely at odds with your argument that “every change is creation ex nihilo,” seeing as the very word change implies something already existing in one state moving to another state.

No it isn’t at odds with what I am saying, since change is the actualisation of some potential state or thing, and that state or thing was nothing before it was actual. The fact that this actualisation occurs in sequence with preceding natures or events does not change the fact that it is creation ex nihilo, a manifestation of that which was non-existent.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

For Catholics, other Christians, Jews, and Muslims

It is Defined Catholic Dogma that God created, in time, all creatures out of nothing ( with no parsing of the word " nothing. " It means from no prior existing matter of any kind, including the " near nothing " states proposed by some " wild eyed," popular cosmologists of the day.

So Catholics must believe that God and His creatures are absolutely other than each other. God is no part of His creatures and they are no part of Him. God and His creatures are absolutely distinct, but His creatures are absolutely dependent upon Him for their existence, and they prosper by His Providence and Government…

It is Defined Catholic Dogma that the essential nature of God is that He is One and Simple. Other attributes are also defined but are not essential to this debate.

There is nothing in Catholic teaching about God’s " Esse, " or His " Act of Existence. " These are philosophical terms and no Catholic is bound to accept them. These same terms have been applied to creatures as well. And we are not bound to acknowledge their validity. However it would be foolish to deny their validity in either case, if they are correctly applied. And that is just where the problem lays.

It is interesting that the O.P. useses the term " act of exisiting " and asks us to prove how God could create the " act of exiting " out of nothing. This term was originated by Thomas Aquinas in the 13th century and showed that God ( the Pure Subsisting Act of Exising ) created the entire universe of creatures ex nihilo, absolutely. And when He did so, He created entire substances, including their " act of existing. " That this is the correct interpretation has been shown in my post # 17. Thomas Aquinas showed in the S.T. Part 1that God is the First Cause of all creatures. In Part 1, he also shows that God created all creatures out of nothing.

Now to demand a blow by blow account as to just how God pulled off these stupendous miracles is asking us to examine the mind of God and that is just spurious in the extreme. All the best minds the world has ever known can do is demonstrate that this is a necessary conclusion. That is, because God exists, we exist.

The O.P. has put forward a number of propositions which cannot be held by Catholics.

1. God cannot create an " act of existing " which is not His Own Act of Existing
2. God cannot create an " act of existing " ex nihilo.
3. We exist, ontologically, in the mind of God.
4. The universe exists, ontologicallly, in the mind of God.
5. God’s " Act of Existing " is the " act of existing " of creatures.
6. God is the only Esse
7. There are no created esses that are separate and distinct from God’s own Esse.
   8, That God creates Essences by sharing with them His Own Esse
8. To excape the odium of an heresy akin to Pantheism because of point # 8, he says that Essence is distinct from Esse. And so God’s Esse is not a part of the created Essence. He fails to see that this has left him in the realm of Prue Ideas, that the world is nothing but a collection of Forms without real substance, a world of non-being, because for a being to exist, it must have its own Esse. But under his philosophy, this is impossible.

• It is possible that I have overlooked other errors.

** It should be noted that Thomas Aquinas teaches that essence and esse are distinct, yet esse is the most important principle of a substance, it is most interior to it and is that whereby an essence becomes a being or substance. It composes with the form and the matter, if any, to make one substance, one being.

*** St Thomas, contrary to what the O.P. says, teaches that God creates entire substances in His act of creation, and the first of His created effect, interior to the substance, is the substance’s very own act of existence,, which is limited by the form or nature of each particualr substance. And further, Thomas teaches that we must hold on Faith, that God has created the universe ex nihilo in time.

He futher teaches that God, though operating most intimately in His creation. is absolutely transcendent to it and does not mix with it in any ontological way. This is also the teaching of the Church.

**** All the arguments against his positions have been given by myself, Utunumsint, Hicetnunc, and Prodigal Son, and Polytropos earlier in this thread. You can read them for yoursef, they are St. Thomas’ own arguments.

Linus2nd

 

[Linux]

The O.P. has put forward a number of propositions which cannot be held by Catholics.

1. God cannot create an " act of existing " which is not His Own Act of Existing
2. God cannot create an " act of existing " ex nihilo.
3. We exist, ontologically, in the mind of God.
4. The universe exists, ontologicallly, in the mind of God.
5. God’s " Act of Existing " is the " act of existing " of creatures.
6. God is the only Esse
7. There are no created esses that are separate and distinct from God’s own Esse.
   8, That God creates Essences by sharing with them His Own Esse
8. To excape the odium of an heresy akin to Pantheism because of point # 8, he says that Essence is distinct from Esse. And so God’s Esse is not a part of the created Essence. He fails to see that this has left him in the realm of Prue Ideas, that the world is nothing but a collection of Forms without real substance, a world of non-being, because for a being to exist, it must have its own Esse. But under his philosophy, this is impossible.

It is your interpretation that my views are contrary to the faith, based on your faulty interpretation of the faith and its relationship with metaphysics. And once again you have resorted to demonising your opponents in order to create a situation where people blindly dismiss my argument for fear of heresy. Just another red herring, its contents of which have not been proven to be the case. You have not successfully proven my argument to be contrary to the faith or false, and it is not a secret that Thomas Aquinas was himself accused of holding views contrary to the faith for supporting Aristotle, by people like you.

All my arguments are back up by logic and metaphysical principles. You can all address the necessary logical conclusions of my arguments and either accept them or reject them. Its up to you. But, to the readers, what you should not do is reject them because somebody (a stranger) who is not the Pope accused me heresy.

 

[Linux]

To the readers of this debate. Whether my arguments are in line with Aquinas or not has no relevance whatsoever with whether or not my argument is correct. Linus claims that his interpretation is in line or even identical with Aquinas, but I would look very carefully at the full body of Aquinas’ work and tell me where you find it explicitly said…

1. That esse and essence in creatures are co-contingent or interdependent or each-other for both their actuality as distinct.
2. Tell me where esse is describe as merely a principle that is not a real thing in itself, and that this non-actual thing, which is not even potency itself, brings potency to act.
3. Tell me where you find Aquinas saying that creatures positively bring potency/nothing to act by their own distinct power, as opposed to God’s power which is mediated by contingent beings?
4. Tell me where Aquinas says that more can come from less.
5. Tell me where Aquinas says that created substances are identical with their actuality?
6. And tell me where Aquinas makes a distinction between actuality and esse?

And I will show you an Aquinas that is not the same Thomas who wrote the Summa theologica.

All these things are their own made up interpretation developed in the attempt to counter my argument. And they all lead to metaphysical irrevocable contradictions.

 

[Linux]

It is your interpretation that my views are contrary to the faith, based on your faulty interpretation of the faith and its relationship with metaphysics. And once again you have resorted to demonising your opponents in order to create a situation where people blindly dismiss my argument for fear of heresy. Just another red herring, its contents of which have not been proven to be the case. You have not successfully proven my argument to be contrary to the faith or false, and it is not a secret that Thomas Aquinas was himself accused of holding views contrary to the faith for supporting Aristotle, by people like you.

All my arguments are backed up by logic and metaphysical principles. You can all address the necessary logical conclusions of my arguments and either accept them or reject them. Its up to you. But, to the readers, what you should not do is reject them because somebody (a stranger) who is not the Pope accused me heresy.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

To the readers of this debate. Whether my arguments are in line with Aquinas or not has no relevance whatsoever with whether or not my argument is correct. Linus claims that his interpretation is in line or even identical with Aquinas, but I would look very carefully at the full body of Aquinas’ work and tell me where you find it explicitly said…

1. That esse and essence in creatures are co-contingent or interdependent or each-other for both their actuality as distinct.
2. Tell me where esse is describe as merely a principle that is not a real thing in itself, and that this non-actual thing, which is not even potency itself, brings potency to act.
3. Tell me where you find Aquinas saying that creatures positively bring potency/nothing to act by their own distinct power, as opposed to God’s power which is mediated by contingent beings?
4. Tell me where Aquinas says that more can come from less.
5. Tell me where Aquinas says that created substances are identical with their actuality?
6. And tell me where Aquinas makes a distinction between actuality and esse?

And I will show you an Aquinas that is not the same Thomas who wrote the Summa theologica.

All these things are their own made up interpretation developed in the attempt to counter my argument. And they all lead to metaphysical irrevocable contradictions.

Apparantly you didn’t read the arguments given yourself. They are all there in this thread, all you or anyone else has to do is go back and read them.

I did not accuse you of heresy, I said your positions were heretical.

Linus2nd

 

[Linux]

Apparently you didn’t read the arguments given yourself.

I have read them and i found both yours and prodigalsons arguments wanting.

They are all there in this thread, all you or anyone else has to do is go back and read them.

As-long as the readers of this thread scrutinise my arguments without unwarranted prejudice or bias (just as a true philosopher does) and not according to your claims of heresy, that is perfectly fine.

I did not accuse you of heresy, I said your positions were heretical.

Linus2nd

What’s the difference? Not only did you fail to prove my argument is heretical (since you are just begging the question and building straw-men by drawing superficial comparisons to other arguments and ignoring any explanation to the contrary) you have also shown weakness in your ability do philosophy by using scare tactics and fearmongering to blind readers to any potential validity my argument has.

Not only that, you continuously patronise and treat your readers as if they have no capacity to think for themselves, placing yourselves as infallible interpretors of Aquinas and appointing yourselves with the power of the inquisition.

Whereas not only have i attempted to show you a different way of reading Aquinas, i have actually been defending my own position (whether it agrees with Aquinas or not) with logical arguments instead of just arguments from authority. If your philosophical argument (including your interpretation of Aquinas) alone was as successful at defeating my argument as you claim it to be you would not have to resort to those kinds of tactics which have no place in this debate.

We are not doing theology here.

 

[Linux]

In the words of Aquinas, *“Nothing is assigned to a genus by reason of its act of being but by reason of its essence; and this is clear from the fact that the act of being of a thing is proper to that thing and distinct from the act being of anything else” (De Potentia, question 7, article 3, corpus). *

Thus when he is speaking of the act of being of a thing, he is not cannot be talking “esse” literally, but rather the essence as an actual thing analogously, since he clearly states that nothing is divided into genus by “act”, but rather by essence.

Unless he is contradicting himself of course.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

In the words of Aquinas, “Nothing is assigned to a genus by reason of its act of being but by reason of its essence; and this is clear from the fact that the act of being of a thing is proper to that thing and distinct from the act being of anything else” (De Potentia, question 7, article 3, corpus).

Thus when he is speaking of the act of being of a thing, he is not cannot be talking “esse” literally, but rather the essence as an actual thing analogously, since he clearly states that nothing is divided into genus by “act”, but rather by essence.

Unless he is contradicting himself of course.

We are not setting ourselves up as authorities of anything. We have allowed Thomas to speak for himself. He does not say what you calim. And whatever you are trying to say by the above, you are saying that the " act of existence " of each being is different from the " act of existence " of every other being. Therefore, the " act of existence " of created beings cannot be the " act of existence " of God, which cannot be divided. For if His " act of existence " is divisible, then He is not God. And clearly, He is God and is not divisible.

Linus2nd.

 

[Linux]

you are saying that the " act of existence " of each being is different from the " act of existence" of every other being.

If a thing is different from the act of existence, then it is not the act of existence. The only thing that can be differentiated from existence is either an essence that is not existence itself or absolutely nothing because existence is not a genus.

It is clear here what Aquinas says in the opening line of the paragraph…

“Nothing is assigned to a genus by reason of its act of being but by reason of its essence

Nothing is assigned to genus by reason of its “act”; in other-words there can be no actual species by reason of a things “act of existence”, but rather a species is made possible by the inherent properties of a things actual “nature”.

This is because esse is not a genus. This is as clear as daylight.

In-order for the rest of the paragraph to make sense the following sentences can only be read in light of this fact.

Therefore when he is speaking of the act of being of a thing, he cannot be talking in particular about “esse” literally, but rather he is speaking about the “essence” as a recipient of act rather than act as something intrinsic to a particular nature, and he is referring to their existence analogously since he clearly states that a thing is not divided into genus by “act”, but rather by essence.

 

[prodigalson2011]

If a thing is different from the act of existence, then it is not the act of existence. The only thing that can be differentiated from existence is either an essence that is not existence itself or absolutely nothing because existence is not a genus.

It is clear here what Aquinas says in the opening line of the paragraph…

“Nothing is assigned to a genus by reason of its act of being but by reason of its essence

Nothing is assigned to genus by reason of its “act”; in other-words there can be no actual species by reason of a things “act of existence”, but rather a species is made possible by the inherent properties of a things actual “nature”.

This is because esse is not a genus. This is as clear as daylight.

In-order for the rest of the paragraph to make sense the following sentences can only be read in light of this fact.

Therefore when he is speaking of the act of being of a thing, he cannot be talking in particular about “esse” literally, but rather he is speaking about the “essence” as a recipient of act rather than act as something intrinsic to a particular nature, and he is referring to their existence analogously since he clearly states that a thing is not divided into genus by “act”, but rather by essence.

This is the most convoluted interpretation of Aquinas I’ve ever heard. He’s saying exactly the opposite.

“Nothing is assigned to a genus by reason of its act of being but by reason of its essence; and this is clear from the fact that the act of being of a thing is proper to that thing and distinct from the act being of anything else” (De Potentia, question 7, article 3, corpus).

“Genus” and “species” are things that numerous beings share in common, and Thomas blatantly associates genus with essence. For instance, take the genus “animal” and the species “man”. All men share the genus “animal” and the species of “man” in common: that is their essence. This common essence is individuated by individual acts. It is the essence which is one, and the act of being that is many.

Esse is not a genus because it does not tell us anything about what something is (and genus is related to essence), only that it is.

 

[polytropos]

No it isn’t at odds with what I am saying, since change is the actualisation of some potential state or thing, and that state or thing was nothing before it was actual. The fact that this actualisation occurs in sequence with preceding natures or events does not change the fact that it is creation ex nihilo, a manifestation of that which was non-existent.

Isn’t this why Aristotle developed the distinction between acts and potencies in the first place - to avoid the conclusion that all change is creation ex nihilo (the error of Parmenides)? A potentiality is not quite nothing. It is not in act, but it is inherent in a thing’s form. Nothing would be the absence of actuality and potentiality of any sort.

 

[prodigalson2011]

Isn’t this why Aristotle developed the distinction between acts and potencies in the first place - to avoid the conclusion that all change is creation ex nihilo? A potentiality is not quite nothing. It is not in act, but it is inherent in a thing’s form. Nothing would be the absence of actuality and potentiality of any sort.

You are exactly right.

 

[Linux]

Isn’t this why Aristotle developed the distinction between acts and potencies in the first place - to avoid the conclusion that all change is creation ex nihilo (the error of Parmenides)? A potentiality is not quite nothing. It is not in act, but it is inherent in a thing’s form. Nothing would be the absence of actuality and potentiality of any sort.

Nothing in and of itself, surely has no potentiality in it; but i am not the one claiming that creation ex-nihilo is the act of positively transforming the negation of esse into esse . It is clear that potency in and of itself is no-thing actual. Potency is inherent in a things form as in to say that a being is able to change into something else or continue to exist since created beings are continuously in potency to act (in a continuous state of becoming or being perfected by act). But potency itself cannot logically be seen as a thing out of which more “existence” is made; that’s a logical contradiction. In that case more is coming from less instead of potency receiving act. Ex-nihilo is obviously taking place in the general sense that a form or essence or state of being which did not exist (was no-thing) before is now actual.

 

[Linux]

This is the most convoluted interpretation of Aquinas I’ve ever heard. He’s saying exactly the opposite.

“Nothing is assigned to a genus by reason of its act of being but by reason of its essence; and this is clear from the fact that the act of being of a thing is proper to that thing and distinct from the act being of anything else” (De Potentia, question 7, article 3, corpus).

“Genus” and “species” are things that numerous beings share in common, and Thomas blatantly associates genus with essence. For instance, take the genus “animal” and the species “man”. All men share the genus “animal” and the species of “man” in common: that is their essence. This common essence is individuated by individual acts. It is the essence which is one, and the act of being that is many.
.

It is clear here what Aquinas says in the opening line of the paragraph…

“Nothing is assigned to a genus by reason of its act of being but by reason of its essence

Nothing is assigned to genus by reason of its “act”; in other-words there can be no actual species by reason of a things “act of existence”, but rather a species is made possible by the inherent properties of a things actual “nature”.

This is because esse is not a genus. This is as clear as daylight.

In-order for the rest of the paragraph to make sense the following sentences can only be read in light of this fact.

Therefore when he is speaking of the act of being of a thing, he cannot be talking in particular about “esse” literally, but rather he is speaking about the “essence” as a recipient of act rather than act as something intrinsic to a particular nature, and he is referring to their existence analogously since he clearly states that a thing is not assigned to a genus by “act”, but rather by essence.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

If a thing is different from the act of existence, then it is not the act of existence. The only thing that can be differentiated from existence is either an essence that is not existence itself or absolutely nothing because existence is not a genus.

It is clear here what Aquinas says in the opening line of the paragraph…

“Nothing is assigned to a genus by reason of its act of being but by reason of its essence

Nothing is assigned to genus by reason of its “act”; in other-words there can be no actual species by reason of a things “act of existence”, but rather a species is made possible by the inherent properties of a things actual “nature”.

This is because esse is not a genus. This is as clear as daylight.

In-order for the rest of the paragraph to make sense the following sentences can only be read in light of this fact.

Therefore when he is speaking of the act of being of a thing, he cannot be talking in particular about “esse” literally, but rather he is speaking about the “essence” as a recipient of act rather than act as something intrinsic to a particular nature, and he is referring to their existence analogously since he clearly states that a thing is not divided into genus by “act”, but rather by essence.

I’ve heard it all before and before and before. You’re logic is, well, is illogical. Readers beware.

Linus2nd

 

[prodigalson2011]

It is clear here what Aquinas says in the opening line of the paragraph…

“Nothing is assigned to a genus by reason of its act of being but by reason of its essence

Nothing is assigned to genus by reason of its “act”; in other-words there can be no actual species by reason of a things “act of existence”, but rather a species is made possible by the inherent properties of a things actual “nature”.

This is because esse is not a genus. This is as clear as daylight.

In-order for the rest of the paragraph to make sense the following sentences can only be read in light of this fact.

Therefore when he is speaking of the act of being of a thing, he cannot be talking in particular about “esse” literally, but rather he is speaking about the “essence” as a recipient of act rather than act as something intrinsic to a particular nature, and he is referring to their existence analogously since he clearly states that a thing is not assigned to a genus by “act”, but rather by essence.

You reply to someone by copying and pasting the very post to which your interlocutor was replying? What is the point of that?

In any case, this makes no sense whatsoever. It’s just another argument by gibberish. You don’t even understand what you just said because there is nothing in it to be understood; you’ve simply redefined the terms to fit your argument.

A thing is assigned to a genus by its essence because the essence tells us what particular kind of thing it is, as does genus. The act of being is not a genus because it can be predicated of anything that is, regardless of what kind of thing it is.

Aquinas is a very exacting thinker and an equally exacting communicator and would not say “act of being” if he meant “essence”, to begin with, to say nothing of the fact that his meaning is entirely clear here, as it is throughout “De potentia.” A genus is common to everything which falls under that genus, as “animal” is common to every species of animal, and as the species “man” is common to every individual man. That there can be many things under a single genus and species (essence) is because they have their own individual acts. That’s exactly what Aquinas means; he speaks quite plainly and clearly for himself; he wasn’t waiting for you to come along 800 years later and tell everybody that when he said “act of being”, he really meant “essence.” That’s ludicrous.

But don’t take my word for it. Look at the passage you’ve just butchered in the original Latin, where he specifically uses the term “esse”:

Respondeo. Dicendum quod Deus non est in genere: quod quidem ad praesens tribus rationibus ostendi potest: primo quidem, quia nihil ponitur in genere secundum esse suum, sed ratione quidditatis suae; quod ex hoc patet, quia esse uniuscuiusque est ei proprium, et distinctum ab esse cuiuslibet alterius rei; sed ratio substantiae potest esse communis: propter hoc etiam philosophus dicit, quod ens non est genus.

“quia esse uniuscuiusque est ei proprium, et distinctum ab esse cuiuslibet alterius rei” translates roughly to: “for the existence of each thing is proper to it, and distinct from the being of the thing of any other.” Or, to retain the Latin term: “for the esse of each thing is proper to it, and distinct from the esse of any other thing.”

But now we know he didn’t mean to say esse. Glad you’re here to clear that up.