Human or not?

  • Thread starter Thread starter ateista
  • Start date Start date
Status
Not open for further replies.
You are thinking that Hamlet consists of text. It does not.

Even if every copy of the text were to be lost, Hamlet would continue to exist. It could be written out again by those who have been involved in producing it for the stage, and by those who have experienced it several times before.
But if every text would be destroyed, and every performance would be forgotten and every tape erased… the Hamlet would cease to exist, and would never be recreated. The specific social circumstances which influenced Shakespeare and the specific configuration of his mind will never be repeated.
 
But if every text would be destroyed, and every performance would be forgotten and every tape erased… the Hamlet would cease to exist, and would never be recreated. The specific social circumstances which influenced Shakespeare and the specific configuration of his mind will never be repeated.
True - if the idea of Hamlet were to disappear, then it would be gone. But not merely if something were to happen to the text. The story has embedded itself into our culture quite deeply - to the point where, in order to get rid of the idea of Hamlet, you would also have to get rid of the idea of a lot of other stories that are based on or allude to the Hamlet idea.

The idea of Hamlet is not a physical thing, though. It’s something that people can carry around in their minds, without reference to anything physical. It is transmitted by physical means, but the idea itself isn’t physical.
 
Thinking about it, Atheista’s machine will be intelligent artificial life but will not be fully human.
On a pure biological basis, of example, the computer will be not suffer the biological pressures of a biologial brain. Hormonal urges for example. Circulation problems. We do not know how the DNA affects the functioning of the neurones of a specific brain vs others.
But “deep down” all there is: the dancing of the electrons in the brain. Chemical reactions could be emulated / implemented to create the stress and biological pressures you speak of. Maybe in a somewhat different fashion, but “emulation” and “recreation” are not truly different: a semi-perfect replica is good enough for our purposes.
And yes, I know, for the scientific empirist epistemology proposed by Atheista, mystical experiences not measurable so they not matter but I save seen somethings that are unexplainable on a purely materialistic view.
Not necessarily. If we could measure the all the electro-chemical activities of the brain (and I see no theoretical reason for denying it) then all the mystical experiences could be recreated. Something is called mystical which we are unable to measure - today.
 
Indeed, we cannot know that. The only way to prove the existence of libertarian free will would be to take a snapshot of the universe, roll it back, and observe if the people would make the same decisions. And that, of course, is impossible. We assume that we do have free will.
So, we cannot know we have free will without rolling back the universe?
And without free will, there is no basis for holding people accountable for their actions, no need for laws or prisons.

And the presumed exercise of free will assumes that we are somehow capable of making non-deterministic free choices. That would require an ability which is not dependent on physical factors; otherwise, our actions would be determined by physical laws, and not be freely chosen. That would require some non-material aspect of our nature.

But, you say that we assume that we do have free will. Are you acknowledging that you assume a non-physical component of humanity, in order to escape from determinism and require people to be responsible for their actions?
 
True - if the idea of Hamlet were to disappear, then it would be gone. But not merely if something were to happen to the text. The story has embedded itself into our culture quite deeply - to the point where, in order to get rid of the idea of Hamlet, you would also have to get rid of the idea of a lot of other stories that are based on or allude to the Hamlet idea.
I agree.
The idea of Hamlet is not a physical thing, though. It’s something that people can carry around in their minds, without reference to anything physical. It is transmitted by physical means, but the idea itself isn’t physical.
The phrase you used: “can carry in their minds” is certainly physical / elecro-chemical.

Think about this: the word “red” is an abstraction, even though it indicates a specific wave-length of light. There are some people who are color-blind: for them “red” means something different, what we consdier a shade of gray. Now the question: “is this apple red?” is pretty much meaningless when presented to a color-blind person.

Abstractions and physical characteristics cannot be separated. There is no such thing as an abstract “Hamlet” - separated from the human minds that have heard or saw or read it. If, by some unfortunate accident Shakespeare would have died in infancy, there would never have been a Hamlet.
 
So, we cannot know we have free will without rolling back the universe?
And without free will, there is no basis for holding people accountable for their actions, no need for laws or prisons.
Yes, that would be true.
And the presumed exercise of free will assumes that we are somehow capable of making non-deterministic free choices. That would require an ability which is not dependent on physical factors; otherwise, our actions would be determined by physical laws, and not be freely chosen. That would require some non-material aspect of our nature.
No, it does not follow. There is true randomness “built into” the fabric of the universe, at least on the quantum level. There is no need for any non-material assumption.
But, you say that we assume that we do have free will. Are you acknowledging that you assume a non-physical component of humanity, in order to escape from determinism and require people to be responsible for their actions?
Yes, we do assume free will, because we would hate to be “railroad cars” on predetermined rails. It may be just an assumption, but we subscribe to it. And if our thoughts rely on subatomic interactions, then we might really have free will, we might be indeterminate beings.
 
I agree.

The phrase you used: “can carry in their minds” is certainly physical / elecro-chemical.

Think about this: the word “red” is an abstraction, even though it indicates a specific wave-length of light. There are some people who are color-blind: for them “red” means something different, what we consdier a shade of gray. Now the question: “is this apple red?” is pretty much meaningless when presented to a color-blind person.

Abstractions and physical characteristics cannot be separated. There is no such thing as an abstract “Hamlet” - separated from the human minds that have heard or saw or read it. If, by some unfortunate accident Shakespeare would have died in infancy, there would never have been a Hamlet.
Well, isn’t that what “abstract” means? That it is held in the mind? For example, an abstract painting can’t exist without the response of the viewer. The viewer looks at it and “sees” the contents of his own response to the painting - his idea of it, because there is nothing there otherwise for him to see. The viewer’s mind makes up for the physically missing elements.
 
Well, isn’t that what “abstract” means? That it is held in the mind? For example, an abstract painting can’t exist without the response of the viewer. The viewer looks at it and “sees” the contents of his own response to the painting - his idea of it, because there is nothing there otherwise for him to see. The viewer’s mind makes up for the physically missing elements.
I agree with you completely. If you look at john doran’s posts, he says something totally different - something about “abstract objects”, which exist independently of our minds. Maybe it was a mistake to include that part in my post. If it caused confusion, I apologize.
 
I agree with you completely. If you look at john doran’s posts, he says something totally different - something about “abstract objects”, which exist independently of our minds. Maybe it was a mistake to include that part in my post. If it caused confusion, I apologize.
But you and John are using the term ‘mind’ in entirely different ways. By ‘mind,’ you mean some physical function of the brain. When he uses the word, he means (I think) the same thing I do: that human faculty of intellection which abstracts all of the physicality from the sensory (name removed by moderator)ut, resulting in the abstract idea, having meaning but not physicality.
 
No, it does not follow. There is true randomness “built into” the fabric of the universe, at least on the quantum level. There is no need for any non-material assumption.
I don’t think that randomness is the same as free will. Free will involves the deliberate and conscious selection between alternatives.

And quantum mechanics has its own laws. Whatever is ruled by quantum mechanics must obey the rules of quantum mechanics. I do not think that quantum mechanics can save free will from determinism.
 
But you and John are using the term ‘mind’ in entirely different ways. By ‘mind,’ you mean some physical function of the brain. When he uses the word, he means (I think) the same thing I do: that human faculty of intellection which abstracts all of the physicality from the sensory (name removed by moderator)ut, resulting in the abstract idea, having meaning but not physicality.
I am not sure. To me it seems that he uses the word “soul” which is totally separated from the physical existence.

I use the word “mind” as the electro-chemical action of the neurons. Almost exactly as the computer program running in the hardware of the computer. The activity of the program relies on the hardware, it is restricted by the hardware, but it cannot be equated to the hardware.

When I tell you a word, it conjures up a “picture” in your mind, that is it elicits a certain elecro-chemical firing of the neurons; which is hopefully similar to the firings in my brain - and if it is, then we understand each other.

The word: “two” for example may bring up two apples, or two sticks, or two “anythings” or maybe a curved line in the shape of “2”. The objects may be different, but there is enough correspondence that we understand each other. However, if I would say “zwei” and you do not understand German, there would be no picture generated in your mind - no firing of the neurons which is even remotely similar to mine. There would be no understanding.

Why is any need to go any further?
 
I don’t think that randomness is the same as free will. Free will involves the deliberate and conscious selection between alternatives.
Sure. But it also means unpredictability. First, it requires that there would be more than one option to choose from. Second, it requires that each option is physically possible to execute. Third, it requires that no one could predict what a selection will be, before the selection is made.

It does not mean that we can do whatever we want. We cannot flap our arms, and start to fly. That does not diminish our freedom significantly.
And quantum mechanics has its own laws. Whatever is ruled by quantum mechanics must obey the rules of quantum mechanics. I do not think that quantum mechanics can save free will from determinism.
Yes, but those laws are stochastic, not deterministic. They merely say that something will happen with a certain level of probability.
 
I use the word “mind” as the electro-chemical action of the neurons.
Exactly. But normally when I use the word ‘mind’ I an thinking of the non-material aspect of human nature which is able to abstract from the particular to the general.

As to the (immaterial) soul, it does have a physical interface–the body. But since the faculties of the soul are intellect and will, these are only capable of being directly experienced by an individual, subjectively.
When I tell you a word, it conjures up a “picture” in your mind, that is it elicits a certain elecro-chemical firing of the neurons; which is hopefully similar to the firings in my brain - and if it is, then we understand each other.
It may conjure up a picture, but I would consider that more in the imagination than the mind. And there are many areas of abstruse study which conjure up no pictures whatsoever.

In order for a particular neuron firing pattern to have consistent meaning, then we would need to have within our brains a persistent and stable neuron pattern for every possible “idea.” Now are brains are quite capacious, but I’m not sure if that is sufficient. Not only that, we have to be able to recognize that the 2 apples or the interger 2, or 2 of anything else, still relate to the general and abstract idea of "two"ness.

I rather view the brain as the integrating organ of the sensory system, and the mind as that which abstracts from the particular to the general.
 
Like this:
  1. The beauty of symphonic music is definitely non-material. (Beauty is a concept.)
  2. The beauty can be percieved when one hears the music (or for very talented people, when reading the notes).
  3. This can happen only via physical means (hearing or reading).
    Therefore the material and abstract realms have a detectable physical interface. The same should apply to the soul - if it existed.
ok. then the interface between the soul and the brain is wherever the brain reacts to what are non-physical phenomena. whatever - nothing rides on this for me. i mean, perhaps every neuron in the brain interacts with the soul…
40.png
ateista:
If there is an interaction between two entities, then there must be an interface, and if one of the entities is material or physical, then the interface is detectable by physical means.
this still makes no sense: how are you going to detect a non-physical entity by means of a physical detector?
atesita:
I don’t understand. You said that the brain-states - the mind - is incapable of making abstraction or conceptualization, so definitely made a judgement about the capabilities (or lack of them) of the mind. So far you did not present any substantiation for this claim.
read my long post a little further up: i presented the outline for 4 arguments for an immaterial principle of intellection, one of which is based on the fact that we are acquainted with abstract objects, which would be impossible if mind were simply material.
40.png
ateista:
Ah, that is interesting. As far as I am concerned, that is incorrect speculation. There is no such thing as an abstract concept - outside the mind. There is no such thing as objective “meaning” of a word. The meaning of a word is whatever the recipient makes of it.
fine. besides simply believing it to be “incorrect speculation”, precisely how is my speculation incorrect?

how do you explain the existence of necessary truth and other modal and mathematical phenomena in the absence of abstract objects?
40.png
ateista:
The word “unacceptable conclusion” simply meant that it is in variance with reality. (A very good example of the previous paragraph - the meaning I assigned to this expression was perceived differently by you - no doubt becasue I did not elaborate on it).
i understand what you mean by it. what i’m asking you is how you could determine that a conclusion logically entailed by “necessary assumptions” is, in fact, at odds with reality…if an argument is sound, then the conclusion necessarily describes reality.
40.png
ateista:
Why do you think that the mind is incapable of these actions? (If there truly is a free will).
as i’ve already said, i’ve presented the arguments a number of posts back - go check them out.
40.png
ateista:
Did you just say that the mind/brain is nothing that a receptor for the soul?
no. the soul is part of the human mind. they work together.
40.png
ateista:
Why should you make this unwarranted assumption? If the neurons of the brain can be excited by electrical impulses and the person percieves this as pleasure or pain - depending on the area affected - why go any further? It is the specific area of the brain with its neurons firing in a specific manner (state of the mind) which is the actual area where the abstract concepts: “pleasure” and “pain” are realized.
i’m not quite sure what you’re getting at here, but this is not a useful response to (let alone logical refutation of) my point that the argument, “if damaging the brain results in cessation of thinking, then thinking must be in the brain” is just as false as “if damaging the power cord of my tv results in the cessation of the picture, then the picture must be in the power cord”.
 
But if every text would be destroyed, and every performance would be forgotten and every tape erased… the Hamlet would cease to exist, and would never be recreated. The specific social circumstances which influenced Shakespeare and the specific configuration of his mind will never be repeated.
not true.

look, think of it this way: how many letter a’s are in this sentence? but how many letter a’s are in the english language? the former are tokens, while the latter is a type. even if all written texts were destroyed, and every english speaker either dead or unconscious, the proposition “there is 1 letter a in the english language” is true in every possible world.

or think of it this way: what is there in the natural world that the following sentences are about, that makes them true, to which their various referents ***actually ***refer:

A) 17 is a prime number;

B) the set of integers is denumerably infinite;

C) ~(A&~A);

D) every even number can be expressed as the sum of two primes.

and just so you know, atheism does not (facially, anyway) entail the non-existence of abstract entities: there are plenty of atheist philosophers that admit them into their ontologies.
 
No, it does not follow. There is true randomness “built into” the fabric of the universe, at least on the quantum level. There is no need for any non-material assumption.
even if randomness was the same as free choice, this statement is simply the expression of yet another of your interpretations of quantum mechanical data; there are other (by my lights, more coherent) and opposing interpretations…

but that is as may be. the kind of subatomic randomness of which you are speaking (e.g. fluctuations in the energy density of the QM vacuum) is utterly unrelated to macroscopic biophysical laws; and as you yourself previously said:
40.png
ateista:
The laws of physics do not explain the charateristics discovered by chemistry, and chemisty cannot explain laws and rules discovered by biology.
 
look, think of it this way: how many letter a’s are in this sentence? but how many letter a’s are in the english language? the former are tokens, while the latter is a type.
So far agreed.
even if all written texts were destroyed, and every english speaker either dead or unconscious, the proposition “there is 1 letter a in the english language” is true in every possible world.
As you stated, it is true - and the clincher is the word “unconscious”. If, however we modify it as “if all written texts were destroyed, and every human being dead” - the proposition would be meaningless, because there would be no English language. I can say something, like “every awerik is noworg in all the possible worlds” and what would its meaning be?

Meanings are mutally agreed upon. They are not intrinsic to verbal or written phrases.
or think of it this way: what is there in the natural world that the following sentences are about, that makes them true, to which their various referents ***actually ***refer:

A) 17 is a prime number;

B) the set of integers is denumerably infinite;

C) ~(A&~A);

D) every even number can be expressed as the sum of two primes.
They are abstractions of the real world. The last one is the Goldbach conjecture, whether it is true, or not is not known.
and just so you know, atheism does not (facially, anyway) entail the non-existence of abstract entities: there are plenty of atheist philosophers that admit them into their ontologies.
Oh, I accept the concept of non-material or abstract concepts or entities, no problem there. They are the reflections of certain brain-states. If mutually agreed upon, they have meanings. Otherwise they are gibberish.
 
A) even if you everything about the brain of another person and all of the neurophysiological processes responsible for behaviour - all of the neuronal firings and what they signify - there would still be something you didn’t know: what it was like for that person to have those experiences. that is, the subjective experience of any given sensation will always be irreducible to neurobiology.
What it was like? What relevance is that? Different people have different tolerance level to pain - so intrinsically - I cannot perceive what level of pain you feel if and when you burn your hand. There are people who do not feel any pain. We are similar, but not identical beings.
as an example, imagine that you are a scientist living 100 years from now when our neuroscience is complete, and that you have never heard the sound of a violin; if you were to identify and document the memory and experience of, say, a concert violinist, you still wouldn’t know what it’s like actually to hear a violin. which means that there’s something to consciousness that is not superevenient on physical brain-states.
And what is the relevance of this? If you never heard a violin, your consciousness is different from someone else’s who has. Consciousness is not independent of brain-states.
B) there are other examples of this same phenomenon: we can conceive, for instance, of a possible world where the individuals in it have exactly the same brain-states as our own, but who have different conscious experiences, whether it’s because they experience the color red when they are looking at blue objects, or middle c when they heard b-flat; it is also possible to conceive of a world where there are people physically identical to us who actually have no conscious experience accompanying/causing their behaviour. which, again, entails that brain-states and consciousness are not identical.
Same as above. You assume that consciousness is independent of brain-states. Why?
C) we are acquainted with propositions - i.e. we know that propositions like “seventeen is a prime number”, and “no proposition can be both true and false at the same time and in the same respect”, are true. propositions are abstract objects - i.e. they have no spatiotemporal location. we could not be acquainted with propositions if our intellectual faculties were purely physical. therefore there is some immaterial principal of knowing in us.
There are no such propositions. Propositions have no true / false / meaningful / meaningless attributes outside a mind. A totally sensible proposition may have no meaning to you, if uttered in a language which you do not understand. Some primitive tribes never got beyond the level of: one, two, many. For them the sentence: “the number 3 is the smallest odd prime” - is simply meaningless.
D) we are morally responsible for our actions. we could not be morally responsible if we are determined to do what we do. but if human beings are purely physical beings, then they are subject to exhaustive physical laws, which would determine their behaviour. which means that we*** cannot*** be purely physical beings - there must be some immaterial component to us that allows us to avoid determination by physical laws, and make free choices that are morally (un)recitifiable.
If there is a free will, which cannot be proven. But even if there is one, the laws of nature are not all deterministic and that allows naturalistic explanation of free will.
 
As you stated, it is true - and the clincher is the word “unconscious”. If, however we modify it as “if all written texts were destroyed, and every human being dead” - the proposition would be meaningless, because there would be no English language. I can say something, like “every awerik is noworg in all the possible worlds” and what would its meaning be?

Meanings are mutally agreed upon. They are not intrinsic to verbal or written phrases.
i think we’re probably getting too far into the philosophy of language here, and i’m afraid i lack the conceptual and expressive facility to make the elementary issues clear to someone who hasn’t studied them.

all i will say is that meanings are what is expressed by communicative acts, which is how there can be one meaning for numerous communicative acts. what ***we ***do as language-users, is determine which meanings are expressed by which communicative acts. so, for example, we have determined that the sentences “it is raining”, “il pleut”, and “es regnet” all express the same proposition, or meaning: “it is raining”.

of course, it could have turned out that each of those sentences were used to express different propositions (and there are an infinite number of possible worlds where exactly that is true), but that’s beside the point.

“meanings” are propositions, which are abstract objects. what we do is choose which propositions are expressed by our communicative acts.
40.png
ateista:
They are abstractions of the real world.
you didn’t answer my questions: what makes those propositions true? to what in the natural world do the terms refer?
40.png
ateista:
The last one is the Goldbach conjecture, whether it is true, or not is not known.
…but necessarily true or necessarily false, all the same.
40.png
ateista:
Oh, I accept the concept of non-material or abstract concepts or entities, no problem there. They are the reflections of certain brain-states.
i don’t understand what you’re saying here, probably because (i assume) you’re using “abstract”, “non-material”, and/or “concept” in a way that i am not.
 
What it was like? What relevance is that? Different people have different tolerance level to pain - so intrinsically - I cannot perceive what level of pain you feel if and when you burn your hand. There are people who do not feel any pain. We are similar, but not identical beings.
you miss the point: even if you knew every single last physical fact about another person, you wouldn’t know one thing: what it is like to have their conscious experiences.

look, if you build a computer and put a camera on it, what experience is the computer having when it trains the camera on a red ball? is it having any experience at all? if so, is it the same one that we have when we look at the ball?

the point is that knowing all the physical facts about the world and about the computer in particular, will not allow you to know the answer to these questions.

ergo, there are some non-physical facts about consciousness.
40.png
ateista:
And what is the relevance of this? If you never heard a violin, your consciousness is different from someone else’s who has. Consciousness is not independent of brain-states.
see above: i can know every physical fact about the world and about the violin player’s consciousness, and still not know what middle-c sounds like. which, again, means that there must be some non-physical facts about consciousness.
40.png
ateista:
Same as above. You assume that consciousness is independent of brain-states. Why?
i make no such assumption: i am simply pointing out that it is logically possible for there to be a world physically identical to our world, but which is disparate with regards the facts about consciousness.
40.png
ateista:
There are no such propositions. Propositions have no true / false / meaningful / meaningless attributes outside a mind.
you’re confusing sentences with propositions…whether or not anyone is around to think it or write it, 2+2=4. which is the same thing as saying the proposition “2+2=4” is true.
40.png
ateista:
A totally sensible proposition may have no meaning to you, if uttered in a language which you do not understand. Some primitive tribes never got beyond the level of: one, two, many. For them the sentence: “the number 3 is the smallest odd prime” - is simply meaningless.
again, you’re talking about sentences, not propositions.
40.png
ateista:
If there is a free will, which cannot be proven.
perhaps not, but so what? if there are other minds, it cannot be proven. if there is a past, it cannot be proven. if our senses are reliable, it cannot be proven…
40.png
ateista:
But even if there is one, the laws of nature are not all deterministic and that allows naturalistic explanation of free will.
i’ve already explained why this cannot be true (even on your terms). check a few posts back.
 
Status
Not open for further replies.
Back
Top