That looks good to me.
Now of course not everyone behaves rationally all the time. And when asleep, unconscious or in coma, people do not exhibit rationality either, so your approach is subject to the same criticism that you directed toward mine.
not really - i don’t give “rationality” the functional definition you seem to give “sentience”.
ateista:
I think we have some minor miscommunication here. Not “reversibility” in general, rather the fact that self-consciousness or rationality is merely “suspended” in sleep, etc. but if and when the person wakes up - it “returns”. That is why I see no problem with sleep, etc. since it is not a permanent state, unlike irreversible coma, death and the persisitent vegetative state.
oh, i get it - i just don’t think i made myself clear…
your original point was that the person in a persistent vegetative state no longer exists because she isn’t
behaving or
functioning as that person did in the past (which is in keeping with your duck principle: if it isn’t acting like a person, then it isn’t).
you then hoped to avoid the objection that functionalism entails that sleep or unconsciousness involves a loss of functional properties (in this case, personhood), by suggesting that the prospect of
regaining functional properties allows one logically to commute those functional properties to non-functional periods.
my point is that this does
not logically follow from the basic pronciple of functionalism that you espouse, which is, as you put it, if it doesn’t act like a person, then it isn’t a person. in order to make the logic work, you’d have to modify your principle to be something closer to “if it acts like a person, or may act like a person in the future, then it’s a person”. the problem
then is to motivate such a revision to the functionalist premise: if the logic of the principle doesn’t require such a modification, then what good reason is there for making it?
but
even if the subsidiary principle is warranted, it doesn’t help you avoid the problem that,
logically, one cannot say that a process is “reversible” or, if you prefer, has been simply “suspended”, until the process has
actually been reversed, or ***actually ***reinstated. which, of course, means that, logically anyway, your revised duck principle still entails that failure to exhibit functional behaviours means that the functional properties aren’t present. which means that a sleeping/unconscious/developmentally challenged individual is not a person.
ateista:
Well, of course not the “same” person, and of course not “same” human either. I just use the words “human” and “person” interchangeably. They are both “buckets”.
look, “person” is to “human” what “german shepherd” is to “dog”.
ateista:
If I recall it correctly, the medical definition of death is the cessation of brain functions, not the stopping of the heart.
you remember incorrectly. look, logically that doesn’t make sense: if terry schiavo was already dead, then what was done to her that was so problematic? i mean, why hadn’t the hospital put her in a body-bag in the morgue already?
ateista:
It depends where the disagreement lies. If the scientists cannot agree upon the subject to be examined, then they cannot be taken seriously. Sort of like astrologists, or proponents of ESP, telekinesis, or auras, what have you.
not the same thing: there’s no disagreement among proponents of “ensoulment” that there is such a thing as a soul - the disagreement simply lies as to the point the soul enters the body. the “subject matter” of the examination is fixed.
ateista:
If someone offers a new hypothesis, like the “soul”, the bare minimum is to get a coherent definition of it, so it can be subject to study.
this is a different objection to the one you initially made, which was that the troubling discrepancy was that between people concerning “ensoulment”.
how is the definition of “soul” that i am using in any way incoherent?