Ignorance of the gaps

[yppop]

Throughout the thread, I’ve used “science” to mean “the scientific method”. Sometimes I also use it to refer to the theories that are currently the most well supported by the scientific method.

Do you believe: (1) that all endeavors that apply the “scientific method” (I assume by this you mean: observation, hypothesis, experiment, and verification or some form of this concatenation) can be designated as “science”, and (2) that some endeavors that do not use the scientific method can still be designated as science?

The “gaps” are the transitional forms in the fossil record that have not yet been found. So if a scientist says that one population of animals of species A evolved after successive generations into some new species B, there will be a gap between A and B. Obviously the difference between A and B didn’t occur all at once, so we would expect to find a fossil that is “midway” between A and B in terms of its traits and genetics.

I was pointing out earlier that even if you found some fossil of species C that lies between A and B, there would be two gaps rather than one (one between A and C, and another between C and B). Thus the number of gaps isn’t reflective of our ignorance, but rather the number of types of fossils we’ve observed.

What should matter is not the number of gaps, but the size of the gaps.

Since the general definition of a “gap” is any observation of natural phenomena that science (scientists applying the scientific method) can’t explain, your answer gives testimony to your forensic skill, but the “missing link” business is such a small part of a much larger menu of unexplained observations, that your definition becomes too narrow to be of much use in this discussion about God in the gaps. Try thinking about some major gaps like: cosmogenesis; geogenesis, abiogenesis, morphogenesis, and psychogenesis, gaps that can only be labeled “creation events”. Plus all those other pesky observations such as the double split experiment; non-locality, entanglement, unified theory, the mind/body problem, qualia, dark energy, dark matter, consciousness, and many more that cannot be explained and never will be unless science considers the presence of a spiritual component of reality.

Based on how the word has been used historically, I would say something is physical if it allows us to predict the behavior of the observable universe. So, for example, potential and kinetic energies are physical (even though they can’t be observed per se) because they allow us to predict the motion of objects.

For the most part, the "abstractions of science such as; force, energy, momentum, time, dark energy, etc., etc. are not directly observable. For the most part, what we observe is change, primarily as motion, matter, and growth. The most direct and simple definition of “physical” is anything having to do with space, time, matter, and energy.

There may be logical proofs of God’s existence, but I have never seen a satisfactory one (and I’ve seen quite a few). However, I concede that gods may exist, thus I’m not “gnostic” (for the lack of a better word). I just see no convincing reason to believe in them, just as I see no convincing reason to believe that a team of cheerleaders will greet me in my dorm tonight.

My approach is to recognize that we can neither conclusively prove God’s existence nor His non-existence. So we can order our lives based on either one of those two propositions. I chose the second - belief in God - and have reconciled my belief with many years of study and contemplation resulting in a thesis that answers to my satisfaction all of those unexplained observations that science can’t explain.

Good luck with the cheerleader dream!
Yppop

 

[tonyrey]

The problem is that there is no way to know in an a priori fashion which entities are physical. A popular misconception is the belief that “If something is physical, it lends itself to scientific explanation”. But in practice, it’s really the converse that comes about: “If something can be explained scientifically, it is physical”. There is no method or algorithm we can use to determine whether something is physical before employing the scientific method, thus a Christian who says “This isn’t physical, so we can’t use science anyway” is jumping the gun.

Take energy for example. Energy used to be regarded as something nearly magical. But once we discovered that it could be used in naturalistic explanations in a consistent manner, it became the subject matter of physics. It wouldn’t have done any good for someone to insist that we shouldn’t have started investigating energy scientifically because it’s not physical. We classified it as physical after using science, not before.

To assume **all **energy is physical is literally self-destructive. It leaves no room for the ability to think for oneself.

Math, at least, also presupposes concepts it cannot demonstrate (such as the axioms of the deductive system you’re using). No one ever seems to make a fuss about this, so why be so critical of science?

Also, strictly speaking, science doesn’t assume what most people mean by “causality”. Quantum mechanics is an example of a discipline where what counts as a “cause” is questionable.

And while we may appeal to causation in our explanations, cause and effect are irrelevant to the math involved. Newtonian physics would work just as well from a mathematical point of view if we instead regarded motion as causing forces and not the other way around.

This view of causation is also self-destructive with its exclusion of the power of independent thought and action.

 

[Oreoracle]

Do you believe: (1) that all endeavors that apply the “scientific method” (I assume by this you mean: observation, hypothesis, experiment, and verification or some form of this concatenation) can be designated as “science”, and (2) that some endeavors that do not use the scientific method can still be designated as science?

My use of the term is consistent with (1), but not with (2).

Since the general definition of a “gap” is any observation of natural phenomena that science (scientists applying the scientific method) can’t explain…

In context, we were talking about the supposed gaps in the fossil record, not in scientific theories in general.

The most direct and simple definition of “physical” is anything having to do with space, time, matter, and energy.

It is simple; perhaps too simple. For all we know, we may need to postulate a new entity to account for phenomena in the same way we postulated energy in the past. I think any definition of “physical” should be flexible enough to allow for such a modification.

To assume **all **energy is physical is literally self-destructive. It leaves no room for the ability to think for oneself.

Well, that depends on how you define “think”.

I assure you that I’m not trying to be pedantic here. Physics is the most exact of the natural sciences, and the most general–every other natural science is a special case of physics. So let’s take a narrower field like biology as an example. The questions of biology can be even harder to answer than those of physics simply because the terminology doesn’t make the connection to physical principles obvious.

I know you’re going to insist that humans are special, so let’s speak of viruses instead. It is debatable whether a virus should be considered a “living” thing or not. Since physics encompasses biology, it follows that this question could be answered in terms of physics, yet it hasn’t. Why not? Well, because the definition of “life” is too ambiguous to be analyzed with a precise science like physics. Physics will only be able to step in once “life” is well-defined. It seems to me that your definition of “think” is similar.

 

[tonyrey]

Oreoracle:
To assume **all **energy is physical is literally self-destructive. It leaves no room for the ability to think for oneself.

This view of causation is also self-destructive with its exclusion of the power of independent thought and action.

Well, that depends on how you define “think”.

I assure you that I’m not trying to be pedantic here. Physics is the most exact of the natural sciences, and the most general–every other natural science is a special case of physics. So let’s take a narrower field like biology as an example. The questions of biology can be even harder to answer than those of physics simply because the terminology doesn’t make the connection to physical principles obvious.

I know you’re going to insist that humans are special, so let’s speak of viruses instead. It is debatable whether a virus should be considered a “living” thing or not. Since physics encompasses biology, it follows that this question could be answered in terms of physics, yet it hasn’t. Why not? Well, because the definition of “life” is too ambiguous to be analyzed with a precise science like physics. Physics will only be able to step in once “life” is well-defined. It seems to me that your definition of “think” is similar.Even if thought is not defined precisely it is still true that if **all **energy is physical is literally self-destructive because it excludes the power of independent thought and action.

 

[tonyrey]

This view of causation is also self-destructive with its exclusion of the power of independent thought and action.

** If **thought had physical causes it could not be independent or impartial.

 

[Catolico65]

The problem is that there is no way to know in an a priori fashion which entities are physical. A popular misconception is the belief that “If something is physical, it lends itself to scientific explanation”. But in practice, it’s really the converse that comes about: “If something can be explained scientifically, it is physical”. There is no method or algorithm we can use to determine whether something is physical before employing the scientific method, thus a Christian who says “This isn’t physical, so we can’t use science anyway” is jumping the gun.

Take energy for example. Energy used to be regarded as something nearly magical. But once we discovered that it could be used in naturalistic explanations in a consistent manner, it became the subject matter of physics. It wouldn’t have done any good for someone to insist that we shouldn’t have started investigating energy scientifically because it’s not physical. We classified it as physical after using science, not before.

It appears you would be talking about some Christians 500 years ago because it certainly isn’t applicable today. In fact Christian scientist Isaac Newton was able to quantify a previously unstudied form of energy, gravity, that changed math and physics forever.

In summary, for the last few hundreds of years Christians haven’t stood in the way of science, in fact many have been at the forefront. What is happening now though is that the unprincipled atheists promote their unproven theories as plausible and likely, just because they say so. Given that these are very intelligent men that completely ignore the implications of their own research and the highly complex natural systems one can only surmise that since that they are applying their own personal lack of morals to their profession, thus causing them to believe in fairy tales instead of what is obvious to the logical mind without pretensions.

 

[balto]

** If **thought had physical causes it could not be independent or impartial.

Precisely, although human thought does have a physical component in addition to non-physical causes. It seems to me that rational thought requires reasoning from ground to consequent. If thought is completely physical, then it is really only a cause to effect relationship which undermines the argument that thought is physically caused. If the conclusion that thought is purely physical is true, it is only accidentally true and not by virtue of any argument. There are numerous examples of human phenonmena that are caused but not rationally grounded.

C.S. Lewis gives an analogy that is useful. It would be like saying that “one of the words in this sentence doesn’t mean what you think it means.” The conclusion, if true, destroys the argument by altering the meaning of the sentence so you cannot use the argument to claim that the conclusion is true.

 

[Oreoracle]

If thought is completely physical, then it is really only a cause to effect relationship which undermines the argument that thought is physically caused. If the conclusion that thought is purely physical is true, it is only accidentally true and not by virtue of any argument.

I don’t follow. So you’re saying that, because human conclusions are reached in a physically deterministic way, the conclusions themselves don’t have logical validity? I don’t see how you make that leap.

For example, let’s apply your argument to computers. The “decisions” and “conclusions” of a computer are determined by its design; that is, computers do what they do because of the laws of physics. However, the behavior of a computer is still representative of logical thinking. The fact that physics determines how computers behave doesn’t imply that computers can’t reach logical conclusions.

 

[Aloysium]

. . . example, let’s apply your argument to computers. The “decisions” and “conclusions” of a computer are determined by its design; that is, computers do what they do because of the laws of physics. However, the behavior of a computer is still representative of logical thinking. The fact that physics determines how computers behave doesn’t imply that computers can’t reach logical conclusions.

The analogy is far from perfect, but let’s go with it.

There is an underlying structure/reality which is the physical world.
We know this world imperfectly through our senses, our cognitive capacities and the social framework of the ideas and words that we share
.
We are created as a physical and spiritual unity.

In order for us to participate and share with each other in this world, we need an intact nervous system. If I have a particular kind of stroke, I will not be able to find any more words with which to communicate. This discussion is taking place because we both have a functioning nervous system.

At the same time these words have meaning.
This meaning is not in the ones and zeros that make this on-line communication a reality, but is part of a nontangible world of thought/ideas.
No matter how much one studies this monitor, the computer, my brain, the meaning I am trying to convey is not to be found in the organization of matter.
The particular hugely complex physical structure that goes into making this entire process a reality involves the laws of physics but those events are organized by “forces” in the realm of ideas.
(This is true only to an extent, as we exist as a unity rather than separate matter/mind/spirit.)

The understanding is both a physical and a mental/spiritual event.
Obviously, computers cannot reach logical conclusions; they are machines.

 

[Catolico65]

The fact that physics determines how computers behave doesn’t imply that computers can’t reach logical conclusions.

Computers can’t think and there is no such thing as AI. Computers only do what we program them to do, thus they mimic our thought process but cannot as of yet mimic our intuitive capabilities and make abstract relationships.

 

[Oreoracle]

At the same time these words have meaning.
This meaning is not in the ones and zeros that make this on-line communication a reality, but is part of a nontangible world of thought/ideas.

But what is a “thought” or “idea”? Define them rigorously, in a way that would let use distinguish thoughts from non-thoughts and ideas from non-ideas with perfect accuracy.

Again, I think the problem is that philosophers have deliberately left such terms vague. If we defined them so that there are sharp distinctions between, say, thoughts and other mental processes, then the connection to physics would become more obvious. This is a shortcoming of language, not of science.

Obviously, computers cannot reach logical conclusions; they are machines.

You might say that computers are not “aware” (another vague term) of what they’re doing, but what they do nonetheless resembles logical thought. It’s not a coincidence that calculators agree with human calculations, for example.

 

[balto]

I don’t follow. So you’re saying that, because human conclusions are reached in a physically deterministic way, the conclusions themselves don’t have logical validity? I don’t see how you make that leap.

I think Aloysium’s explanation is good:
"Aloysium:

In order for us to participate and share with each other in this world, we need an intact nervous system. If I have a particular kind of stroke, I will not be able to find any more words with which to communicate. This discussion is taking place because we both have a functioning nervous system.

At the same time these words have meaning.
This meaning is not in the ones and zeros that make this on-line communication a reality, but is part of a nontangible world of thought/ideas.
No matter how much one studies this monitor, the computer, my brain, the meaning I am trying to convey is not to be found in the organization of matter.
The particular hugely complex physical structure that goes into making this entire process a reality involves the laws of physics but those events are organized by “forces” in the realm of ideas.
(This is true only to an extent, as we exist as a unity rather than separate matter/mind/spirit.)

I imagine that you probably dispute the whole spiritual part of it. You could call it “mind” instead if that works better.

For example, let’s apply your argument to computers. The “decisions” and “conclusions” of a computer are determined by its design; that is, computers do what they do because of the laws of physics. However, the behavior of a computer is still representative of logical thinking. The fact that physics determines how computers behave doesn’t imply that computers can’t reach logical conclusions.

Sometimes I do a poor job of explaining my reasoning but here’s an attempt . Technically what a computer does is take electrical (name removed by moderator)ut and output an electrical process. So it doesn’t do any logic by itself. The only reason we say it does is because we humans have given semantic meaning to certain patterns of electrical output. So the logical reasoning is at our level, not the computer’s level. But if our minds are just like the computer, then we’re not really doing anything but outputting electrical data as physical sounds and motions. So if two people have differing beliefs, how do we know which is correct? If we went to an alien planet that has computers that use different semantics how would we know which of two computers that have different outputs is the correct one if they both claim to answer the same question?

This understanding has kind of been the impetus for my earlier comments.

 

[balto]

But what is a “thought” or “idea”? Define them rigorously, in a way that would let use distinguish thoughts from non-thoughts and ideas from non-ideas with perfect accuracy.

“Thought” is a little vague I admit and can include many things. I draw the distinction between imagination and sensation, which are wholly physical, with concepts and semantics, which are not physical because there is no necessary correlation between the physical images and sounds needed to entertain a concept. For instance, the concept of love could be expressed as “love” in the U.S. but if I were in 1st century Rome I would call it “amor.” Or I could even draw this: . My entertaining of the concept of love is determinate in a way that no character string or image could ever be.

You might say that computers are not “aware” (another vague term) of what they’re doing, but what they do nonetheless resembles logical thought. It’s not a coincidence that calculators agree with human calculations, for example.

They may simulate logical thought but they are not doing logic. They are only accepting (name removed by moderator)ut and generating output.

 

[Aloysium]

But what is a “thought” or “idea”? Define them rigorously, in a way that would let use distinguish thoughts from non-thoughts and ideas from non-ideas with perfect accuracy. . . .

That’s a tough one.
I’m going to have to put a lot of thought into it.
Or maybe not.

 

[yppop]

Oreoacle

Here is my view of science:

When we use the word ‘science’, it sounds sometimes as though we are referring to a monolithic entity speaking with a single voice of a Delphic oracle. Unfortunately, the word is used in a variety of ways. Sometimes the word is used in the context of the people who are engaged in producing it—the scientists. Sometimes it is used in the context of the methodology being used—the so-called scientific method. Sometimes it is used in the context of a specific kind of knowledge produced—a science. Often the word is used to mean the combination of all three connotations.However, it is in the third context that the word rightfully belongs; the word science should be used primarily to designate a specific kind of knowledge.

What kind of knowledge? The materialist argues that only knowledge that derives from the scientific method is worthy of the term science, that in order for knowledge to be considered as science, it must be the result of a process of: observation, hypothesis, prediction, and verification.

If the application of the scientific method is all that defines science then there is no argument about what science is and what isn’t. However, if we consider those areas of study in which some form of the scientific method is applied, a partial list would include: physics, chemistry, metallurgy, astronomy, geology, meteorology, anthropology, archaeology, biology, medicine, economics, psychology, and sociology. Obviously there are questions about the type of knowledge produced in the list, with an observable gradation from first to last, that is, some are more scientific than others and thus we speak of hard and soft science. Where demarcation occurs in the list of sciences is not clear. So what this implies is that science is not clearly defined by application of the scientific method. The application of the scientific method might label a discipline as scientific without necessarily producing knowledge that can be labeled as science. This applies especially to the disciplines at the end of the list.

Karl Popper, suggested a way to classify hypotheses as science; he pointed out that the classical scientific method is based on inductive reasoning and one can never prove a hypothesis to be true based on repeated observation; hypotheses can only be proven false. Consequently, Popper made falsification the criterion for classifying hypotheses as science. The theories of physics are such that a single observation that contradicts a predicted outcome is enough to invalidate the theory, and, in a way, this is what we mean by testability. On the other hand, the hypotheses of psychology are too indeterminate, too broadly cast, to be negated. Every psychology theory seems to have some truth to it even though it is unable to predict anything reliably. Hence, according to Popper, although both physics and psychology may apply scientific means; physics produces science, psychology does not.

Popper also argues that no single method was used for creating a science. He also argues that when a problem does occur in science, competing hypotheses are often proposed and the best is selected. Whereas the classical method puts most emphasis on prediction, Popper argues that the best theory is the one that offers the best explanation and a theory explains best when it is simple, general, and comprehensive.

In the narrow sense, a hypothesis becomes science only if it is testable. This is the definition that a materialist invokes whenever convenient. It implies that the hypothesis must make a prediction that can be verified. Prediction and verification give a hypothesis stature and earns it text book status. In spite of that, predictability and verification by experimentation or measurement are not the only way that hypotheses have been accepted as science.

A hypothesis, without being either predictive or verifiable, can be accepted as science and become a theory through consensus of the scientific community on the basis that it is a *plausible description verified by logical deduction of known facts. *Historical disciplines such as evolution, archeology, and geology are primarily observational and most hypotheses in these fields can never be tested.

Hypotheses become science by two main approaches: the predictive and verifiable approach and the plausible explanation approach. The former is preferred, and science generated by that approach has greater stature than that which is verified by plausible explanation of known facts. The difference between the two approaches generally has to do with the timing of the observations. When something that was predicted by the hypothesis has been observed afterward it becomes “evidence”. If the same observation was made prior to the hypothesis it carries less weight than if it had come after. For example, if the cosmic background radiation had been discovered in 1930, it would have merely been an “observation” that was explained when the big bang theory was developed in the 1950’s; it most likely would have been grudgingly accepted as a “postdictive theory”. Instead the background radiation was observed in 1964 as predicted and thus established the Big Bang in a more conclusive manner. Hypotheses developed as a plausible explanation of the observations can still be considered to be science without predicting anything.

If a** plausible** hypothesis that assumed the presence of a non-physical component was developed and explained the “gaps” in scientific knowledge, the explanation should be accorded equal stature to that of any scientific methodology.

Yppop

 

[polytropos]

But what is a “thought” or “idea”? Define them rigorously, in a way that would let use distinguish thoughts from non-thoughts and ideas from non-ideas with perfect accuracy.

Again, I think the problem is that philosophers have deliberately left such terms vague. If we defined them so that there are sharp distinctions between, say, thoughts and other mental processes, then the connection to physics would become more obvious. This is a shortcoming of language, not of science.

The hallmark of thought is intentional content. Thoughts are about things in a clear and unambiguous way. When I am looking at my cat, there is not just a presence of correlated electric pulses in my brain (in the respect that when I film my cat with a camcorder, there is a set of corresponding electric pulses in its circuitry). Certainly, such physical “manifestations” are there, but they are not about my cat in the way my thoughts are.

My thoughts can also be about nonphysical things. I can think of cats in the abstract, even if no cats are present. Such knowledge need not even be visual, for there is no image of a cat which itself encompasses catness. Any particular cat has, for instance, a particular color. But when I think of cat as a universal, I think of catness without associated color–for there is no particular color so associated.

For example, let’s apply your argument to computers. The “decisions” and “conclusions” of a computer are determined by its design; that is, computers do what they do because of the laws of physics. However, the behavior of a computer is still representative of logical thinking. The fact that physics determines how computers behave doesn’t imply that computers can’t reach logical conclusions.

You might say that computers are not “aware” (another vague term) of what they’re doing, but what they do nonetheless resembles logical thought. It’s not a coincidence that calculators agree with human calculations, for example.

“Representation” and “resemblance” are intentional, observer-relative terms, so using their operations to explain thought is circular.

Suppose I write down on a slip of paper, “If p, then q; p; therefore q”. We can agree that modus ponens, the argument form I wrote on the paper, is a paradigm of logical thinking. Is the paper representative of logical thinking? No. Suppose we seal it in a protective case. After some duration of time, all English speakers die out. The paper only embodied logical thinking insofar that I was there to interpret its syntax.

Likewise, does an abacus represent arithmetic? Not in any unequivocal sense. I can use it to perform arithmetic relative to my interests, but its function is not intrinsic to its structure. The calculator faces the same fate: it is certainly not a coincidence that calculators agree with human calculations. Humans designed them to aid their operation of arithmetic. It doesn’t follow that they are representative of mathematical thinking in any intrinsic sense. We don’t hold, for example, that when a bird lays a second egg in her nest, the function of addition is being instantiated. If I had a few eggs and a basket on hand, I could use them to aid my own calculations, but the representation of thinking is only relative to the interests of me, a thinker.

There is nothing about the nature of computation as such that lends it the ability to create intrinsic semantic meaning. A computer does not resemble logical thinking. For its operations to be taken as logical, an external logical thinker, appropriately situated to interpret its results, is necessary. The case is different with our own thoughts, which are by their nature intentional and bear semantic content.

(Compare: It is always feasible to institute some surface-level isomorphism to alter the outputs of a computer’s data. Yet the internal operations can remain the same. I can construe the operation 0 + 1 = 1 as addition, formal disjunction, or formal conjunction, depending on whether I, as the user of the computer, intend to treat 0 and 1 as numerals, as symbols standing for my concepts of “true” and “false”, or as symbols standing for my concepts of “false” and “true”.)

 

[wanstronian]

Hi all.

Was just watching the Brisbane dialogue between Lawrence Krauss and William Lane Craig and something struck me, which has often struck me before. Oftentimes, one hears atheistic debaters condemn (and rightly so, in my opinion) the “God of the gaps” approach to Christian philosophy, theology and apologetics: “God” should not be used as a catch-all theory to explain something we don’t know in science, for example, how human life began or why planets and stars move in the way they do.

However, I’ve found that the knife cuts both ways: Professor Krauss and many other atheistic thinkers often appeal to “ignorance of the gaps” to rebut cosmological or other arguments in favour of God’s existence. For instance, in response to Dr Craig’s arguments for the beginning of the universe or else for the fine-tuning of the universe for intelligent life, Dr Krauss responds on both occasions with essentially the same argument: Well, we don’t know. Yes, such arguments carry most of the evidence, however, anything is possible so we can conclude that these arguments are even probable or right. To me, this “ignorance of the gaps” is just as bad.

What do you think?

The difference between the “God of the Gaps” and the “Ignorance of the Gaps” arguments is simple but profound. God of the Gaps says, “we don’t know, so it must be God.” Ignorance of the Gaps says, “We don’t know, so let’s not jump to conclusions.”

Surely the latter is the most intellectually honest, as well as the less embarassing position to have held once we do know the answer, and it turns out not to have been “God” all along.

 

[polytropos]

The difference between the “God of the Gaps” and the “Ignorance of the Gaps” arguments is simple but profound. God of the Gaps says, “we don’t know, so it must be God.” Ignorance of the Gaps says, “We don’t know, so let’s not jump to conclusions.”

Surely the latter is the most intellectually honest, as well as the less embarassing position to have held once we do know the answer, and it turns out not to have been “God” all along.

This is taken from the OP: Well, we don’t know. Yes, such arguments carry most of the evidence, however, anything is possible so we can conclude that these arguments are even probable or right

I don’t know if that is an actual quote or a summary of Professor Krauss’s remarks. (I am writing under the assumption that it is a somewhat accurate representation of what he said.) If he is conceding that “such arguments” (as the cosmological argument or fine-tuning argument) currently “carry most of the evidence,” then would not tentatively and conditionally embracing the conclusions of said arguments be (to quote your signature) “a provisional truth based on the best available evidence” rather than “an absolute truth dogmatically expounded in contravention of the best available evidence”?

(I’m not suggesting that you would concede along with Krauss that the kalam cosmological argument or fine-tuning argument carries. I personally find such arguments less than robust in the overall metaphysical picture. But if Krauss concedes that current evidence leans toward those arguments, then it seems that he should at least accept their conclusions “provisionally.”)

Krauss, indeed, if nothing else, seems to be holding onto an absolute truth, if not in contravention of the best available evidence, then in contravention of the best available logic. This is the man who wrote a book titled A Universe From Nothing: Why There is Something Rather than Nothing, which includes a chapter titled “Nothing is Something”. In short, he managed to publish a book the central argument of which depends on a massive and undisguised equivocation–without even realizing.

 

[balto]

The difference between the “God of the Gaps” and the “Ignorance of the Gaps” arguments is simple but profound. God of the Gaps says, “we don’t know, so it must be God.” Ignorance of the Gaps says, “We don’t know, so let’s not jump to conclusions.”

I don’t think that the OP was arguing that God should be used as a scientific filler explanation for anything. He seems to be claiming that atheists shouldn’t propose human ignorance when trying to deflect cosmological arguments for God’s existence, which are metaphysical arguments not scientific ones.

This seems to be a common misunderstanding of arguments for God’s existence (the serious arguments for His existence anyway). God is not being proposed as the “best explanation of the available facts” but rather He is being proposed as self-sustaining Being which grounds the reality of everything. The proof for it is more like a mathematical proof, which holds for all cases, than a positivist scientific theory which could be proven false whenever a counterexample arises. It would be like saying that the Pythagorean theorem amounts to a “theorem-of-the-gaps” and is the “best explanation of what we know about right triangles” and that we “shouldn’t jump to conclusions” regarding its validity. It holds as a matter of necessity.

 

[polytropos]

This seems to be a common misunderstanding of arguments for God’s existence (the serious arguments for His existence anyway). God is not being proposed as the “best explanation of the available facts” but rather He is being proposed as self-sustaining Being which grounds the reality of everything.

In fairness, this is usually true (particularly with respect to classical arguments), but the fine-tuning argument for example is definitely an inference to the best explanation. Kalam, in my opinion, falls somewhere in between an inference to the best explanation and a metaphysical demonstration, depending on how well one could make a case that an infinite series of past events is theoretically problematic. (Some attempts to do so here.) (I know that insofar that Craig uses Borde-Guth-Vilenkin as evidence for it, he is clear that his claim is that current cosmology currently supports his claim that the universe began to begin.)