How does God create "the act of existing" out of nothing?

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(continued from previous post #735)
This is all meaningless what you are saying. A thing does the pushing. Pushing simply does not happen without that which is pushing. Pushing is the activity of “some-thing”
No, it is not meaningless, you just don’t grasp the analogy. The hand (God) pushes (acts upon) the book (essence), which is then in the act of motion (act of existing). But the motion of the book (the existence of the essence, or substance) is not the motion of the hand (existence of God). Rather, the motion of the book (existence of the essence) is an effect of the hand’s activity (God’s activity) upon it, an effective activity from the former which imparts a separate effected activity in the latter.
If you are saying that existence is the activity of an essence, how is that not the same as saying that esse and essence in creatures is identical, or that an essence perfects esse.
Because the activity is imparted to the essence, it does not rise from the essence.

The act of moving (act of existing) does not belong to the nature of the book (essence). The book (essence) does not move (exist) necessarily, but only because the hand (God) moves it (effects an act upon it.) Thus the hand (God) is the cause of the motion (existence) of the book (essence).
In fact what does it mean at all to speak of the activity of existence apart from the activity of a real existence. It means nothing.
It is not apart from the activity of a real existence: God is a real existence, but the existence he imparts to creatures is not His existence, but an effect of his creative activity.
What act of existence, whose act of existence does it have?
Its own, just as the book has its own act of motion imparted to it by the motion of the hand. An agent effects its like
What could that possibly mean unless God is the “act” in which an essence is being sustained?
That’s like asking, “What could it possibly mean that a ball is rolling unless the person who rolled it is himself the ball’s rolling?” God is not a verb.
I don’t understand why you can’t see the problem of referring to esse as a mere principle as opposed to **actuality **versus potency.
Because God is an actuality (noun) of infinite power. Therefore, his creative act is infinitely effective. This creative act has the effect of actualizing potency.

The esse is the activity in creatures caused by God, just as the rolling of a ball is the activity in a ball caused by someone kicking it. Motion effects motion. Actuality effects actuality. But the actuality in the thing effected is not the actuality of the other.
Take that up with Fesser.
No need, as Feser (and any other Thomist) says the same thing.
How can potency be moved to act if act is not a thing in itself?
“Act”, as the term implies, is the activity of something. The activity of one thing may be effected upon another thing to move it from potency to act, just as the act of moving a hand may effect the act of moving in something else.

As I said before, the “push” (act of existence) has no reality outside of the relationship between the hand (God) and the book (effected essence).
You are not making any sense. If neither essence or esse are actual things in creatures then what sense does it make to speak of substances as being real?
The esse is a real act (verb) not a real thing (noun). This act is only possible because something (God) has the power to effect such an act.
It can make sense if we say that esse is a thing in itself and can bring potency to act by conjoining itself with potential essences.
It makes sense if we say that God has infinite creative power and can effect his like (an act of existence) in the form of anything that could possibly exist.
 
The problem is you are just making assertions and ignoring the logical problems that are being raised. If esse is not a thing in itself then it cannot be said to be that which perfects potency, since only actuality (a real being) perfects potency and esse cannot be objectively identical to created substances. Therefore it makes no sense to speak of esse as a potency and not actuality itself. Thus esse is a thing in itself and not just an aspect of a substance, and therefore esse is identically an essence.
It is form which perfects potency and the power to be ( act ) comes to a substance through form. I never said esse was " objectively identical " to substance. A substance is something which exists. Among created substances, a substance is an essence which has existence. Esse is not a potency. Esse is an act. Can you define what that is? Give it a try and see what you get. It is nothing but a power which makes an essence exist, to be a thing. You are way off because you have an ideological position you are trying to hang onto. I don’t know what it is but you will get no where until you let go of it.

Linus2nd
 
No, I am trying to find as many ways as I can to express my point. Regardless, I have been using the term “operative principle” throughout this thread.

Active or operative principles are exactly what they sound like: actions or operations which are principles of something. Almost any, if not all, Scholastic/Aristotelian literature you care to consult will refer to both esse and essence as principles within a thing; being that esse is an act it is therefore an active principle. And what is meant by principle? There are many definitions but the following are particularly helpful as well as relevant:
*
6. a source or fundamental cause; origin: ex: principle of life
  1. chem. a constituent of a substance that gives the substance its characteristics and behaviour: bitter principle*
While definition # 9 refers specifically to chemistry, it is still suitable, for esse is a constituent of a substance that gives that substance the characteristic of existence.

For an analogy, we might say that “growing” is an operative principle of life.

Any Latin dictionary you care to consult will tell you that esse is a verb (action), not a noun (thing). That is why I say that esse is an active principle: it is an action that comprises a part of a substance.

As Armand Maurer notes in his footnotes on Aquinas’ “On Being and Essence”:

[t]o translate esse by a noun is to reify it and to conceive it as if it were a substance or abstract essence. Esse, however, is a verb, and it designates, not an essence or substance, but the act which is the to be of the substance.”

God is not simply esse, because God is a noun; He is personal. You are committing one of the fundamental errors Aquinas warns against in discussing this question: that we can know God’s nature. That esse and essence are identical in God is something we know through a logical survey of creatures. However:
  • But with all this talk of God being “ipsum esse subsistens,” Aquinas believes that we should be on guard against two mistakes.
First, that God’s transcendence means that He is utterly unknowable. Aquinas’ claim that God is utterly transcendent is a conclusion and corollary of arguments that all things are caused by God. Nevertheless, Aquinas believes that creatures can provide us with genuine knowledge about God.

“Hence from the knowledge of sensible things the whole power of God cannot be known; nor therefore can His essence be seen.* But because they are His effects and depend on their cause, we can be led from them so far as to know of God whether He exists, and on to know of Him what must necessarily belong to Him, as the first cause of all things, exceeding all things caused by Him.” (S.T. Ia, 12, 12)

In a way, the only positive knowledge contained in the claim “God is transcendent” is really a claim about creatures: “The cause of creatures is utterly unlike creatures.”

This brings us to the second mistake against which we should guard ourselves. It would be a mistake to think that we know what we are talking about when we say that God is His own act of existence. For Aquinas, we know that such a claim about God is true since it follows from what we know about creatures.

“We know that this proposition which we form about God when we say God is, is true; and this we know from His effects…”(S.T. Ia, 3, 4 Reply to objection 2. See also S.T. Ia, 2, 2 Reply to objection 3.)

But we do not know what “His own act of existence” is, i.e. we do not know His nature. (Dr. Joseph Magee, Aquinas Online)
Very good.
Linus2nd
 
I think you are speaking " mystically " here. " Vanity of vanities, all is vanity but to serve the Lord…" We live in a real world alright, but when we attempt to define it at its roots, it is hard to grasp.

Linus2nd
Linus,
. Thank you for the response. About forty years ago I was baffled when I would read something like this coming from Buddha. “What do you mean it isn’t real?!?”

. Well, it certainly “seems” real. And if I don’t water the tomatoes in the garden they shrivel up and die and I go hungry, thats for sure.

. So on a “reality” level, what do we make of these kinds of statements?

. My sense of it is that it has to do with eternity, and our eternal reality, rather than this temporary mortal world of existence which, for the moment, seems like all there is.

. What happens when we dream? Is that “dream world” real? Where do we go when we die, if our soul is not constrained to the laws of physics, chemistry, and biology. When we cast off this mortal frame, this “second set of clothes”, then “where” is the eternal reality to which we ascend, leaving behind this mortal world of dust?

. Looking forward to your thoughts and comment on this one… 😉
 
Linus,
. Thank you for the response. About forty years ago I was baffled when I would read something like this coming from Buddha. “What do you mean it isn’t real?!?”

. Well, it certainly “seems” real. And if I don’t water the tomatoes in the garden they shrivel up and die and I go hungry, thats for sure.

. So on a “reality” level, what do we make of these kinds of statements?

. My sense of it is that it has to do with eternity, and our eternal reality, rather than this temporary mortal world of existence which, for the moment, seems like all there is.

. What happens when we dream? Is that “dream world” real? Where do we go when we die, if our soul is not constrained to the laws of physics, chemistry, and biology. When we cast off this mortal frame, this “second set of clothes”, then “where” is the eternal reality to which we ascend, leaving behind this mortal world of dust?

. Looking forward to your thoughts and comment on this one… 😉
The where do we go when we die question.

Like the many before us, usually the ceremonial aspect of it happens wanted or not.

These things may or may not provide comfort to the living, but we must not forget what a living those who are involoved in this must make,
 
Linus,
. Thank you for the response. About forty years ago I was baffled when I would read something like this coming from Buddha. “What do you mean it isn’t real?!?”

. Well, it certainly “seems” real. And if I don’t water the tomatoes in the garden they shrivel up and die and I go hungry, thats for sure.

. So on a “reality” level, what do we make of these kinds of statements?

. My sense of it is that it has to do with eternity, and our eternal reality, rather than this temporary mortal world of existence which, for the moment, seems like all there is.

. What happens when we dream? Is that “dream world” real? Where do we go when we die, if our soul is not constrained to the laws of physics, chemistry, and biology. When we cast off this mortal frame, this “second set of clothes”, then “where” is the eternal reality to which we ascend, leaving behind this mortal world of dust?

. Looking forward to your thoughts and comment on this one… 😉
You have a lot of questions here and I suspect your thinking results from your education hisorty and your journey of faith. From my own perspective, I never doubted the reality of the world And I never douted that we have an immortal soul which lives on after death and at some point our souls will be reunited with our bodies after the general Judgement. And of course the latter view comes from my particular faith perspective.As such I cannot prove these things to you. You can read the Catechism of the Catholic Church and see if it makes sense to you. vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/_INDEX.HTM

For a philosophical treatment you can read the Summa Theologica, Part 1 or buy a copy of " Aquinas " by Edward Feser ( reasonably priced) or check it out at the library.
. newadvent.org/summa/1.htm

Linus2nd
 
(continued from previous post #735)

No, it is not meaningless, you just don’t grasp the analogy. The hand (God) pushes (acts upon) the book (essence), which is then in the act of motion (act of existing). But the motion of the book (the existence of the essence, or substance) is not the motion of the hand (existence of God). Rather, the motion of the book (existence of the essence) is an effect of the hand’s activity (God’s activity) upon it, an effective activity from the former which imparts a separate effected activity in the latter.

Because the activity is imparted to the essence, it does not rise from the essence.

The act of moving (act of existing) does not belong to the nature of the book (essence). The book (essence) does not move (exist) necessarily, but only because the hand (God) moves it (effects an act upon it.) Thus the hand (God) is the cause of the motion (existence) of the book (essence).

It is not apart from the activity of a real existence: God is a real existence, but the existence he imparts to creatures is not His existence, but an effect of his creative activity.

Its own, just as the book has its own act of motion imparted to it by the motion of the hand. An agent effects its like

That’s like asking, “What could it possibly mean that a ball is rolling unless the person who rolled it is himself the ball’s rolling?” God is not a verb.

Because God is an actuality (noun) of infinite power. Therefore, his creative act is infinitely effective. This creative act has the effect of actualizing potency.

The esse is the activity in creatures caused by God, just as the rolling of a ball is the activity in a ball caused by someone kicking it. Motion effects motion. Actuality effects actuality. But the actuality in the thing effected is not the actuality of the other.

No need, as Feser (and any other Thomist) says the same thing.

“Act”, as the term implies, is the activity of something. The activity of one thing may be effected upon another thing to move it from potency to act, just as the act of moving a hand may effect the act of moving in something else.

As I said before, the “push” (act of existence) has no reality outside of the relationship between the hand (God) and the book (effected essence).

The esse is a real act (verb) not a real thing (noun). This act is only possible because something (God) has the power to effect such an act.

It makes sense if we say that God has infinite creative power and can effect his like (an act of existence) in the form of anything that could possibly exist.
Good explanation. 🙂

God bless,
Ut
 
(continued from previous post #735)

No, it is not meaningless, you just don’t grasp the analogy. The hand (God) pushes (acts upon) the book (essence), which is then in the act of motion (act of existing). But the motion of the book (the existence of the essence, or substance) is not the motion of the hand (existence of God). Rather, the motion of the book (existence of the essence) is an effect of the hand’s activity (God’s activity) upon it, an effective activity from the former which imparts a separate effected activity in the latter.
This analogy in reference to esse as it relates to creatures makes no sense objectively speaking. First of all Aquinas never speaks of esse as neither a being or a potency. If it is not a being or a potency then what are you talking about? It is just something you are asserting. Magically esse is neither a self subsisting essence in itself or a potency, and yet one is simply suppose to believe that such brings potency to act. Its just something you made up to evade the illogical implications of your interpretation. Your evasion has failed because it makes no sense; It is purely arbitrary. Its just a shallow and superficial concept which you are using to the disguise the gaping whole in your argument. In others words its purely semantics.

Secondly, motion occurs when potency is actualized. That is to say that a thing moves because it is continuously being actualized from potency; every and all change is a potency being actualized. Potency cannot meaningfully be actualized by that which is not intrinsically actual becuase the power to be does not come from nothing or that which begins as potency. Created beings do not move of their own accord in the sense that God gives them their own distinct intrinsic power to move. God is continuously moving all things at every instant because a substance in and of itself has no power to do anything let alone be actual. Your analogy amounts to deism where God pushes a thing and a thing continues to be in motion by itself. That is not what Aquinas teaches and it certainly is not what is meant by secondary causes.
 
You have a lot of questions here and I suspect your thinking results from your education hisorty and your journey of faith. From my own perspective, I never doubted the reality of the world And I never douted that we have an immortal soul which lives on after death and at some point our souls will be reunited with our bodies after the general Judgement. And of course the latter view comes from my particular faith perspective.As such I cannot prove these things to you. You can read the Catechism of the Catholic Church and see if it makes sense to you. vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/_INDEX.HTM

For a philosophical treatment you can read the Summa Theologica, Part 1 or buy a copy of " Aquinas " by Edward Feser ( reasonably priced) or check it out at the library.
. newadvent.org/summa/1.htm

Linus2nd
Linus,
. Thanks for the reply. My sense of “life after death” is also culturally affected by growing up on a Sioux Reservation where the Lakota people had been influenced by what was called “the Ghost Dance” religion of Wovoka.
. In that context, through special prayers, ceremonies, and fasting, some would have visions which would confirm that their dead relatives still lived, in the “spirit world”, and that some of them sensed this very strongly.
. It is also true that some “interpreted” aspects of their visions to mean that their deceased relatives would return to earth, where they would be united with them. I don’t hold that view.
. My sense of heaven is that it is beyond our elemental physical world, yet is most definitely “real” in every sense, while distanced from us by design.
. Have you ever read “Proof of Heaven”, by Eben Alexander? He is a neurosurgeon who was in a coma for a week and speaks as a scientist who was an atheist. He articulates his story very well.
 
This analogy in reference to esse as it relates to creatures makes no sense objectively speaking. First of all Aquinas never speaks of esse as neither a being or a potency. If it is not a being or a potency then what are you talking about?
Aquinas never speaks of esse as a being, because esse is part of a being. Aquinas never speaks of esse as a potency because it is an act. Which is exactly what I said. Your counterarguments are getting more and more incoherent.
It is just something you are asserting.
Your favorite comeback. If anyone’s just making assertions here, it’s you. My arguments have been backed up with plenty of sources and explanation. Yours are becoming more and more incoherent by the post.
Magically esse is neither a self subsisting essence in itself or a potency, and yet one is simply suppose to believe that such brings potency to act.
You clearly did not pay attention to anything I said. Esse is an act. Is breathing a self-subsisting essence? Is the act of running a self-subsisting essence?

And esse is not a potency because it is an act, which is the opposite of a potency.
ts just something you made up to evade the illogical implications of your interpretation. Your evasion has failed because it makes no sense; It is purely arbitrary. Its just a shallow and superficial concept which you are using to the disguise the gaping whole in your argument. In others words its purely semantics.
I made up the concept of esse being an act/verb? Ok, I’ll be sure to tell Aristotle and the inventors of the Latin language to forward my royalty check. :rolleyes:
Secondly, motion occurs when potency is actualized.
Um, that’s kind of exactly what I said.
That is to say that a thing moves because it is continuously being actualized from potency; every and all change is a potency being actualized.
And where in my argument is that denied?
Potency cannot meaningfully be actualized by that which is not intrinsically actual becuase the power to be does not come from nothing or that which begins as potency.
There’s no nice way of saying this: you have no idea what you’re talking about Linux. Potency is precisely something’s ability to be moved into act. Once in act, it is actualized and can therefore actualize potency in other things. For example, a match could potentially be on fire. That potency is actualized by the act of striking it against a surface that provides sufficient friction to ignite it. Once in the act of burning, it can actualize the potential to burn in something else.
Created beings do not move of their own accord in the sense that God gives them their own distinct intrinsic power to move. God is continuously moving all things at every instant because a substance in and of itself has no power to do anything let alone be actual.
So you don’t have your own power to think, to act, etc.? God makes all your choices? I thought you weren’t a pantheist.

Nevertheless, while at least some of God’s creatures do have the power to act, that very power is dependent upon God’s sustenance of their act.
Your analogy amounts to deism where God pushes a thing and a thing continues to be in motion by itself.
So if the hand stops pushing the book, the book keeps moving itself? :confused:

I’ll take your persistence in deliberately misrepresenting or ignoring my arguments (I explicitly made a case for the necessity of God’s constant activity in sustaining creatures in act) as a backhanded compliment.

Even if we consider the well-known principle of inertia (an object in motion will stay in motion unless acted upon by a contrary force) and imagine that the book is moved in a space with no contrary force, its motion is still dependent on the existence of that space which is itself dependent on God.

Any analogy is going to run into problems somewhere because there is nothing that truly compares to God, and especially no creature to creature relationship is sufficient to completely parallel the relationship between God and creatures.

Nevertheless, as the law of inertia does not apply to nonphysical relations, the principle still stands.
That is not what Aquinas teaches and it certainly is not what is meant by secondary causes.
And it’s certainly not anywhere near to what I said.
 
This passage from Aquinas’ Compendium of Theology (Ch. 70) explains creation from nothing perfectly:

*…to create is the prerogative of that cause which does not suppose another cause which is more universal, as we saw in the preceding chapter. But such causality pertains to God alone.

…the more remote a potency is from act, the greater must be the power that reduces it to act. But whatever distance may be imagined between potency and act, the distance will ever be still still greater if the very potency itself is withdrawn. To create from nothing, then, requires infinite power. But God alone is infinite in power, since He alone is infinite in essence. Consequently, God alone can create.*

In other words, the less potency a thing has towards a certain act, the greater a force is required to cause that transition. For example, gasoline has a very high potency towards burning, thus something as simple as a spark may reduce that potency to act. Metal, on the other hand, has a very low potency towards burning, thus it requires a much more intense source of heat to reduce that potency to act.

Now, in the case of created beings, which are brought into being from nothing, there is no prior substance to possess any potency at all. So the distance between potency and act in created beings is infinite. It follows that only an infinite force can move such things into existence. And God is that infinite force.
 
Re: How does God create “the act of existing” out of nothing?

Quote:
Originally Posted by Linusthe2nd
It is form which perfects potency and the power to be ( act ) comes to a substance through form.

Linus2nd
( Linux Responds)So potency brings potency into being.
You didn’t read that properly. Form is in potence to the act of to be. And matter is in potency to form. So the whole essence or substance is in potency to esse.

Say Linux are you a fan of Jean Paul Sartre?

Linus2nd
 
Linus,
. Thanks for the reply. My sense of “life after death” is also culturally affected by growing up on a Sioux Reservation where the Lakota people had been influenced by what was called “the Ghost Dance” religion of Wovoka.
. In that context, through special prayers, ceremonies, and fasting, some would have visions which would confirm that their dead relatives still lived, in the “spirit world”, and that some of them sensed this very strongly.
. It is also true that some “interpreted” aspects of their visions to mean that their deceased relatives would return to earth, where they would be united with them. I don’t hold that view.
. My sense of heaven is that it is beyond our elemental physical world, yet is most definitely “real” in every sense, while distanced from us by design.
. Have you ever read “Proof of Heaven”, by Eben Alexander? He is a neurosurgeon who was in a coma for a week and speaks as a scientist who was an atheist. He articulates his story very well.
I have heard of him and similar reports. I don’t know what to make of them. It worked for him and for him, that is the point.

Linus2nd
 
Aquinas never speaks of esse as a being, because esse is part of a being.
He does speak of esse as being when he refers to God. What is the point of saying that in everything other than God, esse and nature is distinct, if esse is not a nature itself? Are we to now say that God as esse itself is not a being? Obviously not. When Aquinas speaks of creatures as existing analogously he is referring precisely to the fact that substances are not esse; which only makes sense in comparison to that which is esse. He is not speaking of “esse” in an analogous sense, but rather he is speaking of created essences as they are actual and distinct from actuality itself.

If esse is the act of existence then it is being itself to which all other things are only analogously real. There is no other meaningful sense in which to describe it. At this point I really don’t care what you think Aquinas intended by his words, I am only interested in showing the logical flaws in what you think Aquinas means.
Aquinas never speaks of esse as a potency because it is an act.
Esse is the act of existence and therefore it is something actual in itself; it is existence itself. Otherwise you are not truly talking about the act of existence.
My arguments have been backed up with plenty of sources and explanation.
You have certainly given that illusion. But you have not refuted my argument.
Esse is an act.
Esse is actuality itself.
Is breathing a self-subsisting essence?
Breathing is not an esse. Breathing is the behaviour of a particular nature that is distinct from esse.
And esse is not a potency because it is an act, which is the opposite of a potency.
In the context of how potency relates to actuality, If esse is not a potency, then it is a being itself.
There’s no nice way of saying this: you have no idea what you’re talking about Linux. Potency is precisely some-things ability to be moved into act. Once in act, it is actualized and can therefore actualize potency in other things. For example, a match could potentially be on fire.
Esse is required to actualise every instant of change in creation. A thing cannot catch on fire without God actualising that fire at that very instant since creation has no power in itself. God cannot break off a piece of his power and give it to creation because God is power itself just like God is esse itself. There is no power outside of God. It is meaningless to say otherwise. Rather God conjoins his power to creation, and since Gods power is identical with his esse what he is in fact doing is conjoining his esse with creation. In this instant a creature expresses the power and therefore the esse of God according to the limitations of its essence. This is not to say that essences positively limit the esse or power of God, but rather it is to say that creation can only express the power of God to a limited degree due to its finiteness. God animates everything. Actuality is not caused by secondary causes.

But I am not saying that there are no secondary causes, but rather secondary causation is only meaningful in the sense that a thing behaves according to its nature, but it does not actualise the **activity **of its nature. Otherwise you would have more coming less, actuality coming from potency, and that is metaphysically impossible. God has absolute sovereignty over existence.
So you don’t have your own power to think, to act, etc.?
I do not actualise my thoughts. My essence is not identical to the power of esse.
God makes all your choices?
God actualises all my choices
I thought you weren’t a pantheist.
Pantheism is the belief that nature and God are not distinct.
Any analogy is going to run into problems
Your analogy doesn’t just run into problems; it fails to reflect reality fullstop.
 
Esse is required to actualise every instant of change in creation. A thing cannot catch on fire without God actualising that fire at that very instant since creation has no power in itself. God cannot break off a piece of his power and give it to creation because God is power itself just like God is esse itself. There is no power outside of God. It is meaningless to say otherwise. Rather God conjoins his power to creation, and since Gods power is identical with his esse what he is in fact doing is conjoining his esse with creation. In this instant a creature expresses the power and therefore the esse of God according to the limitations of its essence. This is not to say that essences positively limit the esse or power of God, but rather it is to say that creation can only express the power of God to a limited degree due to its finiteness. God animates everything. Actuality is not caused by secondary causes.
But I am not saying that there are no secondary causes, but rather secondary causation is only meaningful in the sense that a thing behaves according to its nature, but it does not actualise the activity of its nature. Otherwise you would have more coming less, actuality coming from potency, and that is metaphysically impossible. God has absolute sovereignty over existence.
I just wanted to underline this last part in bold. I certainly agree with you that God, as primary cause, actualizes “the activity of a nature”, in the sense of cause to effect. So our effect, our activity, is the immediate effect of God’s activity. But I would not say that my activity is God’s activity - I’m pretty sure you agree as well. God provides me the power to act because he is the primary cause of all creation. There is not a secondary cause that is not ultimately traceable back to God as primary cause. God is the only primary cause.

But the way you phrased that sentence reveals what, I think, myself, and prodigalSon2011, and Linus have been saying all along. God actualizes “the activity of a nature”. The activity and the nature are two separate things. But my activity is not God. My nature has been given a certain amount of power, which is the effect of God who is the primary cause of the activity in all natures.

As Aquinas says:
It is also contrary to God’s goodness, which is self-communicative to the extent that God made things like himself not only in being but in acting.
God is the generator that keeps the whole created universe running with its own proper activity.
"One thing causes the action of another as a principle agent causes the action of its instrument, and again in this manner we must admit that God causes all action in natural things. For the higher the cause the greater is its scope and efficacy; and the more efficacious the cause, the more profoundly it penetrates its effect and the more remote the power bringing the effect into action. Now every natural thing is a being, a natural thing, of this or that nature; the first is common to all things, the second to all natural things, and the third to all members of a sepcies, while the fourth is proper, if we consider accidents, to this or that individual. So that this or that individual thing by its action cannot cause another individual of the same species except as the instrument of that cause, which contains within its scope the whole species and in addition the entire being of the inferior creature. So that no action from these loer bodies achieves the production of a species except through a heavenly body’s power, nor does anything produce being except through God’s power. For being is the first and most common effect, more intimate than all other effects; so it is an effect producible only by God through his own power, and for this reason, no intelligence gives being unless it has divine power. God is therefore the cause of evey action insofar as every agent is an instrument of the acting divine power. …
but if we attend to the power by which the action is done, the power of the higher cause is more immediately related to the effect than the power of the lower cause, insofar as only through the power of the higher cause is the lower cause’s power connected with its effect… God’s essence must be wherever his power is…Accordingly we may assert that God acts in all things insofar as each thing needs his power for it to act…
God is therefore the cause of everything’s action because he gives to everything its power to act, preserves it in existence, and puts it into action, and because by his power, every other power acts. And if we add to this that God is his own power and that he is present in all things not as part of their essence but to maintain them in existence, we shall conclude that he acts immediately within every agent, while not eliminating the action of the will and of the nature.
I think what is difficult for me to accept is the idea that God’s esse is my esse. Ultimately God’s esse is the primary cause of all creation. All creation depends on God as primary cause, but I really do agree with Aquinas in that God gives to creation its own activity as primary cause to effect. That effect, God’s immediate effect, becomes our causal ability, as secondary causes. limited in scope by our essence. We can’t even cause an effect unless that effect is always caused by God as the primary cause.

God bless,
Ut
 
I just wanted to underline this last part in bold. I certainly agree with you that God, as primary cause, actualizes “the activity of a nature”, in the sense of cause to effect. So our effect, our activity, is the immediate effect of God’s activity. But I would not say that my activity is God’s activity - I’m pretty sure you agree as well.
I would not say that Gods activity is the activity of our essence. However i would say that God is the esse or the actuality of our essence.
God provides me the power to act because he is the primary cause of all creation. There is not a secondary cause that is not ultimately traceable back to God as primary cause. God is the only primary cause.
I agree.
The activity and the nature are two separate things.
It depends what you mean by activity. If we are talking about how natures behave in principle, then such principles are intrinsic to the identity of my nature in the sense that my nature will behave according to the principles of my nature and is obviously not something separate from my nature. When we speak about the principles of a nature, one is simply talking about what a nature can do once it is actual. On the other hand i would not say that holding a cup is intrinsic to my identity since the actuality of me holding a cup is not identical to my essence, and thus i am always potentially holding a cup. Nevertheless it cannot be said that my holding a cup is identical to the act of existence since a thing behaves with its nature; A thing functions according to what it is (the whatness of a thing). When one speaks of the behavior of a nature, one is speaking about what a nature is doing; One is not speaking about what a behavior (as objectively distinct from a nature) is doing to a nature; that is meaningless. A nature is functioning. Pushing is the activity of a hand. It is not the activity of existence for the two are not same; otherwise the two would be identical and would exist eternally and my holding a cup would be timeless.

The act of existence actualizes the activity of the hand, but esse itself is not the activity of it; that is to say it is not the intrinsic behavior of the hands nature itself. Otherwise essence would be bringing esse to act from potency, which is a contradiction.
But my activity is not God.
I never said it was, i said God is the esse of all contingent natures. You seem to be under the impression that the activity of a created nature (the principles intrinsic to how a particular thing behaves) is the same thing as the act of existence. Rather the activity of a nature, the kind of behavior intrinsic to a particular nature, is only analogously real. It acts only insofar as esse actualizes the natural principles of its activity.
My nature has been given a certain amount of power, which is the effect of God who is the primary cause of the activity in all natures.
Power only exists in God; there is no power outside of the nature of God. The activity of a contingent nature is completely passive to the power of God. Creation has no power of its own, just like it has no existence of its own.
 
How does God create “the act of existing” out of nothing?

I believe that such an act would violate the absolute distinction between something and nothing, and therefore I would say that it is metaphysically impossible; no more rational than saying the universe popped out of nothing.

That being said I agree with creatio ex nihilo if by that it is meant that God does not create from pre-existing physical materials. But I reject what I would call “the rabbit out of the hat interpretation” of creation. I would not think it logical for a magician to literally create a rabbit from nothing, and I don’t think that by replacing the word magician with the word God, makes it any-more rational to think it possible.
Linux,
. I am reading an amazing book called “The Forces of Our Time”, by Hooper Dunbar, which examines physical reality as the outward appearance of spiritual forces. He gives the example of water vapor turning to droplets and crystalizing into ice and snowflakes, thus appearing as “physical” matter to us.

. If we begin with the premise that God is not “physical”, and that what the effect of His Words “Be, and it is” means, then that which comes into existence is in reality spiritual in nature, although we speak of it in physical terms, for that is what is “apparent” to us.

. Its like Newtonian physics when you are playing pool as opposed to quantum physics. The former is much more useful when you want to sink that 8 ball in the side pocket… 😉
 
Linux,
. I am reading an amazing book called “The Forces of Our Time”, by Hooper Dunbar, which examines physical reality as the outward appearance of spiritual forces. He gives the example of water vapor turning to droplets and crystalizing into ice and snowflakes, thus appearing as “physical” matter to us.

. If we begin with the premise that God is not “physical”, and that what the effect of His Words “Be, and it is” means, then that which comes into existence is in reality spiritual in nature, although we speak of it in physical terms, for that is what is “apparent” to us.

. Its like Newtonian physics when you are playing pool as opposed to quantum physics. The former is much more useful when you want to sink that 8 ball in the side pocket… 😉
Are you saying that physical nature is God? Or are you saying that physical reality does not truly have extension (like virtual-reality). Some people think this, especially since the dawn of Quantum physics. In fact some people think that the universe is essentially just the outward expression of mathematical code rendering. This is to say that the universe itself is very much like a holographic projection and is not really “solid” or 3 dimensional even though it appears that way due to restrictions on how much a mind can effect the holographic projections around it.

Its fun to speculate on these things.
 
Rather than churn out another quick retort, I decided rather to take my time in composing the following. I apologize in advance for the length:
He does speak of esse as being when he refers to God.
No, he refers to God as a being whose essence is His existence. Aquinas never refers to God as simply “esse”, or vice versa.

To say that “God is His own act of existence” is not equivalent to saying “God is the only act of existence.” That’s like saying “Dan is his own boss” is equivalent to “Dan is everyone’s boss.”

Whether God is the only esse is not a conclusion that follows from the premise of God as “Ipsum esse subsistens.”
What is the point of saying that in everything other than God, esse and nature is distinct, if esse is not a nature itself? Are we to now say that God as esse itself is not a being? Obviously not.
For starters, Aquinas does not refer to God as simply “esse itself” but “self-subsisting esse” or “subsistent being itself”. The former is the simple act considered apart from any actual thing, the latter is the act considered in terms of a being whose nature is that act.

Anyway, the point of saying that in everything other than God, esse and essence are distinct is because the essence of anything else can be conceived of apart from its existence; we can know what something is without knowing whether it is. Therefore, existence is not an essential property of that thing. Whereas for God, we cannot conceive of Him apart from His existence because He is, by definition, the necessary First Being apart from which we cannot conceive of anything at all.

Esse does not have to be a nature itself in order for something to have it. Esse is an act; it means, literally, “to be”, which is a verb. Just as “knowing” is “to know” or “running” is “to run.” The difference between esse and other acts is that all other acts presuppose esse as a principle, thus being (esse) can only be caused by something which is, in and of itself, being. And such a being (ens) is what we call God.

When God is referred to as “Ipsum esse subsistens”, that does not mean that he is the esse of everything else, but that He is His own act of existence. And even still, we must keep in mind that “esse” is predicated of different things analogously (an artifice does not exist in the same sense that its material constituents exist; material substances do not exist in the same sense in which intellectual substances exist; a substance’s accidents do not exist in the same sense that the substance itself exists), which is incidentally also why it is not a genus (it is not predicated of different things univocally), and in the case of God we do not know exactly how it is to be predicated of Him, we only know that He is the first of all existences and thus the source of all others. So the esse of different things are analogous to one another insomuch as they exist, but in different ways, while the esse of all things is analogous to God as their first cause which they to some extent resemble.
When Aquinas speaks of creatures as existing analogously he is referring precisely to the fact that substances are not esse; which only makes sense in comparison to that which is esse.
That is not what is meant by the analogy of being. At all. (See above) It is entirely different and much more complicated than that. This passage demonstrates a general idea of the analogy of being:

Any creature, in so far as it possesses any perfection, represents God and is like to him, for he, being simply and universally perfect, has pre-existing in himself the perfections of all his creatures as noted above. [1a, q. 4, a. 2] But a creature is not like to God as it is like to another member of its species or genus, but resembles him as an effect may in some way resemble a transcendent cause although failing to reproduce perfectly the form of the cause—as in a certain way the forms of inferior bodies imitate the power of the sun . . . Thus words like ‘good’ and wise’ when used of God do signify something that God really is, but they signify it imperfectly because creatures represent God imperfectly.

That, in a nutshell, is the analogy of being, so far as concerns God and creatures.

Again, there’s much more to it than that (i.e. the way “esse” is predicated of substances and accidents, etc.) , but that’s more than I have time to get into any more than I already have. However, you have once again revealed a demonstrable ignorance of the terms and concepts you employ.
He is not speaking of “esse” in an analogous sense, but rather he is speaking of created essences as they are actual and distinct from actuality itself.
Actuality is the state of being actual. How can something be actual yet distinct from actuality? That is absurd. And it’s not what Aquinas is talking about, as evidenced above.

(continued…)
 
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