How does God create "the act of existing" out of nothing?

[Linux]

And this:

And further:

And here on the question of creation from nothing:

"

I am trying to digest how this concept might apply to the current discussion. Hopefully this material can help us better understand what Aquinas is saying about esse. But if anything applies, I think the term “intelligible emanation” is where we should start.

God bless,
Ut

In post 396 Linux says, " One things for certain, Aquinas does not view esse as being identical with essence even after being conjoined, and thus anything else he says has to be viewed and interpreted in light of that fact. He speaks of essences coming into existence; he does not speak of esse coming into esse. "

This is very difficult to square with what Thomas says below, he certainly does speak of essences and esse coming into existence altogether in the created substance. So while essence and esse are distinct, the created substance or being would not exist without the two composing principles of essence and esse. And together, they compose the created substance or being.

".T. Ques 45 , art 5 " Reply…Among all effects the most universal is existence itself…which should accordingly be the proper effect of the first and most universal cause, which is God…Now God’s Proper effect in creating is that which is presupposed to any other , namely existence tout court ( or simply ). "

If existence is the proper effect of creation, then God is creating an existence which He gives to creatures as their very own, an existence which is not a certain amount of His own existence ( and, indeed, how can God divide Himself so as to dole out bits and pieces of Himself to creatures as their act of existence? )

And this view is firmly held by Etienne Gilson. For he says, " And Etienne Gilson has this to say on pg 177 of " Elements of Christian Philosophy. " He says in part, “…The only things that can properly be created are those of which it has previously been said that they are capable of having an act of being of their own. These are substances…” Obviously, Gilson is convinced that the esse of creatures is their own and that God creates it along with the entire substance. It is an effect of God’s creative act to give created beings an act of existence of their very own. "

One can get a fuller flavor by reading pg 176 and all of 177. But his position is clear. Creatures have their own esse which is not God’s Esse or a part thereof.

Sorry for interrupting. It seemed important.

Linus2nd

It seems evident that there are points at which he is speaking of existence in an analogous sense and rather than in the sense of “esse” as distinct from essence. Otherwise it would appear that he is contradicting himself. He is speaking of a creatures essence (their natures) as they exist and come into existence and is not speaking literally of their own “esse”.

That is your interpretation.

 

[utunumsint]

Do you notice that when Aquinas speaks of being in reference to creatures he is speaking specifically of their essences. He speaks of them as existing, but he does not say anything about their relationship with esse insofar as whether esse begins to exist in conjunction with their essences. He merely speaks of “no-man” becoming a “real man”, a no-horse becoming an actual horse. He speaks of essences becoming actual.

One things for certain, Aquinas does not view esse as being identical with essence even after being conjoined, and thus anything else he says has to be viewed and interpreted in light of that fact. He speaks of essences coming into existence; he does not speak of esse coming into esse.

I think this is a very important point to consider when trying to determine whether my argument is consistent with the metaphysics of Aquinas and Aristotle.

Interesting quote here that may apply describing the difference between created wisdom and uncreated wisdom.

Reply to Objection 4: When we say “Wisdom was created,” this may be understood not of Wisdom which is the Son of God, but of created wisdom given by God to creatures: for it is said, “He created her [namely, Wisdom] in the Holy Ghost, and He poured her out over all His works” (Ecclus. 1:9,10). Nor is it inconsistent for Scripture in one text to speak of the Wisdom begotten and wisdom created, for wisdom created is a kind of participation of the uncreated Wisdom. The saying may also be referred to the created nature assumed by the Son, so that the sense be, “From the beginning and before the world was I made”—that is, I was foreseen as united to the creature. Or the mention of wisdom as both created and begotten insinuates into our minds the mode of the divine generation; for in generation what is generated receives the nature of the generator and this pertains to perfection; whereas in creation the Creator is not changed, but the creature does not receive the Creator’s nature. Thus the Son is called both created and begotten, in order that from the idea of creation the immutability of the Father may be understood, and from generation the unity of nature in the Father and the Son. In this way Hilary expounds the sense of this text of Scripture (De Synod.). The other passages quoted do not refer to the Holy Ghost, but to the created spirit, sometimes called wind, sometimes air, sometimes the breath of man, sometimes also the soul, or any other invisible substance.

The idea that the created does not receive the creator’s nature seems to rule out an identification of our esse with God’s esse.

God bless,
Ut

 

[Linux]

Interesting quote here that may apply describing the difference between created wisdom and uncreated wisdom.

The idea that the created does not receive the creator’s nature seems to rule out an identification of our esse with God’s esse.

God bless,
Ut

We do not receive the nature of God into our nature. What is being said here is that our essence is not Gods essence. It speaks of the receiving of that which becomes apart of the essence itself. It does not rule out that we are conjoined with Gods esse because in that case we remain distinct from God in nature.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

It seems evident that there are points at which he is speaking of existence in an analogous sense and rather than in the sense of “esse” as distinct from essence. Otherwise it would appear that he is contradicting himself. He is speaking of a creatures essence (their natures) as they exist and come into existence and is not speaking literally of their own “esse”.

That is your interpretation.

The quotation below is no interpretation. It is in Thomas’ own words. However, the quotation by Gilson is his interpretation. Do you know who he is? You should look up his bio. He is imminently qualified, more than any other, to have an opinioni. On the other hand, what you are saying above is no where mentioned in the quotation.

Originally Posted by Linusthe2nd
In post 396 Linux says, " One things for certain, Aquinas does not view esse as being identical with essence even after being conjoined, and thus anything else he says has to be viewed and interpreted in light of that fact. He speaks of essences coming into existence; he does not speak of esse coming into esse. "

This is very difficult to square with what Thomas says below, he certainly does speak of essences and esse coming into existence altogether in the created substance. So while essence and esse are distinct, the created substance or being would not exist without the two composing principles of essence and esse. And together, they compose the created substance or being.

".T. Ques 45 , art 5 " Reply…Among all effects the most universal is existence itself…which should accordingly be the proper effect of the first and most universal cause, which is God…Now God’s Proper effect in creating is that which is presupposed to any other , namely existence tout court ( or simply ). "

If existence is the proper effect of creation, then God is creating an existence which He gives to creatures as their very own, an existence which is not a certain amount of His own existence ( and, indeed, how can God divide Himself so as to dole out bits and pieces of Himself to creatures as their act of existence? )

And this view is firmly held by Etienne Gilson. For he says, " And Etienne Gilson has this to say on pg 177 of " Elements of Christian Philosophy. " He says in part, “…The only things that can properly be created are those of which it has previously been said that they are capable of having an act of being of their own. These are substances…” Obviously, Gilson is convinced that the esse of creatures is their own and that God creates it along with the entire substance. It is an effect of God’s creative act to give created beings an act of existence of their very own. "

One can get a fuller flavor by reading pg 176 and all of 177. But his position is clear. Creatures have their own esse which is not God’s Esse or a part thereof. ( Gilson’s opinion, not mine )

Linus2nd

 

[Linux]

The quotation below is no interpretation. It is in Thomas’ own words. However, the quotation by Gilson is his interpretation. Do you know who he is? You should look up his bio. He is imminently qualified, more than any other, to have an opinioni. On the other hand what you are saying above is no where mentioned in the quotation.

One can get a fuller flavor by reading pg 176 and all of 177. But his position is clear. Creatures have their own esse which is not God’s Esse or a part thereof.

Linus2nd

Actually it is not clear at all because your view in which you reject the different senses in which Aquinas speaks of being leads to Aquinas contradicting himself.

 

[Linux]

".T. Ques 45 , art 5 " Reply…Among all effects the most universal is existence itself…which should accordingly be the proper effect of the first and most universal cause, which is God…Now God’s Proper effect in creating is that which is presupposed to any other , namely existence tout court ( or simply ). "

If existence is the proper effect of God which is universal, it cannot be logically said that God creates another existence as that would contradict the singular notion implied by the universal nature of existence simply.

In fact this quote supports my position. Thankyou.

 

[utunumsint]

We do not receive the nature of God into our nature. What is being said here is that our essence is not Gods essence. It speaks of the receiving of that which becomes apart of the essence itself. It does not rule out that we are conjoined with Gods esse because in that case we remain distinct from God in nature.

The only way this can make sense for me is if we give to God alone the concept of esse or distinguish between God’s esse and our esse.

If we take the first path, then God is simply the cause of our essence.
If we take the second path, the God is simply the cause of our esse and essence.

Either way, we are either essence alone, caused to be by God,
or
we are esse and essence cause to be by God.

Either way, we must preserve the unity of God and the separate createdness of nature.

Frankly, I have no problem with this, either way. The way Aquinas understands union with God is on the level of mind. Truth, beauty, and goodness. The way we image God, is not simply by being, but by reflecting God’s nature, specifically in our will:

Hence, if the image of the Divine Trinity is to be found in the soul, we must look for it where the soul approaches the nearest to a representation of the species of the Divine Persons. Now the Divine Persons are distinct from each other by reason of the procession of the Word from the Speaker, and the procession of Love connecting Both. But in our soul word “cannot exist without actual thought,” as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 7). Therefore, first and chiefly, the image of the Trinity is to be found in the acts of the soul, that is, inasmuch as from the knowledge which we possess, by actual thought we form an internal word; and thence break forth into love. But, since the principles of acts are the habits and powers, and everything exists virtually in its principle, therefore, secondarily and consequently, the image of the Trinity may be considered as existing in the powers, and still more in the habits, forasmuch as the acts virtually exist therein.

God bless,
Ut

 

[Linux]

The only way this can make sense for me is if we give to God alone the concept of esse or distinguish between God’s esse and our esse.

If we take the first path, then God is simply the cause of our essence.
If we take the second path, the God is simply the cause of our esse and essence.

Either way, we are either essence alone, caused to be by God,
or
we are esse and essence cause to be by God.

Either way, we must preserve the unity of God and the separate createdness of nature.

Frankly, I have no problem with this, either way. The way Aquinas understands union with God is on the level of mind. Truth, beauty, and goodness. The way we image God, is not simply by being, but by reflecting God’s nature, specifically in our will:

God bless,
Ut

You must never assume that somebody is attempting to destroy the unity of God and the separate createdness of nature by expressing a different notion of esse and essence to the one that you’re use to. Conspiracy theories of this sort is not fare and is uncharitable. Do not be like Linus and Empther.

It is clear, whether my argument is right or wrong, that I have always preserved an absolute distinction between Gods nature and the nature of creation.

 

[Peter_Plato]

Unless we distinguish between the metaphors of light used in the creed to describe the procession of Father to Son as uncreated light, and some other unnecessary light.

This is very interesting. Consider the difference between light that is generated by the sun and light that is reflected by another body such as the moon.

Consider being in the same “light” so to speak. God as Being itself actualizes creation in the same way that sunlight “actualizes” or makes apparent heavenly bodies that do not “create” their own light.

In a sense, the esse of created things is “reflected esse” in the sense that as created essences they reflect the “esse” of God in order to become existing things. In this sense, they do not have their own esse but by virtue of their created essence they “instantiate” the esse of God in particular modes as their essential capacity as creatures in relation to Creator allows.

We would not say the moon creates its own light as we would not say creatures have their own being or esse, but, at the same time we would not say the moon is dark or creatures “non-existent” because of the capacity of the moon to reflect sunlight and the capacity of creatures to particularize the esse of God which is “reflected” by their created essence in a limited but substantial way.

 

[Linux]

In a sense, the esse of created things is “reflected esse” in the sense that as created essences they reflect the “esse” of God in order to become existing things. In this sense, they do not have their own esse but by virtue of their created essence they “instantiate” the esse of God in particular modes as their essential capacity as creatures in relation to Creator allows.

Can I use this as my Signature?

 

[Peter_Plato]

Can I use this as my Signature?

Linux,

The post was merely speculative. I was hoping for some critique. I am not sure I fully agree with it and am definitely unsure of what implications might arise or what false impressions, perhaps even confusion, might be taken from it.

 

[prodigalson2011]

In a sense, the esse of created things is “reflected esse” in the sense that as created essences they reflect the “esse” of God in order to become existing things. In this sense, they do not have their own esse but by virtue of their created essence they “instantiate” the esse of God in particular modes as their essential capacity as creatures in relation to Creator allows.

In what sense is this not pantheistic? I fail to see how this is any different than the Hinduist notion of Maya. That is, creation is an illusion: God manifesting himself through different appearances (“essences”). God is real, creation is only real insofar as it is God.

I have been hesitant to bring this up because the historical record is a bit fuzzy, but I have been researching the matter for some time and would like to present for the consideration of this thread’s audience the case of Meister Eckhart. For those unfamiliar, Eckhart was a 13th century Dominican friar, mystic and theologian. He was eventually charged as a heretic for seeming to preach precisely the thesis of this thread. He later renounced whatever heretical notions were present in his teachings and was reunited (and died in good standing) with the Church. In the same Papal Bull that restored him as a Catholic in good standing, Pope John XXII also condemned 17 of Eckhart’s statements as heretical, and another 11 as under suspicision.

The controversial formula that Eckhart proposed was, “esse est deus” (being is God). However, much like Aquinas, but even moreso, Eckhart’s was a complicated understanding which employed unfortunate and misleading language. As it came to be understood, he was not actually teaching that God was, in any direct sense, the esse of creatures. However, his poor choice of words led to particular formulations within his philosophy being deemed heretical. As Alessandra Beccarisi writes in “A Companion to Meister Eckhart”:

*Being can be predicated of God only per identitatem, for it is not a different thing from God. God is not the subject of being but being itself. Thus, sum means the essence proper to God. But saying that divine being is the subject itself, God, comes down to saying that there is no difference between subject and predicate. Both are one and the same sum. God is thus pure being, naked being, being for itself. It could seem (and for a long time Eckhartian critics have thought so) that Eckhart is here in contradiction with what he claims in the first Parisian question [ps2011: the first Parisian question is “Are existence and understanding the same in God?”] … The contradiction, however, is merely apparent, for the pure and naked being Eckhart is speaking of here is not in any way the being of the created beings, of which he speaks in other contexts…

…Being from the point of the view of the created is always a more or less determinate being, a hoc et hoc as Eckhart says. It is clear that in this sense, in God, there cannot be the same kind of being, but rather an absence of being and contemporaneously an inclination towards the being of the created. From the point of view of God, the question is reversed: being is everything and totally in God, and in the created as separated from God, it is nothing. But the being which is God Himself, naturally, cannot be the same which is predicated of created beings, but must be infinite, indistinct, pure, simple, and in particular, must be completely reflexive on itself, a kind of divine self-knowing…

…In God, therefore, the thing itself cannot exist, and this is obvious, but there cannot even exist the ideal version of that thing or idea. For in God, there exists only the principle that enables a thing to exist: this principle is similar to the thing insofar as it is its foundation, its reason for existing. But, at the same time, it is also dissimilar, for it is different from the thing or its idea.*

Or, as Dr. Joseph Stabbic writes:

[Kevin] Hart observes that Eckhart reverses Aquinas’s formulation of the relationship between God and esse. Instead of holding that Deus est suum esse [ps2011: God is his own being], Eckhart says that Esse est Deus. According to Hart, by this reversal Eckhart insists, “contra Aquinas, that the act of being is God (or, less archly, that Being properly belongs only to God)” (TS, 255). The logic by which Hart arrives at this conclusion is fuzzy as is the criticism that he intends to make of Aquinas. Does he wish to say that, for Eckhart, only God truly is esse whereas esse cannot rightly be predicated of anything else? If this is the case, then it seems that he is making Eckhart out to be a kind of Spinozistic monist and pantheist (which, in fact, Eckhart may very well tend toward). Neither Aquinas nor any Thomist would be tempted by this understanding of the divine. Or is Hart saying instead that, for Eckhart, God is esse in all its purity and other things can only exist through this Esse, by participation, and that the esse predicated of them, though real, bears the most distant of analogies to the Esse of their cause? If this is Hart’s meaning, then precisely how is Eckhart’s doctrine appreciably different from Aquinas’s, since this view of things is classic Thomism?

 

[Linux]

Linux,

The post was merely speculative. I was hoping for some critique. I am not sure I fully agree with it and am definitely unsure of what implications might arise or what false impressions, perhaps even confusion, might be taken from it.

The way I read it is that you are saying God creates essences that are conjoined to esse to the degree that their specific essences allow.

They do not have their own esse, but they are called beings analogously and they glorify God to the extent they they are sustained in God’s act of reality

 

[prodigalson2011]

The way I read it is that you are saying God creates essences that are conjoined to esse to the degree that their specific essences allow.

They do not have their own esse, but they are called beings analogously and they glorify God to the extent they they are sustained in God’s act of reality

The problem, as I see it, Linux, is that such functions as free will, while defined by the essence, are not operations of the essence. In fact, an essence has no operative power. Operative power is a function of being. If God is the only being, then only God has any operative power.

 

[Peter_Plato]

In what sense is this not pantheistic? I fail to see how this is any different than the Hinduist notion of Maya. That is, creation is an illusion: God manifesting himself through different appearances (“essences”). God is real, creation is only real insofar as it is God.

Creation has reality and is essentially distinct from God. Creation is not God and it is real, but it is only real ”in relation” to God. God bestows its own formal and material reality on creation by creating it “from nothing,” but creation is only maintained in “act” (actual existence) by Actus Purus (Pure Act, i.e., God). That does not mean creation is an illusion, it does mean creation is not “actual” unless and until God renders it as “existing.”

 

[prodigalson2011]

Creation has reality and is essentially distinct from God. Creation is not God and it is real, but it is only real ”in relation” to God. God bestows its own formal and material reality on creation by creating it “from nothing,” but creation is only maintained in “act” (actual existence) by Actus Purus (Pure Act, i.e., God). That does not mean creation is an illusion, it does mean creation is not “actual” unless and until God renders it as “existing.”

I fully agree. But this seems more in keeping with the idea that God is the necessary condition for the esse of creation while not being the esse of creation Himself.

 

[utunumsint]

I fully agree. But this seems more in keeping with the idea that God is the necessary condition for the esse of creation while not being the esse of creation Himself.

I think so too.

Peter, you said this:

Creation has reality and is essentially distinct from God.

How can a thing have reality distinct form God if it does not have its own esse? For that matter, how can anything be real without esse?

God bless,
Ut

 

[Linusthe2nd]

".T. Ques 45 , art 5 " Reply…Among all effects the most universal is existence itself…which should accordingly be the proper effect of the first and most universal cause, which is God…Now God’s Proper effect in creating is that which is presupposed to any other , namely existence tout court ( or simply ). "

If existence is the proper effect of God which is universal, it cannot be logically said that God creates another existence as that would contradict the singular notion implied by the universal nature of existence simply.

In fact this quote supports my position. Thankyou.

You are misconstruing the quotation. Thomas is not saying God the created existence is universal, it is saying that it is the effect of what is proper to God, which would be the universal existence of God. The effect of God is a created existence which is the " most universal " of all created effects because it is the one common note of all created substances. It is " universal " in that it is a common note, not because it is universal as the Existence of God is the universal cause. This is evident from the structure of the sentence.

You can disagree of course but it certainly is obvious what Thomas is saying. He is not saying what you imply.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

In what sense is this not pantheistic? I fail to see how this is any different than the Hinduist notion of Maya. That is, creation is an illusion: God manifesting himself through different appearances (“essences”). God is real, creation is only real insofar as it is God.

I have been hesitant to bring this up because the historical record is a bit fuzzy, but I have been researching the matter for some time and would like to present for the consideration of this thread’s audience the case of Meister Eckhart. For those unfamiliar, Eckhart was a 13th century Dominican friar, mystic and theologian. He was eventually charged as a heretic for seeming to preach precisely the thesis of this thread. He later renounced whatever heretical notions were present in his teachings and was reunited (and died in good standing) with the Church. In the same Papal Bull that restored him as a Catholic in good standing, Pope John XXII also condemned 17 of Eckhart’s statements as heretical, and another 11 as under suspicision.

The controversial formula that Eckhart proposed was, “esse est deus” (being is God). However, much like Aquinas, but even moreso, Eckhart’s was a complicated understanding which employed unfortunate and misleading language. As it came to be understood, he was not actually teaching that God was, in any direct sense, the esse of creatures. However, his poor choice of words led to particular formulations within his philosophy being deemed heretical. As Alessandra Beccarisi writes in “A Companion to Meister Eckhart”:

Being can be predicated of God only per identitatem, for it is not a different thing from God. God is not the subject of being but being itself. Thus, sum means the essence proper to God. But saying that divine being is the subject itself, God, comes down to saying that there is no difference between subject and predicate. Both are one and the same sum. God is thus pure being, naked being, being for itself. It could seem (and for a long time Eckhartian critics have thought so) that Eckhart is here in contradiction with what he claims in the first Parisian question [ps2011: the first Parisian question is “Are existence and understanding the same in God?”] … The contradiction, however, is merely apparent, for the pure and naked being Eckhart is speaking of here is not in any way the being of the created beings, of which he speaks in other contexts…

…Being from the point of the view of the created is always a more or less determinate being, a hoc et hoc as Eckhart says. It is clear that in this sense, in God, there cannot be the same kind of being, but rather an absence of being and contemporaneously an inclination towards the being of the created. From the point of view of God, the question is reversed: being is everything and totally in God, and in the created as separated from God, it is nothing. But the being which is God Himself, naturally, cannot be the same which is predicated of created beings, but must be infinite, indistinct, pure, simple, and in particular, must be completely reflexive on itself, a kind of divine self-knowing…

…In God, therefore, the thing itself cannot exist, and this is obvious, but there cannot even exist the ideal version of that thing or idea. For in God, there exists only the principle that enables a thing to exist: this principle is similar to the thing insofar as it is its foundation, its reason for existing. But, at the same time, it is also dissimilar, for it is different from the thing or its idea.

Or, as Dr. Joseph Stabbic writes:

[Kevin] Hart observes that Eckhart reverses Aquinas’s formulation of the relationship between God and esse. Instead of holding that Deus est suum esse [ps2011: God is his own being], Eckhart says that Esse est Deus. According to Hart, by this reversal Eckhart insists, “contra Aquinas, that the act of being is God (or, less archly, that Being properly belongs only to God)” (TS, 255). The logic by which Hart arrives at this conclusion is fuzzy as is the criticism that he intends to make of Aquinas. Does he wish to say that, for Eckhart, only God truly is esse whereas esse cannot rightly be predicated of anything else? If this is the case, then it seems that he is making Eckhart out to be a kind of Spinozistic monist and pantheist (which, in fact, Eckhart may very well tend toward). Neither Aquinas nor any Thomist would be tempted by this understanding of the divine. Or is Hart saying instead that, for Eckhart, God is esse in all its purity and other things can only exist through this Esse, by participation, and that the esse predicated of them, though real, bears the most distant of analogies to the Esse of their cause? If this is Hart’s meaning, then precisely how is Eckhart’s doctrine appreciably different from Aquinas’s, since this view of things is classic Thomism?

Well, that pretty well cinches the case I would say. God creates the esse ( existence ) of all creatures. Therefore, their esse is not the esse of God. Thanks for the research. I wonder if Gilson ever read that book. Perhaps that is how he reached his own conclusion.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

I fully agree. But this seems more in keeping with the idea that God is the necessary condition for the esse of creation while not being the esse of creation Himself.

The underlined portion is mine. That is absolutely true in my view and agrees with Thomas. Excellent.

Linus2nd