I'm leaving Catholicism

[Magnanimity]

So then to say that God the Father and God the Son are really distinct is to say that God the Father has something that God the Son lacks, otherwise they’d be the same being with no real distinction between them.

Not everyone within the Tradition claims a “real distinction” between the divine Persons. One well-known example would be Bl John Duns Scotus who holds to what he calls a “formal distinction” between the Persons. From what I understand of his position, it follows from his desire to maintain simplicity and infinity as proper to the divine essence.

Whatever someone wants to say of divine Fatherhood, divine Sonship, etc, for Scotus, there is no reason to believe that the distinctive reality of each Person is itself a perfection. It is only when one constitutes this reality as a perfection that one gets into trouble (because each divine person, lacking the personalities of the other two, would be imperfect).

Scotus writes, “here an objection is raised: if a thing can be a necessary being only by reason of one, but not the other of two realities in it (for otherwise it would be necessary twice over), then it follows that in a necessary being one can never assume the existence of any realities that are formally distinct. Therefore one could never postulate such a distinction between the essence and relation in the divine person. (Scotus, Treatise on God as First Principle, 4.6). But God is not necessary only by reason of Fatherhood or only by reason of Sonship.

It is possible to speak of the perfectibility of various divine attributes (power, knowledge), but personhood is not spoken of in terms of degrees of perfection. What would be meant by an infinitely perfect “father?” By its very nature a father is relational so can’t admit of perfectibility on its own. But, Scotus continues, “wherever we have two formally distinct entities, if they are compatible,” they can be “two realities fit by nature to actuate the same thing.” (Treatise, 4.6).

 

[TheDefaultMan]

Not everyone within the Tradition claims a “real distinction” between the divine Persons. One well-known example would be Bl John Duns Scotus who holds to what he calls a “formal distinction” between the Persons.

The Church, and from my understanding, at least, the first few councils, explicitly teach that there are real distinctions within the Trinity. I would also like to point out that I take Edward Feser’s view that formal distinctions collapse into either real or logical distinctions. It doesn’t really make sense to say that they differ in definition but not in reality. A definition always refers to essences in reality, so to say that there is no distinction in reality but there is a distinction in definition seems to be incoherent.

 

[Maximian]

divisive doctrine

All Truth is divisive because the Truth is never welcomed by all.

 

[Theban]

It’s nonsense because I think you’re misrepresenting what I said. I didn’t mean to say that any pile of bricks is a house, but rather, an aggregate of bricks that are arranged in a certain way as to instantiate the accidental form of house. This aggregate of bricks would logically have to be equal to the house if you agree that that is what a house is.

Ok, fair enough. I interpreted your previous statement about the sum of components to only include the material components, but sure if we say that a pile of bricks built into the form of a house in order to make a house are the components then I agree that a house is equal to the sum of it’s components.

It is a logical distinction because it can be used to emphasize certain properties of a thing, like the logical distinction between a dog and a Canis lupus familiaris.

So by a logical distinction, what you mean is simply using a different name for something, with the intent of rhetorically conveying some other information about that thing?
In that case I understand why you called the difference between water and H2O a logical one, although I must adamantly in this case insist that they are, scientifically speaking, terms describing very different things.

So when you are saying that the distinction between the Persons of the Trinity is logical, what you’re saying is that it’s really just a manner of speaking to say they are different?

Your plant analogy makes use of the concepts of genus and species in the metaphysical sense.

My intention with the plant analogy was to make a point that y is x does not follow x is y as a matter of principle. There are times when x is = to y, in which case y is also equal to x, but that’s not what we’re saying in regards to the Trinity. The Father is not equal to God, He is God. Therefore it does not follow that the Father is equal to the Son. But the Father and the Son do share the same Being, and so they are not different parts either.

So then to say that God the Father and God the Son are really distinct is to say that God the Father has something that God the Son lacks, otherwise they’d be the same being with no real distinction between them.

But they are the same, their distinction is not ontological. To repeat what others here have said, their distinction is strictly with regards to their Persons and their Relationships. Which brings us to…

 

[Theban]

Personhood is indeed something that exists, so a distinction between persons would indeed be a distinction in being.

You make a strong argument here, and I admit that, as a garbage man, this is more than I know how to argue against. Still, if I was to throw some ideas at it, I guess I would say that personhood can only exist within a being and not independently. And since there’s no real reason why a Being can’t have more than one personhood(even a non-composite one), the Trinity doesn’t necessarily imply an ontological difference between the Persons.

Hopefully some of the philosophy majors can put up a better fight on this point.

 

[OrbisNonSufficit]

Personhood is indeed something that exists, so a distinction between persons would indeed be a distinction in being.

But Personhood is not composition. Otherwise even if God had 1 Personhood, He would be composite. Hence Personhood does not actually affect composition… even if there are 3 Personhoods.

 

[TheDefaultMan]

So by a logical distinction, what you mean is simply using a different name for something, with the intent of rhetorically conveying some other information about that thing?
In that case I understand why you called the difference between water and H2O a logical one, although I must adamantly in this case insist that they are, scientifically speaking, terms describing very different things.

They aren’t describing different things. Water is H2O and H2O is water. All examples of H2O are water, and vice versa. There isn’t an example in reality that is H2O but not water, or water but not H2O.

So when you are saying that the distinction between the Persons of the Trinity is logical, what you’re saying is that it’s really just a manner of speaking to say they are different?

In a sense, yes. It’s still useful to make those logical distinctions, which is why I think it makes sense to talk about God’s Divine Attributes because, while in God they are not distinct, we ourselves cannot fathom how they are all synonymous because we understand them imperfectly via analogy.

My intention with the plant analogy was to make a point that y is x does not follow x is y as a matter of principle. There are times when x is = to y, in which case y is also equal to x, but that’s not what we’re saying in regards to the Trinity. The Father is not equal to God, He is God. Therefore it does not follow that the Father is equal to the Son. But the Father and the Son do share the same Being, and so they are not different parts either.

I think I’ll just refer back to the difference between genus and species. X = Y would entail that Y = X, what you’re talking about is X being a species under the genus Y, which is not the same as saying X = Y.

Still, if I was to throw some ideas at it, I guess I would say that personhood can only exist within a being and not independently. And since there’s no real reason why a Being can’t have more than one personhood(even a non-composite one), the Trinity doesn’t necessarily imply an ontological difference between the Persons.

What I’d say in response is that, like I said earlier, Personhood could not be distinct from God’s Being. I’m not saying that it exists independently, in fact, what I’m saying is the exact opposite of that.

Hopefully some of the philosophy majors can put up a better fight on this point.

I don’t know if you’ll continue with this thread, but I respect that you put up a decent fight.

 

[TheDefaultMan]

But Personhood is not composition. Otherwise even if God had 1 Personhood, He would be composite. Hence Personhood does not actually affect composition… even if there are 3 Personhoods.

I didn’t say Personhood implies composition, but rather that a multitude of Personhood implies a composition. God having one Person (in an analogical way, of course) is completely compatible with God having one Divine Essence, and can thus be identical to all of God’s attributes in him.

 

[rdj69]

Basing your faith on whether you can make sense of all of the doctrines of the Church using one specific school of metaphysics is so misguided. If you do not believe Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics can fully explain every doctrine of the Church, and this makes you leave your faith, then your faith was not in the Church - it was in the metaphysics. Rather than having faith that the Church teaches truth, you have faith the the metaphysics you’re espousing can fully explain anything that’s true, and that therefore anything it can’t fully explain is not true. This is nothing more than Scientism, just with a specific school of metaphysics instead of with science.

 

[TheDefaultMan]

Basing your faith on whether you can make sense of all of the doctrines of the Church using one specific school of metaphysics is so misguided. If you do not believe Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics can fully explain every doctrine of the Church, and this makes you leave your faith, then your faith was not in the Church - it was in the metaphysics.

Well, that’s both true and false. It’s true in the sense that what I knew to be true based on reason (which includes the metaphysics) was, for me, epistemologically prior to any belief in Christianity or Catholicism. But it’s false because I once really did believe that the Church was revealed by Actus Purus to be the one true religion, and till this day I consider that position to be respectable and rational even though ultimately I think it fails.

This is nothing more than Scientism, just with a specific school of metaphysics instead of with science.

Nope. Scientism is the view that the scientific method can explain everything, without the need for philosophy and metaphysics specifically. This is obviously fallacious because science itself presupposes a conglomerate of different axioms that could not be discovered by the scientific method, which makes it self-refuting.

This isn’t the same as metaphysics because metaphysics analyzes those concepts presupposed by science itself. It seems like you’re just confused because I do not understand why you’d even say something like this.

the metaphysics you’re espousing

I’m not assuming Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics for no reason at all. It’s not as if I just personally like it. Rather, my position is that A-T metaphysics can be deduced from first principles that cannot be coherently denied.

You’re acting as though my appeal to A-T metaphysics is anti-Catholic when A-T metaphysics was literally developed mostly by the Church itself kek

 

[stoplooklisten]

A Triune God is a much richer concept than a sterile God alone without relationship, Not only can it be said that God does love but it can be said the God IS Love. In the Trinity, there is the love and relationship among Father, Son and Holy Spirit operating in complete unity and oneness. Love between Father and Son is a beautiful thing to behold. We’re not so smart to figure everything out on our own and disregard what’s been revealed to others and by others. Jesus Christ revealed his relationship with the Father and promised the Holy Spirit. We are richer for it.

 

[rdj69]

kek

…really?

 

[TheDefaultMan]

and that therefore anything it can’t fully explain is not true.

No this is false. I’ve said this like a million times already, but I am entirely aware of the limits of human reason. As a Classical Theist, one thing I always remember is that we can only know what God is by knowing what he cannot be (negative theology). This is because human reason could not possibly fathom the Divine Essence. I understand this, but that doesn’t mean that I can accept contradictory doctrines about the Divine Essence.

If a religion claimed to be the true religion of Actus Purus, would you believe that religion if that religion was claiming things about God that he couldn’t possibly be? If they claimed that God changes, or that God is a composite, etc. These claims could not possibly be said to be true of God given what we know about God as Actus Purus. That means we ought to deny the religion, not what we know of God through reason.

 

[TheDefaultMan]

Basing your faith on whether you can make sense of all of the doctrines of the Church using one specific school of metaphysics is so misguided.

It makes more sense to me to say that assuming your religion is true in spite of the blatant logical contradictions is more misguided. Your reasoning makes just as much sense as a Muslim’s, or a Jew’s, or a Hindu’s reasoning for why their religions are true.

 

[nicholasG]

Are you looking a religion that will conform to your ideals?

 

[stoplooklisten]

Are you looking a religion that will conform to your ideals?

If you make your religious organization small enough, then you can control everything and be your own pope and make your own doctrines. But, vital Christianity is more than doctrines and includes gifts and graces. No one has all gifts and graces, we need others We need the communion of saints across the centuries.

 

[rdj69]

assuming your religion is true in spite of the blatant logical contradictions is

A-T metaphysics is not logic, itself - finding a doctrine of the Church which A-T metaphysics cannot make complete sense of is not equivalent to finding a doctrine of the Church that is a logical contradiction.

A-T metaphysics is a model that we created to try to explain certain aspects of the world; it is no more an objective picture of existence than physics. This is why what you’re doing is akin to Scientism. You are beginning from the position that A-T metaphysics can provide a full and accurate picture of all that exists, and therefore excluding anything that it cannot explain as not existing. You are demanding that reality align with your model of it, instead of basing your model of reality on reality - you’re putting the cart before the horse.

The doctrines of Divine Simplicity and the Trinity are not dependent on A-T metaphysics - we do not know them by appeal to A-T metaphysics, we know them as a result of Divine Revelation.

How do we know that this Divine Revelation is true? Can A-T metaphysics tell us whether or not this Divine Revelation is true? Of course not. Whether we accept Divine Revelation is not dependant on whether it aligns with A-T metaphysics.

I highly recommend you read Saint John Henry Cardinal Newman’s “An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent” if you want to gain a more accurate understanding of why we believe what we believe.

 

[Theban]

Water is H2O and H2O is water.

No, H2O refers to a molecule which just happens to be the building block of water. But it is not water because water is specifically referring to the liquid mode of (albeit the same) chemical substance. The chemical is known as H2O on the molecular plane, ice when solid, water when liquid and steam when gaseous.

These are all real, substantial differences. Rather than saying that there is a logical difference between these things, I think it’s closer to the truth to say that there is a fictional equivalency we have constructed between them to better understand.

what you’re talking about is X being a species under the genus Y, which is not the same as saying X = Y.

If we’re defining every instance where x is y but not opposite as a “species and genus” relationship, then that is fine. A black cat is a species of the genus “stuff that is black”. A mortal man is a species of things that are mortal. A memory is a species of thoughts.

If we’re being liberal like that then I would argue you can indeed define the Father as a species in the Genus “Persons that are God” in which there are two other members, their differentia being their Personhoods and Relationships, neither of which (in my opinion) requires them to be different Entities.

Personhood could not be distinct from God’s Being. I’m not saying that it exists independently, in fact, what I’m saying is the exact opposite of that.

I agree, but how do you reconcile this with the idea that a Personhood has an entity of its own? Because it seems to me that if one Person can depend on the Divine Essence for its existence without becoming or bringing a new composite part of God, then two or even three united Persons can do the same with no problem.

 

[TheDefaultMan]

A-T metaphysics is not logic, itself - finding a doctrine of the Church which A-T metaphysics cannot make complete sense of is not equivalent to finding a doctrine of the Church that is a logical contradiction.

I never said it was logic itself what I said was that it can be deductively derived from first principles of logic.

A-T metaphysics is a model that we created to try to explain certain aspects of the world; it is no more an objective picture of existence than physics.

I disagree. My position is that A-T metaphysics does in fact give an objective picture of existence. Why else would anyone use A-T metaphysics if it didn’t give an exhaustive account of reality?

You are demanding that reality align with your model of it, instead of basing your model of reality on reality - you’re putting the cart before the horse.

You’re assuming that A-T metaphysics doesn’t give an account of reality, which is something I reject.

The doctrines of Divine Simplicity and the Trinity are not dependent on A-T metaphysics - we do not know them by appeal to A-T metaphysics, we know them as a result of Divine Revelation.

You’re correct about the latter (assuming there even was Divine Revelation) but not really the former. The former can be derived purely from reason. This is affirmed by the Church itself.

How do we know that this Divine Revelation is true? Can A-T metaphysics tell us whether or not this Divine Revelation is true? Of course not. Whether we accept Divine Revelation is not dependant on whether it aligns with A-T metaphysics.

What I’d argue is that for something to contradict or not align with A-T metaphysics would entail that it is illogical because, as I’ve stated already, A-T metaphysics is derived from first principles of logic.

The problem is that your belief in Divine Revelation is entirely baseless. There is essentially no difference between your blind belief in Catholicism and a Muslim’s blind belief in Islam. You are literally the stereotype Christian that many new atheists make fun of.

 

[TheDefaultMan]

No, H2O refers to a molecule which just happens to be the building block of water.

No. H2O is literally water. Water doesn’t have to only refer to the liquid mode. It is entirely accurate to say that ice and water vapor are essentially water in different states of matter.

If we’re being liberal like that then I would argue you can indeed define the Father as a species in the Genus “Persons that are God” in which there are two other members, their differentia being their Personhoods and Relationships, neither of which (in my opinion) requires them to be different Entities.

Well one, your position already seems to contradict the Church’s position, as the Church’s position is that God is not a genus. Also, why exactly does it not require them to be different entities?

I agree, but how do you reconcile this with the idea that a Personhood has an entity of its own? Because it seems to me that if one Person can depend on the Divine Essence for its existence without becoming or bringing a new composite part of God, then two or even three united Persons can do the same with no problem.

I wouldn’t say that Personhood has an entity of its own. A Personhood doesn’t depend on the Divine Essence, but rather, it is the Divine Essence, the same way all of God’s attributes essentially are his Divine Essence. This would mean that a multitude in persons would also be a multitude in Divine Essences.