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simpleas
Guest
I think I need to give thinking up all together…
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fhansen
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IMO they may never have been in truly RROTSTG. They may have been in a sort of NeutralROTSTG, but they hadn’t yet achieved right realtionship perfectly; they hadn’t yet even fulfilled this basic teaching for themselves:
**1732 As long as freedom has not bound itself definitively to its ultimate good which is God, there is the possibility of choosing between good and evil, and thus of growing in perfection or of failing and sinning. This freedom characterizes properly human acts. It is the basis of praise or blame, merit or reproach. **
Their perfection would be attained as their commitment to God solidified, as it would become no longer optional for them to sway from it, because they no longer *desired *anything else. The positive movement away from neutrality would’ve, possibly, been signified by the eating of the Tree of Life, an act of drawing nearer to God, as opposed to the act they made, of doing the opposite. That positive act was totally optional for them; the TOL virtually presented as an *aside *in the narrative, while being, speculatively, totally central in God’s knowing eyes. Anyway, it’s interesting that the TOL was later brought up at the end of the story once more, to reveal that it was now banned. Adam & Eve’s lot for now would consist in tasting of a world where death, rather than life, reigned; they weren’t yet ready for the TOL; that would come later after many trials and hardships, after many lessons.
Anyway, whether or not that take on the TOL is at all accurate, A&E were still expected to act, at some point, in making a positive movement towards God, an act of the *will-*even if they needed a detour out of Eden in order to gain the wisdom to make it. That’s the same act that we’re all being groomed here to make, as we’re willing, and as the fruit of the Tree becomes accessible again which it might be said that it is now, with the Eucharist, as we partake of Life by drawing near to God in eating of that fruit, partaking of Him, which was always intended as the “RROTSTG”. That basic concept regarding the TOL, BTW, aligns closely with the position of the Eastern Church from early on.
As to SG, OJ, AND OH, from my very amateurish and simplistic perspective I’d submit that, when St Paul called love the greatest of the theological virtues, 1) that virtue is theological because it’s supernatural as it comes by sanctifying grace, and 2) it defines the nature of justice as it, love, ‘fulfills the Law’, being the basis of God’s justice, and 3) it most fully describes or fleshes out the nature of holiness, which can otherwise be sort of an elusive quality to conceive of. It seems that love might link together and satisfy the requirements for all three: SG, OJ, and OH. And this, relatedly, would be why the Greatest Commandments give it the central focus.
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fhansen
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No, I was speaking of Adam and all humankind, whom Adam represents. As a fallen being Adam, by now, long ago, has presumably had the opportunity to learn of his limitations, of his creaturely status, of his dependency on God, and has come to embrace God rather than his rebellion against Him. This is what *all *fallen humans are called to do here; this is the same opportunity *all *mankind has, this is what this life is geared to teach us, with the help of revelation and grace.
Not at all, I’m only saying that the notion that children and most adults are so uninnocent as to be deserving of beheadings and concentration camps should seem absolutely absurd to us, in spite of their fallen natures. The Church obviously does not condone or accept evil just because all of earth’s human population are fallen beings of course. This is why the Church can say:
309 If God the Father almighty, the Creator of the ordered and good world, cares for all his creatures, why does evil exist? To this question, as pressing as it is unavoidable and as painful as it is mysterious, no quick answer will suffice.
324 The fact that God permits physical and even moral evil is a mystery that God illuminates by his Son Jesus Christ who died and rose to vanquish evil. Faith gives us the certainty that God would not permit an evil if he did not cause a good to come from that very evil, by ways that we shall fully know only in eternal life.
I don’t expect, as you seem to?, to be able to fully understand why God allows the evil He does in this life-I only trust that I *will * understand-someday. “All shall be well, and all shall be well, and all manner of things shall be well”, as Julian of Norwich, burdened with the fate of those dying from the Black Plague, quoted in the CCC, was “shewn”, without giving her any idea of how this would be accomplished. Anyway, in these teachings above is a recognition that the question of evil is not an easy one to resolve. And this becomes an issue especially when doing apologetics: defending the faith against atheism (a condition we all start out with, truth be told), or simply when witnessing to the faith in general, or when trying to save the life of someone you love who’s been abused as a child and who no longer cares to live, six years after the fact, so fully had the seeds satan planted earlier come to blossom into a downward spiral of darkness. People need answers, not platitudes. That’s all I’m trying to do with my crude attempts. Anyway, posts #124 & 127 spell it out fairly well.
I’ll try to summarize. There’s a *purpose *for man’s exile here. Here fallen man experiences, directly, viscerally, personally, good and evil; he *knows *good and evil. And so here we’re asked to differentiate and come to choose between the two. But he might not be able to keep from asking, especially as he’s first considering faith in God, is this much evil really necessary?
The doctrine of OS places the primary responsibility for evil onto man, corporately through Adam, by failing to heed God, by scorning and rejecting God *as *God. And Adam’s descendants sort of confirm Adam’s position when, by our own sins, we carry on the family tradition, abusing our own freedom in one way or another at least once we’ve attained an age where that is possible. And yet the Church also acknowledges that evil is not so readily explainable. Is it really just from any perspective for any human being, fallen or otherwise, to be trafficked as a sex slave, for children to be forced to work in sweat shops, among a host of other evils, some of which I’ve mentioned previously? Isn’t this world a bit *too *free perhaps; do we need so much distance from God’s controlling hand? Couldn’t He intervene a little more, do we really need cancer cells ravaging the human body, diseases that slowly shut the body down while the mind remains sharp; couldn’t we do without animals that tear people apart?
These are legitimate questions that often arise only when a particular evil directly harms ourselves or someone close to us. And these are all instances of evils that would not exist in Eden of course, that would be unknown to man if, IOW, Adam’s descendants weren’t cast out along with him. This is not a matter of whining, as if victims should never have any right to cry out for justice. For myself, you can treat me like dirt and I’ll probably never complain to God or anyone else but that doesn’t mean that I can necessarily understand why things are as they are. It begins to make sense only in the light of our faith, the product of revelation and grace, believing that God is with us in the midst of suffering, knowing that He, Himself, lived and dwelt among us and shared in our sufferings, in more than most will ever endure in fact. God allows evil rather than squashing it like a bug, and then seeks to overcome it with love instead, enduring the evil Himself without striking back, inviting us all to follow Him on this path. Evil will be completely overcome in the end; the evils and injustices of this life are temporary. But the questions are valid-and the Church doesn’t shy away from or evade or dismiss them.
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grannymh
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Personally, I prefer the Catholic teachings over the ideas of representation and corporately. In real life, Adam is his own person.
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Blue_Horizon
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Thankyou for this highly apposite reference.
I had no idea the Compendium could go so deeply into matters hardly touched on by the CCC.
It is greatly interesting that this text addresses essenrtial aspects of Aquinas’s teaching completely left out by the CCC, ie the ordering of the soul to God which is the most essential point of his teaching on OJ.
Again I note the Compendium’s studied avoidance of SG here. This continues the Magisteriums ongoing silence over whether or not OJ can be possessed without SG.
If you knew of resources in this area I would be grateful.
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fhansen
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This is from the Compendium Theologiae, correct? Wow, that was great in any case. Thank you.
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Vico
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Here is a source with both the Latin and English translation:
dhspriory.org/thomas/Compendium.htm
Also
CHAPTER 187
THE STATE OF ORIGINAL JUSTICE
This wonderfully ordered state of man is called original justice. By it man himself was subject to God on high, and all lower creatures were subordinate to man, as is indicated in Genesis 1:26: “Let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea and the fowls of the air.” And among the component parts of man, the lower were subservient to the higher without any conflict. This state was granted to man, not as to a private individual, but as to the first principle of human nature, so that through him it was to be handed down to his descendants together with human nature.
Moreover, since every one ought to have a habitation befitting his condition, man thus harmoniously constituted was placed in a most temperate and delightful region, so that all inconvenience, not only of internal annoyance, but also of external surroundings, might be far removed from him.
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Blue_Horizon
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Well, this further quote, contra Aquinas, strongly suggests OJ it is a natural gift not a supernatural gift (ie not necessitating indwelling presence of God).
It is likely then that those in “Limbo”, if it exists, at the GResurrection may well be able to receive such OJ restored even in the unlikely event they do not receive the BVision nor SG.
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fhansen
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Thanks again. I haven’t spent much time in the Compendium but it seems to read much smoother and plainer, explaining things more fully and a bit clearer than the Summa. But then again, I guess that’s why he wrote it.
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Blue_Horizon
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Ah, I see you did not clearly reference what you meant by “Compendium”.
It is NOT that of the recent Catechism but that of Aquinas. Disappointing.
Do you note Aquinas’s inconsistency in your quotes here … and indeed amongst his works as a whole.
It is clear he vacillates between OJ involving SG or not.
And as I observed below, the Magisterium in the CCC has NOT included “right relationship of the soul to God” (RROTSTG) as an element of OJ (and OJ does NOT involve SG).
Now Granny would interpret that to mean its a definite correction of Aquinas
.Myself, not so much.
Its simply signalling a validly debated point.
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Vico
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Catholic Encyclopedia, Supernatural Gifts
A supernatural gift may be defined as something conferred on nature that is above all the powers (vires) of created nature. When God created man, He was not content with bestowing upon him the essential endowments required by man’s nature. He raised him to a higher state, adding certain gifts to which his nature had no claim. They comprise qualities and perfections, forces and energies, dignities and rights, destination to final objects, of which the essential constitution of man is not the principle; which are not required for the attainment of the final perfection of the natural order of man; and which can only be communicated by the free operation of God’s goodness and power. Some of these are absolutely supernatural, i.e. beyond the reach of all created nature (even of the angels), and elevate the creature to a dignity and perfection natural to God alone; others are only relatively supernatural (preternatural), i.e. above human nature only and elevate human nature to that state of higher perfection which is natural to the angels. The original state of man comprised both of these, and when he fell he lost both. Christ has restored to us the absolutely supernatural gifts, but the preternatural gifts He has not restored.
Scannell, T. (1909). Supernatural Gift. In The Catholic Encyclopedia. New York: Robert Appleton Company. newadvent.org/cathen/06553a.htm
Catholic Encyclopedia, Supernatural Order
Briefly, the history is this: From the beginning, man was raised, far above the claims of his nature, to a life which made him, even here below, the adopted child of God, and to a destiny which entitled him to the beatific vision and love of God in heaven. To these strictly supernatural gifts by which man was truly made partaker of the Divine nature (2 Peter 1:4) were added preternatural endowments, that is immunity from ignorance, passion, suffering and death, which left him “little lower than the angels” (Psalm 8:6; Hebrews 2:7). Through their own fault, our first parents forfeited for themselves and their race both the God-like life and destiny and the angel-like endowments. In His mercy God promised a Redeemer who, heralded by ages of prophecy, came in the fulness of time in the person of Jesus Christ, the incarnate Son of God. By His Incarnation, labours, passion, and death, Jesus Christ restored mankind to its former Divine sonship and heavenly inheritance, if not to its quasi-angelic prerogatives, the virtue of Redemption being applied to us through the joint ministrations of the inner Spirit, and of the visible Church, in the form of actual helps, habitual sanctity, and the power of meriting Heaven.
Sollier, J. (1912). Supernatural Order. In The Catholic Encyclopedia. New York: Robert Appleton Company. newadvent.org/cathen/14336b.htm
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fhansen
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I’ve often wondered if the above paragraph from Article 3, ques 82 conflicts with paragraph 405 of the CCC which certainly seems to maintain that concupiscence is not an element in OS, while being a consequence of it:
406 The Church’s teaching on the transmission of original sin was articulated more precisely in the fifth century, especially under the impulse of St. Augustine’s reflections against Pelagianism, and in the sixteenth century, in opposition to the Protestant Reformation. Pelagius held that man could, by the natural power of free will and without the necessary help of God’s grace, lead a morally good life; he thus reduced the influence of Adam’s fault to bad example. The first Protestant reformers, on the contrary, taught that original sin has radically perverted man and destroyed his freedom; they identified the sin inherited by each man with the tendency to evil (concupiscentia), which would be insurmountable. The Church pronounced on the meaning of the data of Revelation on original sin especially at the second Council of Orange (529)296 and at the Council of Trent (1546).297
And Happy Easter!
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Vico
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The are the irascible and the concupiscible appetites. The original sin is pride.
Consequently if the difficult thing which is the object of pride, were merely some sensible object, whereto the sensitive appetite might tend, pride would have to be in the irascible which is part of the sensitive appetite. But since the difficult thing which pride has in view is common both to sensible and to spiritual things, we must needs say that the subject of pride is the irascible not only strictly so called, as a part of the sensitive appetite, but also in its wider acceptation, as applicable to the intellective appetite. Wherefore pride is ascribed also to the demons.
ccel.org/ccel/aquinas/summa.SS_Q162_A3.html
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Blue_Horizon
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Not quite sure what you are saying. Especially as you mention CCC 405 but quote 406.
I really cannot see how your CCC quote has anything that contradicts Aquinas…or even is saying anything relevant.
As I understand it Protestantism once held that OS was no more than the passing down of concupiscence. Pelagianism was the opposite, there was nothing passed down except a history of bad example which was no loss to the soul itself.
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fhansen
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Well, I tend to think CCC406 is relevant or the Church wouldn’t have included it.
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fhansen
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Ok, *that *addresses the question I think. But Aquinas is speaking of the two aspects of OS. Adam’s sin was one of pride. But what is Aquinas saying when he declares that the state of OS is concupiscence materially?
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Vico
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Materially seems to mean “improperly”. The formal constituent of a thing it the root of other things pertaining to it. So for original sin, the formal constituent is* privation of original justice*. Original sin is a consequence of original sin in as much as it follows upon unwillingness to be subject to God. S.T. Q85. A3.
Summa Theologiae, First Part of the Second Part
Question 85. The effects of sin, and, first, of the corruption of the good of nature
Article 3. Whether weakness, ignorance, malice and concupiscence are suitably reckoned as the wounds of nature consequent upon sin?
I answer that, As a result of original justice, the reason had perfect hold over the lower parts of the soul, while reason itself was perfected by God, and was subject to Him. Now this same original justice was forfeited through the sin of our first parent, as already stated (I-II:81:2; so that all the powers of the soul are left, as it were, destitute of their proper order, whereby they are naturally directed to virtue; which destitution is called a wounding of nature.
Again, there are four of the soul’s powers that can be subject of virtue, as stated above (I-II:61:2), viz. * the reason, where prudence resides, * the will, where justice is, * the irascible, the subject of fortitude, and * the concupiscible, the subject of temperance.
Therefore * in so far as the reason is deprived of its order to the true, there is the wound of ignorance; * in so far as the will is deprived of its order of good, there is the wound of malice; * in so far as the irascible is deprived of its order to the arduous, there is the wound of weakness; and * in so far as the concupiscible is deprived of its order to the delectable, moderated by reason, there is the wound of concupiscence.
Accordingly these are the four wounds inflicted on the whole of human nature as a result of our first parent’s sin. But since the inclination to the good of virtue is diminished in each individual on account of actual sin, as was explained above (I-II:1:2), these four wounds are also the result of other sins, in so far as, through sin, the reason is obscured, especially in practical matters, the will hardened to evil, good actions become more difficult and concupiscence more impetuous.
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fhansen
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Ok, I may not be understanding here, but in reading the whole of ques 82, art 3, it sure seems to be saying that the matter of the state of OS is concupiscence. I’m not sure of how to understand this, or if the Church accepts it which I don’t think she does. Certainly there’s a direct relationship of loss of OJ and loss of self-mastery, and in fact this is a lesson God wants us to learn here I believe: we need grace; we need* Him*. But are you meaning to say that Aquinas is here denying that concupiscence is an essential element of the state of OS?
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fhansen
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Yes, sorry, 406, not 405
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Vico
Guest
There is no liability to concupiscence in Adam and Eve due to original justice. See: S.T. First Part of the Second Part, Question 89, A5.
Reply to Objection 3. This freedom from liability to concupiscence was a result of original justice. Wherefore that which is opposed to such liability pertains, not to actual but to original sin.
And from before, widely, pride is “applicable to the intellective appetite”:
“we must needs say that the subject of pride is the irascible not only strictly so called, as a part of the sensitive appetite, but also in its wider acceptation, as applicable to the intellective appetite. Wherefore pride is ascribed also to the demons.”
Also see Q163, A1:
I answer that, Many movements may concur towards one sin, and the character of sin attaches to that one in which inordinateness is first found. And it is evident that inordinateness is in the inward movement of the soul before being in the outward act of the body; since, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18), the sanctity of the body is not forfeited so long as the sanctity of the soul remains. Also, among the inward movements, the appetite is moved towards the end before being moved towards that which is desired for the sake of the end; and consequently man’s first sin was where it was possible for his appetite to be directed to an inordinate end. Now man was so appointed in the state of innocence, that there was no rebellion of the flesh against the spirit. Wherefore it was not possible for the first inordinateness in the human appetite to result from his coveting a sensible good, to which the concupiscence of the flesh tends against the order of reason. It remains therefore that the first inordinateness of the human appetite resulted from his coveting inordinately some spiritual good. Now he would not have coveted it inordinately, by desiring it according to his measure as established by the Divine rule. Hence it follows that man’s first sin consisted in his coveting some spiritual good above his measure: and this pertains to pride. Therefore it is evident that man’s first sin was pride.
newadvent.org/summa/3163.htm
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