Continuation
As Aristotle aptly observes, the higher abilities of lower species mimic the lower activities of higher species, and that means that we must carefully discern the dividing lines between merely material activities and those which need higher spiritual powers.That is why, although wasps make nests bespeaking intellective design, the intellect ultimately behind such design need not be attributed to the wasp itself. That is because beyond its singular instinctive behavior it shows no capacity for adaptation. It has no “plan B.” On the contrary, higher primates do adapt and vary behavior. While early Homo erectus made symmetrical hand axes, anthropologist Thomas Wynn points out that they failed to exceed the capacity of apes for sensory shape recognition. But the three-dimensionally congruent, aesthetic symmetrical hand axes which appear about 500,000 B.C. suddenly exhibit the need for a grasp of imagined geometry qualitatively exceeding mere sensory abilities.
And, as I have already pointed out, this is a case of special pleading. Wynn bases his argument on the fact that other apes do not produce similar tools. But other apes do not produce Oldowan or pre-500K BP tools either, and the argument about symmetry and aethetics seems to me to be spurious, as the example of the wasp nest shows. A scientist would say that a wasp nest is part of the extended phenotype of the wasp’s genotype. It is impossible for you to show that the stone tool in question was not similarly part of the extended phenotype of the genotype of Homo erectus. It is no good pointing to the ability of higher primates to display behavioural flexibility when the specific behavioural evidence remains essentially unchanged over hundreds of thousands of years. I am not saying that it is impossible to make a case for the emergence of fully human capabilities by reference to palaeontological evidence, indeed such work is underway, but that case is not made by the single example of the post-500K BP Acheulean bifacial. Furthermore, the palaeontological evidence strongly supports the *gradual *rather than the binary appearance of human cognition. See for example:
Michael Balter,
On the origin of Art and Symbolism, Science 323, 709 - 711 (2009)
I don’t claim that all questions are answered at this point, but this tells the philosopher that genuinely spiritual intellective acts are now taking place, and true man is on the scene. We rely on natural scientists for this paleoanthropological data, and thus every judgment is conditioned by the inherent fallibility of the scientists involved, who often contend against one another and change their stories. That is their problem, not ours.
I am not sure what has prompted this sniping comment at the process of science. It is true that science makes progress by being open to investigating a range of hypotheses and to modifying theories in the light of new evidence - over time, scientists reach consensus which is generally a closer aproximation to reality. If I were to be equally snide, I could point out that philosophers are still debating questions that were posed millenia ago - it does not seem to be possible to use philosophical considerations as a reliable guide to what is.
It is also true that, given the same anthropological data, philosophers of different schools will disagree about the timing of the emergence of fully human cognition; and that the question is far from being solely a philosophical one, including, as it does, questions related to experimental psychology, neural processes, sociology, linguistics and so on.
The fact of variation in capacity exhibited at every level of species and within the human species proves nothing except that the presence of the spiritual soul with its strictly spiritual operative potencies is dependent upon for their operation (not existence) the material organic conditions in which they operate.
The fact of variation shows that human cognition lies on a continuum of capability, that it does not suddenly appear fully formed and qualitatively different either in evolution or individual development, and that it is therefore not different in kind, but merely in degree (very different in degree, admittedly) from that of other animals.
To say that what you call the “spiritual operative potencies” are dependent on the material organic conditions in which they operate, is to agree that the presence of a material brain is necessary for their operation. If the brain is damaged, they are damaged; if the brain is destroyed, they cease. The possible existence of disembodied spiritual operative potencies that neither operate nor are potent does not seem very interesting. You have not attempted to show that any human capability requires anything other than emergent properties of matter (other than by reference to universals, discussed above) - since matter is necessary for mind then until something else can be shown to be necessary, I conclude that matter is necessary and sufficient.
That is to say, if the human intellect is present in a person whose brain suffers organic disease or disfunction, then it cannot manifest its full abilities and that person may be judged an idiot. But he is still true man and due to human respect,
Here we encounter all sorts of dilemmas - what about someone whose brain damage is so severe that he loses all uniquely human (as you see it) intellect; or someone born that way; or more severe cases where the intellect is less than that of any sentient animal? Is the intellect present but unexpressed and unexpressible? How do you now? If you take the valid position that they are human and worthy of respect then you are making a judgement based on the fact that they are members of our species, and not at all about their intellective abilities.
to be continued
