How does God create "the act of existing" out of nothing?

[prodigalson2011]

To the readers of this debate. Whether my arguments are in line with Aquinas or not has no relevance whatsoever with whether or not my argument is correct. Linus claims that his interpretation is in line or even identical with Aquinas, but I would look very carefully at the full body of Aquinas’ work and tell me where you find it explicitly said…

1. That esse and essence in creatures are co-contingent or interdependent or each-other for both their actuality as distinct.

*20. Reason, too, is in accord with this, because the existence of a composed substance is not the existence of the form alone nor of the matter alone, but of the composite itself; and essence is that according to which a real thing is said to be. Whence it is necessary that the essence, whereby a real thing is denominated a being, be neither the form alone nor the matter alone, but both, although the form alone in its own way is the cause of such existence.

1. We see the same in other things which are constituted of a plurality of principles, namely, that the real thing is not denominated from one of these principles alone, but from what includes both.
2. Now everything which receives something from another is in potency with respect to what it receives, and what is received into it is its act. It is necessary therefore that the quiddity (essence) itself or the form, which is the intelligence, be in potency with respect to the existence which it receives from God; and this existence is received as an act. It is in this way that potency and act are found in the intelligences, but not form and matter, unless equivocally.

And from this it follows that he is not in a genus, because everything which is in a genus must have a quiddity which is other than its existence. And this is so since the quiddity or nature of a genus or species, in the case of those things which have a genus or species, is not multiplied according to the intelligible content of the nature; rather, it is the existence in these diverse things which is diverse. *

All of this eventually leads up to Aquinas’ refutation of your position:
*
90. Nor is it necessary, if we say that God is existence alone, for us to fall into the error of those who say that God is universal existence whereby each and every thing formally exists. For the existence which God is, is such that no addition can be made to it. Whence by virtue of its purity it is an existence distinct from every existence. This is why, in the commentary on the ninth proposition of the Book on Causes, it is said that the individuation of the First Cause, which is existence alone, is through its pure goodness. But as regards that universal existence, just as it does not include in its intelligible content any addition, so too neither does it include in its intelligible content any exclusion of addition, because if this were the case, nothing in which something is added over and above its existence could be understood to be.

1. Tell me where esse is describe as merely a principle that is not a real thing in itself, and that this non-actual thing, which is not even potency itself, brings potency to act.

Esse is a real thing in anything that exercises such an act. But it requires some form in which to act, in the same way an “act of rolling” requires some object which it can cause to roll. “Nothing” doesn’t roll, just as there is always “something” that exists. In order for any act (other than God) to be actual, some potency must receive it. Thus, an “act of burning” cannot be real unless something’s potency to burn receives it.

Again, God may be likened to the hand which pushes the book along the table. God, like the man who moves the book, has a will and the power to move something by that will and activity. The possible being (essence), like the book, does not have such a power, so left alone it is completely inert (book) or non-actual (essence). But as God acts upon the essence, the essence is moved to an act like that of the agent which is acting upon it (existence), just as the hand acts upon the book which is then moved to an act like that of its agent (as the hand is moving, so is the book moving.) But the motion of the book is not identical to the motion of the hand, nor is the existence of the creature that of God.

(continued…)*

 

[prodigalson2011]

(…continued)

saying that creatures positively bring potency/nothing to act by their own distinct power, as opposed to God’s power which is mediated by contingent beings?

Potency and nothing are not the same thing; you are loading the question with a false premise. As regards the potency of an actual thing, it is a “real potential”. It presupposes and inheres within the existence of the thing in which it is a potentiality, so it is not nothing. Your “nothing” is the same kind of bait-and-switch used by physicists like Lawrence Krauss who use “nothing” to describe a state of indeterminacy, which is still “something.”

I answer that we must admit without any qualification that God operates in the operations of nature and will. Some, however, through failing to understand this aright fell into error, and ascribed to God every operation of nature in the sense that nature does nothing at all by its own power…

It is also opposed to reason which convinces us that nothing in nature is void of purpose. Now unless natural things had an action of their own the forms and forces with which they are endowed would be to no purpose; thus if a knife does not cut, its sharpness is useless. It would also be useless to set fire to the coal, if God ignites the coal without fire.
It is also opposed to God’s goodness which is self-communicative: the result being that things were made like God not only in being but also in acting.

The argument which they put forward is altogether frivolous. When we say that an accident does not pass from one subject to another, this refers to the same identical accident, and we do not deny that an accident subjected in a natural thing can produce an accident of like species in another subject: indeed this happens of necessity in every natural action. (ps2011: as I said earlier, the potencies actualized by created things are “accidental changes” in their patients/recipients.) *Moreover, they suppose that all forms are accidents, and this is not true: because then in natural things there would be no substantial being, the principle of which cannot be an accidental but only a substantial form. Moreover, this would make an end of generation and corruption: and many other absurdities would follow.

Avicebron (Fons Vitae) says that no corporeal substance acts, but that a spiritual energy penetrating all bodies acts in them, and that the measure of a body’s activity is according to the measure of its purity and subtlety, whereby it is rendered amenable to the influence of a spiritual force. He supports his statement by three arguments. His first argument is that every agent after God requires subject-matter on which to act: and no corporeal agent has matter subject to it, wherefore seemingly it cannot act. His second argument is that quantity hinders action and movement: in proof of which he points out that a bulky body is slow of movement and heavy: wherefore a corporeal substance being inseparable from quantity cannot act. His third argument is that the corporeal substance is furthest removed from the first agent, which is purely active and nowise passive, while the intermediate substances are both active and passive: and therefore corporeal substances which come last, must needs be passive only and not active.

Now all this is manifestly fallacious in that he takes all corporeal substances as one single substance; and as though they differed from one another only in accidental and not in their substantial being. If the various corporeal substances be taken as substantially distinct, every one will not occupy the last place and the furthest removed from the first agent, but one will be higher than another and nearer to the first agent, so that one will be able to act on another. Again in the foregoing arguments the corporeal substance is considered only in respect of its matter and not in respect of its form, whereas it is composed of both. It is true that the corporeal substance belongs to the lowest grade of beings, and has no subject beneath it, but this is by reason of its matter, not of its form: because in respect of its form a corporeal substance has an inferior subject in any other substance whose matter has potentially that form which the corporeal substance in question has actually. Hence it follows that there is mutual action in corporeal substances, since in the matter of one there is potentially the form of another, and vice versa. And if this form does not suffice to act, for the same reason neither does the energy of a spiritual substance, which the corporeal substance must needs receive according to its mode.—Nor does quantity hinder movement and action, since nothing is moved but that which has quantity (Phys. vi, 10). Nor is it true that quantity causes weight. This is disproved in De Coelo iv, 2. In fact, quantity increases the speed of natural movement, thus a weighty body, the greater it is, the greater the velocity of its downward movement, and in like manner that of a light body in its movement upwards. And although quantity in itself is not a principle of action, no reason can be given why it should hinder action, seeing that rather is it the instrument of an active quality; except in so far as active forms in quantitative matter receive a certain limited being that is confined to that particular matter, so that their action does not extend to an extraneous matter. But though they receive individual being in matter, they retain their specific nature, by reason whereof they can produce their like in species, and yet are unable themselves to be in another subject. Hence we are to understand that God works in every natural thing not as though the natural thing were altogether inert, but because God works in both nature and will when they work. How this may be we must now explain.*

(continued…)

 

[prodigalson2011]

(…continued)
*
It must be observed that one thing may be the cause of another’s action in several ways. First, by giving it the power to act: thus it is said that the generator moves heavy and light bodies, inasmuch as it gives them the power from which that movement results. In this way God causes all the actions of nature, because he gave natural things the forces whereby they are able to act, not only as the generator gives power to heavy and light bodies yet does not preserve it, but also as upholding its very being, forasmuch as he is the cause of the power bestowed, not only like the generator in its becoming, but also in its being; and thus God may be said to be the cause of an action by both causing and upholding the natural power in its being. For secondly, the preserver of a power is said to cause the action; thus a remedy that preserves the sight is said to make a man see. But since nothing moves or acts of itself unless it be an unmoved mover; thirdly, a thing is said to cause another’s action by moving it to act: whereby we do not mean that it causes or preserves the active power, but that it applies the power to action, even as a man causes the knife’s cutting by the very fact that he applies the sharpness of the knife to cutting by moving it to cut. And since the lower nature in acting does not act except through being moved, because these lower bodies are both subject to and cause alteration: whereas the heavenly body causes alteration without being subject to it, and yet it does not cause movement unless it be itself moved, so that we must eventually trace its movement to God, it follows of necessity that God causes the action of every natural thing by moving and applying its power to action. Furthermore we find that the order of effects follows the order of causes, and this must needs be so on account of the likeness of the effect to its cause. Nor can the second cause by its own power have any influence on the effect of the first cause**, although it is the instrument of the first cause in regard to that effect: because an instrument is in a manner the cause of the principal cause’s effect, not by its own form or power, but in so far as it participates somewhat in the power of the principal cause through being moved thereby: thus the axe is the cause of the craftsman’s handiwork not by its own form or power, but by the power of the craftsman who moves it so that it participates in his power. Hence, fourthly, one thing causes the action of another, as a principal agent causes the action of its instrument: and in this way again we must say that God causes every action of natural things. For the higher the cause the greater its scope and efficacity: and the more efficacious the cause, the more deeply does it penetrate into its effect, and the more remote the potentiality from which it brings that effect into act. Now in every natural thing we find that it is a being, a natural thing, and of this or that nature. The first is common to all beings, the second to all natural things, the third to all the members of a species, while a fourth, if we take accidents, into account, is proper to this or that individual. Accordingly this or that individual thing cannot by its action produce another individual of the same species except as the instrument of that cause which includes in its scope the whole species and, besides, the whole being of’ the inferior creature. Wherefore no action in these lower bodies attains to the production of a species except through the power of the heavenly body, nor does anything produce being except by the power of God. For being is the most common first effect and more intimate than all other effects: wherefore it is an effect which it belongs to God alone to produce by his own power: and for this reason (De Causis, prop. ix) an intelligence does not give being, except the divine power be therein. Therefore God is the cause of every action, inasmuch as every agent is an instrument of the divine power operating."*

** - Hence why even though God effects a separate act of existence upon creatures, they cannot sustain it themselves. A second cause (creature) cannot have any influence on the effect (esse) of the First Cause.

The active and passive powers of a natural thing suffice for action in their own order: yet the divine power is required for the reason given above.

The above clearly distinguishes between the power of instruments (second causes) and the power of the first cause. The powers of secondary causes are simply actions that are proper to their nature (as it is the proper action of that which is sharp to cut), but they all find their origin and reality by being moved to act by the power of the first cause. Insofar as a thing is real, it has its own powers as appropriate to its nature, but since a thing is only real insofar as it has being, these powers are only real because God causes the things which possess them to be.

It belongs to the lower power to be a principle of operation in a certain way and in its own order, namely as instrument of a higher power: wherefore, apart from the latter it has no operation.

Again, lower powers depend on higher powers for their operation, such that a tool’s power depends on the craftsman, the craftsman depends on the sun, the sun depends on the elements and so on until all such dependent powers eventually trace their origin back to God, who is seen to be the necessary cause of them all.

(continued…)

 

[prodigalson2011]

(…continued)

The natural forces implanted in natural things at their formation are in them by way of fixed and constant forms in nature. But that which God does in a natural thing to make it operate actually, is a mere intention, incomplete in being, as colours in the air and the power of the craftsman in his instrument. Hence even as art can give the axe its sharpness as a permanent form, but not the power of the art as a permanent form, unless it were endowed with intelligence, so it is possible for a natural thing to be given its own proper power as a permanent form within it, but not the power to act so as to cause being as the instrument of the first cause, unless it were given to be the universal principle of being. Nor could it be given to a natural power to cause its own movement, or to preserve its own being. Consequently just as it clearly cannot be given to the craftsman’s instrument to work unless it be moved by him, so neither can it be given to a natural thing to operate without the divine operation.

A natural thing can have its own power, it just cannot be the source of its own being or power, nor can it be the cause of being of some other natural thing. In order for it to have and exercise its own power, it is necessary for God to sustain it by His power.

*God is said to have left man in the hand of his counsel not as though he did not operate in the will: but because he gave man’s will dominion over its act, so that it is not bound to this or that alternative: which dominion he did not bestow on nature since by its form it is confined to one determinate effect.

The will is said to have dominion over its own act not to the exclusion of the first cause, but inasmuch as the first cause does not act in the will so as to determine it of necessity to one thing as it determines nature; wherefore the determination of the act remains in the power of the reason and will.*

While God causes the act which is man’s will, the will is given its own dominion (power) over its act so as to determine its agent activity itself.

We may add as a third reason that an instrument acts not only by its own power but also by the power of its mover.

Pretty plainly spoken: An instrument has its own power, but that power is dependent upon the power of that which moves it.

*And prior in time to the things having potential being there were certain things having actual being, namely, agents, by which the former have been brought to actuality. For what exists potentially must always be brought to actuality by an agent, which is an actual being. Hence what is potentially a man becomes actually a man as a result of the man who generates him, who is an actual being;

…no instrument can achieve its ultimate perfection by the power of its own form, but only by the power of the principal agent, although by its own power it can provide a certain disposition to the ultimate perfection.

Besides, God not only gives powers to things but, beyond that, no thing can act by its own power unless it acts through His power, as we showed above. So, man cannot use the power of will that has been given him except in so far as he acts through the power of God. Now, the being through whose power the agent acts is the cause not only of the power, but also of the act. This is apparent in the case of an artist through whose power an instrument works, even though it does not get its own form from this artist, but is merely applied to action by this man. Therefore, God is for us the cause not only of our will, but also of our act of willing.

And again, things have their own powers, but they exercise these powers through the power of God, insomuch as he brings them to and sustains them in act. Some things’ powers act in a very determinate way (such as things bound by physical laws, i.e. the inanimate universe), while other things (namely, intellectual beings) have their own will which can direct their own powers to freely chosen ends.

(continued…)*

 

[prodigalson2011]

(…continued)

1. Tell me where Aquinas says that more can come from less.

Aquinas never says that, nor have I or anyone else here. This notion is a result of your faulty interpretation of our arguments. You are making the same mistake that many of Aquinas’ critics did in failing to distinguish between creation and change:

*It seemed to many of Aquinas’ contemporaries that there was a fundamental incompatibility between the claim of ancient physics that something cannot come from nothing and the affirmation of Christian faith that God produced everything from nothing…

…The key to Aquinas’ analysis is the distinction he draws between creation and change. The natural sciences, whether Aristotelian or those of our own day, have as their subject the world of changing things: from sub-atomic particles to acorns to galaxies. Whenever there is a change there must be something that changes. The Greeks are right: from nothing, nothing comes; that is, if the verb “to come” means a change. All change requires an underlying material reality.

Creation, on the other hand, is the radical causing of the whole existence of whatever exists. To cause completely something to exist is not to produce a change in something, is not to work on or with some already existing material. If, in producing something new, an agent were to use something already existing, the agent would not by itself be the complete cause of the new thing. But such a complete causing is precisely what creation is. To create is to give existence, and all things are totally dependent upon God for the very fact that they are. God does not take nothing and make something out of “it.” Rather, anything left entirely to itself, separated from the cause of its existence, would be absolutely nothing. Creation is not some distant event; it is the continuing, complete causing of the existence of everything that is. Creation, thus, is a subject for metaphysics and theology, not for the natural sciences.*

1. Tell me where Aquinas says that created substances are identical with their actuality?

*Among substances are by general consent reckoned bodies and especially natural bodies; for they are the principles of all other bodies. Of natural bodies some have life in them, others not; by life we mean self-nutrition and growth (with its correlative decay). It follows that every natural body which has life in it is a substance in the sense of a composite.

But since it is also a body of such and such a kind, viz. having life, the body cannot be soul; the body is the subject or matter, not what is attributed to it. Hence the soul must be a substance in the sense of the form of a natural body having life potentially within it. But substance is actuality, and thus soul is the actuality of a body as above characterized. Now the word actuality has two senses corresponding respectively to the possession of knowledge and the actual exercise of knowledge. It is obvious that the soul is actuality in the first sense, viz. that of knowledge as possessed, for both sleeping and waking presuppose the existence of soul, and of these waking corresponds to actual knowing, sleeping to knowledge possessed but not employed, and, in the history of the individual, knowledge comes before its employment or exercise. * (Aristotle, On the Soul)

[Aristotle] identifies actuality with form, and hence substance, while identifying matter with potentiality. An uncarved piece of wood, for example, is a potential statue, and it becomes an actual statue when it is carved and thus acquires the form of a statue. Action is an actuality, but there are such things as incomplete actions, which are also the potentiality for further actions. (from SparkNotes’ entry on Aristotle: Metaphysics)

Now actuality is the existence of a thing not in the sense in which we say that a thing exists potentially, as when we say that Mercury is potentially in the wood, and a half in the whole, because it can be separated from it, or as we say that one who is not theorizing is a man of science if he is able to theorize; but in the sense in which each of these exists actually. (Aristotle’s text)

First, he shows what actuality is. He says that a thing is actual when it exists but not in the way it exists when it is in potency… (Aquinas’s commentary on the preceding text)

For starters, let’s look at the meaning of the suffix, “-ity.” According to the Dictionary.com, it is “a suffix used to form abstract nouns expressing state or condition: jollity; civility;” So jollity is the state of being jolly; civility is the state of being civil; actuality is the state of being actual. A real thing is an actuality.

Actuality, therefore, is “being in act” rather than simply “being in potency”.

(continued…)

 

[prodigalson2011]

1. And tell me where Aquinas makes a distinction between actuality and esse?

You are creating more straw men. Esse is an actuality in whatever exercises that act. The point is that a thing’s “act of existing” depends on the form which receives it to be actual, just as a ball’s “act of rolling” depends on the ball which receives it in order to be actual.

He (Aristotle) says that if a thing’s perfection and goal do not consist in actuality, there would then seem to be no difference between someone wise, as Mercury was, and someone foolish, as Pauson was. For if the perfection of science were not in the one acting, Mercury would not have exhibited it in his own science, if he had “internal scientific knowledge,” i.e., in reference to its internal activity, “or external,” i.e., in reference to its external activity, as neither would Pauson. For it is by means of the actual use of scientific knowledge, and not by means of the potency or power, that one is shown to have a science; because activity is the goal of a science, and activity is a kind of actuality. (ps2011: actuality can be predicated of any actual state, so while existence is chief among those, actuality extends beyond mere existence.)
*
And for this reason the term actuality is derived from activity, as has been stated above (1805); and from this it was extended to form, which is called completeness or perfection.

1. But while (790).

He explains a point which could cause a difficulty in the foregoing argument. For since he had said that some product is the goal of activity, one could think that this is true in all cases. But he denies this, saying that the ultimate goal or end of some active potencies consists in the mere use of those potencies, and not in something produced by their activity; for example, the ultimate goal of the power of sight is the act of seeing, and there is no product resulting from the power of sight in addition to this activity. But in the case of some active potencies something else is produced in addition to the activity; for example, the art of building also produces a house in addition to the activity of building.

1. However, this difference does not cause actuality to be the goal of potency to a lesser degree in the case of some of these potencies and to a greater degree in the case of others; for the activity is in the thing produced, as the act of building in the thing being built; and it comes into being and exists simultaneously with the house. Hence if the house, or the thing built, is the goal, this does not exclude actuality from being the goal of potency.
2. Now it is necessary to consider such a difference among the aforesaid potencies, because (1) when something else is produced besides the actuality of these potencies, which is activity, the activity of such potencies is in the thing being produced and is their actuality, just as the act of building is in the thing being built, and the act of weaving in the thing being woven, and in general motion in the thing being moved.*

And I will show you an Aquinas that is not the same Thomas who wrote the Summa theologica.

All the evidence points to you having never even read the Summa Theologica. Or if you have, maybe once, very quickly and without much reflection. As even PeterPlato (who is no dummy) has expressed, Aquinas’ work is weighty stuff and requires a lot of study and rereading to get a proper handle on.

All these things are their own made up interpretation developed in the attempt to counter my argument. And they all lead to metaphysical irrevocable contradictions.

You keep telling yourself that. The real issue is you are just determined that you are right and you rush through everything anyone says, slapping your preconceived notions over it without actually thinking over what has been said. The rushed, misrepresentative and poorly composed nature of many of your replies is evidence of your lack of intellectual investment in the other side of the argument.

And that you think your argument is novel or irrefutable further confirms my impression of your minimal familiarity with the subject matter of this debate. As briefly evidenced above, Aquinas was well familiar with such a view as yours and argued strongly against it and, I might add, successfully so.

 

[prodigalson2011]

prodigalson2011:

He explains a point which could cause a difficulty in the foregoing argument. For since he had said that some product is the goal of activity, one could think that this is true in all cases. But he denies this, saying that the ultimate goal or end of some active potencies consists in the mere use of those potencies, and not in something produced by their activity; for example, the ultimate goal of the power of sight is the act of seeing, and there is no product resulting from the power of sight in addition to this activity. But in the case of some active potencies something else is produced in addition to the activity; for example, the art of building also produces a house in addition to the activity of building.

1. However, this difference does not cause actuality to be the goal of potency to a lesser degree in the case of some of these potencies and to a greater degree in the case of others; for the activity is in the thing produced, as the act of building in the thing being built; and it comes into being and exists simultaneously with the house. Hence if the house, or the thing built, is the goal, this does not exclude actuality from being the goal of potency.

Just to be sure the point gets across, I’m going to explain why I highlighted this particular section. Beginning in the first paragraph, Aquinas says: “In the case of some active potencies something else is produced in addition to the activity; for example, the art of building produces a house in addition to the activity of building.”

He then goes on to explain, “the activity is in the thing produced, as the act of building in the thing being built; and it comes into being and exists simultaneously with the house.”

This is exactly what I have been saying about “esse”. To rephrase, “the activity is in the thing produced, as the act of existing in the thing being created; and it comes into being and exists simultaneously with the creature.”

Again, no activity has any reality outside of the relationship between the agent and the recipient of the act. Just as there is no “act of building” without a builder and the thing being built, so there is no “act of existence” outside of the creative agent (God) and that which He acts upon (a possible being.)

 

[Linusthe2nd]

There Linux, take that. Prodigal Son has much more energy than I do. But, if you will cite one philosopher who agrees with you I will treat your day dreams as something worth paying attention to.

Linus2nd

 

[Linux]

There Linux, take that. Prodigal Son has much more energy than I do. But, if you will cite one philosopher who agrees with you I will treat your day dreams as something worth paying attention to.

Linus2nd

If my arguments are as weak as you are claiming them to be then you needn’t have wasted your time.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Linux, I sure hope you are reading ProdigalSon’s posts. In his post 893 you should pay particular attention to a paragraph near the end:

" For being is the most common first effect and more intimate than all other effects: wherefore it is an effect which it belongs to God alone to produce by his own power: and for this reason (De Causis, prop. ix) an intelligence does not give being, except the divine power be therein. Therefore God is the cause of every action, inasmuch as every agent is an instrument of the divine power operating."

** - Hence why even though God effects a separate act of existence upon creatures, they cannot sustain it themselves. A second cause (creature) cannot have any influence on the effect (esse) of the First Cause.

This is the way Thomas deals with one of your more serious errors. Thomas clearly says being is the most common effect of God’s action. And that no creature can provide this effect. Now an effect is something different than its cause. Therefore the being of creatures is not the being of God. So it is clear that God creates and sustains the act of existence, the being of His creatures.

Linus2nd
/SIZE]

 

[Linusthe2nd]

If my arguments are as weak as you are claiming them to be then you needn’t have wasted your time.

They are inane, they do not make sense. But ProdigalSon has more patience.

Linus2nd.

 

[Linux]

They are inane, they do not make sense. But ProdigalSon has more patience.

Linus2nd.

Then you needn’t waste any more time. Thanks for your participation.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Then you needn’t waste any more time. Thanks for your participation.

Oh, I’m not disappearing. I’m observing. I want to be here when you celebrate the thousandth post to this thread and it dies a merciful death.

For Catholics, other Christians, Jews, and Muslims

It is Defined Catholic Dogma that God created, in time, all creatures out of nothing ( with no parsing of the word " nothing. " It means from no prior existing matter of any kind, including the " near nothing " states proposed by some " wild eyed," popular cosmologists of the day.

So Catholics must believe that God and His creatures are absolutely other than each other. God is no part of His creatures and they are no part of Him. God and His creatures are absolutely distinct, but His creatures are absolutely dependent upon Him for their existence, and they prosper by His Providence and Government…

It is Defined Catholic Dogma that the essential nature of God is that He is One and Simple. Other attributes are also defined but are not essential to this debate.

There is nothing in Catholic teaching about God’s " Esse, " or His " Act of Existence. " These are philosophical terms and no Catholic is bound to accept them. These same terms have been applied to creatures as well. And we are not bound to acknowledge their validity. However it would be foolish to deny their validity in either case, if they are correctly applied. And that is just where the problem lays.

It is interesting that the O.P. useses the term " act of exisiting " and asks us to prove how God could create the " act of exiting " out of nothing. This term was originated by Thomas Aquinas in the 13th century and showed that God ( the Pure Subsisting Act of Exising ) created the entire universe of creatures ex nihilo, absolutely. And when He did so, He created entire substances, including their " act of existing. " That this is the correct interpretation has been shown in my post # 17. Thomas Aquinas showed in the S.T. Part 1that God is the First Cause of all creatures. In Part 1, he also shows that God created all creatures out of nothing.

Now to demand a blow by blow account as to just how God pulled off these stupendous miracles is asking us to examine the mind of God and that is just spurious in the extreme. All the best minds the world has ever known can do is demonstrate that this is a necessary conclusion. That is, because God exists, we exist.

The O.P. has put forward a number of propositions which cannot be held by Catholics.

1. God cannot create an " act of existing " which is not His Own Act of Existing
2. God cannot create an " act of existing " ex nihilo.
3. We exist, ontologically, in the mind of God.
4. The universe exists, ontologicallly, in the mind of God.
5. God’s " Act of Existing " is the " act of existing " of creatures.
6. God is the only Esse
7. There are no created esses that are separate and distinct from God’s own Esse.
   8, That God creates Essences by sharing with them His Own Esse
8. To excape the odium of an heresy akin to Pantheism because of point # 8, he says that Essence is distinct from Esse. And so God’s Esse is not a part of the created Essence. He fails to see that this has left him in the realm of Prue Ideas, that the world is nothing but a collection of Forms without real substance, a world of non-being, because for a being to exist, it must have its own Esse. But under his philosophy, this is impossible.

• It is possible that I have overlooked other errors.

** It should be noted that Thomas Aquinas teaches that essence and esse are distinct, yet esse is the most important principle of a substance, it is most interior to it and is that whereby an essence becomes a being or substance. It composes with the form and the matter, if any, to make one substance, one being.

*** St Thomas, contrary to what the O.P. says, teaches that God creates entire substances in His act of creation, and the first of His created effect, interior to the substance, is the substance’s very own act of existence, which is limited by the form or nature of each particualr substance. And further, Thomas teaches that we must hold on Faith, that God has created the universe ex nihilo in time.

He futher teaches that God, though operating most intimately in His creation. is absolutely transcendent to it and does not mix with it in any ontological way. This is also the teaching of the Church.

**** All the arguments against his positions have been given by myself, Utunumsint, Hicetnunc, and Prodigal Son, and Polytropos earlier in this thread. You can read them for yoursef, they are St. Thomas’ own arguments.

Linus2nd

---

Linus2nd

 

[Linux]

For Catholics, other Christians, Jews, and Muslims

It is Defined Catholic Dogma that God created, in time, all creatures out of nothing ( with no parsing of the word " nothing. " It means from no prior existing matter of any kind, including the " near nothing " states proposed by some " wild eyed," popular cosmologists of the day.

So Catholics must believe that God and His creatures are absolutely other than each other. God is no part of His creatures and they are no part of Him. God and His creatures are absolutely distinct, but His creatures are absolutely dependent upon Him for their existence, and they prosper by His Providence and Government…

I have not contradicted any of this.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Re: How does God create “the act of existing” out of nothing?

---

Quote:
Originally Posted by Linusthe2nd

For Catholics, other Christians, Jews, and Muslims

( Statement from Linus2nd ) " It is Defined Catholic Dogma that God created, in time, all creatures out of nothing ( with no parsing of the word " nothing. " It means from no prior existing matter of any kind, including the " near nothing " states proposed by some " wild eyed," popular cosmologists of the day.

So Catholics must believe that God and His creatures are absolutely other than each other. God is no part of His creatures and they are no part of Him. God and His creatures are absolutely distinct, but His creatures are absolutely dependent upon Him for their existence, and they prosper by His Providence and Government." ( End QUOTE )

( Linux Responds ) " I have not contradicted any of this. " ( End Quote )

Linus2nd Responds
You cannot say that and hold the following positions:

LINUX has put forward a number of propositions which cannot be held by Catholics.

1. God cannot create an " act of existing " which is not His Own Act of Existing
2. God cannot create an " act of existing " ex nihilo.
3. We exist, ontologically, in the mind of God.
4. The universe exists, ontologicallly, in the mind of God.
5. God’s " Act of Existing " is the " act of existing " of creatures.
6. God is the only Esse
7. There are no created esses that are separate and distinct from God’s own Esse.
   8, That God creates Essences by sharing with them His Own Esse
8. To excape the odium of an heresy akin to Pantheism because of point # 8, he says that Essence is distinct from Esse. And so God’s Esse is not a part of the created Essence. He fails to see that this has left him in the realm of Prue Ideas, that the world is nothing but a collection of Forms without real substance, a world of non-being, because for a being to exist, it must have its own Esse. But under his philosophy, this is impossible.

Linus2nd

 

[StrawberryJam]

I have not contradicted any of this.

All the bolding and highlighting in red has not made it clearer to you?

 

[Linux]

Re: How does God create “the act of existing” out of nothing?

---

Quote:
Originally Posted by Linusthe2nd

For Catholics, other Christians, Jews, and Muslims

Linus2nd Responds
You cannot say that and hold the following positions:

LINUX has put forward a number of propositions which cannot be held by Catholics.

1. God cannot create an " act of existing " which is not His Own Act of Existing
2. God cannot create an " act of existing " ex nihilo.
3. We exist, ontologically, in the mind of God.
4. The universe exists, ontologicallly, in the mind of God.
5. God’s " Act of Existing " is the " act of existing " of creatures.
6. God is the only Esse
7. There are no created esses that are separate and distinct from God’s own Esse.
   8, That God creates Essences by sharing with them His Own Esse
8. To excape the odium of an heresy akin to Pantheism because of point # 8, he says that Essence is distinct from Esse.

Linus2nd

For Catholic Jews and Muslims, he is just asserting that these views cannot be held.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Re: How does God create “the act of existing” out of nothing?

---

Quote:
Originally Posted by Linusthe2nd
Re: How does God create “the act of existing” out of nothing?

---

Quote:
Originally Posted by Linusthe2nd

For Catholics, other Christians, Jews, and Muslims

Linus2nd Responds
You cannot say that and hold the following positions:

LINUX has put forward a number of propositions which cannot be held by Catholics.

1. God cannot create an " act of existing " which is not His Own Act of Existing
2. God cannot create an " act of existing " ex nihilo.
3. We exist, ontologically, in the mind of God.
4. The universe exists, ontologicallly, in the mind of God.
5. God’s " Act of Existing " is the " act of existing " of creatures.
6. God is the only Esse
7. There are no created esses that are separate and distinct from God’s own Esse.
   8, That God creates Essences by sharing with them His Own Esse
8. To excape the odium of an heresy akin to Pantheism because of point # 8, he says that Essence is distinct from Esse.

Linus2nd

For Catholic Jews and Muslims, he is just asserting that these views cannot be held.

I can certainly speak for Catholics since I have been one for 74 years, went to Catholic schools for 16 years, and have a Bachelors in Thomistic Philosophy. Catholics cannot hold any of these positions and remain Orthodox Catholics. And I don’t see how any other type of Christian, Jew, or Muslim could hold them and consider themselves Orthodox in their particular Faith. Linux has no standing. He won’t even tell us his religious affiliation, because he is either embarrassed to admit it or he is affraid we would point out to him that his intellectual views conflict badly with his religious Faith.

Linus2nd

 

[Linux]

I can certainly speak for Catholics since I have been one for 74 years, went to Catholic schools for 16 years, and have a Bachelors in Thomistic Philosophy. Catholics cannot hold any of these positions and remain Orthodox Catholics. And I don’t see how any other type of Christian, Jew, or Muslim could hold them and consider themselves Orthodox in their particular Faith. Linux has no standing. He won’t even tell us his religious affiliation, because he is either embarrassed to admit it or he is affraid we would point out to him that his intellectual views conflict badly with his religious Faith.

Linus2nd

Another irrelevant red herring. Ad hominem attacks will only fool the gullible. The fact that you are a Catholic and have studied Thomism academically holds no guarantee that you really understand metaphysics or that you have the critical conceptual faculties to truly understand when or why a metaphysical argument is right or wrong without bias. Retaining academic information is not the same thing as truly understanding information. You certainly don’t have the authority to assert that my argument is against church teaching. That is something you have to prove which you have not. All you have done is build straw-men accompanied by red herrings based on superficial resemblances between my argument and other philosophical beliefs that i do not agree with.

You don’t know me, and it is ridiculous to assert without providing proof that there is no possible grounds for disagreement among Thomists or that Thomism is the only philosophy that is possible for Catholics. I doubt you even realize that there are different schools of Thomism. All you have done is parroted Aquinas and asserted that your take on the matter is correct, without any real refutation of my essential argument. Its just a fallacious argument from authority posing as a genuine understanding of the issue that’s being discussed.

As for my religious status, why on earth would i have to reveal what i believe in order to have a genuine philosophical debate?

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Another irrelevant red herring. Ad hominem attacks will only fool the gullible.

Oh boy, the pot calling the kettle black .

The fact that you are a Catholic and have studied Thomism academically holds no guarantee that you really understand metaphysics or that you have the critical conceptual faculties to truly understand when or why a metaphysical argument is right or wrong without bias. Retaining academic information is not the same thing as truly understanding information.

All true.

You certainly don’t have the authority to assert that my argument is against church teaching. That is something you have to prove which you have not.

True, but I know what is acceptable for Catholics to hold in these matters. Of course I have only persuasive influence. No one has to believe me.

All you have done is build straw-men accompanied by red herrings based on superficial resemblances between my argument and other philosophical beliefs that i do not agree with.

To you perhaps, not to me or orthodox Catholics.

You don’t know me, and it is ridiculous to assert without providing proof that there is no possible grounds for disagreement among Thomists or that Thomism is the only philosophy that is possible for Catholics. I doubt you even realize that there are different schools of Thomism.

Of course I realize that and a few times I have reminded you of that myself.

All you have done is parroted Aquinas and asserted that your take on the matter is correct, without any real refutation of my essential argument. Its just a fallacious argument from authority posing as a genuine understanding of the issue that’s being discussed.

None of this is true. I used Thomas’ arguments because I happen to agree with them and because he explains these things much better than I ever could. All philosophers take advantage of the well known men and women who agree with them. This is because no matter how clever one is, no one will take an unknown seriously unless one can cite precedents. All those writing or speaking publically on academic matters, even scientists, do the same. So your objection is baseless.

As for my religious status, why on earth would i have to reveal what i believe in order to have a genuine philosophical debate?

Because it will let others know what kind of prejudices you may have. And it is clear you have some. At the moment, we are free to assume the worst.

Linus2nd