I'm leaving Catholicism

[Theban]

As I said, Theban is the one who removed the being requirement, in order to avoid a contradiction.

I didn’t mean to remove the being requirement per se, a personhood is not completely independent from a being. I don’t think a person is just another property a being has, we cannot imagine a (living) human being without a person, or a personal rock for instance.
I would say that the rational being generates the person, and so the being is the person, but not in the sense that the two are completely synonymous.

 

[Theban]

You really don’t have to keep posting on this thread if you don’t want to. I’d rather you say “I don’t know” or “I might have to think about it more” than say things you’re not sure about.

No, I think this is an interesting discussion and you bring up a lot of good points for your position. I certainly have a lot to research regarding much of what you’ve said, but as you’re the one asserting that I am holding a contradiction by believing both the Trinity and the Divine Simplicity it shouldn’t matter that I’m not as educated in philosophy as you in this discussion. I am the one holding the position, and you’re the one trying to show why it’s wrong.

I am not as of yet convinced my position is contradictory, so for my part I am happy to continue. I am not trying to be narrow-minded either, I am open to the idea that there might be something that, to me, will seem like a contradiction.
You will not get me to abandon Catholicism even if you do convince me, though, as at this point I would sooner spend the rest of my life trying to find a way to reconcile it than to go anywhere else.

How can you affirm, as you did earlier, that the person(s) just is God but derives it from his entity?

This is the main point we’ve been arguing about with the x is y, x=y thing. I guess my basic point is
the assertion that there can be generative relationships between things outside of potentiality and causality. Disagree if you like, but I don’t see why this is logically impossible. The whole discussion seems to come down to this point.

 

[TheDefaultMan]

But love is defined as willing the good of the other and willing communion with the other, as per St. Thomas’ definition.

I’m not sure if this is true. From what I know, love just means to will the good of something. So, I can love myself by willing the good for myself without there being the need for some other person. Much the same way, if God is synonymous with his Will and Goodness, and since God is identical to his act of willing himself, then it follows that God is necessarily identical to his act of willing the good, which is essentially Love, meaning that He is Love. There is no need for a real, outside of the human mind, distinction between The one who knows/wills, the subject of the knowing/willing, and the act of knowing/willing, since our understanding of God’s knowledge and will are only based on imperfect and analogical predicates, meaning that there is no reason for us to suppose that there is a real distinction between them, the same way that we know that there isn’t a real distinction between God’s Love, Goodness, Existence, Omnipotence, etc.

Yes, God as Knower/Willer, Object Known/Willed, and Act of Knowing/Willing all say something real about God in their own way, but in God they aren’t really distinct.

If you have no interest in why God created you, and not just that He did, which, yes, is plain and simple, then we are driven to philosophize for different reasons!

The question of why is a question of explanans, or, a question of what the explanation is for a thing. God’s merely creating this world is purely sufficient, on its own, to answer the question as to why God created me. There is absolutely no relation in God to us, otherwise, he would be a composite of substance and accidents. There is only our relation to Him as creation. God is no different in all possible worlds. In a world where you don’t exist, he is exactly the same as in a world wherein you do. Interestingly enough, this is the Catholic view as well, that God has no real relations to us in any meaningful sense, only that we, as creation, have a real relation to Him.

And also, you don’t philosophize because you want to justify your feelings. That’s just not how it works. Sure, Classical Theism paints a picture of God that is very cold. After all, even Catholics agree that God is impassible (he has no passions or emotions). But this is the truth, and you must seek it whether or not you like it.

 

[TheDefaultMan]

This is the main point we’ve been arguing about with the x is y, x=y thing. I guess my basic point is
the assertion that there can be generative relationships between things outside of potentiality and causality.

I don’t disagree that there can be generative relationships between things without the need for potency, but to say that there is a distinction in reality between the ones having the relations is my contention, as I’ve already stated numerous times, a distinction in reality/a real distinction entails a distinction in being, almost tautologically, as reality and being are synonymous terms. So to say that there are ontological differences between the trinity (which is what a distinction in being/reality mean) entails a multiplicity of parts in some sort, as to say that there is a difference between them entails that one of them has a potency that the other one lacks.

 

[Theban]

as I’ve already stated numerous times, a distinction in reality /a real distinction entails a distinction in being , almost tautologically, as reality and being are synonymous terms.

Right, but I never agreed that a difference in reality mentioned in the Cathechism needs to mean a difference in ontology, and I don’t believe that the only kinds of distinctions are ontological ones and fictional ones. Specifically, I referred to the Persons of the Trinity and how they are the same Being but with a non-fictional difference between themselves due to their Relations. In other words, they are neither ontologically or logically different, nor are they exactly equal to each other.

To back up this assertion that a third type of distinction is possible I propose the simple example of a human being. The human person has a relation to its own being, in the sense that a person knows itself. So the person is the knower and the being is the known, and while the two are not ontologically different they are still distinct in the sense that the person cannot be said to be the known and the being the knower.

This type of distinction is, in plain layman terms, referred to as real. If you would rather term it logical, because such a distinction is grounded in a mind, then do so; but be careful to remember that God Himself is a mind and can very well make such a distinction Himself in Himself, and so it would be false to say the Persons are really synonymous to each other from His point of view.

The Trinitarian Personhood is simply Gods Being, but by the nature of Personhood a relationship has to form at least with regards to itself, and if it’s possible for one relationship to form between the Person and the Being without an ontological difference, there is nothing against the idea that three Persons can form relationships to the same Being and to each other without an ontological difference.
Nor does this make Him a composite, because each Person is fully God and would be synonymous were it not for the fact that relationships necessarily form between them.

 

[TheDefaultMan]

To back up this assertion that a third type of distinction is possible I propose the simple example of a human being. The human person has a relation to its own being, in the sense that a person knows itself. So the person is the knower and the being is the known, and while the two are not ontologically different they are still distinct in the sense that the person cannot be said to be the known and the being the knower.

This doesn’t really work as a model for the trinity for a number of reasons. One reason is that the Church affirms that there are three persons in God, while there is only one person in you, so this isn’t really analogous to the Trinity.

But another more fundamental problem is that you misunderstand what it is to know yourself because there is indeed an ontological distinction between the knower and the object known. When you know yourself, there is an idea, or a form in your mind, of who you are. That is not ontologically the same as who you actually are. Your idea of yourself is not the same as yourself. It is not an idea in the human mind who literally eats, sleeps, has sex, etc.

Also, take note of your language. You said “while the two are not ontologically different they are still distinct in the sense that the person cannot be said to be the known and the knower”

This is very very interesting. You said that they were not ontologically distinct, but you also said that the person cannot be said to be the known and the knower.

To say something is to be is to make reference to being, which is what ontology studies. Therefore, if there is a distinction in what they are said to be, then there is a distinction in ontology.

Or, if you want to focus on the said part instead of the to be part, saying that there is no distinction in how the thing is (or is to be) but that there is a distinction in how it is said to be, then that would just be a logical distinction.

 

[OrbisNonSufficit]

I don’t guarantee that every programming code is written correctly or will give you the correct answer.

It’s not about code. It’s about memory. Computer can’t store real numbers precisely because they could have unlimited amount of digits. You could use any programming language and it won’t be precise enough all the time.

Assuming that arithmetical addition has been defined

But you can’t assume that it has been accepted by everyone.

By the way, see how 1+1 = 2 is actually divisive based on this little conversation of ours?

 

[Theban]

This doesn’t really work as a model for the trinity for a number of reasons.

It is not intended as a model for the Trinity, rather it goes to show that there can be distinctions that are neither fictional nor ontological.

When you know yourself, there is an idea, or a form in your mind, of who you are. That is not ontologically the same as who you actually are.

I suppose that’s true, but that is more due to the fact that human minds are limited and not because the relationship isn’t being formed. In God there would be no such ontological distinction.

You said that they were not ontologically distinct, but you also said that the person cannot be said to be the known and the knower.

That is because of the way the English language is constructed. I trust you understand that I did not mean that because of the opposing relationship between the Being and the Person, the Person goes off to become its own being.
I suppose you could hold that a relationship is only possible between ontologically distinct entities, and thus hold that a person is a separate entity from a being, but for my part I disagree, and hold no contradictions in my beliefs on that point.

but that there is a distinction in how it is said to be, then that would just be a logical distinction.

I’m not sure I follow, if one thing can be said of one but not the other, how is that just a logical distinction?

 

[TheDefaultMan]

It is not intended as a model for the Trinity, rather it goes to show that there can be distinctions that are neither fictional nor ontological.

But what I argued was that your demonstration collapses into ontological distinctions.

I suppose that’s true, but that is more due to the fact that human minds are limited and not because the relationship isn’t being formed. In God there would be no such ontological distinction.

But it was you who was using this as a way to demonstrate that there are distinctions that are neither ontological nor fictional, which I argued that it doesn’t. All you did here was to assert that there would be no such ontological distinction. What I would say in response is that you’re right, and therefore, the distinctions are fictional (I don’t like using this term because this has a ton of baggage that might not be accurate in explaining what a logical distinction is, but it doesn’t really matter). You haven’t demonstrated, yet, that there are distinctions that are not ontological nor fictional, because even your analogy collapses into ontological distinctions.

That is because of the way the English language is constructed. I trust you understand that I did not mean that because of the opposing relationship between the Being and the Person, the Person goes off to become its own being.

But you used the word “to be”, and you said that they could not be said to be the same. You understand that there is literally no other definition of “to be” that doesn’t refer to something in being, right?

I suppose you could hold that a relationship is only possible between ontologically distinct entities, and thus hold that a person is a separate entity from a being, but for my part I disagree, and hold no contradictions in my beliefs on that point.

You’re just asserting at this point. Why does it matter if you personally disagree or not? This doesn’t just boil down to personal preferences. If we both have an understanding of Divine Simplicity and real distinctions between the Trinity, they are either compatible or not.

Also, why do you keep on using words like “entities”?

I suppose you could hold that a relationship is only possible between ontologically distinct entities, and thus hold that a person is a separate entity from a being

But, as I keep on saying over and over again, the person and the being in God could not in principle be different.

Can I just ask you this question, and I want a straight answer. What do you mean by entity? Why do you keep on saying that the persons are separate “entities” from the being???

 

[TheDefaultMan]

I’m not sure I follow, if one thing can be said of one but not the other, how is that just a logical distinction?

Let’s just say we have object C in the world. Object C can be referred to either as A or as B. Both A and B are perfectly adequate words to mean C, and all As are Bs. However, there could be some utility in saying A at a certain time rather than B. It could be the case that saying A rather than B highlights certain properties or things about C that could not be highlighted using B. Nevertheless, they still refer to the same object C.

This is basically what a logical distinction boils down to.

 

[AlNg]

It’s not about code. It’s about memory. Computer can’t store real numbers precisely because they could have unlimited amount of digits. You could use any programming language and it won’t be precise enough all the time.

Another reason why some computers may be wrong about 1 + 1 = 2. Computers give out wrong answers for all kinds of different reasons. I do not guarantee that a computer will always get the right answer. My guarantee is that 1 + 1 = 2 in the base 10 arithmetic system.

But you can’t assume that it has been accepted by everyone.

It has been proven in Principia Mathematica that 1 + 1 = 2. Do you disagree with the proof or know anyone in the world who disagrees? I am interested to know who disagrees with the proof.

By the way, see how 1+1 = 2 is actually divisive based on this little conversation of ours?

That is because you are attempting to stir up discord and controversy when there really is none. Americans and Russians, Chinese and Japanese, Muslims and Christians, Catholics and Baptists, Pentecostalists and Methodists, Anglicans and Unitarians, Jews and Muslims, Canadians and Mexicans, North Koreans and South Koreans, Liberals and Conservatives, Gays and Straights, Married and unmarried, Russian Orthodox and Greek Orthodox, Oriental Orthodox and Eastern Orthodox, Italians and Austrians, Czechs and Slovaks, Serbs and Croats, Albanians and Macedonians, Blacks and whites, Asians and Europeans, Vietnamese and Cambodians, French and Germans, English and Irish, all are united in agreement with the equation that 1 + 1 = 2. It is a great unifier. You however are attempting to create division where there is none. Does not the Bible tells us that it is wrong to sow division and discord when there should be none ?

 

[OrbisNonSufficit]

Do you disagree with the proof or know anyone in the world who disagrees? I am interested to know who disagrees with the proof.

I don’t disagree with the proof by itself, but I disagree it works in every system. As I said, in system of computer memory it does not apply. That works differently. Non-Euclidian system might work differently when 1+1=2 is about geometrical structure. Supermarkets can write 1+1=3 to suggest sale on product and people will debate the heck out of it if that is denied to them, essentially debating against your principle. Try saying 1+1 = 2 in binary system and you’ve got yourself some problems too. In system of boolean calculations (may just be on computers but usually applies everywhere) 1+1 = 1 is the norm.

Does not the Bible tells us that it is wrong to sow division and discord when there should be none ?

Should there be none though? You took one mathematical system where this applies and are trying to say it applies everywhere. Math is just too complicated to say that. You didn’t even include counts of what you are presenting. 1+1 = 2 could mean 1 potato + 1 potato = 2 potatoes. It could mean 1 monkey + 1 helicopter = 2 coins. You were too imprecise in your assumptions.

It is a great unifier.

Would animals agree? Small children (babies perhaps) ? People weak on the mental side?

You can’t assume something is correct because it works in one scenario (or in limited number of scenarios). It is a “great unifier” for many, but not all people.

When above poster said Truth is divisive you were quick to jump in with example obviously unrelated to what he meant just to prove him wrong. Unfortunately you were incorrect in that too.

 

[TheDefaultMan]

3 days ago, I made a topic called “I’m leaving Catholicism” because I wanted to outline my philosophical objections to the Church’s teaching on the Trinity. I didn’t think there would be so many who would view it and who would comment on it, and I am grateful to everyone who participated in the discussions. More specifically, I would like to thank @Theban, @OrbisNonSufficit, @Wesrock, and many others who charitably engaged with my arguments. I did not think that, at the end of the day their counter-arguments were successful. Nevertheless I must give credit where credit is due.

I will no longer comment or respond to any posts as I have been doing so for 3 days straight. It will still be left open, and anyone is free to respond to what I’ve said already.

My thoughts are that

A ) I do not think that, at the end of the day, the counter-arguments succeeded. Most of the counter-arguments hinged on the concept of relational distinctions which I argued, if real, entails an ontological distinction, which could not exist in an Absolutely Simple God. There were also counter-arguments that explored very strange notions that I’ve never heard before. I’ve never seen responses and counter-arguments so dissimilar. It was fascinating.

B ) I found it very odd that more than half of the people who responded did so by appealing to Divine Revelation (which is odd because I made it clear that I rejected it). This saddened me more than anything else because, usually, Catholics are quick to say that their faith does not contradict reason. And yet they are dangerously close, in my view, to the protestant view known as “presuppositionalism”, which presupposes that Divine Revelation is true when arguing against skeptics. This is notoriously fallacious, and the Church itself seems to be harsh in its condemnation against it.

and C ) I think both sides, my side and the side of some (but not most) of the apologists arguing against me, should have been more charitable. On my end, I was too quick to be rude and cold when presenting my arguments and my counter-arguments. I should’ve made it more clear that I do not hate the Church or hate Catholics, and that I have nothing but respect for what the catholic Church has done. On their end, there have been many people who have claimed that I was somehow arrogant for trying to point out contradictions in God, stating that I just don’t understand him and that human reason is just feeble. Not only does this, as I have already mentioned, move dangerously close towards presuppostionalism, it is also an insult to thousands of years of the Catholic intellectual tradition, which has spent years of intellectual effort to making sense of God and pointing out logical contradictions in heresies.

I hope everyone has a good day, and I hope we could all learn something from my topic thread.

 

[EndTimes]

I just cannot be Catholic if it means accepting logically contradictory doctrines

It’s your mis-representing // mis-understanding the Trinity, and, Catholic Teachings…
which causes you to have not logically shown any contradictions…

My question is - whether or not you’ve possessed actual Faith in Jesus - to begin with.

_

 

[MarkRome]

What promise are you referring to (Gospel verse please), and how does it imply that the three aspects of the Trinity are all omniscient, omnipotent, and perfect?

John 16:13.

We have the Church which Jesus promised the gates of hell would not prevail against it. Otherwise we might all be Nestorians, or Arians, or Monothelites, or other non-Trinitarians heresies.

 

[Vico]

Vico:

Reply to Objection 3: The supreme unity and simplicity of God exclude every kind of plurality of absolute things, but not plurality of relations. Because relations are predicated relatively, and thus the relations do not import composition in that of which they are predicated, as Boethius teaches in the same book.

My problem with his response is that a “real distinction”, or, a distinction in reality, entails an absolute or an ontological distinction precisely because reality and being are synonymous.

Obviously I’m not saying that I’m smarter than Thomas Aquinas, and I respect him greatly. He’s still my favorite philosopher. That being said, I disagree with him on this (as most Thomists today would admit that he was wrong on some things)

Thomists do not agree with St. Thomas Aquinas, therefore they are in reality neo-Thomists.

Distinction can be one of two kinds: real distinction or distinction of reason. Also there is no change in relations of opposition, so do not imply any change in God. Opposites are mentioned below, that is for relations of opposition.

Real distinction is covered in Summa Theologiae > First Part > Question 28, Article 3. Whether the relations in God are really distinguished from each other? (Objection 1)
https://www.newadvent.org/summa/1028.htm

Objection 1. It would seem that the divine relations are not really distinguished from each other. For things which are identified with the same, are identified with each other. But every relation in God is really the same as the divine essence. Therefore the relations are not really distinguished from each other.

Reply to Objection 1. According to the Philosopher (Phys. iii), this argument holds, that whatever things are identified with the same thing are identified with each other, if the identity be real and logical; as, for instance, a tunic and a garment; but not if they differ logically. Hence in the same place he says that although action is the same as motion, and likewise passion; still it does not follow that action and passion are the same; because action implies reference as of something “from which” there is motion in the thing moved; whereas passion implies reference as of something “which is from” another. Likewise, although paternity, just as filiation, is really the same as the divine essence; nevertheless these two in their own proper idea and definitions import opposite respects. Hence they are distinguished from each other.

 

[Theban]

But what I argued was that your demonstration collapses into ontological distinctions.

I’m just clarifying what I meant by the analogy.

Can I just ask you this question, and I want a straight answer. What do you mean by entity?

I’m not trying to be dodgy, what I mean with an entity is just a being. My particular writing style is such that I tend to switch words up sometimes when it can make some statements easier to read.
Sorry if that wasn’t clear.

Why do you keep on saying that the persons are separate “entities” from the being???

I am trying to say that this is not the case.

This is basically what a logical distinction boils down to.

Oh, okay. I just misunderstood you then; I thought you were saying that, in reference to the analogy, even if a being can only be said to be the known and not the knower and the person vice versa, that would still entail a logical distinction. If you’re not saying that then I understand.

You’re just asserting at this point. Why does it matter if you personally disagree or not? This doesn’t just boil down to personal preferences.

I didn’t say it boils down to preference, I don’t see how you could read that from what I said.
Yes, I am asserting and not arguing, because I am not trying to argue a point. You are the one who is claiming that my belief in the Trinity and Divine Simplicity is contradictory. If that claim rests on an assertion I have not assented to, then I am quite content to not assent to that assertion.

I’m basically letting you know here that this is a moot point in the discussion, and that it is a waste of time to argue that the relationships in God must entail different entities, because I do not hold the position that all relationships entail ontological differences between the parties.

I argued that it doesn’t.

And you argued well, but I argue that the reason it doesn’t isn’t because such relational distinctions aren’t there; rather it doesn’t work because human persons are limited. If we imagine a perfect person and a perfect being, the person is still the knower and the being the known, and there is no ontological difference between what the person knows and the being is.

You understand that there is literally no other definition of “to be” that doesn’t refer to something in being, right?

Just because a language has no way of conveying something, that doesn’t mean that said something is disproven. Yes, English is obviously constructed in such a way that we can never describe a distinction without referring to it as an ontological distinction. “There is a difference,”.

 

[Theban]

I trust you are not trying to argue that there can’t be any real distinctions except ontological ones on the basis that the English language uses the word “be” when describing a difference.
So again, to clarify, when I say that a person is the knower and cannot be said to be the known, I do not use the word “be” in a literal sense. The person is ontologically indistinct from the being, but is nevertheless distinct in a special way that only involves a relationship.

As a final point, so we don’t end up arguing about the analogy forever, it doesn’t really matter whether it works or not. Even if there were no examples of the third category of distinction which is neither ontological or logical, it is still proven to exist by the Doctrine of the Trinity.

The Doctrine of the Trinity specifically says that the Persons of the Trinity are the same ontologically, but are still distinct due to their Relations. This completely proves that the type of distinction I tried to show by analogy is indeed possible and real in God. It may well be (though I don’t think so) that there is no other example of this type of distinction than the Trinity, but even that doesn’t disprove the idea.

Of course this requires us to first assent to the Trinity, but once that is done I don’t think it’s logically impossible to assign the distinctions in the Trinity to this third, relational distinction category.

 

[Wesrock]

Wesrock:

Claiming it is a logical relation only is, to me, like stating that the relation between mother and child is only logical and not real, or the relation between an agent and the end she wills and obtains is logical and not real.

I would say this if the mother and the child were the exact same substance and if the mother and the child were absolutely simple.

And on your explanation of the processions, again, given that all of our predictions of God are analogical, it makes sense to say that we cna day the same of God while maintaining the integrity of his Simplicity. The same way that to us omnipresence and love are different, in God they are the same because our predictions of God of this are analogical.

Because the Divine Attributes are predicated analogically of the essence there is no opposition to them being one. But with the persons were not predicating similar attributes of what the divine essence is, we’re speaking of a real, processional activity within God and how the nature essentially relates to itself. There’s necessity for there to be multiple parts for such a relation. I think the issue is that Divine Simplicity is (surprisingly) being left out of the equation. I do not mean to justify this by a circular argument, only to point out that I think there is a habit in thinking anthropomorphically about relations. Of the human intellect to its thoughts, of the human intellect to the human essence, and so on, or accidental relations in finite things. Nothing else but God understands all at once, via its essence, essentially, and is Simple, so it’s a very foreign idea to think of how an essence essentially relates to itself by essential activity. But there’s nothing necessarily contradictory about an essence relating to itself in such a way. It’s just not the type of relating you’d find in any other thing due to them not being Simple.

I hope that makes some sense, I don’t feel like this is top notch writing on my part.

 

[Wesrock]

Theban:

I’m not sure I follow, if one thing can be said of one but not the other, how is that just a logical distinction?

Let’s just say we have object C in the world. Object C can be referred to either as A or as B. Both A and B are perfectly adequate words to mean C, and all As are Bs. However, there could be some utility in saying A at a certain time rather than B. It could be the case that saying A rather than B highlights certain properties or things about C that could not be highlighted using B. Nevertheless, they still refer to the same object C.

This is basically what a logical distinction boils down to.

That is the case, I believe, with the typical Divine Attributes. However, that is not the case with the relations, which are related to real, processional activity in the Divine Nature. It’s not just different aspects or from how we’re considering it.