F
FractalFire
Guest
While I agree with your criticism of Bradski – I think he is being somewhat overconfident about his grasp of arguments he doesn’t appear to have studied – how are you defining “being?” I was using it in the sense that we might say “person.” That is, not the physical embodiment of a person, but the actual person themselves – a consciousness, a self-aware entity. Of course, my grasp of philosophical definitions is somewhat shaky, so I quite probably used the wrong term. Why do you object to the use of this phrasing?I will try this once.
Bradski - look at my long post, #18. It doesn’t look a thing like you just described. Did you even read it? Did you not get it? What do you have an issue with? Can you make an actual argument or will there just be more rhetoric?
God is not “a being,” so He can’t be “a maximally great being” or “a necessary being,” though God is in a sense maximally great and is absolutely necessary.
Also, in defense of my prior phrasing, I was using maximally great being as used in the ontological argument, which has been reformulated recently by Plantinga and defended by William Lane Craig (so the typical Thomist critique of Anselm’s suspicious formulation no longer applies, or so Craig argues, anyway). I’m not sure I accept the argument myself, but it seems like a good enough description of God’s nature for our purposes, so I went with it. See here for clarification:
reasonablefaith.org/misunderstanding-the-ontological-argument
reasonablefaith.org/questions-on-time-and-scary-monsters
reasonablefaith.org/defenders-2-podcast/transcript/s4-24