How does God create "the act of existing" out of nothing?

[prodigalson2011]

(…continued)

If esse is the act of existence then it is being itself to which all other things are only analogously real.

if creation is nothing real, nothing is really created. Now this is clearly false. Therefore creation is something real. [Sum. Th. I, Q. xiv, A. 3]

Wherefore creation does not denote an approach to being, nor a change effected by the Creator, but merely a beginning of existence, and a relation to the Creator from whom the creature receives its being. Consequently creation is really nothing but a relation of the creature to the Creator together with a beginning of existence. [ibid]

To start with, “being itself” is simply the act of existence considered in the abstract apart from any substance. Being (esse) as being (ens) is properly designated as “Ipsum esse subsistens” (subsistent being itself or being subsisting in itself). But more to the point, any act must subsist in some substance. “Shining” (act), for instance, does not exist except by something (substance) which shines. Likewise, an esse must subsist in some essence. But, as esse is the actuality of all other acts (or the act prior to all others; i.e. a thing cannot shine unless it first simply is), there must be something in which esse subsists in itself (something which is pure actuality), because only something already in act can reduce a potency to act. Therefore, the first being cannot have any admixture of act and potency. But created beings are actualized from no prior substance, and thus there is an infinite distance between potency and act. But God, being of infinite power, is sufficient to effect such a movement. As an agent effects its like (fire effects fire), so God effects esse in the form of created beings.

Esse is the act of existence and therefore it is something actual in itself; it is existence itself. Otherwise you are not truly talking about the act of existence.

This is like saying, “To sing” is the act of singing and therefore it is something actual in itself; it is singing itself. Otherwise you are not truly talking about the act of singing." This is clearly false. An act is something which is actualized in some substance; it is not, considered in isolation, an actuality in itself. That is why, in the case of esse, God is given the description of “Ipsum esse subsistens” and not just “esse.” If “esse” were actual in itself, the designation “Ipsum esse subsistens” would be redundant.
If anything is to exist, there must be something which exists necessarily. If anything is to change, there must be something that does not change. As an agent effects its like, God effects existence.

You have certainly given that illusion.

I have given the illusion of providing sources that back me up? Then my sources must be composed of entirely different words than those that appear.

But you have not refuted my argument.

I’m pretty sure I have, but I’ll let a much greater mind than my own speak to the point: Aquinas. In his book, “The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to Uncreated Being,” John F. Wippell notes:

*"…one might be tempted to identify “esse commune” (the esse of created beings) with self-subsisting being or God as one recent writer, K. Kremer, has done. Thomas strongly rejects any such suggestion. For instance, in Summa contra Gentiles I, c.26, he attempts to show that God is not the formal esse for other things, or the esse whereby each of them exists. One of his arguments runs this way. What is common to many things does not exist as such apart from the many except in the order of thought. Thus animal is not something which exists apart from Socrates and Plato and other animals except in the intellect. The intellect can grasp the form of animal by abstracting it from all individuating and specifying characteristics. Much less, continues Thomas, is “esse commune” to be regarded as something which exists apart from individual existent things, except in the order of thought. If, Thomas concludes, God were to be identified with esse commune, then God too would exist only in the order of thought or in the intellect…

…In other contexts Thomas brings out the difference between esse commune and self-subsisting esse in still another way. *For instance, in De potentia, q. 7, a. 2, ad 4, he explicityly makes the point that the divine esse which is identical with the divine essence (substantia) is not esse commune and is distinct from every other instance of esse. Hence through his very esse God differs from every other being. And in replying to the sixth objection Thomas acknowledges that being in general (ens commune) is such that nothing is added to it, but not in such a way that no addition could be made to it. On the other hand, the divine esse is such that nothing is added to it and nothing can be added to it. Therefore, he concludes, the divine esse is not esse commune. In other words, being in general is neutral with respect to such addition. Self-subsisting esse excludes the possibility of any kind of addition.

(continued…)

 

[prodigalson2011]

(…continued)

*…In his late Commentary on the Liber de causis of 1271-1272 Thomas finds its unknown author considering the following objection. Someone might argue that if the first cause is pure esse (esse tantum), it is esse commune which is predicated of all things; therefore it is not something existing individually and distinct from all others. That which is common is not rendered individual except by being received in something. Since the first cause is, in fact, something individual and distinct from all others, it seems necessary to conclude that it has yliatim, that is, something which receives its esse.

Thomas comments that to this the Liber de causis replies that the very infinity of the divine esse, insofar as it is not restricted by any receiving principle, plays the role in the first cause which yliatim exercises in other things.  This is so because **the divine goodness and the divine esse are rendered individual by reason of their very purity, that is, **by reason of the fact that they are not received in anything else.**  Thomas explains that **something is said to be an individual because it is not its nature to be found in many things.**  But this may happen in two ways.  It may be owing to the fact that the thing in question is determined to some one subject in which it is received.  Or it may simply be owing to the fact that the thing in question is not of such a nature as to be received in something, and therefore is an individual of itself.  Thus, if there were a separated whiteness which could exist apart from any receiving subject, it would be individual of itself.  This kind of individuation in fact obtains in the case of created separate substances which are forms which have esse.  In other words, such entities are not individuated by being received in matter.  This explanation also applies concludes, Thomas, to the first cause which is subsisting esse itself.  Most important for our immediate purposes, however, is Thomas's continuing refusal to identify esse commune with esse subsistens.

…First of all, other existents depend on esse commune, but God does not. Rather, esse commune itself depends on God. If we wonder how this can be, this becomes clearer as Thomas develops the second and third differences. Secondly, therefore, all other existents are contained under esse commune itself, but God is not. Esse commune itself rather falls under God’s power. For God’s power is more extended than is created esse. By this Thomas must mean that God can create many things which he does not actually create and to which esse commune does not actually extend.

…As a third difference Thomas explains that all other existents participate in esse, but that God does not. On the contrary, created esse is a kind of participation in God and a likeness of God. This is Thomas’s way of explaining Dionysius’s statement that esse commune “has” God. he means that it , i.e., the entities that fall under it (esse commune), **participate in a likeness of God. **

…Here, then, we return to a theme that we ahve already considered in other texts–other existents are said to participate in esse commune. This accounts for the fact that they are said to have esse, but are not identical with the esse (act of being) which they have or in which they participate. **This should not be taken to imply, of course, that esse commune actually subsists as such apart from individual existents. ***

Here is some of the original text of Thomas’ refutation of your position, with my commentary:

*[3] Furthermore, things are not distinguished from one another in having being, for in this they agree. If, then, things differ from one another, either their being must be specified through certain added differences, so that diverse things have a diverse being according to their species, or things must differ in that the being itself is appropriate to natures that are diverse in species. The first of these alternatives is impossible, since, as we have said, no addition can be made to a being in the manner in which a difference is added to a genus. It remains, then, that **things differ because they have diverse natures, to which being accrues in a diverse way. Now, the divine being does not accrue to a nature that is other than it; it is the nature itself, as we have said. If, therefore, the divine being were the formal being of all things, all things would have to be absolutely one.

Here Thomas affirms what I have said before: The divine esse cannot accrue to another nature because it is its own nature.

If it did, then it would also be the nature of everything else. Pantheism ensues.

[4] Then, too, a principle is naturally prior to that whose principle it is. Now, in certain things being has something that is as its principle. For the form is said to be a principle of being, and so is the agent, that makes things to be in act. If, therefore, the divine being is the being of each thing, it will follow that God, Who is His own being, has some cause. Thus, He is not through Himself a necessary being. But, we have proved the contrary of this conclusion above.

As regards creatures, being (esse) is received into some form. So the form (essence) is a principle of being in that thing. This leads to the contradiction of God Himself becoming the effect of some cause.

(continued…)*

 

[prodigalson2011]

(…continued)

[5] Moreover, that which is common to many is not outside the many except by the reason alone. Thus, animal is not something outside Socrates and Plato and the other animals except in the intellect that apprehends the form of animal stripped of all its individuating and specifying characteristics. For man is that which truly is animal; otherwise, it would follow that in Socrates and Plato there are several animals, namely, common animal itself, common man, and Plato himself. Much less, then, is common being itself something outside all existing things, save only for being in the intellect. Hence, if God is common being, the only thing that will exist is that which exists solely in the intellect. But we showed above that God is something not only in the intellect but also in reality. Therefore, God is not the common being of all things.

This amounts to a very sophisticated exposition of another principle I put forth earlier: a real thing cannot be at one and the same time many things. That which is predicated of diverse things does not exist apart from those individual things except as a concept.

*[6] Again, strictly speaking, generation is the way to being and corruption the way to non-being. For form is not the terminus of generation, and privation is not the terminus of corruption, except because a form causes being and privation non-being. If a form did not cause being, a thing which received such a form would not be said to be generated. Hence, if God is the formal being of all things, He will consequently be the terminus of generation. This is false, since, as we have shown above, God is eternal.

[7] It will also follow that the being of each thing has existed from eternity. Generation or corruption is therefore impossible.** If it does exist, pre-existing being must accrue to something anew. It will therefore accrue either to something pre-existing or to something in no way pre-existing. In the first instance, since according to the above position the being of all existing things is one, it will follow that a thing that is said to be generated acquires, not a new being, but a new mode of being. The result is alteration, not generation. But, if the generated thing in no way pre-existed, it will follow that it is produced from nothing—which is contrary to the nature of generation. This position, therefore, entirely ruins generation and corruption and, as a consequence, is evidently impossible.*

Here in much greater detail, depth and articulation than I could ever hope to achieve, Aquinas affirms another of my arguments: your position renders the notion of creation unintelligible.

*[8] Sacred Teaching as well casts aside this error in confessing that God is “high and elevated,” according to Isaiah (6:1), and that He is “over all,” according to Romans (9:5). For, if He is the being of all things, He is part of all things, but not over them.

[9] So, too, those who committed this error are condemned by the same judgment as are the idolaters who “gave the incommunicable name,” that is, of God, “to wood and stones,” as it is written (Wis. 14:21). If, indeed, God is the being of all things, there will be no more reason to say truly that a stone is a being than to say that a stone is God.*

I have nothing to add here.

[10] Four factors seem to have contributed to the rise of this error. The first is the warped interpretation of certain authoritative texts. There is in Dionysius this remark [De caelisti hierarchia IV, 1]: “The being of all things is the super-essential divinity.” From this remark they wished to infer that God is the formal being of all things, without considering that this interpretation could not square with the words themselves. For, if the divinity is the formal being of all things, it will not be over all but among all, indeed a part of all. Now, since Dionysius said that the divinity was above all things, he showed that according to its nature it was distinct from all things and raised above all things. And when he said that the divinity is the being of all things, he showed that there was in all things a certain likeness of the divine being, coming from God. Elsewhere Dionysius has rather openly set aside this warped interpretation. He has said: “God neither touches nor is in any way mingled with other things, as a point touches a line or the figure of a seal touches wax” [De divinis nominibusi II, 5].

This emphasizes the importance of careful consideration of all such complex subjects in their full and proper context; a point I have been stressing since the very beginning of this thread. Indeed, this seems to be your biggest problem.

I asked earlier if you had read much Thomistic or Aristotelian literature and that the impression I got from my participation in and observation of your past few threads was that the only complete work you had read was Ed Feser’s “Aquinas.” You did not respond to the question, and I have taken your silence as a tacit admission (correct me if I’m wrong.) Feser’s book is meant to be a modern introduction to Aquinas; it is not sufficient to a full and proper understanding of Aristotelian/Thomistic metaphysics.

(continued…)

 

[prodigalson2011]

(…continued)

[11] The second cause leading them to this error is a failure of reason. For, since that which is common is specified or individuated through addition, they thought that the divine being, which receives no addition, was not some proper being but the common being of all things. They ignored the fact that what is common or universal cannot exist without addition, but is considered without addition. For animal cannot be without the difference rational or the difference irrational, although it is considered without these differences. What is more, although a universal may be considered without addition, it is not without the receptibility of addition; for, if no difference could be added to animal, it would not be a genus. The same is true of all other names. But the divine being is without addition not only in thought but also in reality; and not only without addition but also without the receptibility of addition. From the fact, then, that it neither receives nor can receive addition we can rather conclude that God is not common being but proper being; for His being is distinguished from all the rest by the fact that nothing can be added to it. Hence the Commentator says in the Book of Causes that, out of the purity of its goodness, the first cause is distinguished from the rest and in a manner individuated.

Regarding the three bolded statements, in order: 1) Esse cannot exist apart from form, but may be considered as an intellectual construct apart from form. 2) Nothing, not even another nature can be added to the divine esse. 3) As I have said before, “That which is God cannot be other than God.” God’s being is fulfilled in itself, and thus individuated, which is to say that it cannot be predicated of anything else.

[12] The third factor that led them into this error concerns the divine simplicity. God is at the peak of simplicity. They therefore thought that the last point of resolution in our way of seeing things is God, as being absolutely simple. For it is not possible to proceed to infinity in composition among the things we know. Their reason also failed because they did not observe that what is most simple in our understanding of things is not so much a complete thing as a part of a thing. But, simplicity is predicated of God as of some perfect subsisting thing.

As I said earlier in this thread, “esse itself” is just a part of something considered apart from that of which it is a part. But God is “Ipsum esse subsistens”, a perfect subsisting thing. That which subsists in itself cannot be a part of something else.

[13] A fourth factor that could have led them to their error is the mode of expression we use when we say that God is in all things. By this we do not mean that God is in things as a part of a thing, but as the cause of a thing that is never lacking to its effect. For we do not say that a form is in matter as a sailor is in a ship.

This has been a persistent error in your reading of my own arguments as well as Thomas’. A single word can have several different and even interrelated meanings. It is crucial to a proper understanding that these terms be understood in the mode intended.

Esse is actuality itself.

Esse is the principle whereby a substance is actual; it is not an actuality itself.

Breathing is not an esse. Breathing is the behaviour of a particular nature that is distinct from esse.

I did not say breathing was an esse, I said breathing was an act, just as esse is an act. They are actions, not things in themselves. Acts are exercised by things.

God is not simply “esse”, because “esse” is an analogous term, predicated of different things in different ways. In the case of God, we cannot even completely say what this means. We can only know in part what God’s Being is like by analogy to created things.

(continued…)

 

[prodigalson2011]

(…continued)

In the context of how potency relates to actuality, If esse is not a potency, then it is a being itself.

No, it is not a being itself. It is the act of a being by which that exists. “Ipsum esse subsistens” is a being (ens) which has that act (esse) by its nature (essence).

Esse is required to actualise every instant of change in creation. A thing cannot catch on fire without God actualising that fire at that very instant since creation has no power in itself.

I answer that we must admit without any qualification that God operates in the operations of nature and will. Some, however, through failing to understand this aright fell into error, and ascribed to God every operation of nature in the sense that nature does nothing at all by its own power…
It is also opposed to reason which convinces us that nothing in nature is void of purpose. Now unless natural things had an action of their own the forms and forces with which they are endowed would be to no purpose; thus if a knife does not cut, its sharpness is useless. It would also be useless to set fire to the coal, if God ignites the coal without fire.

The true colors of your argument are starting to show. You essentially reduce creation to a puppet show.

It is also opposed to God’s goodness which is self-communicative: the result being that things were made like God not only in being but also in acting.

Creation has the power of secondary act, or secondary causation. That is to say, potencies that are latent in created things may be actualized by one another. These effects are still tracebable to God as the first cause of the actualities which contain those potencies as well as the cause of their very causal power. They may further be accredited to God inasmuch as divine providence demands that all things are ordered to the good, which is God and His will. Thus, God can bring good from evil, those acts which tend towards privation and are counter to God’s will and thus cannot be attributed to Him in any direct sense.

The argument which they put forward is altogether frivolous. When we say that an accident does not pass from one subject to another, this refers to the same identical accident, and we do not deny that an accident subjected in a natural thing can produce an accident of like species in another subject: indeed this happens of necessity in every natural action. Moreover, they suppose that all forms are accidents, and this is not true: because then in natural things there would be no substantial being, the principle of which cannot be an accidental but only a substantial form. Moreover, this would make an end of generation and corruption: and many other absurdities would follow. [Sum. Th. I, Q. cv, A. 5: C.G. III. lxvii; I-II, Q. x, art. 4]

God cannot break off a piece of his power and give it to creation because God is power itself just like God is esse itself.

The error of calling God “esse itself” has already been brought to the fore. Nevertheless, God does not have to “break off a piece of his power” in order to give it to creation. An agent effects its like: a fire does not break off a piece of itself in order to give fire to something else.

There is no power outside of God. It is meaningless to say otherwise. Rather God conjoins his power to creation, and since Gods power is identical with his esse what he is in fact doing is conjoining his esse with creation. In this instant a creature expresses the power and therefore the esse of God according to the limitations of its essence.

As has already been shown, yes, there is power outside of God and God cannot be conjoined to anything else because He subsists in Himself. And to say that the action of a creature is an exercise of the power of God is to say, especially in the case of intellectual beings which may act in ways that contradict His will which is His power, that creatures manipulate God, which is manifestly impossible, not to mention blasphemous.

(continued…)

 

[prodigalson2011]

(…continued)

This is not to say that essences positively limit the esse or power of God, but rather it is to say that creation can only express the power of God to a limited degree due to its finiteness. God animates everything. Actuality is not caused by secondary causes.

First of all, any expression of the power of God is an expression of His will. So if all of creation is an expression of His will, sin is an expression of God’s will. But God cannot violate his own nature, so it is impossible that an act of sin is an expression of His will. Thus, we can see that the power of creation is not the power of God. Rather, the power of creation is subject to the power of God and is ordered to His will, i.e. even those powers which act contrary to His will are ordered in such a way that all things, nevertheless, fulfill His will.

Secondly, as to the question of whether actuality is caused by secondary causes, here we have a case again of a failure to make distinctions. Primary act, or the actuality of all other actualities (esse) is not caused by secondary causes. Secondary actualities (those of potencies that are accidental to things, i.e. material changes, movements of the intellect, etc.) can be caused by secondary causes.

As regards creation, actuality is nothing more than the effect of some activity, such as the actuality of creation is the effect of God’s creative activity or the actuality of a house is the effect of the builder’s activity. Since God has given his creation the power of secondary causation, His creatures can actualize potencies in themselves and other creatures. These effects are still reducible to God, who is the primary act of all else and thus is present to all effects inasmuch as they owe their activity to Him.

It must be observed that one thing may be the cause of another’s action in several ways. First, by giving it the power to act: thus it is said that the generator moves heavy and light bodies, inasmuch as it gives them the power from which that movement results. In this way God causes all the actions of nature, because he gave natural things the forces whereby they are able to act, not only as the generator gives power to heavy and light bodies yet does not preserve it, but also as upholding its very being, forasmuch as he is the cause of the power bestowed, not only like the generator in its becoming, but also in its being; and thus God may be said to be the cause of an action by both causing and upholding the natural power in its being. [ibid.]

But I am not saying that there are no secondary causes, but rather secondary causation is only meaningful in the sense that a thing behaves according to its nature, but it does not actualise the **activity **of its nature. Otherwise you would have more coming less, actuality coming from potency, and that is metaphysically impossible. God has absolute sovereignty over existence.

“Therefore God is the cause of everything’s action inasmuch as he is the cause of power in anything else, and preserves it in being and applies it to action, and inasmuch as by his power every other power acts.”

To act is to actualize some potency. While you do not actualize your own being nor the being of anything else, but you have been given the powers of will, intelligence and motion and thus you can actualize potencies in other actual things. You have this secondary power by virtue of the primary power which has effected it in you.

God’s sovereignty is not dependent on nothing else having any power whatsoever.

I do not actualise my thoughts. My essence is not identical to the power of esse.

God actualises all my choices

The above amounts to saying that God is in complete control of your will. If God actualizes your thoughts, your thoughts are His creation. So your every thought and action is really the action of God. So every sin you or I have ever commited was actually commited by God. Every evil thought you’ve ever had was put into you by God. If God is the only power, then it necessarily follows that you do not have the power to think.

The will is said to have dominion over its own act not to the exclusion of the first cause, but inasmuch as the first cause does not act in the will so as to determine it of necessity to one thing as it determines nature; wherefore the determination of the act remains in the power of the reason and will.[ibid]

(continued…)

 

[prodigalson2011]

(…continued)

Pantheism is the belief that nature and God are not distinct.

You are trying to escape the consequences of your philosophy by equivocating on two different definitions of the word “nature.” In Thomistic terms, “nature” as employed here in your definition of pantheism would be more accurately translated as “creation.” If God is the actuality of creation, then creation is God. Indeed, if God is the only actuality, then creation is not real but only an illusion cast by God.

Your analogy doesn’t just run into problems; it fails to reflect reality fullstop.

Translation: my analogy fails to reflect your opinion.

In summary, the greatest problem in our communication is that you have evidently not engaged the ideas you are discussing thoroughly. That you think Aquinas thinks of God as the only act of existing is damning evidence of that fact. His De anima (the soul) makes reference over 150 times to different “acts of existing.” (You can read it in its entirety here: De anima). A few quotes:

*Being is said to be the result of creation in so far as every second cause when it gives being does so forasmuch as it acts by the power of the first creating cause: since being is the first effect and presupposes nothing else.

the intellective soul, inasmuch as it performs its proper operation without communicating in any way with the body, must act of itself. And because a thing acts so far as it is actual, the intellective soul must have a complete act of existing in itself, depending in no way on the body. For forms whose act of existing depends on matter or on a subject do not operate of themselves. Heat, for instance, does not act, but something hot. [Summa theol., I, q.75, a.2; q.76, a.1; Contra Gentiles, II, chaps. 56, 57, 59, 68, 69, and 70; De potentia, q.3, a.9 and 11; De spir. creat., a. 2; Comm. in De anima, Bk. II, lect. 4; Bk. III, lect. 7; De unit. intell.]

Although the soul has a complete act of existing of its own, it does not follow that the body is united to it accidentally: first, because the same act of existing that belongs to the soul is conferred on the body by the soul so that there is one act of existing for the whole composite; secondly, because, while the soul can subsist of itself, it does not have a complete species, for the soul needs the body in order to complete its species. [ibid]*

It is clear to me that you have not properly understood Aquinas; not, presumably, for any reason of intellectual deficiency but because you have not sufficiently engaged his work or that of the Thomistic school in general. Almost the entirety of his corpus can be found here, courtesy of the Dominican House of Studies. That’s a great place to start.

 

[daler]

Are you saying that physical nature is God? Or are you saying that physical reality does not truly have extension (like virtual-reality). Some people think this, especially since the dawn of Quantum physics. In fact some people think that the universe is essentially just the outward expression of mathematical code rendering. This is to say that the universe itself is very much like a holographic projection and is not really “solid” or 3 dimensional even though it appears that way due to restrictions on how much a mind can effect the holographic projections around it.

Its fun to speculate on these things.

God is above all human conception of corporeal existence, and whatever we “imagine” of God falls short of His Being. If I may enter a quote for clarification, followed by further commentary:

. To every discerning and illumined heart it is evident that God, the unknowable Essence, the divine Being, is immensely exalted beyond every human attribute, such as corporeal existence, ascent and descent, egress and regress. Far be it from His glory that human tongue should adequately recount His praise, or that human heart comprehend His fathomless mystery. He is and hath ever been veiled in the ancient eternity of His Essence, and will remain in His Reality everlastingly hidden from the sight of men.
(Baha’u’llah: The Kitab-i-Iqan, p. 98)

. Consider that all that is in the heavens the earths (or billions of galaxies and trillions of stars and planets, as they have deduced with telescopes) has been created by this Infinite Single Being. Quantum physics calls into questions the very idea of “matter”, and the further it examines its facets it indeed appears to me more of an extension or projection of what might be termed best as “spirit” i.e. in search of the God-particle, which they might as well admit is searching God, or at least His fingerprints, so to speak.

. I actually wonder if what we refer to as “heaven” is more akin to what we experience in the dream state, or in visions, which happen without ever leaving the place of rest, yet transport us to other times and “places”, where we walk without feet, traversing illimitable distances, and converse with other souls. Then sometimes, a dream actually manifests itself ten years later, or some lesser or greater time, in the normal life we live.

Any further contribution of your thoughts on this would be appreciated.

Thank you, kindly for its a deeeep subject, beyond quarks and time…

 

[wbradl]

prodigalson…I believe Acquinas does talk about act and potency. Analogies always fail when speaking about God. God is too far above us , we know very little about him except that he exists,how he “is”,we know not,how He acts,we know not He is a mystery so it is pointless to speculate about the infinite. There is no reason for God to create,he is complete within himself. Man creates because he wants or has needs,God has no wants or needs, ergo he does not act ,but he does,lo another mystery…w bradl.

 

[utunumsint]

Hi Prodigalson2011,

I’m reading through your posts.

Quick question: what is yliatim?

God bless,
Ut

 

[utunumsint]

Done. Thanks for these posts prodigalson2011. I have to say, Aquinas is very clear.

Linux, you seem to be misunderstanding the layer between God and created beings.

1-Divine esse
2-Common esse (considered separately from essences only as an abstraction)
3-Essences (considered separately from common esse only as an abstraction)
4-Substance (in which both common esse and essence exist)

To better understand how Aquinas arrives at this division, you have to look at how he believes philosophers gradually arrived at this idea of divine esse by ascribing to God what they see in nature. This quote is from De Potential, the first article.

I answer that to make the point at issue clear we must observe that we speak of power in relation to act. Now act is twofold; the first act which is a form, and the second act which is operation. Seemingly the word ‘act’ was first universally employed in the sense of operation, and then, secondly, transferred to indicate the form, inasmuch as the form is the principle and end of operation. Wherefore in like manner power is twofold: active power corresponding to that act which is operation—and seemingly it was in this sense that the word ‘power’ was first employed:— and passive power, corresponding to the first act or the form,—to which seemingly the name of power was subsequently given.
Now, just as nothing suffers save by reason of a passive power, so nothing acts except by reason of the first act, namely the form. For it has been stated that this first act is so called from action.

1. 
   *]Now God is act both pure and primary, wherefore it is most befitting to him to act and communicate his likeness to other things:and consequently active power is most becoming to him: since power is called active forasmuch as it is a principle of action.
   *]We must also observe that our mind strives to describe God as a most perfect being.
   *]And seeing that it is unable to get at him save by likening him to his effects, while it fails to find any creature so supremely perfect as to be wholly devoid of imperfection, consequently it endeavours to describe him as possessing the various perfections it discovers in creatures, although each of those perfections is in some way at fault, yet so as to remove, from God whatever imperfection is connected with them.
   *]For instance, being denotes something complete and simple, yet non-subsistent; in other words, it is only found in substances.]
   *]substance denotes something subsistent, yet the subject of something. in other words, it is subject of common being]
   *]Accordingly we ascribe being and substance to God; but substance by reason of subsistence not of substanding; and being by reason of simplicity and completeness, not of inherence whereby it inheres to something. in other words, in God esse is his own essence and there is no composition in him like we find in the things of our experience - his effects - common esse with essence. He is pure act.]
   *]In like manner we ascribe to God operation by reason of its being the ultimate perfection, not by reason of that into which operation passes. And we attribute power to God by reason of that which is permanent and is the principle of power, and not by reason of that which is made complete by operation.

1. 
   God bless,
   Ut

 

[Linux]

No, he refers to God as a being whose essence is His existence. Aquinas never refers to God as simply “esse”, or vice versa.

His essence is esse. There is no dancing around that fact.

Actuality is the state of being actual. How can something be actual yet distinct from actuality? That is absurd. And it’s not what Aquinas is talking about, as evidenced above.

(continued…)

So you are now saying essence is not objectively distinct from the act of existence and instead essence is identical to actuality in creatures.

Whats it going to be Linus?

 

[Linux]

Done. Thanks for these posts prodigalson2011. I have to say, Aquinas is very clear.

Linux, you seem to be misunderstanding the layer between God and created beings.

1-Divine esse
2-Common esse (considered separately from essences only as an abstraction)
3-Essences (considered separately from common esse only as an abstraction)
4-Substance (in which both common esse and essence exist)

To better understand how Aquinas arrives at this division, you have to look at how he believes philosophers gradually arrived at this idea of divine esse by ascribing to God what they see in nature. This quote is from De Potential, the first article.

God bless,
Ut

Esse is not a genus.

 

[Peter_Plato]

Rather than churn out another quick retort, I decided rather to take my time in composing the following. I apologize in advance for the length:

No, he refers to God as a being whose essence is His existence. Aquinas never refers to God as simply “esse”, or vice versa.

ProdigalSon,

Thank you for the time and effort you have put into this series of posts. I have read through them and find your position very compelling.

The content is not easy to grasp and I will need to spend more time rereading the sequence to fully agree with you, but on first reading I find your points convincing.

I am in the process of reading Maritain’s The Range of Reason. He has a very interesting take on what he calls Absolute Atheism as a kind of wholesale commitment to Absolute Immanence in order to bring about a “reconciliation between essence and existence.”

Absolute atheism starts as a claim of man to become the sole master of his own destiny, totally freed. from any “alienation” and heteronomy, made totally and decisively independent of any ultimate end as well as of any eternal law imposed upon him by any transcendent God. According to atheistic theorists, does not the idea of God originate in an alienation of human nature separated from its true subject, and transmuted into an ideal and sublimated image whose very transcendence and sovereign attributes ensure man’s submission to an enslaved state of existence? Is it not by getting rid of that sublimated image and of any transcendence, that human nature will achieve the fullness of its own stature and freedom and bring about the final "reconciliation between essence and existence?"

But what is the actual end-all of the philosophy of absolute Immanence which is all one with absolute atheism? Everything which was formerly considered superior to time and participating in some transcendent quality – either ideal value or spiritual reality – is now absorbed in the movement of temporal existence and the all-engulfing ocean of Becoming and of History. Truth and justice, good and evil, faithfulness, all the standards of conscience, henceforth perfectly relativized, become radically contingent: they are but changing shapes of the process of History, just as for Descartes they were but contingent creations of divine Freedom. The truth, at any given moment, is that which conforms with the requirements of History’s begettings. As a result truth changes as time goes on. An act of mine which was meritorious today will be criminal tomorrow. And that is the way my conscience must pass judgment on it. The human intellect and moral conscience have to become heroically tractable.

www2.nd.edu/Departments/Maritain/etext/range08.htm

It seems to me that what he is getting at here is precisely what is being discussed in this thread. That the manner in which we come to terms with the distinction between the transcendence and immanence of God is what will determine which direction we will end up taking in terms of either making God out of our understanding of creation or allowing the transcendence of God into our understanding of creation.

Reconciling this distinction between the Esse of God and the esse of created things would seem to be the philosophical rendition of this existential and moral “crossroads.” Just a thought.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

His essence is esse. There is no dancing around that fact.

So you are now saying essence is not objectively distinct from the act of existence and instead essence is identical to actuality in creatures.

Whats it going to be Linus?

Thomas refers to God as Ipsum Esse Subsistens, Subsistent Existence Itself. S.T. Part 1, Ques 4, art 2: " Secondly, from what has been already proved, God is existence itself, of itself subsistent "

S.T., Part 1, art. 4 " On the contrary, Hilary says (Trin. vii): “In God existence is not an accidental quality, but subsisting truth.” Therefore what subsists in God is His existence.

I answer that, God is not only His own essence, as shown in the preceding article, but also His own existence. This may be shown in several ways.

First, whatever a thing has besides its essence must be caused either by the constituent principles of that essence (like a property that necessarily accompanies the species–as the faculty of laughing is proper to a man–and is caused by the constituent principles of the species), or by some exterior agent–as heat is caused in water by fire. Therefore, if the existence of a thing differs from its essence, this existence must be caused either by some exterior agent or by its essential principles. Now it is impossible for a thing’s existence to be caused by its essential constituent principles, for nothing can be the sufficient cause of its own existence, if its existence is caused. Therefore that thing, whose existence differs from its essence, must have its existence caused by another. But this cannot be true of God; because we call God the first efficient cause. Therefore it is impossible that in God His existence should differ from His essence.

Secondly, existence is that which makes every form or nature actual; for goodness and humanity are spoken of as actual, only because they are spoken of as existing. Therefore existence must be compared to essence, if the latter is a distinct reality, as actuality to potentiality. Therefore, since in God there is no potentiality, as shown above (Article 1), it follows that in Him essence does not differ from existence. Therefore His essence is His existence.

Thirdly, because, just as that which has fire, but is not itself fire, is on fire by participation; so that which has existence but is not existence, is a being by participation. But God is His own essence, as shown above (Article 3) if, therefore, He is not His own existence He will be not essential, but participated being. He will not therefore be the first being–which is absurd. Therefore God is His own existence, and not merely His own essence. "

Linux, you should read the first reference, I know you will like it.

Well, are you a fan of Jean Paul Sartre?

Linus2nd

 

[utunumsint]

Esse is not a genus.

 

[Linux]

Thomas refers to God as Ipsum Esse Subsistens, Subsistent Existence Itself. S.T. Part 1, Ques 4, art 2: " Secondly, from what has been already proved, God is existence itself, of itself subsistent "

God is Ipsum Esse Subsistens becuase esse is his essence.

I answer that, God is not only His own essence, as shown in the preceding article, but also His own existence. This may be shown in several ways.

God is not 2 things. Esse and essence is identical in God, and therefore we are talking about one thing. God’s “isnesss” is his “whatness”. Essence is esse in God. Thus it is not wrong to speak of God as being simply esse as that is speaking of his essence.

First, whatever a thing has besides its essence must be caused either by the constituent principles of that essence (like a property that necessarily accompanies the species–as the faculty of laughing is proper to a man–and is caused by the constituent principles of the species), or by some exterior agent–as heat is caused in water by fire. Therefore, if the existence of a thing differs from its essence, this existence must be caused either by some exterior agent or by its essential principles. Now it is impossible for a thing’s existence to be caused by its essential constituent principles, for nothing can be the sufficient cause of its own existence, if its existence is caused. Therefore that thing, whose existence differs from its essence, must have its existence caused by another. But this cannot be true of God; because we call God the first efficient cause. Therefore it is impossible that in God His existence should differ from His essence.

I agree.

Secondly, existence is that which makes every form or nature actual; for goodness and humanity are spoken of as actual, only because they are spoken of as existing.

But at the same time in creatures they cannot be spoken of as identical or equally contingent upon each other for their distinct actuality because then potency would be perfecting actuality (bringing actuality into actuality), which is a contradiction.

Therefore, since in God there is no potentiality, as shown above (Article 1), it follows that in Him essence does not differ from existence. Therefore His essence is His existence.

His essence is esse, his isness is simply his whatness. I agree.

Thirdly, because, just as that which has fire, but is not itself fire, is on fire by participation; so that which has existence but is not existence, is a being by participation.

I agree.

But God is His own essence, as shown above (Article 3) if, therefore, He is not His own existence He will be not essential, but participated being. He will not therefore be the first being–which is absurd. Therefore God is His own existence, and not merely His own essence. "

I agree.

Linux, you should read the first reference, I know you will like it.

Unfortunately i am devoid of emotion.

Well, are you a fan of Jean Paul Sartre?

Linus2nd

Jean paul satre was an existentialist, what does he have to do with this in your opinion.

Your other posts are rather large, so i will have to deal with them on the weekend.

 

[Linux]

It seems to me that what he is getting at here is precisely what is being discussed in this thread. That the manner in which we come to terms with the distinction between the transcendence and immanence of God is what will determine which direction we will end up taking in terms of either making God out of our understanding of creation or allowing the transcendence of God into our understanding of creation.

Reconciling this distinction between the Esse of God and the esse of created things would seem to be the philosophical rendition of this existential and moral “crossroads.” Just a thought.

I can’t see it my self. What does this have to do with the arguments on this thread?

 

[onenow1]

Hi,All

Maybe this is dumb ? Can science prove science ? Can science know what nothing is ?

So is this the first premise, understanding what nothing is ?

God is God and nothing is impossible for Him.

God Bless All
onenow1

 

[Linux]

Hi,All

Maybe this is dumb ? Can science prove science ? Can science know what nothing is ?

So is this the first premise, understanding what nothing is ?

God is God and nothing is impossible for Him.

God Bless All
onenow1

God cannot cease to exist, so clearly the idea that nothing is impossible for God clearly does not imply that God can do the metaphysically impossible. Science is irrelevant insofar as the fact that it is not the basis of my claim.