How does God create "the act of existing" out of nothing?

[Linux]

“For the sake of convenience, then, one can divide all things that exist into one of two sides of a dividing line: God on one side; and the universe on the other side, the relationship between the two being, among other things, that of cause to effect. However, this means, in Aquinas’s terms, that every ‘thing’ but God has the cause of its existence in God, i.e.,** it participates in existence inasmuch as it participates in God’s existence**.”

 

[utunumsint]

In other-words there is no ontological distinction between the esse of a man and the esse of a fish. There is only differentiation in essences; and therefore esse is one and has no distinction in it. In fact essences can only be different because esse is not intrinsic to their nature. There can be no differentiation in esse.

Given the first portion of the quote which is basically saying that the act of existence (esse) cannot be a genus and therefore there cannot be different kinds of the act of existence, this cannot be taken as arguing that esse is as diverse as essence; unless of course one is willing to say that Aquinas is contradicting himself.

This needn’t be interpreted as saying that God is not the esse of all essences. It can be simply saying that the lack of distinction between God’s essence and esse is not something possessed by contingent natures, and this is to say that the unity of esse and essence in God is not something true of creation. Of course you can disagree but then you would have to recognize that Aquinas is contradicting the truth that existence is not a genus.

And we could also conclude from this that the devine act of existence is something uniqe to Gods essence and does not constitute the essence of created things. From this it would not contradict the idea that God is the esse of all essences; but i am happy to disagree with Aquinas and say he is in error.

Only if by the term “divine act of existence” he is also including the essence of created things. But i agree that there is only one esse, and i am happy to disagree with Aquinas which i certainly made clear in the OP.

Linux, I think you are stretching here… perhaps we could get an undecided third party to arbitrate…

PeterPlato? Can you review this quote? Do you think Linux’s interpretation is possible?

God bless,
Ut

 

[utunumsint]

“For the sake of convenience, then, one can divide all things that exist into one of two sides of a dividing line: God on one side; and the universe on the other side, the relationship between the two being, among other things, that of cause to effect. However, this means, in Aquinas’s terms, that every ‘thing’ but God has the cause of its existence in God, i.e.,** it participates in existence inasmuch as it participates in God’s existence**.”

Were does this come from?

 

[Linusthe2nd]

It does not show any such thing, and neither have you or Thomas Aquinas disproved my argument.

If by saying that God is not the formal being of each thing he is saying that God is not the esse of each essence, then i have no choice but to reject his claim because it leads to ontological contradictions which i have explained thoroughly and have been ignored with red herrings (for example, this has turned into a debate about Thomas instead of a debate about the Title of this thread).

But if he is saying that God is not the essence of a thing as it adheres in an actual substance, then i agree.

Perhaps the problem is that you can’t understand what you read?

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

In other-words there is no ontological distinction between the esse of a man and the esse of a fish. There is only differentiation in essences; and therefore esse is one and has no distinction in it. In fact essences can only be different because esse is not intrinsic to their nature. There can be no differentiation in esse.

Given the first portion of the quote which is basically saying that the act of existence (esse) cannot be a genus and therefore there cannot be different kinds of the act of existence, this cannot be taken as arguing that esse is as diverse as essence; unless of course one is willing to say that Aquinas is contradicting himself.

This needn’t be interpreted as saying that God is not the esse of all essences. It can be simply saying that the lack of distinction between God’s essence and esse is not something possessed by contingent natures, and this is to say that the unity of esse and essence in God is not something true of creation. Of course you can disagree but then you would have to recognize that Aquinas is contradicting the truth that existence is not a genus.

And we could also conclude from this that the devine act of existence is something uniqe to Gods essence and does not constitute the essence of created things. From this it would not contradict the idea that God is the esse of all essences; but i am happy to disagree with Aquinas and say he is in error.

Only if by the term “divine act of existence” he is also including the essence of created things. But i agree that there is only one esse, and i am happy to disagree with Aquinas which i certainly made clear in the OP.

You can twist a coiled spring all you want, it will always spring back to its natural form. You can parse Thomas’ words all you want. The problem is that, if you do that, you are telling honest, thinking men that you either don’t understand what you read or you are attempting to defend some indefensible ideology or cult religion.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

It does not show any such thing, and neither have you or Thomas Aquinas disproved my argument.

If by saying that God is not the formal being of each thing he is saying that God is not the esse of each essence, then i have no choice but to reject his claim because it leads to ontological contradictions which i have explained thoroughly and have been ignored with red herrings (for example, this has turned into a debate about Thomas instead of a debate about the Title of this thread).

But if he is saying that God is not the essence of a thing as it adheres in an actual substance, then i agree.

So, you are a more powerful thinker and logician than Thomas who had mastered not only Plato, Aristotle, Avicenna, Averroes, Maimonides, and all science of the day, on top of Latin and Greek, and who had memorized the Bible? In that case we can surely expect a book containing a full explanation of all your errors?

I would love to debate with you futher, but it is like talking to a wooden door. :banghead::banghead:

Linus2nd

 

[utunumsint]

To continue to the next passage in S.C.G I, 26, Aquinas says:

[4] Then, too, a principle is naturally prior to that whose principle it is. Now, in certain things being has something that is as its principle. For the form is said to be a principle of being, and so is the agent, that makes things to be in act. If, therefore, the divine being is the being of each thing, it will follow that God, Who is His own being, has some cause. Thus, He is not through Himself a necessary being. But, we have proved the contrary of this conclusion above.

Now, it what he says here is true, that the form is the principle of being in a created essence (i.e. that which brings esse,) then form is priory to esse. Therefore, if God’s esse were the esse of created beings, it would be caused by form.

[5] Moreover, that which is common to many is not outside the many except by the reason alone. Thus, animal is not something outside Socrates and Plato and the other animals except in the intellect that apprehends the form of animal stripped of all its individuating and specifying characteristics. For man is that which truly is animal; otherwise, it would follow that in Socrates and Plato there are several animals, namely, common animal itself, common man, and Plato himself. Much less, then, is common being itself something outside all existing things, save only for being in the intellect. Hence, if God is common being, the only thing that will exist is that which exists solely in the intellect. But we showed above that God is something not only in the intellect but also in reality. Therefore, God is not the common being of all things.

In the above, Aquinas is clearly differentiating from our esse and God’s esse in the sense that the very concept of esse is an abstraction. Esse is never separated from essences… It is always conjoined with an essence and in a substance, or refers to something unreal.

[6] Again, strictly speaking, generation is the way to being and corruption the way to non-being. For form is not the terminus of generation, and privation is not the terminus of corruption, except because a form causes being and privation non-being. If a form did not cause being, a thing which received such a form would not be said to be generated. Hence, if God is the formal being of all things, He will consequently be the terminus of generation. This is false, since, as we have shown above, God is eternal.

Again, he mentions that form causes being. If God were the being of a creature, then form would be causing God. Which is non-sense.

I will go on later with Aquinas’ objections, but you see that the problem is with your idea that esse is conjoined with created essence and yet somehow remains unchanged in the process. Also, it becomes very clear that you can’t conceive of God’s esse generating all essences without having any impact on his own essence.

God bless,
Ut

 

[utunumsint]

[11] The second cause leading them to this error is a failure of reason. For, since that which is common is specified or individuated through addition, they thought that the divine being, which receives no addition, was not some proper being but the common being of all things.

This is very interesting. Proper being. This is what Aquinas believes God to be. Not common being.

They ignored the fact that what is common or universal cannot exist without addition, but is considered without addition. For animal cannot be without the difference rational or the difference irrational, although it is considered without these differences.

The mistake is clear - thinking that esse can exist apart from a subject. The esse of created beings only exists on its own in the intellect.

What is more, although a universal may be considered without addition, it is not without the receptibility of addition; for, if no difference could be added to animal, it would not be a genus. The same is true of all other names.

Common being is therefore receptive of differentiation.

But the divine being is without addition not only in thought but also in reality; and not only without addition but also without the receptibility of addition. From the fact, then, that it neither receives nor can receive addition we can rather conclude that God is not common being but proper being; for His being is distinguished from all the rest by the fact that nothing can be added to it. Hence the Commentator says in the Book of Causes that, out of the purity of its goodness, the first cause is distinguished from the rest and in a manner individuated.

Perfect!

[12] The third factor that led them into this error concerns the divine simplicity. God is at the peak of simplicity. They therefore thought that the last point of resolution in our way of seeing things is God, as being absolutely simple. For it is not possible to proceed to infinity in composition among the things we know. Their reason also failed because they did not observe that what is most simple in our understanding of things is not so much a complete thing as a part of a thing. But, simplicity is predicated of God as of some perfect subsisting thing.

[13] A fourth factor that could have led them to their error is the mode of expression we use when we say that God is in all things. By this we do not mean that God is in things as a part of a thing, but as the cause of a thing that is never lacking to its effect. For we do not say that a form is in matter as a sailor is in a ship.

Frankly, I will let Aquinas speak for himself.

God bless,
Ut

 

[Linusthe2nd]

This is very interesting. Proper being. This is what Aquinas believes God to be. Not common being.

The mistake is clear - thinking that esse can exist apart from a subject. The esse of created beings only exists on its own in the intellect.

Common being is therefore receptive of differentiation.

Perfect!

Frankly, I will let Aquinas speak for himself.

God bless,
Ut

Excellent, and the upshot is that God has created an act of existence and given it to each created substance. Therefore God and creatures are entirely separate and function in their proper modes of existence, yet so that God is immediately active in all His creatures.

The conclusions to be drawn from this are:
1.God is not the esse of creatures but causes their esse.
2.Creation ex nihilo becomes perfectly intelligible.
3.We do not exist, ontologically, in the Mind of God, though we do exist in His Mind as Ideas, or thoughts, as something known to exist.
4.The created universe does not exist, ontologically, in the Mind of God, though it does exist as an Idea or Thought, and as somthing known to exist.
5.Creatures and God are two different realities. Creatures exist in the contingency of time and space, God exists in His Infinite and Eternal mode. Yet God acts most intimately within His creatures through His power ( which is the same as His essence), causing them to be and to act, governing them, and directing them to their final end.

This is not to be construed as a mixing of the two separate realities. God’s Presence should be envisioned more in the manner of a " surrounding " or as a parallel " accompaniment. " One could even envision Him as the " gravity " which holds things together. All these are mere images. We cannot know the reality of His Presence as it really is. All we can know for certain is that the two realities do not mix in any ontological way and that God operates throughout His creation. These two simple facts are all we can know with certitude.

Linus2nd

 

[Peter_Plato]

Linux, I think you are stretching here… perhaps we could get an undecided third party to arbitrate…

PeterPlato? Can you review this quote? Do you think Linux’s interpretation is possible?

God bless,
Ut

At the risk of being accused of siding with Linux as a co-conspirator in an attempt to undermine democracy, I do think Linux is on to something.

I have always understood esse or existence as being or to mean simply “to be.” I do not think that there are different “kinds” of existence, I have always presumed there to be just one “existence” that requires no delineation. Explanation, yes. Delineation, no.

This had been a basic understanding of mine since I was old enough to think (age 1 and a half, I believe.) That is why I intuitively agree with many of Linux’s points. I have never assumed, nor can I fathom the possibility, that there are different “kinds” of existence, but merely that existence is to be equated to “being,” pure and simple.

When I read, in the past, Aquinas as saying God is ipsum esse subsistens or Actus Purus, my natural interpretation has always been that God is “existence itself” and created things exist by partaking to some extent or other in existence. It has never dawned on me that this very basic belief of mine has been heretical, as Linus has declared. In fact, on every reading of Aquinas, this basic belief has been corroborated by what he writes. Nor have I ever had cause to question it in my reading of any Thomist or Scholastic

To hear from Linus that this basic belief is not only mistaken but heretical, I am genuinely puzzled. I simply cannot integrate the idea of different kinds of existence into my metaphysics no matter how forcibly I try to make the idea fit. How can existence be not one, but many? That is as foreign to me as polytheism is. It doesn’t compute.

That does not mean my metaphysics is correct. Heaven forbid that has never been something that I have been assured of. However, I do have this little skeptical hair that stands up on the back of my neck when something doesn’t seem quite right. I feel that way about conceding that existence is not just one basic, simple reality, but that existence(s) like essences, can be manifold.

The other problem is reconciling this idea of existence as manifold with what Aquinas means when he refers to the potential-actual distinction. To be actualized, in my reading of Aquinas, is to exist, to come to be. God is Existence Itself and created things are actualized by God because only what is in act or being (i.e., exists ) can bring into act or being (simpliciter) things that do not currently exist. This means things that can exist (have potency) must be given that potential, ex nihilo in the act of conception (brought to potential) and in the act of creation (brought into being) since these would have been nothing (ontologically speaking) before having potency, and then brought into existence (actualized) by being endowed with esse (again, existence simpliciter.)

Existence is simply the “state” of being in act rather than not. I cannot fathom different “kinds” of existence (although that distinction would be meaningful applied to essences.) If anything, existence could be characterized as something like “the extent to which” a thing is actualized, but that does not translate easily into a “kinds” distinction.

The other issue I have is that Aquinas clearly states that being and goodness are transferable. If God is Goodness itself, then there seem to be issues if we claim things have their own esse implying that things have their own “goodness” so it would be a mistake to claim that God is Goodness itself since goodness, like esse, would not reside in and emanate from God alone. Created things would have their own little distinct parcels of goodness like they do of esse.

My sympathy is with Linux simply because his view is much more aligned to my basic metaphysics. To reconcile “kinds of existence” I would basically have to start over trying to make sense of reality or, actually, realities (plural) because I tend to define reality as “what is” or what “exists” as the very basic meaning of being.

That said, unlike Linux, I cannot imagine Aquinas being confused on this. Aquinas’ entire metaphysics are coherent and clear. He would not make a simple error. I just think we don’t completely understand esse and essence as clearly as he did, unfortunately he is not available to explain. I would feel much safer siding with Aquinas than with any argument I construct that seems to contradict his view, no matter how convinced I was that I was right. My bet would be with Aquinas without question and defined Church teaching absolutely,

I also don’t think Linus has provided a knock down argument against Linux, either, since he tends to cite Aquinas by letting Aquinas "speak for himself” with the assumption that everyone will simply interpret Aquinas through Linus lenses.

To take one example: Aquinas on “formal esse.” Why would Aquinas use a very specific descriptor “formal” when he states (loosely cited) that God is not the formal esse of creation? Linus simply glosses over that word "formal’ as if it doesn’t matter. Obviously, Aquinas has something very specific in mind here. Why did he not simply and categorically state: God is not the esse of creation?” What is the difference between “formal esse” and “esse?” Linus needs to provide a meaningful interpretation that resonates with my understanding for me to buy into his interpretation as the only or authoritative one.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Peter

I read your post to Ut. The problem you are having is that you have not been trained in philosophy. Also, I think you are a person who is governed more by feelings and emotion than by thought. So I have enclosed the following to help. The simple fact is God creates an Act of Existence for His creatures. Thomas says it over and over. Don’t you think that in 1,000 years, during which all priests ever ordained in the West studied Thomas intently, that if he was wrong, don’t you think a huge stink would have been raised?

Please consider the following:

S.C.G. Book I, Ch 26, para 3

3] Furthermore, things are not distinguished from one another in having being, for in this they agree. If, then, things differ from one another, either their being must be specified through certain added differences, so that diverse things have a diverse being according to their species, or things must differ in that the being itself is appropriate to natures that are diverse in species. The first of these alternatives is impossible, since, as we have said, no addition can be made to a being in the manner in which a difference is added to a genus. It remains, then, that things differ because they have diverse natures, to which being accrues in a diverse way. Now, the divine being does not accrue to a nature that is other than it; it is the nature itself, as we have said. If, therefore, the divine being were the formal being of all things, all things would have to be absolutely one.
dhspriory.org/thomas/ContraGentiles1.htm#26

Again: This from S.C.G., Book II, ch 21, para 4:

[4] Furthermore, effects correspond proportionally to their causes, so that we attribute actual effects to actual causes, potential effects to potential causes, and, similarly, particular effects to particular causes and universal effects to universal causes, as Aristotle teaches in Physics II [3]. Now, the act of being is the first effect, and this is evident by reason of the universal presence of this act. It follows that the proper cause of the act of being is the first and universal agent, namely, God. Other agents, indeed, are not the cause of the act of being as such, but of being this-of being a man or being white, for example. On the contrary, the act of being, as such, is caused by creation, which presupposes nothing; because nothing can pre-exist that is outside being as such. By makings other than creation, this being or such being is produced; for out of pre-existent being is made this being or such a being. It remains that creation is the proper action of God.
dhspriory.org/thomas/ContraGentiles2.htm#21

I will close out with a warning to Catholics, other Christians, Jews, and Muslims ( the latter two groups had a valuable philosophical tradition in the Golden Age of their past which Thomas was wont to draw from frequently). The quotation below illustrates a problem which is unfolding in this thread and similar ones. All should read the entire Encyclical Humani Generis from which the quotation is taken.
papalencyclicals.net/Pius12/P12HUMAN.HTM

1. These new opinions, whether they originate from a reprehensible desire of novelty or from a laudable motive, are not always advanced in the same degree, with equal clarity nor in the same terms, nor always with unanimous agreement of their authors. Theories that today are put forward rather covertly by some, not without cautions and distinctions, tomorrow are openly and without moderation proclaimed by others more audacious, causing scandal to many, especially among the young clergy and to the detriment of ecclesiastical authority. Though they are usually more cautious in their published works, they express themselves more openly in their writings intended for private circulation and in conferences and lectures. Moreover, these opinions are disseminated not only among members of the clergy and in seminaries and religious institutions, but also among the laity, and especially among those who are engaged in teaching youth.

Linus2nd

 

[prodigalson2011]

Linux,

I’m curious: how much Thomistic literature have you read? Because in all of your recent threads, the only work I’ve ever seen you cite is Ed Feser’s “Aquinas” which is a very basic introductory work.

I ask because, and here I agree with Linus, you seem to be minimally familiar with the complexities of the concepts you’re dealing with. That which you see as so simple has been grappled with for centuries by men, St. Thomas chief among them, who have devoted their entire lives to properly understanding these distinctions. I readily admit that my own offerings here are of a very oversimplified nature and that my own understanding is light years away from thorough.

But one thing I know for certain: your familiarity with the Thomistic school of thought cannot be very expansive at all if you think your own is compatible with it.

If you can find it in a nearby university library, the book “Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas” by Rudi Te Velde is particularly helpful in getting a handle on this particular issue. (You can check here: worldcat.org/title/participation-and-substantiality-in-thomas-aquinas/oclc/185936700)

An excerpt:

To say of the divine being that it is tantum esse may give rise to misunderstandings… First, when we say that God is his being itself (ipsummet suum esse), we do not intend to deny an essence in God, so Thomas explains. Although there is no definable (and thus finite) essence in God, he still has a fully determinate essence, namely an essence which consists in pure esse. Another misunderstanding would be to conclude from the expression ‘tantum esse’ that the divine being is the same as “universal being” (esse universale) by which every thing formally is a being. This universal esse is something indeterminate and common, and acquires in each different being a different determination in virtue of the essence. So the danger here is that we take the expression ‘tantum esse’ to mean ‘being without essence,’ pure being that is free of any determinate content. But, Thomas argues, God’s being is fully determined in itself; it is not because his being is received in a distinct essence but by its very purity that the divine being is distinct from all other instances of being… … The designation of God’s being as tantum esse is therefore qualified and explained by the formula ‘bonitas pura’ taken from Liber de causes, ‘pure’ denotes God’s simplicity and ‘goodness’ refers to the fullness and determinate character of God’s being…

And later:

Thomas concludes his treatment of God’s simplicity with an article in which he explicitly excludes the identification of the simple God with the simplicity of prime matter or that of common being (esse commune). God’s simplicity is not such that he enters into a composition with others; He cannot be a part of a whole, for in that case he would not be simpliciter prima in entibus.

Altogether, this expounds, in much greater clarity and detail, one of the main points I have been driving: God cannot be a part of something else. It’s a violation of the divine nature. I do intend to reply directly to your last couple of posts, and in fact am currently in the process of doing so, but I wanted to bring this up in the interim.

 

[Peter_Plato]

Peter

I read your post to Ut. The problem you are having is that you have not been trained in philosophy.

Very presumptuous of you.

Also, I think you are a person who is governed more by feelings and emotion than by thought. So I have enclosed the following to help. The simple fact is God creates an Act of Existence for His creatures. Thomas says it over and over. Don’t you think that in 1,000 years, during which all priests ever ordained in the West studied Thomas intently, that if he was wrong, don’t you think a huge stink would have been raised?

Please consider the following:

Likewise:

Please consider the following:

For it is obvious that the first being, which is God, is infinite act, as having in itself the entire fullness of being, not contracted to any generic or specific nature. Hence its very existence must not be an existence that is, as it were, put into some nature which is not its own existence, because thus it would be limited to that nature. Hence we say that God is His own existence. Now this cannot be said of any other being. For, just as it is impossible to understand that there are many separate whitenesses, but if there were “whiteness” apart from every subject and recipient, there would be but one whiteness, so it is impossible to have a self-subsisting existence unless there is but one. Accordingly, every thing which exists after the first being, because it is not its own existence, has an existence that is received in something, through which the existence is itself contracted; and thus in any created object the nature of the thing which participates in existence is one thing, and the participated existence itself is another. And because any thing participates in the first act through similitude insofar as it has existence, the participated existence must in each case be related to the nature participating in it, as act is related to potency. Accordingly, in the world of physical objects, matter does not of itself participate in actual existence, but it does participate therein through form; for the form coming upon the matter makes the matter itself actually exist, as the soul does to the body.

From: De Spiritualibus Creaturis - Article 1, Answer Paragraph 4

I take it from the above that Aquinas views existence as one, not many (as per my previous post.) Just as there cannot be many “whitenesses,” as if each white thing has its own whiteness, so too each existing thing does not have its own “existence.” The term Aquinas uses in several parts of De Spiritualibus Creaturis is the word “subsist” for what creatures do when actualized, so Aquinas concludes "…it is impossible to have a self-subsisting existence unless there is but one [existence].” Things subsist - according to their own nature or essence - in existence, which is but one reality, “infinite act” or the “entire fullness of being,” which only God is or has. Created things have, if anything, what Aquinas calls “participated existence” or subsistence, which is related to the nature or essence of the thing that “participates” in existence.

According to the above, created things cannot have their own existence because then God would “as it were, put [existence] into some nature which is not its own existence, because thus it would be limited to that nature.” If each created thing had its own existence, then existence itself would be “limited” to the nature of that thing which had it, which according to Aquinas is impossible.

Linus, this seems pretty definitive to me. It supports what Linux has been saying. I leave it to Ut and ProdigalSon (and others viewing) to make their own sense of it, but unless they (or you) can show me that this rendering of Aquinas is just completely off base, I stand by my long held view.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Linux,

I’m curious: how much Thomistic literature have you read? Because in all of your recent threads, the only work I’ve ever seen you cite is Ed Feser’s “Aquinas” which is a very basic introductory work.

I ask because, and here I agree with Linus, you seem to be minimally familiar with the complexities of the concepts you’re dealing with. That which you see as so simple has been grappled with for centuries by men, St. Thomas chief among them, who have devoted their entire lives to properly understanding these distinctions. I readily admit that my own offerings here are of a very oversimplified nature and that my own understanding is light years away from thorough.

But one thing I know for certain: your familiarity with the Thomistic school of thought cannot be very expansive at all if you think your own is compatible with it.

If you can find it in a nearby university library, the book “Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas” by Rudi Te Velde is particularly helpful in getting a handle on this particular issue. (You can check here: worldcat.org/title/participation-and-substantiality-in-thomas-aquinas/oclc/185936700)

An excerpt:

And later:

Altogether, this expounds, in much greater clarity and detail, one of the main points I have been driving: God cannot be a part of something else. It’s a violation of the divine nature. I do intend to reply directly to your last couple of posts, and in fact am currently in the process of doing so, but I wanted to bring this up in the interim.

Great research. Velde is one of the best commentators of Thomas, I often considered buying this book. Wipple has a book discussing the same issues. The " Preview " option on World Cat must be a relatively new feature. Great tool.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Very presumptuous of you.

Likewise:

Please consider the following:

From: De Spiritualibus Creaturis - Article 1, Answer Paragraph 4

I take it from the above that Aquinas views existence as one, not many (as per my previous post.) Just as there cannot be many “whitenesses,” as if each white thing has its own whiteness, so too each existing thing does not have its own “existence.” The term Aquinas uses in several parts of De Spiritualibus Creaturis is the word “subsist” for what creatures do when actualized, so Aquinas concludes "…it is impossible to have a self-subsisting existence unless there is but one [existence].” Things subsist - according to their own nature or essence - in existence, which is but one reality, “infinite act” or the “entire fullness of being,” which only God is or has. Created things have, if anything, what Aquinas calls “participated existence” or subsistence, which is related to the nature or essence of the thing that “participates” in existence.

According to the above, created things cannot have their own existence because then God would “as it were, put [existence] into some nature which is not its own existence, because thus it would be limited to that nature.” If each created thing had its own existence, then existence itself would be “limited” to the nature of that thing which had it, which according to Aquinas is impossible.

Linus, this seems pretty definitive to me. It supports what Linux has been saying. I leave it to Ut and ProdigalSon (and others viewing) to make their own sense of it, but unless they (or you) can show me that this rendering of Aquinas is just completely off base, I stand by my long held view.

Thomas proves your " long held view " incorrect in the very quotation you use, " … And because any thing participates in the first act through similitude insofar as it has existence, the participated existence must in each case be related to the nature participating in it, as act is related to potency. Accordingly, in the world of physical objects, matter does not of itself participate in actual existence, but it does participate therein through form; for the form coming upon the matter makes the matter itself actually exist, as the soul does to the body…" Thomas explains that to participate means to be similar to, as any effect must be similar to its cause, not that it is a part of the cause as being a part of that which is perfect.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Very presumptuous of you.

Better than me art thou. Personally, I would rather be right than loved.

…Reader can refer to the original post.

According to the above, created things cannot have their own existence because then God would “as it were, put [existence] into some nature which is not its own existence, because thus it would be limited to that nature.” If each created thing had its own existence, then existence itself would be “limited” to the nature of that thing which had it, which according to Aquinas is impossible.

Linus, this seems pretty definitive to me. It supports what Linux has been saying. I leave it to Ut and ProdigalSon (and others viewing) to make their own sense of it, but unless they (or you) can show me that this rendering of Aquinas is just completely off base, I stand by my long held view.

From: De Spiritualibus Creaturis - Article 1, Answer Paragraph 4

Thomas proves your " long held view " incorrect in the very quotation you use, " … And because any thing participates in the first act through similitude insofar as it has existence, the participated existence must in each case be related to the nature participating in it, as act is related to potency. Accordingly, in the world of physical objects, matter does not of itself participate in actual existence, but it does participate therein through form; for the form coming upon the matter makes the matter itself actually exist, as the soul does to the body…" Thomas explains that to participate means to be similar to, as any effect must be similar to its cause, not that it is a part of the cause as being a part of that which is perfect. So, this squares perfectly with what Thomas says here and in a multitued of other places:
" But in all creatures there is found the trace of the Trinity, inasmuch as in every creature are found some things which are necessarily reduced to the divine Persons as to their cause. For every creature subsists in its own being, and has a form, whereby it is determined to a species, and has relation to something else. Therefore as it is a created substance, it represents the cause and principle; and so in that manner it shows the Person of the Father, Who is the “principle from no principle.” According as it has a form and species, it represents the Word as the form of the thing made by art is from the conception of the craftsman. According as it has relation of order, it represents the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as He is love, because the order of the effect to something else is from the will of the Creator. And therefore Augustine says (De Trin. vi 10) that " (S.T.Part 1, Ques 45, Art 7). Notice, “… every creature subsists in its own being…” And notice, " …it is a created substance…" And notice, " …it represents ( or we could say ’ participates " the cause and principle…"

And again, " … Now to produce being absolutely, not as this or that being, belongs to creation. Hence it is manifest that creation is the proper act of God alone…" ( op. cit. Art 5 ) So, God creates being, considered either as the entire substance or the beings act of existence.

And again, " …Now the proper effect of God creating is what is presupposed to all other effects, and that is absolute being…" ( op. cit. Art 5 ) So, twice in the same article, Thomas states that God creates existence.
newadvent.org/summa/1045.htm#article5

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

It does not show any such thing, and neither have you or Thomas Aquinas disproved my argument.

If by saying that God is not the formal being of each thing he is saying that God is not the esse of each essence, then i have no choice but to reject his claim because it leads to ontological contradictions which i have explained thoroughly and have been ignored with red herrings (for example, this has turned into a debate about Thomas instead of a debate about the Title of this thread).

But if he is saying that God is not the essence of a thing as it adheres in an actual substance, then i agree.

And contrary to the facts of reality, Simon Magus, found that when he jumped from the tower, he really could not fly!!!

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

“For the sake of convenience, then, one can divide all things that exist into one of two sides of a dividing line: God on one side; and the universe on the other side, the relationship between the two being, among other things, that of cause to effect. However, this means, in Aquinas’s terms, that every ‘thing’ but God has the cause of its existence in God, i.e.,** it participates in existence inasmuch as it participates in God’s existence**.”

My response to Peter’s post 550 answers this.

Thomas proves your " long held view " incorrect in the very quotation you use, " … And because any thing participates in the first act through similitude insofar as it has existence, the participated existence must in each case be related to the nature participating in it, as act is related to potency. Accordingly, in the world of physical objects, matter does not of itself participate in actual existence, but it does participate therein through form; for the form coming upon the matter makes the matter itself actually exist, as the soul does to the body…" Thomas explains that to participate means to be similar to, as any effect must be similar to its cause, not that it is a part of the cause as being a part of that which is perfect. So, this squares perfectly with what Thomas says here and in a multitued of other places:
" But in all creatures there is found the trace of the Trinity, inasmuch as in every creature are found some things which are necessarily reduced to the divine Persons as to their cause. For every creature subsists in its own being, and has a form, whereby it is determined to a species, and has relation to something else. Therefore as it is a created substance, it represents the cause and principle; and so in that manner it shows the Person of the Father, Who is the “principle from no principle.” According as it has a form and species, it represents the Word as the form of the thing made by art is from the conception of the craftsman. According as it has relation of order, it represents the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as He is love, because the order of the effect to something else is from the will of the Creator. And therefore Augustine says (De Trin. vi 10) that " (S.T.Part 1, Ques 45, Art 7). Notice, “… every creature subsists in its own being…” And notice, " …it is a created substance…" And notice, " …it represents ( or we could say ’ participates " the cause and principle…"

And again, " … Now to produce being absolutely, not as this or that being, belongs to creation. Hence it is manifest that creation is the proper act of God alone…" ( op. cit. Art 5 ) So, God creates being, considered either as the entire substance or the beings act of existence.

And again, " …Now the proper effect of God creating is what is presupposed to all other effects, and that is absolute being…" ( op. cit. Art 5 ) So, twice in the same article, Thomas states that God creates existence.
newadvent.org/summa/1045.htm#article5

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Were does this come from?

S.T., Part 1, Ques. 3, Art. 5

Linus2nd

 

[utunumsint]

At the risk of being accused of siding with Linux as a co-conspirator in an attempt to undermine democracy, I do think Linux is on to something.

I have always understood esse or existence as being or to mean simply “to be.” I do not think that there are different “kinds” of existence, I have always presumed there to be just one “existence” that requires no delineation. Explanation, yes. Delineation, no.

This had been a basic understanding of mine since I was old enough to think (age 1 and a half, I believe.) That is why I intuitively agree with many of Linux’s points. I have never assumed, nor can I fathom the possibility, that there are different “kinds” of existence, but merely that existence is to be equated to “being,” pure and simple.

I understand how background can influence thought. To explain my background, I have an undergrad in comparative religions and classical studies. One of the focuses of my comparative religions courses was mysticism. Abviously, I’m no expert, but in studying the writings of the mystics, I always found this idea that there is a point when the soul ascends into God, that we leave created reality and approach God who is completely other. Everything intelligible to us is only an image of God’s perfection. That includes being itself. There are parallels here in eastern religion with the concept of nirvana, a place outside of being, but unlike the eastern approach, the Christian approach is to see God as personal.

This ultimate other that is prior and transcendent to everything in nature, including being itself is ultimately what I think of as God. The natural ways of reaching to God, for example through some forms neo-platonism, lose sight of the distance between creature and creator. In created matter, vegetation, and animals life, there are only traces that point to a God. In human beings, there is an image, but that image is a reflection of a Being that is impossible to grasp through our natural powers. (I am not talking of an uninvolved transcendent being such as the Deists conceive, - God causes and sustains all things in creation, including being itself, but remains other.)

When I read, in the past, Aquinas as saying God is ipsum esse subsistens or Actus Purus, my natural interpretation has always been that God is “existence itself” and created things exist by partaking to some extent or other in existence. It has never dawned on me that this very basic belief of mine has been heretical, as Linus has declared. In fact, on every reading of Aquinas, this basic belief has been corroborated by what he writes. Nor have I ever had cause to question it in my reading of any Thomist or Scholastic

To hear from Linus that this basic belief is not only mistaken but heretical, I am genuinely puzzled. I simply cannot integrate the idea of different kinds of existence into my metaphysics no matter how forcibly I try to make the idea fit. How can existence be not one, but many? That is as foreign to me as polytheism is. It doesn’t compute.

Right. I think Thomas makes it clear that he distinguishes between common being, common to us all (something that only exists alone as an abstraction in the mind), that accrues to each nature, and the personal being of God. God is one, creation is another. All creation, including being.I think he makes this point that creation, per se, is primarily the creation of being, from which essences can derive their existence. The essences themselves presuppose this common being. But I honestly don’t think Aquinas is identifying this common being with God’s being. I think S.C.G I chapter 26 really drives this home dhspriory.org/thomas/ContraGentiles1.htm#26

That does not mean my metaphysics is correct. Heaven forbid that has never been something that I have been assured of. However, I do have this little skeptical hair that stands up on the back of my neck when something doesn’t seem quite right. I feel that way about conceding that existence is not just one basic, simple reality, but that existence(s) like essences, can be manifold.

So, the way I see it (the way I see Aquinas seeing it), nothing that exists, e.g., no substance in nature, exists without a form. Therefore form is the cause of a thing’s actuality. Thus, there is no esse that is not accompanied by form. Form is prior to esse. This common being that all things share, is simply a pure receptivity to form. Form is what actualizes. But God has his own essence, his own form. It is infinite and thus infinitely transcends created forms.

The other problem is reconciling this idea of existence as manifold with what Aquinas means when he refers to the potential-actual distinction. To be actualized, in my reading of Aquinas, is to exist, to come to be. God is Existence Itself and created things are actualized by God because only what is in act or being (i.e., exists ) can bring into act or being (simpliciter) things that do not currently exist. This means things that can exist (have potency) must be given that potential, ex nihilo in the act of conception (brought to potential) and in the act of creation (brought into being) since these would have been nothing (ontologically speaking) before having potency, and then brought into existence (actualized) by being endowed with esse (again, existence simpliciter.)

The parallels are:

• non being to being.
• potency to act
• matter to form
• tabula rassa mind to intellectual form

Everything on the right is on the plane of existence.
Continued later… I have to start my day job

God bless,
Ut