How does God create "the act of existing" out of nothing?

[Linusthe2nd]

Peter Plato and Linux, here is another quote that reinforces my understanding:

Again, universal esse and divine esse. One can be added to, the other cannot!

How am I getting this wrong?

God bless,
Ut

Great work. No doubt about the meaning.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Perhaps because Aquinas uses contracted twice in the same passage further compounds the problem. Your reading of the meaning of “contract” as “change” as in reduce in number, size, etc. is not the only one possible in both instances.

Instance 1
In the first use of “contracted,” I would argue that Aquinas means in the sense of limiting because he is speaking of God’s “fullness of being” which leads into the use of contracted. Also, he is arguing that God’s existence cannot be “put into” any created being precisely because that would “limit” existence to the nature of that being. He adds “…because thus it would be limited to that nature.” This is pretty clear.

Instance 2

This seems, on first reading, to be simply a repetition of the same use of contracted as in Instance 1, but that is not necessarily so. He prefaces this use with two important observations:

1. “…it is impossible to have a self-subsisting existence unless there is but one.”
2. “Accordingly, every thing which exists after the first being, because it is not its own existence has an existence that is received in something.”

Those two phrases indicate that perhaps Aquinas had a different meaning of the term “contracted” in mind here. In this case it could be that he meant “contracted” in the sense of “mediated” or “the means by which something is transferred or conferred.” In this sense a disease might be “contracted” or transmitted from one entity to another.

If the entire sentence is read with this meaning of “contracted” in mind, the sense of what Aquinas writes is completely changed.

Accordingly, every thing which exists after the first being, because it is not its own existence, has an existence that is received in something through which the existence is itself contracted; and thus in any created object the nature of the thing which participates in existence is one thing, and the participated existence itself is another…

Thus, existence of created things is received through “something” *, which distinguishes existence itself (God) from the mediated or participated existence (subsistent ens) of the created object. This contracted “something” through which participation in existence occurs is the degree of separation that does not “contract” or limit existence itself to the nature of the thing created.

Thus the difficulty exposed by Aquinas in Instance 1, is resolved by him in Instance 2. Existence is mediated or contracted to the creature by the nature or essence of the thing (form) which allows participation (as caused effect) in existence without endowing existence itself on the being, which would be problematic, according to Aquinas, because in that case, existence would be “limited” by the nature of each created thing, which is not only impossible but contradicts the ipsum esse subsistens of God.

If each being had actual existence, which belongs properly only to God, then the identity of existence and nature in God would be compromised, since existence would be limited by the nature of each act of created “existence.” Existence would, then, not be simple, but multiplied and complex.

In this sense, I would argue, that created beings “subsist” or, in a manner of speaking, “contract” their being (subsist) through their created “act of being” mediated in the essential nature of each created thing. They participate in existence as “acts” of existence, but cannot have existence as distinct or separated from God’s existence.*

Yes, he is using " contracted " in the sense of limiting, limited by, bound by, attached to, circumscribed by. Pretty darn clear. Also note that created beings can " subsist, " they just aren’t self-substent. Rather their subsistence is a dependent subsistence.

 

[utunumsint]

I am in the process of reading through the entire body of DE POTENTIA DEI to try to put your quoted sections in perspective. Unfortunately, I also have a busy evening tonight and tomorrow. I will get back to you because your concerns are legitimate ones and I see a need to reconcile the text to my position or concede to yours.

Thanks for your patience.

PP

Hi PP,

I just saw this post now. Thanks for taking the time to follow up on this. I appreciate the effort.

God bless,
Ut

 

[Peter_Plato]

Yes, he is using " contracted " in the sense of limiting, limited by, bound by, attached to, circumscribed by. Pretty darn clear. Also note that created beings can " subsist, " they just aren’t self-substent. Rather their subsistence is a dependent subsistence.

Linus?

Your posts are becoming so unobtrusive and your formatting so diminutive that I almost missed this post. A welcome relief from the pneumatic drill approach that had become your “stock and trade.”

I will get to the above point, but in a roundabout way.

In post #655, you insisted on this:

The answer is so clear that it hardly needs explanation. Created creatures subsist, but their subsistence is obviously a dependent subsistence as opposed to God’s self-substence. I hope this clears up this misunderstanding.

I am not clear that this clears up anything precisely because no one is arguing that creatures do not have “being” or do not “exist.” What is at issue is the manner in which creatures, and creation at large, has existence.

You have been arguing that creatures have “their own existence.” Linux and I have been taking the position that existence is in some sense a “participation” in the one and only existence possible, existence itself, which Aquinas holds is God himself.

No one is disputing the above point that the “subsistence” of creatures is dependent, that is quite clear. And no one is arguing that existence (if it only belongs to God proper) does not need to be “contracted,” even in the sense of “limited” in order for creatures to partake in it.

In the passage I have been referring to from De Spiritualibus Creaturis, Aquinas is actually attempting to reconcile how existence can be one and yet allow creatures to participate in or “have” existence. Even if you insist that contracted must mean “reduced,” the passage is attempting to explain how that happens, i.e., existence must be “reduced” or contracted in order for creatures to participate in it. I was arguing that Aquinas is implying that some kind of mediation or “contracting” to creation must occur and, therefore, a mediator (aka Christ) is implied.

Again, what is at issue is not whether creatures exist, but rather whether that existence is “their own” (as you and others are insisting) or whether that existence is participatory (as Linux and I are.)

To claim that Aquinas states creatures are “in being” or “exist” does not, on its own, make your case, unless you equivocate on “exist” as meaning “have their own existence.” That would seem to imply that “have being” means the same as “have its own being” which seems to be what Aquinas claims only God has, ipsum esse subsistens.

If you care to explain how a creature can “have its own existence” without confusing what that means with only in God are essence and existence identical, that would be most helpful. What can “have its own existence” possibly mean except that a creature’s essence entails its existence because essence and existence are “conjoined” in some sense. A creature would then exist in some limited way because it possesses its own existence in a complete way. But why would its own existence have to then be reduced or limited, since that existence would be “its own” or identical to its essence? That kind of existence would NOT need to be reduced in the least since it would derive from the nature of the creature. What would it need to be reduced from?

I doubt creatures have “their own existence” precisely because existence is one, belongs to God as pure act (the definition of what “to be” or “to exist” means, and cannot be subdivided or parceled out to creatures who then have a “piece” of it. I doubt this is what Aquinas had in mind.

Existence can only be a participatory act which must depend fully on God.

Please do not take out the jackhammer again by reposting and repeating the same passage and claiming how clear your point is. It is only clear if you equivocate “exists” with “has its own existence,” which is precisely the point in contention. Exists need not mean that, it may mean “participate” in some mediated sense in the only existence possible.

That may not necessarily mean we simply “are one in being with God” who is existence. My point is that Aquinas is arguing that the oneness in being is a mediated or contracted “oneness” that does not entail the Divine essence is divided, distributed nor reduced, but, rather, “shared” with creation in a non-diminishing way. The economy of love is non-reductive, it “gives away” without being reduced or impoverished.

 

[utunumsint]

Still thinking along the line of universal esse and divine esse, and how to explain the difference.

I’ve been theorizing that God is pure act in the sense that there is no movement from potentiality to actuality, a paradigm that characterizes universal esse. God is pure actuality. So when Aquinas says no addition can be made to God, he means that there is never a sense that God moves from one act to another. He is always pure act. One and simple.

To illustrate, every moment of my life I alternate between two acts, inhaling air, and exhaling air. When I am exhaling, I am actuating the form of exhaling and am in potentiality with regard to inhaling. As soon as I begin to inhale, I have become in potentiality to exhaling. This pattern goes on for the duration of my life.

But since God is pure act, he does not participate in that flux from form to form which characterizes universal existence.Thus he must make, in the act of creation, a universal existence capable of actuating forms.

If we agree that the universe is composed entirely of essential forms that feed into this universal esse, and if we agree that the created universe is not co-eternal with God (aviternal, maybe, but not co-eternal), then we have to admit that this universal esse is itself limited by essences, Because that universal esse only exists to actuate formal essences. That universal esse is constrained as a part of creation, inseperable from the forms it actuates. From this, I am not saying that there is potential in universal esse, but that it is not identical to divine esse because its purpose is to conjoin with created essences as it cycles through various formal activations, and allow those forms to fall out of activation into privation.

Whenever we actualize a particular form, we participate in a limited way, in the perfection of God who is pure act. But the nature of divine esse and universal esse are different. Universal esse is created to serve a purpose in creation that divine esse cannot, by its nature, serve. But both universal esse and all essences participate in God’s divine esse through causality. God is the only efficient cause capable of creating such a universal esse that can actuate forms.

What do you think PP?

God bless,
Ut

 

[Linux]

Nothing exists which does not have nature and existence. Even God has a nature, as was pointed out previously. Both esse and essence are principles of anything that exists, including God. Only in the case of God, his essence is identical to his existence.

Esse is either an objective thing that is distinct from essences even when conjoined or it is not. If it is distinct from esse, then esse is itself an essence and is identical with itself like God. Otherwise it is identical with the essence of creatures. There is no middle ground.

Saying that esse and essences is just two principles of one substance does not free you from the problem, since the fact still remains that an esse is objectively and really distinct from an essence in a substance. Otherwise you have to say that esse and essence is merely abstract principles describing a substance. A handle attached to a brush might make one whole object called a paint brush, but the handle is still a separate and real nature. Like you said an esse cannot exist without an essence otherwise esse cannot exist meaningfully, and since esse is truly and actually distinct from created essences then esse must have its own essence to which it is identical. There is only one such nature and that is God.

 

[utunumsint]

Still thinking along the line of universal esse and divine esse, and how to explain the difference.

I’ve been theorizing that God is pure act in the sense that there is no movement from potentiality to actuality, a paradigm that characterizes universal esse. God is pure actuality. So when Aquinas says no addition can be made to God, he means that there is never a sense that God moves from one act to another. He is always pure act. One and simple.

To illustrate, every moment of my life I alternate between two acts, inhaling air, and exhaling air. When I am exhaling, I am actuating the form of exhaling and am in potentiality with regard to inhaling. As soon as I begin to inhale, I have become in potentiality to exhaling. This pattern goes on for the duration of my life.

But since God is pure act, he does not participate in that flux from form to form which characterizes universal existence.Thus he must make, in the act of creation, a universal existence capable of actuating forms.

If we agree that the universe is composed entirely of essential forms that feed into this universal esse, and if we agree that the created universe is not co-eternal with God (aviternal, maybe, but not co-eternal), then we have to admit that this universal esse is itself limited by essences, Because that universal esse only exists to actuate formal essences. That universal esse is constrained as a part of creation, inseperable from the forms it actuates. From this, I am not saying that there is potential in universal esse, but that it is not identical to divine esse because its purpose is to conjoin with created essences as it cycles through various formal activations, and allow those forms to fall out of activation into privation.

Whenever we actualize a particular form, we participate in a limited way, in the perfection of God who is pure act. But the nature of divine esse and universal esse are different. Universal esse is created to serve a purpose in creation that divine esse cannot, by its nature, serve. But both universal esse and all essences participate in God’s divine esse through causality. God is the only efficient cause capable of creating such a universal esse that can actuate forms.

What do you think PP?

God bless,
Ut

This charaterization fits in with what he says in S.C.G;

dhspriory.org/thomas/ContraGentiles1.htm#26

[3] Furthermore, things are not distinguished from one another in having being, for in this they agree. If, then, things differ from one another, either their being must be specified through certain added differences, so that diverse things have a diverse being according to their species, or things must differ in that the being itself is appropriate to natures that are diverse in species. The first of these alternatives is impossible, since, as we have said, no addition can be made to a being in the manner in which a difference is added to a genus. It remains, then, that things differ because they have diverse natures, to which being accrues in a diverse way. Now, the divine being does not accrue to a nature that is other than it; it is the nature itself, as we have said. If, therefore, the divine being were the formal being of all things, all things would have to be absolutely one.

If divine being can’t do the job, because “divine being does not accrue to a nature that is other than it”, and if being cannot be parceled out according to species, then we need the concept of universal being. Only universal being (esse) that can be the formal being (esse) of all things.

As he continues on to say:

[4] Then, too, a principle is naturally prior to that whose principle it is. Now, in certain things being has something that is as its principle. For the form is said to be a principle of being, and so is the agent, that makes things to be in act. If, therefore, the divine being is the being of each thing, it will follow that God, Who is His own being, has some cause. Thus, He is not through Himself a necessary being. But, we have proved the contrary of this conclusion above.

Now, we should not take this to mean that universal being is in privation until form actualizes it, but I think this does mean that created universal being never exists apart from a form that it actualizes. And since this is on the paradigm of potency to act, it is inappropriate for the divine esse, which is pure act, to be involved in this constant stream of actualizing forms.

continued…

 

[utunumsint]

[5] Moreover, that which is common to many is not outside the many except by the reason alone. Thus, animal is not something outside Socrates and Plato and the other animals except in the intellect that apprehends the form of animal stripped of all its individuating and specifying characteristics. For man is that which truly is animal; otherwise, it would follow that in Socrates and Plato there are several animals, namely, common animal itself, common man, and Plato himself. Much less, then, is common being itself something outside all existing things, save only for being in the intellect. Hence, if God is common being, the only thing that will exist is that which exists solely in the intellect. But we showed above that God is something not only in the intellect but also in reality. Therefore, God is not the common being of all things.

This part is just reaffirming what I said in the last post that form and esse are part of created substances. You can’t find an esse that is not conjoined with an essence, except as an abstraction in the mind. Now God is no abstraction. He is real. He is a personal God, not some impersonal principle that makes up our substance.

[6] Again, strictly speaking, generation is the way to being and corruption the way to non-being. For form is not the terminus of generation, and privation is not the terminus of corruption, except because a form causes being and privation non-being. If a form did not cause being, a thing which received such a form would not be said to be generated. Hence, if God is the formal being of all things, He will consequently be the terminus of generation. This is false, since, as we have shown above, God is eternal.

This is just saying that if God were the esse involved in actualizing forms, then he would be finite, participating in the paradigm of potential to actual, which goes against the very concept of his pure eternal actuality.

[7] It will also follow that the being of each thing has existed from eternity. Generation or corruption is therefore impossible. If it does exist, pre-existing being must accrue to something anew. It will therefore accrue either to something pre-existing or to something in no way pre-existing. In the first instance, since according to the above position the being of all existing things is one, it will follow that a thing that is said to be generated acquires, not a new being, but a new mode of being. The result is alteration, not generation. But, if the generated thing in no way pre-existed, it will follow that it is produced from nothing—which is contrary to the nature of generation. This position, therefore, entirely ruins generation and corruption and, as a consequence, is evidently impossible.

Not sure I get this one.

[8] Sacred Teaching as well casts aside this error in confessing that God is “high and elevated,” according to Isaiah (6:1), and that He is “over all,” according to Romans (9:5). For, if He is the being of all things, He is part of all things, but not over them.

Seems clear enough to me.

This next passage seems clear enough.

[9] So, too, those who committed this error are condemned by the same judgment as are the idolaters who “gave the incommunicable name,” that is, of God, “to wood and stones,” as it is written (Wis. 14:21). If, indeed, God is the being of all things, there will be no more reason to say truly that a stone is a being than to say that a stone is God.

[10] Four factors seem to have contributed to the rise of this error. The first is the warped interpretation of certain authoritative texts. There is in Dionysius this remark [De caelisti hierarchia IV, 1]: “The being of all things is the super-essential divinity.” From this remark they wished to infer that God is the formal being of all things, without considering that this interpretation could not square with the words themselves. For, if the divinity is the formal being of all things, it will not be over all but among all, indeed a part of all. Now, since Dionysius said that the divinity was above all things, he showed that according to its nature it was distinct from all things and raised above all things. And when he said that the divinity is the being of all things, he showed that there was in all things a certain likeness of the divine being, coming from God. Elsewhere Dionysius has rather openly set aside this warped interpretation. He has said: “God neither touches nor is in any way mingled with other things, as a point touches a line or the figure of a seal touches wax” [De divinis nominibusi II, 5].

continued.

 

[kmcarl56]

From what I have read and watched on Christian television, scientists have actually proven that everything written in the Bible that they have tried to prove wrong or impossible scientifically, is actually true, as far as man is capable of such proof in this current age. With regard to the “act of existing” out of nothing, isn’t that the a definition of faith itself?

If you are a Christian, you must believe in God. If you have the faith that God is a real and living God, then you must believe that He has existed out of nothing forever in the past and in the future.

None of us will have all the answers we seek until we are able to ask God Himself, and I can’t wait to meet Him because I have a lot of questions!

May God bless you and keep you in all you do and say from this day until eternity!

 

[utunumsint]

And finally, here is the one I quoted yesterday that introduces the concept of universal being:

[11] The second cause leading them to this error is a failure of reason. For, since that which is common is specified or individuated through addition, they thought that the divine being, which receives no addition, was not some proper being but the common being of all things. They ignored the fact that what is common or universal cannot exist without addition, but is considered without addition. For animal cannot be without the difference rational or the difference irrational, although it is considered without these differences. What is more, although a universal may be considered without addition, it is not without the receptibility of addition; for, if no difference could be added to animal, it would not be a genus. The same is true of all other names. But the divine being is without addition not only in thought but also in reality; and not only without addition but also without the receptibility of addition. From the fact, then, that it neither receives nor can receive addition we can rather conclude that God is not common being but proper being; for His being is distinguished from all the rest by the fact that nothing can be added to it. Hence the Commentator says in the Book of Causes that, out of the purity of its goodness, the first cause is distinguished from the rest and in a manner individuated.

Now, I was reading De Potentia this morning, and I came on this passage in Question I, article 1 Is There Power in God?:

I answer that to make the point at issue clear we must observe that we speak of power in relation to act. Now act is twofold; the first act which is a form, and the second act which is operation. Seemingly the word ‘act’ was first universally employed in the sense of operation, and then, secondly, transferred to indicate the form, inasmuch as the form is the principle and end of operation. Wherefore in like manner power is twofold: active power corresponding to that act which is operation—and seemingly it was in this sense that the word ‘power’ was first employed:— and passive power, corresponding to the first act or the form,—to which seemingly the name of power was subsequently given.
Now, just as nothing suffers save by reason of a passive power, so nothing acts except by reason of the first act, namely the form. For it has been stated that this first act is so called from action. Now God is act both pure and primary, wherefore it is most befitting to him to act and communicate his likeness to other things: and consequently active power is most becoming to him: since power is called active forasmuch as it is a principle of action. We must also observe that our mind strives to describe God as a most perfect being. And seeing that it is unable to get at him save by likening him to his effects, while it fails to find any creature so supremely perfect as to be wholly devoid of imperfection, consequently it endeavours to describe him as possessing the various perfections it discovers in creatures, although each of those perfections is in some way at fault, yet so as to remove, from God whatever imperfection is connected with them. For instance, being denotes something complete and simple, yet non-subsistent; substance denotes something subsistent, yet the subject of something. Accordingly we ascribe being and substance to God; but substance by reason of subsistence not of substanding; and being by reason of simplicity and completeness, not of inherence whereby it inheres to something. In like manner we ascribe to God operation by reason of its being the ultimate perfection, not by reason of that into which operation passes. And we attribute power to God by reason of that which is permanent and is the principle of power, and not by reason of that which is made complete by operation.

Here you find affirmed what I was saying previously, that God does not exercise power in the passive sense. That entire paradigm, that of moving from passive potentiality to act, is no possible in God, because there is no potentiality in him, by his very essence. Therefore in creation, you need the concept of universal esse that activates form and allows for addition, e.g. is participated being in which forms can be activated.

Continuing on in S.C.G. chapter 26,

[12] The third factor that led them into this error concerns the divine simplicity. God is at the peak of simplicity. They therefore thought that the last point of resolution in our way of seeing things is God, as being absolutely simple. For it is not possible to proceed to infinity in composition among the things we know. Their reason also failed because they did not observe that what is most simple in our understanding of things is not so much a complete thing as a part of a thing. But, simplicity is predicated of God as of some perfect subsisting thing.

Here it is again. Universal being must be conjoined to esse. Universal esse does not stand on its own, but is “a part of a thing”, e.g. that part that actuates forms - there still remains the privations that still exist in potentiality. God does is pure act, and in no way participates in us. We participate in him, indirectly, through universal esse, which he creates in us, along with our esse, “as part of a thing” (part of us).

[13] A fourth factor that could have led them to their error is the mode of expression we use when we say that God is in all things. By this we do not mean that God is in things as a part of a thing, but as the cause of a thing that is never lacking to its effect. For we do not say that a form is in matter as a sailor is in a ship.

And here is the kicker. Here is where we participate in God. We participate in God because “the cause of a thing …is never lacking to its effect.” And that cause, which is God, is the only “perfect subsisting thing.”

God bless,
Ut

 

[Aloysium]

:twocents: and random musings:

God creates the universe.
He creates me. He created me out of nothing.
I was not in time, and then I was, and here I am.
Although eternal, I had a beginning in time.

I am.
I am able to participate in creation, relate to it, love it, because I exist and am separate from it.
I am not you; no matter how similar, even if we were completely identical, we would not be each other.
We can empathize, communicate, love and feel so close that there may be an experience of oneness.

Although Love is at the centre of the cosmos, my life is a struggle to make it my centre.
I am not God. My will is mine; it defines, in a limited sense creates, makes me who I choose to become. God permits this.
He creates this me, who then chooses his destiny.

So God creates me “out of nothing”.
He creates me as someone who, participating in the world, brings into it goodness or evil,
someone who is striving to return Home.

In trying to understand what the concept “the act of existing” can mean,
it reminds me that I do exist, and this is very, very awesome.
reflecting and connecting me to Who it is that is creating me,
a self, a participant in this us and the complexity that is the totality of His creation.

 

[wbradl]

I believe there are many things we do not understand about god,and never will!! when the finite mind of man understands the infinite mind of God either we or God are in trouble,and I’ll give you a clue,God is never in trouble!!! ergo…finish the logicThis reminds me, in college the good jesuit asked the class “can God make a square circle?” I replied Yes he can!,the jebbie said how foolish,God can only do the possible!,a square circle is not possible…to witt I replied God cld surely make a square circle,only if he did you wouldnn’t understand it!!!. The same logic applies to God making something from naught!!!w bradl

 

[Peter_Plato]

:twocents: and random musings:

God creates the universe.
He creates me. He created me out of nothing.
I was not in time, and then I was, and here I am.
Although eternal, I had a beginning in time.

I am.
I am able to participate in creation, relate to it, love it, because I exist and am separate from it.
I am not you; no matter how similar, even if we were completely identical, we would not be each other.
We can empathize, communicate, love and feel so close that there may be an experience of oneness.

Although Love is at the centre of the cosmos, my life is a struggle to make it my centre.
I am not God. My will is mine; it defines, in a limited sense creates, makes me who I choose to become. God permits this.
He creates this me, who then chooses his destiny.

So God creates me “out of nothing”.
He creates me as someone who, participating in the world, brings into it goodness or evil,
someone who is striving to return Home.

In trying to understand what the concept “the act of existing” can mean,
it reminds me that I do exist, and this is very, very awesome.
reflecting and connecting me to Who it is that is creating me,
a self, a participant in this us and the complexity that is the totality of His creation.

:clapping:

 

[Peter_Plato]

This charaterization fits in with what he says in S.C.G;

dhspriory.org/thomas/ContraGentiles1.htm#26

If divine being can’t do the job, because “divine being does not accrue to a nature that is other than it”, and if being cannot be parceled out according to species, then we need the concept of universal being. Only universal being (esse) that can be the formal being (esse) of all things.

As he continues on to say:

Now, we should not take this to mean that universal being is in privation until form actualizes it, but I think this does mean that created universal being never exists apart from a form that it actualizes. And since this is on the paradigm of potency to act, it is inappropriate for the divine esse, which is pure act, to be involved in this constant stream of actualizing forms.

continued…

I think you are on to something here. Members of universal being “exist” in an attenuated sense of being “passive” recipients of existence, they “have” being, rather than “are” being. This fits in with the idea of a kind of “mediated” or contingent being that passively "has” existence as an add-on (contracted from) rather than as God who is the fullness of existence itself, because he is pure and complete act.

 

[prodigalson2011]

Esse is either an objective thing that is distinct from essences even when conjoined or it is not. If it is distinct from esse, then esse is itself an essence and is identical with itself like God. Otherwise it is identical with the essence of creatures. There is no middle ground. Saying that esse and essences is just two principles of one substance does not free you from the problem, since the fact still remains that an esse is objectively and really distinct from an essence in a substance. Otherwise you have to say that esse and essence is merely abstract principles describing a substance. A handle attached to a brush might make one whole object called a paint brush, but the handle is still a separate and real nature. Like you said an esse cannot exist without an essence otherwise esse cannot exist meaningfully, and since esse is truly and actually distinct from created essences then esse must have its own essence to which it is identical. There is only one such nature and that is God.

There is a third alternative: that of God’s infinite creative power which brings an entire substance into existence. There is no contradiction in a substance created in full from no prior components having both esse and essence. The two are really distinct not because they are ontologically separable but because they are irreconcilably different in definition and function within the being. Therefore, they cannot be identical to one another. From Aquinas Online (aquinasonline.com):

Just as the substantial form of a material being determines and makes actual some part of matter, so esse actualizes the potency of a thing’s essence. This similarity is an analogous one because, the esse and essence of a thing are not separable in real beings, as the form is separable from matter in abstraction; the two are only distinguishable because of their own very real distinction.

 

[daler]

God is a Spirit and in order for Him to communicate with His human creatures on a personal basis, and His human creatures with Him, God has created human beings as spirit beings: “…there is a spirit in men, and the inspiration of the Almighty giveth understanding” (Job 32:8). In other words, God created mankind and made them individuals by giving each human being his or her own personal spirit. God did not create human beings by giving them a piece of Himself, since God is indivisible. God created human beings in (not of or from) His own image.

This brings to mind something from the Writings of Baha’u’llah

O SON OF MAN!
I loved thy creation, hence I created thee. Wherefore, do thou love Me, that I may name thy name and fill thy soul with the spirit of life.

 

[Linux]

Just as the substantial form of a material being determines and makes actual some part of matter, so esse actualizes the potency of a thing’s essence. This similarity is an analogous one because, the esse and essence of a thing are not separable in real beings, as the form is separable from matter in abstraction; the two are only distinguishable because of their own very real distinction.

If esse and essence is inseparable in real things, then they cannot fail to exist for they cannot be separated from each-other and might as well-be identical just as the 3 sides of a triangle is inseparable from the concept of a triangle. Thus what you are trying to imply here with this quote cannot be the case. Of course an essence cannot be real if esse is separated from it, as opposed to esse and essence merely being ontologically separate things in themselves. Also the distinction is not merely an abstraction, but a real objective distinction, just as the handle is its own nature and the brush is something else. Thus whatever is intended by the quote is not what you are implying and of course cannot be logically true even if that is what Aquinas intends…

 

[Linux]

There is a third alternative: that of God’s infinite creative power which brings an entire substance into existence. There is no contradiction in a substance created in full from no prior components having both esse and essence. The two are really distinct not because they are ontologically separable but because they are irreconcilably different in definition and function within the being. Therefore, they cannot be identical to one another. From Aquinas Online (aquinasonline.com):

Esse and essence is not a merely a functional distinction, for if that were the case esse and essence would be identical in everything but function, and therefore an essence would not fail to exist. But that does not make any sense for how can a man be identical to existence accept in function? If you are your esse then your act or function is your esse.

And yes, there is a contradiction involved in God making a species of existence.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

" For, just as it is impossible to understand that there are many separate whitenesses, but if there were “whiteness” apart from every subject and recipient, there would be but one whiteness,so it is impossible to have a self-subsisting existence unless there is but one."

This is refering to God, who is self-subsistent. Created beings are subsistent but not self-substent. Because their act of existence is created, their subsistence is a dependent subsitence.

4."…Accordingly, every thing which exists after the first being, because it is not its own existence, has an existence that is received in something, through which the existence is itself contracted …"

Created being receives an act of existence form God as its own and which is not God’s Act of Existence or any part thereof. It is received through their essence or form to which and by which it is limited ( contracted ). Its existence is contracted ( limited ) by its form.

Your argument doesn’t hold. How many examples do you need, a dozen? I’m not sure I can find that many.

Your assertion that there is only one Esse is completely unfounded, Thomas does not teach that, you have not proven that. Futher, Catholics cannot hold that view, it is contrary to Catholic Doctrine which teaches that God and His Creatures are two different realities.
---------------------
" .God transcends creation and is present to it

300 God is infinitely greater than all his works: "You have set your glory above the heavens."156 Indeed, God’s “greatness is unsearchable”.157 But because he is the free and sovereign Creator, the first cause of all that exists, God is present to his creatures’ inmost being: "In him we live and move and have our being."158 In the words of St. Augustine, God is “higher than my highest and more inward than my innermost self”.159

God upholds and sustains creation

301 With creation, God does not abandon his creatures to themselves. He not only gives them being and existence, but also, and at every moment, upholds and sustains them in being, enables them to act and brings them to their final end. Recognizing this utter dependence with respect to the Creator is a source of wisdom and freedom, of joy and confidence: " ( CCC, paras 300,301)

Linus2nd

Linus2nd

That’s me. If you have read my posts 635,637,638,646,654,655 and remain unconvinced there really isn’t much more I can say. You understand of course that to establish the truth it is not necessary to get you or Linux or anyone else to agree that I am correct. I am well aware that there are Ideologues of one stamp or another who will agree with nothing I or Thomas has to say. It is my hope only that the innocent who follow these debates are not led astray. But I leave it in God’s hands.

The only comment I would make is that neither you nor Linux have not been able to prove any of your five basic assumptions. Your whole argument is based on your basic assumption that the Esse of God is the only esse, that there is only one esse.

The first error here is to assume that there is a God to start with. You have to do that just as Thomas did. And you cannot do it by reinterpreting his teaching.

Secondly, you assume that the Esse of God is the only esse, that there is only one esse.
You have not proven that, you have made a bare assertation without proof.

Seconldy, Jesus Christ really does not enter into this debate in any way. We were discussing the fundamental underlying structure of reality and the causation of contingent being.

Finally, I am tired of this whole debate. I am convinced I am dealing with people who are incapable of reasoning logically, who are unable to read and understand Thomas Aquinas, or who, for motives of their own, intentionally misinterpret him.

Linus2nd

 

[Peter_Plato]

Secondly, you assume that the Esse of God is the only esse, that there is only one esse.
You have not proven that, you have made a bare assertation without proof.

Linus2nd

To preface this post…

My reply is not meant to Linus specifically, since he has “signed off” on this thread, but it is to open a discussion into what it could possibly mean for there to be more than one “esse.” ProdigalSon and Ut, you both may have some insights in how your position is not the position Aquinas tries to refute in this article.

The following is from Aquinas’ De Potentia Q. V: ARTICLE II

Keep in mind that the numbered points are the points that Aquinas is attempting to show are in error. Aquinas’ rebuttal starts at, “On the Contrary.”

This claim of Linus that creatures could have their own esse seems to me very much like a claim that creatures can exist “autonomously,” i.e., have their own esse, otherwise I have no idea what having its “own” esse could possibly mean.

Does it mean something like Point 1 (below) having received the power to “keep itself in existence?” If it does, then Aquinas clearly argues against that contention.

If it doesn’t, then what does “having its own esse” entail?

I have bold-faced key ideas that would seem relevant to the discussion.

Can God Enable A Creature to Keep Itself in Existence by Itself and Without God’s Assistance?

THE second point of inquiry is whether God can make a creature able of itself to keep itself in existence independently of God , and seemingly he can do so.

1. To create is more than to keep oneself in existence. Now a creature could have received the power to create according to the Master (Sent. v, 4). Therefore it could have received the power to keep itself in existence.

1. The power of God over things surpasses the power of our intellect. Now our intellect can understand a creature apart from God. Much more therefore can God make a creature able of itself to keep itself in existence.

1. There is a creature made to God’s image (Gen. i, 26). Now according to Hilary (De Synod.) an image is the undivided and united likeness of one thing adequately representing another: so that an image can be adequate to the thing of which it is the image. Seeing then that God needs no other to keep him in existence, it would seem that he could communicate this to a creature.

1. The more perfect the agent the more perfect an effect can it produce. Now natural agents can produce effects which are able to remain in existence without their causes. Therefore a fortiori God can do this.

On the contrary God can do nothing that is prejudicial to his own authority: and it would be prejudicial to his dominion if anything could exist without his upholding it. Therefore God cannot do this.

I answer that God’s omnipotence does not imply that he can make two contradictories true at the same time. Now the statement that God can produce a thing which does not need to be upheld by him involves a contradiction. For we have already proved that every effect depends on its cause in so far as it is its cause. Accordingly the statement that a thing needs not God to uphold its existence implies that it is not created by God: while the statement that such a thing is produced by God implies that it is created by him. Wherefore just as it would involve a contradiction to say that God produced a thing that was not created by him, even so it would involve a contradiction were one to say that God made a thing that did not need to be kept in existence by him. Wherefore God is equally unable to do either.

Reply to the First Objection. Since to create is to be the cause of something, and only that which has no cause needs not to be kept in existence by another, it is clear that not to need to be kept in existence by another is more than to create: even as to have no cause is more than to be a cause. Moreover it is not altogether true that the power of creating is communicable to a creature, seeing that it is the act of the first agent as we have shown above (Q. iii, A. 4).

Reply to the Second Objection. Although the intellect is able to understand a creature without understanding God, it cannot understand a creature not being kept in existence by God, since this involves a contradiction, as if one were to say that a creature is not created by God, as stated above (Q. iii, A. 5).

Reply to the Third Objection. Equality is essential to an image, not absolutely speaking but of a perfect image: such an image of God is not a creature but the Son of God; wherefore the argument proves nothing.

The Reply to the Third Objection (last paragraph) is to clarify (specifically to Linus) that Jesus Christ does enter into this debate because the underlying structure of reality is, for Aquinas, tied to the Son of God.

In that paragraph he is, I think, pointing out that to be made “in God’s image” means essentially to be made “in” the Son and, by implication, from the third objection Aquinas is rebutting, it is through the Son, God’s perfect image, that we are kept in existence.