I'm leaving Catholicism

[Theban]

A real distinction is a distinction that exists outside our minds. If all minds disappeared today, those real distinctions would still exist.

How do you define a distinction outside of the mind?
You’ve pointed to the difference between water and H2O as a logical distinction rather than a real one, but doesn’t this distinction exist outside the mind as well; water being defined as the liquid phase of H2O and H2O being the chemical “map” of what components make up water. Where do you draw the line between what distinctions are real and merely logical?

 

[Defc]

Dear TheDefaultMan,
I have been scrolling through the stories and see many discussions. I by no means have the intelligence to mix in these discussions to try to inform or try to convince you to stay Catholic.

What i do know (or believe might be the better word) is that Faith is a Grace. It is in the heart and in the soul. Even when we don’t understand we have the supernatural Grace of Faith, given by God. One cannot be discussed into it not can one be discussed out of it. Therefore i would like to propose you the following route. Wait 33 days before you take the decision to leave, and in these 33 days pray a daily Rosary and ask Our Lady, Our Mother, for guidance. Ask her for the grace to believe, she will answer. The Mother will always take Her children to The Son. Now if after these 33 days you still want to leave Catholicism, you have a free will, so you can choose to go.

Please think about this proposal and in the meantime maybe you can watch this clip, Fulton Sheen on the Holy Trinity:

And a short one from Fr Ripperger:

You’ll be in my prayers and God Bless

 

[rdj69]

A real distinction is a distinction that exists outside our minds. If all minds disappeared today, those real distinctions would still exist.

Given this, it must be some distinction in being

And what exactly does it mean for a distinction to be “in being”? It means, according to your own arguments, that the distinction is real; that it is true; that it represents something which actually exists.

The distinction between the persons of the Trinity is a distinction that is real; that is true; that represents something which actually exists.

Nowhere have you explained how it follows from any of this that such a distinction violates the notion of Divine Simplicity.

There is a real distinction between the persons of God due to the fact that God is self-referential; God must be simultaneously the object, the subject, and the act, precisely because God is absolutely simple not composed of parts. The persons of the Trinity are distinct relations but one in substance; they are not accidents which emerge from the substance, they are relations within the substance - the substance relating to itself.

Is this impossible for us to fully comprehend? Yes.
Does that mean it’s wrong, or contradictory? No.

Your claim that a real distinction between the persons of the Trinity can only mean that they are separate parts of God and therefore God cannot be absolutely simple is baseless; you haven’t demonstrated why you think it’s the case, you simply state it as if it’s self-evident. It’s not, and several people here have been trying to explain to you why it’s not only not self-evident, but not true.

The persons of the Trinity are real distinctions which describe how the substance of God relates to itself.

 

[TheDefaultMan]

but doesn’t this distinction exist outside the mind as well

Not really. H2O is not just the aggregate of atoms, that’s a misunderstanding. It’s a chemical bond. H2O has properties that cannot be reduced to the sum of its parts, which is why “H2O” and “water” are not really distinct, as H2O is water and water is H2O.

That doesn’t mean that there isn’t some utility in using H2O and water at different times. “H2O” stresses the atoms that make up the chemical bond, while “water” doesn’t.

 

[TheDefaultMan]

And what exactly does it mean for a distinction to be “in being”? It means, according to your own arguments, that the distinction is real; that it is true; that it represents something which actually exists.

A distinction in being would mean that there is some form of metaphysical/ontological multiplicity. Metaphysical/ontological multiplicity cannot exist without potency, as potency is what limits act.

Now, if potency was necessary for all real (and thus ontological/metaphysical) distinctions, it would have to follow that God would have potency in some way. This is absurd since God is Pure Act, and he is devoid of potency.

Your claim that a real distinction between the persons of the Trinity can only mean that they are separate parts of God and therefore God cannot be absolutely simple is baseless; you haven’t demonstrated why you think it’s the case, you simply state it as if it’s self-evident.

Are you kidding me? Did you ignore every single post that I’ve made on this thread? I constantly gave the same arguments highlighting the problems related to real distinctions and distinctions between God’s Essence and God’s Personhood. Nobody has directly argued against what I’ve pointed out about the nature of real distinctions. It’s always an appeal to relational distinctions without directly addressing whether or not the distinction is real or logical.

The simple question I’m asking is this…

Is there an ontological distinction in God as Triune? If your answer is yes, then (if you accept broad Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics) there must be some potency. If the answer is no, then you simply have to deny a real distinction, since a real distinction entails a distinction in reality, which is synonymous with being, thus making it metaphysical/ontological.

 

[rdj69]

A distinction in being would mean that there is some form of metaphysical/ontological multiplicity

Says you, with zero support for your claim.

This is the source of your confusion - you are wrong about this, and people have been trying to help you see why for hours now but you just don’t seem capable of recognizing or admitting your own errors.

a real distinction entails a distinction in reality , which is synonymous with being , thus making it metaphysical/ontological.

Wrong.

And I’m giving up on this conversation for a second time because I’ve reached the end of my patience.

 

[TheDefaultMan]

Says you, with zero support for your claim.

Zero support for my claim? If we accept basic Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics on act/potency (which I’m assuming you do, if not we can discuss that), then we can know certain things, namely, that Act is more fundamental than potency (since pure potency is nothing, meaning that for potency to exist it must be grounded in act), and that beings can only be differentiated with respect to potency.

For being to be differentiated by nothing would entail that nothingness is doing something, which is absurd

but for being to be differentiated without potency or non-being would collapse the possibility of differentiation.

So it must be differentiated with respect to potency.

Following this, if there is a real distinction, meaning that it is a distinction in reality, is to directly state that it is a distinction in being, since reality and being are synonymous.

But, as I’ve stated earlier, a distinction in being could not possibly exist without reference to potency, which is impossible in Pure Act

Wrong.

What do you think terms like reality or real even mean? They refer to being. To say something is real is to say that it exists, ehich is to essentially make an ontological claim.

 

[Theban]

Not really. H2O is not just the aggregate of atoms, that’s a misunderstanding. It’s a chemical bond. H2O has properties that cannot be reduced to the sum of its parts, which is why “H2O” and “water” are not really distinct, as H2O is water and water is H2O.

The reason I call H2O a map is because the name “Two Hydrogens and an Oxygen” is indeed simply a list of it’s components, and that is also the context for why the term exists. H2O is the term for a specific type of molecule, and it cannot be equated to water (even if it’s done a lot in common language), any more than a house can be equated to bricks.
This is proven by the fact that while we can reduce water to the molecular level and always get H2O, H2O at the substantial level can just as easily be ice or steam as water. And, for the record, isolated H2O molecules also have very different properties from small drops of water. Therefore it is clear that the terms describe more than just a logical difference.

My point in bringing this up is because I think the issue here is mainly a semantic one, on what it is that is meant in the Cathechism by a real difference. You propose two ways of differentiating, one “real” and one imagined. Still, I don’t think you have been clear on where we draw the line between the two.

It seems to me like you’re saying that a real difference has to be ontological, and that any difference which is not ontological is not real. And so, when you read in the Cathechism that there is a real difference between the Persons of the Trinity, you read that there is an ontological difference between them. Am I correct in this understanding?

 

[TheDefaultMan]

H2O is the term for a specific type of molecule, and it cannot be equated to water (even if it’s done a lot in common language), any more than a house can be equated to bricks.

This topic in metaphysics is incredibly complicated and controversial, but nonetheless, I’ll try to give my 2 cents

Most Thomists would argue that there is a difference between H2O and a house. H2O is a substance, and it has certain properties (or, proper accidents to be more specific) that cannot be reducible to just the sum of its parts.

Take the house made up of bricks and wood, for example. The house is essentially just an aggregate of its parts because the brick part of the house has the same melting point as bricks not part of the house. Same with wood.

This isn’t true of H2O, which has different boiling points than hydrogen and oxygen individually. This is why H2O isn’t just a bunch of things put together. It’s a synthesis of hydrogen and oxygen, and it has properties that could only exist when they are united in that synthesis.

This is proven by the fact that while we can reduce water to the molecular level and always get H2O, H2O at the substantial level can just as easily be ice or steam as water.

This might just be due to semantics, but from what I’m aware of, most people are comfortable with saying that ice is just solid water, or that water vapor is the gaseous phase of water.

It seems to me like you’re saying that a real difference has to be ontological, and that any difference which is not ontological is not real. And so, when you read in the Cathechism that there is a real difference between the Persons of the Trinity, you read that there is an ontological difference between them. Am I correct in this understanding

Yep. That’s my view.

Basically, it doesn’t make sense to say that there are real distinctions between the persons without saying that there are ontological distinctions between the persons, as reality and being are synonymous, and anything having to do with being is ontological.

So, to say that a distinction exists in reality is to say that the distinction exists in being, which I take to be absurd given Divine Simplicity.

 

[RaisedCatholic]

Although I am no longer Catholic, I am a Christian. What gave me comfort years ago, wasn’t so much attempting to try to reconcile alleged irreconcilable theological & philosophical conundrums pertaining to the Trinity. Rather, it was realizing that the claims of Biblical Christianity can be proven historically. The real issue is whether or not Jesus rose bodily from the dead, which He did, which - again - can be proven historically. Since this happened, and the apostles were eyewitnesses to the Resurrection - the same apostles who wrote much of the New Testament & performed miracles themselves - then there is no logical reason to reject the Biblical doctrine of the Trinity, even if we cannot reconcile something infinite, heavenly, & spiritual which has no physical boundaries, with our finite, early, physical minds.

Something that cannot be reconciled in our own minds does not mean that it is contradictory. God can reconcile in His infinite Mind that we cannot in our finite minds. That is why God states in His Word, “My ways are not your ways; My thoughts are not your thoughts.”

Also, I would recommend “Mere Christianity” by C.S. Lewis. He has a section in his books where he tackles the concept of God being a Trinity, which he uses logic beautifully.

 

[Theban]

The house is essentially just an aggregate of its parts because the brick part of the house has the same melting point as bricks not part of the house.

It’s not really an important point, but I don’t see how that follows. Boiling point is a unique property H2O has that isn’t derived from it’s components, but a house can also be said to have properties that isn’t derived from it’s parts, even if the melting point isn’t one of them.

I’m not sure if you’re trying to assert that the form of a house, which is chiefly the appearance, is less “real” than the form of H2O which includes unique physical and chemical properties. If so then that is a major underlying disagreement right there.

most people are comfortable with saying that ice is just solid water,

Yes, they are. In my opinion that’s an abuse of language, but I guess it is possible to argue that the phases of H2O are all consubstantional. I would like to hear a good reason for why we should suddenly decide to define the substance of stuff on the molecular level, though, as opposed to the cellular or the subatomic level.

 

[Theban]

So, to say that a distinction exists in reality is to say that the distinction exists in being, which I take to be absurd given Divine Simplicity.

Then I’m happy to inform you that, apart from your terminology, you are not in disagreement with the Catholic Church; because the Church explicitly teaches that what is meant by a real difference is not an ontological difference.

Your terminology does pose some difficulties though, especially your use of synonyms to describe reality. If x is y, it doesn’t necessarily follow that y is x. So if God is Love, and God is Justice, that doesn’t mean that love and justice are the same things.
We use the terms love and justice to describe aspects of God in a logical way, and know that they do not constitute any parts of Him. Even so, love is a distinct thing from justice, and if the human mind can recognize this then so can the Divine.

So it is with the Trinity, the Father is God, but God is not the Father (exclusively). The Son is also God, but God is not limited to the Son. There is a difference in so far as the Father is not the Son, but otherwise they are perfectly united. We can understand this by analogy, let’s say there was a parallel universe where everything is exactly the same, with an exact copy of you. That copy of you is the same as you in every way except for the fact that he isn’t you. I hope that makes sense.

 

[TheDefaultMan]

It’s not really an important point, but I don’t see how that follows. Boiling point is a unique property H2O has that isn’t derived from it’s components, but a house can also be said to have properties that isn’t derived from it’s parts, even if the melting point isn’t one of them.

I’m not sure if you’re trying to assert that the form of a house, which is chiefly the appearance, is less “real” than the form of H2O which includes unique physical and chemical properties. If so then that is a major underlying disagreement right there.

This is a really complicated area in metaphysics (the distinction between substantial and accidental forms) so I’d rather not get too deep into it as it doesn’t directly address the more fundamental discussion, which is on the Trinity.

But even assuming that a house does in fact have properties that aren’t reducible to the sum of its parts (which I would disagree with), it actually would follow that the sum of the parts is in fact equal to the house, the same way H2O is equal to water.

Yes, they are. In my opinion that’s an abuse of language, but I guess it is possible to argue that the phases of H2O are all consubstantional. I would like to hear a good reason for why we should suddenly decide to define the substance of stuff on the molecular level, though, as opposed to the cellular or the subatomic level.

To be frank, I myself am not that educated on NeoAristotelian applications to the physical sciences, but either way, it shouldn’t be relevant to the discussion on the Trinity, which is what I came here to discuss.

My basic point was that if we define water as H2O, then, of course, there is no real distinction between H2O and water. This just follows from the Principle of Identity. If A is H2O and B is water, and it is acknowledged that A=B, then of course A is = to B

That doesn’t mean that there are no times wherein it would be preferable to say A rather than B, or vice versa.

Same as how the distinction between a dog and a Canis lupus familiaris is not a real distinction as they both refer to or correspond to the same ontological reality, while emphasizing certain things about that ontological reality.

 

[TheDefaultMan]

because the Church explicitly teaches that what is meant by a real difference is not an ontological difference.

However, I am in disagreement with the Church. My position is that the Church’s position (which is that the Father is really different from the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and vice versa) necessarily collapses into an ontological distinction.

Your terminology does pose some difficulties though, especially your use of synonyms to describe reality. If x is y, it doesn’t necessarily follow that y is x. So if God is Love, and God is Justice, that doesn’t mean that love and justice are the same things.

Actually, given the principle of Identity, it really is true that if X = Y then Y would have to be = to X.

Your God example uses terms like love and justice in analogical ways from how we understand love and not in univocal ways.

(Univocal means to be used in the exact same way (ex. “I saw a bat fly” and “I saw a bat in the cave.” The word “bat” refers to the same reality, the animal).

(Analogical means to be used in a similar but imperfect way (ex. The goodness of a human and the goodness of a dog are similar insofar as goodness is the perfection of essence, yet they are distinct because the goodness of a human is very different from the goodness of a dog)

The reason why this is important is because this is what allows us to speak of Divine Attributes using imperfect concepts from created reality.

So, you would be right in saying that goodness, as we understand it, is not equal to love, but in God they are identical.

We can understand this by analogy, let’s say there was a parallel universe where everything is exactly the same, with an exact copy of you. That copy of you is the same as you in every way except for the fact that he isn’t you. I hope that makes sense.

There would have to be an ontological difference, though. If there is a difference between me and this parallel counterpart, it must be because there is something he has that I lack, which would entail potency. Potency cannot exist in any way in God.

By the way, if I’m saying something that you don’t understand, I’m more than happy to clarify. I’m not trying to gish gallop or to hide behind fancy words

 

[TheDefaultMan]

The real issue is whether or not Jesus rose bodily from the dead, which He did, which - again - can be proven historically.

The problem I have with this is that philosophy will always be prior to other sciences like physics, history, etc. You have to assume a plethora of philosophical principles whenever doing historical or scientific analysis.

This is why if a particular belief system claims to have historical evidence for it but contains a doctrine that is philosophically incoherent (which is what I think of the Trinity), then it cannot be rationally held. It’ll have to be the case that the historical questions surrounding Jesus of Nazareth have to be explained some other way.

 

[Theban]

My position is that the Church’s position (which is that the Father is really different from the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and vice versa) necessarily collapses into an ontological distinction.

Which is why it matters how we define what constitutes a real difference as opposed to what you refer to as logical difference.

If a house is not ontologically different from the sum of it’s parts because the change in form is merely accidental, then the difference between a pile of bricks and a house to you is a logical distinction made in the mind, and not a real objective thing. That is, and pardon my saying so, nonsense. And if this is the type of reasoning you are applying to the Trinity, that the distinction between the Persons is logical and not really real, then that is the source of the disagreement.

My basic point was that if we define water as H2O, then, of course, there is no real distinction between H2O and water.

But how is this a distinction at all, logical or real? The term H2O describes a very specific thing, and it is not equal to water. That is because the term water is meant to describe another specific thing. In terms of changes in form, a group of H2O molecules are certainly undergoing a substantial change before becoming a drop of water. So if this is not a real difference either, what is?

Your God example uses terms like love and justice in analogical ways from how we understand love and not in univocal ways.

You are right that it was a poor example, I was trying to hastily get us back to the Trinity, although it was done poorly. But it still doesn’t follow that y is x even when x is y (I don’t use =, because that sign implicitly states that the statement can be reversed, but I could have been more clear). The principle of Identity states that x=x and y=y, but that doesn’t mean that they need to have an equal relation to each other. If x is trees and y is plants, then x is y, but y is not x.

There would have to be an ontological difference, though. If there is a difference between me and this parallel counterpart, it must be because there is something he has that I lack, which would entail potency. Potency cannot exist in any way in God.

It was a hasty and imperfect analogy I made up, and it has a number og flaws when applied to God. I’m not sure I understand why you think the difference requires potency, though, if you’d care to expand on that idea.
Your clone and the universe would be completely identical, and if we supposed that you and your clone suddenly fused together and became aware of each other you would both be indistinguishable from another in all the classical ways of being, but still two distinct Persons.

 

[TheDefaultMan]

If a house is not ontologically different from the sum of it’s parts because the change in form is merely accidental, then the difference between a pile of bricks and a house to you is a logical distinction made in the mind, and not a real objective thing. That is, and pardon my saying so, nonsense.

It’s nonsense because I think you’re misrepresenting what I said. I didn’t mean to say that any pile of bricks is a house, but rather, an aggregate of bricks that are arranged in a certain way as to instantiate the accidental form of house. This aggregate of bricks would logically have to be equal to the house if you agree that that is what a house is. It’s really not difficult to understand. It’s simple Identity. If A=B, then B=A.

And if this is the type of reasoning you are applying to the Trinity, that the distinction between the Persons is logical and not really real, then that is the source of the disagreement.

Indeed it is the source of disagreement. It isn’t a baseless source of disagreement, though. What I argued was that for us to maintain Divine Simplicity, the distinctions between the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit would have to be logical.

But how is this a distinction at all, logical or real?

It is a logical distinction because it can be used to emphasize certain properties of a thing, like the logical distinction between a dog and a Canis lupus familiaris. The latter emphasizes the genus, species, and subspecies (scientific, not metaphysical) while still referring to the exact same thing in reality.

But it still doesn’t follow that y is x even when x is y (I don’t use =, because that sign implicitly states that the statement can be reversed, but I could have been more clear). The principle of Identity states that x=x and y=y, but that doesn’t mean that they need to have an equal relation to each other. If x is trees and y is plants, then x is y, but y is not x.

Your plant analogy makes use of the concepts of genus and species in the metaphysical sense. A tree is a species, or a specific type of thing that exists within the category/genus of plant.

This doesn’t work with God. You can’t say that the Father is a species in the genus God, because there would have to be a differentia (something that makes the Father a specific “species” as opposed to the other species that are under the genus God), which would, again, not make him equal to the Divine Essence and would reintroduce a composite nature in God.

Keep in mind that analogies for the Trinity don’t ever truly work because they always fail to take into account the metaphysical distinctions presupposed in those analogies, which could not in principle exist in God (precisely because he cannot be a composite).

 

[TheDefaultMan]

I’m not sure I understand why you think the difference requires potency, though, if you’d care to expand on that idea.

Sure. Let’s just say that there are 2 individual things that have the same essence (say, human essence). What has to differentiate them is what one has that the other lacks, otherwise if they were identical in everything and they didn’t lack anything the other had, they’d be the exact same being, which would cease to make them individual beings.

So, being A might be actually in location A, while being B only has the potency to be in location A.

So then to say that God the Father and God the Son are really distinct is to say that God the Father has something that God the Son lacks, otherwise they’d be the same being with no real distinction between them.

To say that God the Father has something that God the Son lacks would be to say that God the Son only has that thing potentially or in potency, which would make God an act-potency composite.

 

[TheDefaultMan]

Your clone and the universe would be completely identical, and if we supposed that you and your clone suddenly fused together and became aware of each other you would both be indistinguishable from another in all the classical ways of being, but still two distinct Persons.

We wouldn’t be indistinguishable in all the classical ways of being because we differ with respect to personhood. Personhood is indeed something that exists, so a distinction between persons would indeed be a distinction in being.

 

[BlueMaxx]

If our faith in God was to be based on our complete understanding of Him, only God would believe in God.

1. Do you believe the God of the Old Testament?
2. Do you consent to the fact that Jesus fulfilled the Old Testament prophesies?
3. Do you believe Jesus is who He says He is?
4. Do you believe in all of what Jesus promised us (including the indwelling of the Holy Spirit) or do you think He lied?

I think the real questions are the above, they clearly lead to a belief in the Trinity. If you truly believe the above then you simply have to accept that God is above our complete comprehension. Otherwise there would be no such thing as justifying faith (and therefore sanctifying obedience from that faith) if we could completely understand Him. Faith is a gift, not of ourselves but of God. Because we can not comprehend Him on our own.

You said as much as I did in a much more concise and eloquent way…I rely on pasting scripture to address issues…kudos…