Infinite regress

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Yes, irresistable forces cannot be overcome - thats true too.
The question is…how does one recognise whether the real world force I am dealing with is resistable or irresistable 🤷.

That’s a different sort of truth isnt it.
I answered that.
 
Blue Horizon:
But a meteor… once accelerated up to speed requires no further external mover despite the fact Aristotle would say it is changing (position).
How can a meteor accelerate up to speed without being moved by another, and is its speed constant, and is the meteor undergoing a change while it is moving? You take so much for granted. You are left with the question, “if an object could move itself, the cause of the movement would be internal, intrinsic meaning movement was part of its nature,meaning” it wasn’t moved by another" This was my statement that I wanted you to answer. You just gave a partial quote.
 
How can a meteor accelerate up to speed without being moved by another, and is its speed constant, and is the meteor undergoing a change while it is moving? .
Please reread my contributions. If this is what you think I said you’ve missed something.

Yes, it seems Aristotle by his own system is forced to agree that a meteor, by its very motion of constant velocity, is changing (position). Yet unlike accelerated motion, this change does not logically seem to require a separate mover either external or internal.
 
Isnt it basic hylomorphism?
All change has four causes, one of them being an efficient cause.
If an object moves from one position to another then an accidental potential is being actualised. A thing changing from potency to act can only change so by another already in act.
Here, I think we need to be careful of terminology. It is true that a being (ens or on) that is only potential cannot be brought into act without the agency of a (different) being that is already in act.

The agent need not be a separate (extrinsic) thing. For instance, most animals have an intrinsic principle of locomotion—they can, in a way, move themselves. In that case, the “agent” is the faculties (nervous and muscular system) that move the body.
Yet this is not actually true for a meteor - no agent is responsible for this continual change in position it seems to me.
No agent extrinsic to the meteor, I grant you. But the meteor has an active quality that keeps it moving constantly in one direction.
Granted…but what part of a meteor causes it to keep moving forever.
Its active quality (which I think best corresponds to the physical property of momentum), just as the animal’s faculties cause it to change position and move.
I do not believe this is not Aristotelian philosophy sorry.
Change in the accident called “position” yes.
But no change in the accident of “quality” (specifically momentum)… I don’t think so.
I didn’t say that the momentum changes. In fact, that would make the velocity non-constant (i.e., be an acceleration), right?

I said that a certain active quality, which corresponds to the momentum, keeps the position (i.e., the objects spatial relations with other objects) in constant flux.
Aristotle had no such “quality”, let alone a concept thereof.
Such a concept would be impossible for him because it would necessitate he agree with you that rectilinear movement does not involve change…which for him it clearly does. Its a change in the accident called “position”.
I didn’t say that rectilinear movement does not involve change. I said it involves a constant change in position (which consists in the spatial relations with other bodies). It must make some sort of change; otherwise velocity would not be measurable.

As far as Aristotle … naturally, he did not have a concept of momentum, as we do. (Remember that he did not have the instrumentation that we have, nor the scientific method, nor the mathematical instruments necessary to make such a concept.) But the concept of active qualities are all over his works. They are the “second species” of quality that Aristotle speaks about in the Categories.
So I don’t believe this proposition can be used to resolve Aristotle’s inconsistencies with the true nature of the material world discovered since Newton/Hume.
I think that Aristotle’s philosophical notions can, with careful thought, be separated from his strictly “physical” theories.
Also, does Aristotle ever say that an accident of a substance (your alleged quality of momentum) can properly be called a “part” in this context.
I think Aquinas would say such a “part” has to be a primary part of the substance - and an accident doesnt look to qualify.
(I am not quite sure what you mean by “primary part;” that is certainly not Aquinas’ vocabulary.)

If the quality is in act (as is the case with the active qualities or “powers”), then it can move things. That is it’s job, so to speak. The heat of a stove can heat water; the nervous system of an animal can move its muscles; a person’s will can move him to action, etc. So yes, parts move other parts all the time, according to both Aristotle and Aquinas—and specifically, active qualities do a lot of that moving.
In fact motion is a change in an accident not an accident itself!
Motion is an “accidental change,” yes. But “action” (poiein) and “passion” (paschein) are listed among the categories. It seems to me that Aristotle considers them accidents.
I am not familiar with Aristotle speaking of an “accident” as an active agent of change in the same being. Can you provide a quote and reference it?
How about the De anima, in which he talks about the different faculties of animals?
From memory he certainly did accept the possibility in SCG. He could not make up his mind between various options and throughout his whole Corpus he regularly switched from one preference to another.
In the SCG, anyway, he seems to discard that idea (which is Avicenna’s): I am looking at Chapter 87. In any event, that idea is clearly outdated by what we know about the planets and similar objects nowadays. They are not organisms (and only organisms have souls), so they cannot have souls.
Not sure whence my inexactitude. I am clearly speaking of the element earth. For Aristotle it always moves downward until impeded. Therefore unending unaided motion by definition is not possible because such distances are finite.
Fair enough. But I think if we realize that his theory of elements constitutes his primitive “physics,” I still think his metaphysical notions remain valid.
Nor have I seen anyone clearly explain his “generating cause” which always ends up sounding like a philosophic singularity just to explain the unexplainable - gravity and inertia of which the ancients had no real grasp.
What “generating cause” do you mean? The Unmoved Mover? Or the notion of efficient cause?

[quite]An oxymoron methinks. If they could be made to understand the findings of modern science some of their Natural Philosophy would have to be jettisoned.

But I don’t think it need all be jettisoned.
 
Please reread my contributions. If this is what you think I said you’ve missed something.

Yes, it seems Aristotle by his own system is forced to agree that a meteor, by its very motion of constant velocity, is changing (position). Yet unlike accelerated motion, this change does not logically seem to require a separate mover either external or internal.
Sometimes one has to be tautological in order, one hopes, to get a point across, but if a blind spot is suspected, all the tautology in the world is useless to remove the problem
A meteor is experiencing all kinds of changes, in speed, in orbit, in resistance, and even existing as a meteor when it burns up in the atmosphere. It could not experience these changes if it didn’t have the potential to do so. The principle “that motion is the actualization of a potency” is a universal principle that involves all change, that’s why it is a universal truth At the foundation of this truth, there is the phenomenon of cause and effect found in the empirical world that give the principle validity.
 
But a meteor… once accelerated up to speed requires no further external mover despite the fact Aristotle would say it is changing (position).
This could not take place without the causal activity of God. This is for certain.
 
So a lot of St. Thomas Aquinas’s arguments for God’s existence are based in part on the principle that there can’t be an infinite backward line of causes.

Why not?
Infinite regress is possible if the beginning is singular. Read this for further explanation.
 
A meteor is experiencing all kinds of changes, in speed, in orbit, in resistance, and even existing as a meteor when it burns up in the atmosphere. It could not experience these changes if it didn’t have the potential to do so. The principle “that motion is the actualization of a potency” is a universal principle that involves all change, that’s why it is a universal truth At the foundation of this truth, there is the phenomenon of cause and effect found in the empirical world that give the principle validity.
The point is whether all empirical examples of what Aristotle calls change do logically require a continuing separate mover (whether a separate whole or an internal part).

I see no apriori logical argument that demands this in all cases - physical motion in space obviously demonstrating an acceptable contrary hypothesis.

Of course a pure metaphysician can personally define “change” in a tautological way such that such a mover must always be required. Or advance an interpretation of the contrary phenomenon that attempts to negate it.

This is called a “Black Swan” retort: Such happened when explorers reported the existence of black Swans back to Europe. This was rideculed by most as everybody knew that in all history there had never been a black swan. (This of course also contradicted a favourite syllogism of Aristotle: All swans are white. This is a swan. Therefore this swan is white.) These European “wise men” concluded that the explorers must be mistaken, these birds cannot be swans but look alikes 🤷.

You attempted below this Black Swan take-down with Newton and meteors and the weakness of your criticism has been fairly clearly demonstrated.

Of course, like modern geo-centric astronomers the maths can be made to support the ancient views if made complicated enough. I shave with an Occam razor myself. And I believe that metaphysic principles that claim temporal application, like kings, are in fact accountable to the physical they claim to rule without querstion. IE they must be capable of physical falsifiability - and only one example is required to so falsify. Newton has credibly done this.

It is clear you still believe in the analogous philosophic attitude observed in medieval politics - the divine right of Kings who are beyond the criticism of their subjects.

I suggest that if you hold to a metaphysic principle that is physically non-falsifiable … then it is likely little more than a tautology at heart with no real world logical coercive force.
 
This could not take place without the causal activity of God. This is for certain.
Which comment really has little to do with the topic of this thread and certainly not the First Way from what I can see.

99.999% of us come to believe in God’s existence by faith methinks.
 
Here, I think we need to be careful of terminology. It is true that a being (ens or on) that is only potential cannot be brought into act without the agency of a (different) being that is already in act.
This is so basic I assumed we all know this.
And it doesn’t have to be a “different being”, it can be another part of the same being so long as that part is “primary” (Aquinas) This is why even animals must have souls - as do planets according to Aristotle. Few realise Aristotle had a theory of “mineral souls” - anything that animates from within has a soul - thats why soul and motion (animation) are so intertwined as in the word “animus”.
The agent need not be a separate (extrinsic) thing. For instance, most animals have an intrinsic principle of locomotion—they can, in a way, move themselves. In that case, the “agent” is the faculties (nervous and muscular system) that move the body.
Yes, I didnt think this needed to be spelled out. The “moved by another” may be a primary “part” rather than an external substance.
The problem is what qualifies to be validly called “a part”.
You’ve attempted to argue that an accidental quality can be such a part that can be a valid internal agent of motion. I believe this fairly rapes Aristotle! Suffering action and acting on another can be an accidental state of a substance obviously. But you are trying to say that an accident itself can be an agent acting on the substance itself which is not what Aristotle is saying here surely!
But the meteor has an active quality that keeps it moving constantly in one direction.
Well I certainly know what you mean here in colloquial english but this isn’t the way Aristotle would use those words methinks! An accident (“quality”) cannot be an originating agent that continually acts, as if a part, on the substance that is the substratum of that quality.
Its active quality (which I think best corresponds to the physical property of momentum), just as the animal’s faculties cause it to change position and move.
I dont think so. If you could provide an actual quote maybe we could exegete it? Ultimately I think the acting part in an animal needs to be grounded in the soul which would be considered a valid “part” while the muscles alone…maybe not.
I didn’t say that the momentum changes. In fact, that would make the velocity non-constant (i.e., be an acceleration), right?
Fair enough. However I don’t believe Aristotle would ever accept that an abiding accident of a substance could ever actively generate (“an active quality”) ongoing change in other accidents. Accidents are not “parts” of a being as far as I know.
As far as Aristotle … naturally, he did not have a concept of momentum, as we do. (Remember that he did not have the instrumentation that we have, nor the scientific method, nor the mathematical instruments necessary to make such a concept.) But the concept of active qualities are all over his works. They are the “second species” of quality that Aristotle speaks about in the Categories.
As above, substances are obvious capable of receiving impressions and giving impressions to other beings. This is therefore an “accidental quality” … but this does not mean what you are trying to make it mean…the ability for an accident to be an internal and ongoing agent of act. But a substantial soul can act on a body because these are validly called parts of the whole animal. The soul is not an accident of the animal.
 
…CONTINUED
I think that Aristotle’s philosophical notions can, with careful thought, be separated from his strictly “physical” theories.
They can be distinguished, but there is always a relationship. As I mentioned with Ynotzap I don’t accept that metaphysical principles with temporal application are immune from a single falsifying empirical experiment.
“Whatever is moving is being moved by another” is a principle that applies to both metaphysical and physical realms surely? And if it was originally inducted from sense experience (as I see no apriori reason why it must be logically true in itself) then it only takes one black swan instance to bury it.
(I am not quite sure what you mean by “primary part;” that is certainly not Aquinas’ vocabulary.)
I am afraid it is, it was a recent rereading of SGC in the light of this discussion that brought it to my attention. Cannot remember exactly where, but it was on his discussion of the First Way and his analysis of internal movers.
If the quality is in act (as is the case with the active qualities or “powers”), then it can move things. That is it’s job, so to speak.
As above I dont accept this is what Aristotle actually says when speaking of interal parts moving other parts.
The heat of a stove can heat water;
Water is not part of the stove, the water is external
the nervous system of an animal can move its muscles;
This is interesting, but I do not believe this is analogous to a meteor being moved by an accident called “momentum” (inertia?).
a person’s will can move him to action, etc.
Yes, a soul qualifies as an internal part - but unless you believe a meteor is like a heavenly body (composed of ether and a mineral soul according to Aristotle) this fails sorry.
Motion is an “accidental change,” yes. But “action” (poiein) and “passion” (paschein) are listed among the categories. It seems to me that Aristotle considers them accidents.
Yes I agree action/passion are of course accidents because a substance is still the same substance regardless of whether it is the patient or agent of another.
But you have interpretted Aristotle here in a totally different way as above.
How about the De anima, in which he talks about the different faculties of animals?
OK, thats not my area of expertise. Can you quote something and lets exegete it a bit if possible.
In the SCG, anyway, he seems to discard that idea (which is Avicenna’s): I am looking at Chapter 87.
I’ll find the quote, but I am 99% sure you are mistaken because I was very taken aback to see Aquinas was actually open to this ancient belief because he could not deny the philosophic principles that lead to this possible conclusion (amongst others). I discussed this somewhere on CAF two years ago with Linus2nd who was of the same opinion as yourself until I quoted Aquinas in SCG.
In any event, that idea is clearly outdated by what we know about the planets and similar objects nowadays. They are not organisms (and only organisms have souls), so they cannot have souls.
That’s not the point. The point is that this principle IS Aristotle and it has much bearing on understanding him when he speaks of motion, parts and agents of motion. For Aristotle if an external agent or internal part could not be discovered to explain motion he was quite happy to posit the existence of a soul - even a “mineral” one if the body in question was composed of the element aether.
What “generating cause” do you mean? The Unmoved Mover? Or the notion of efficient cause?
Hmmnn. I thought you were deeply into Aristotle and his “explanation” of allegedly inherent elemental motion. “Cause generans” is his primary tool for trying to explain this. To me it leads nowhere.
But I don’t think it need all be jettisoned.
I agree, there are however a few things in the area we are discussing that just dont divide evenly into the rest of his otherwise coherent system.
 
In the SCG, anyway, he seems to discard that idea (which is Avicenna’s): I am looking at Chapter 87. In any event, that idea is clearly outdated by what we know about the planets and similar objects nowadays. They are not organisms (and only organisms have souls), so they cannot have souls.
Here you go I found it:
forums.catholic-questions.org/showthread.php?p=13169598&highlight=celestial+body#post13169598

Post 198 and surrounding.
It was ThankAndMull not Linusthe2nd.

Its not Avicenna’s idea, it goes back to Aristotle and others.
 
The point is whether all empirical examples of what Aristotle calls change do logically require a continuing separate mover (whether a separate whole or an internal part).

I see no apriori logical argument that demands this in all cases - physical motion in space obviously demonstrating an acceptable contrary hypothesis.

Of course a pure metaphysician can personally define “change” in a tautological way such that such a mover must always be required. Or advance an interpretation of the contrary phenomenon that attempts to negate it.

This is called a “Black Swan” retort: Such happened when explorers reported the existence of black Swans back to Europe. This was rideculed by most as everybody knew that in all history there had never been a black swan. (This of course also contradicted a favourite syllogism of Aristotle: All swans are white. This is a swan. Therefore this swan is white.) These European “wise men” concluded that the explorers must be mistaken, these birds cannot be swans but look alikes 🤷.

You attempted below this Black Swan take-down with Newton and meteors and the weakness of your criticism has been fairly clearly demonstrated.

Of course, like modern geo-centric astronomers the maths can be made to support the ancient views if made complicated enough. I shave with an Occam razor myself. And I believe that metaphysic principles that claim temporal application, like kings, are in fact accountable to the physical they claim to rule without querstion. IE they must be capable of physical falsifiability - and only one example is required to so falsify. Newton has credibly done this.

It is clear you still believe in the analogous philosophic attitude observed in medieval politics - the divine right of Kings who are beyond the criticism of their subjects.

I suggest that if you hold to a metaphysic principle that is physically non-falsifiable … then it is likely little more than a tautology at heart with no real world logical coercive force.
To me you seem not to recognize the truth of universal principles in nature, in the cosmos. Yet you do, I assume recognize math principles in science and you recognize the ideal from the real in some circumstances. You do not recognize how using metaphysical principles are dealing with the ultimate causes and effects in the empirical world, and even in what you consider questionable, spiritual world, how these principles can be applied to both realities. How would you for example, prove the existence of God outside of faith? Are you saying that somehow Aquinas has missed the boat in using the Cosmological Argument ? Are you saying that there is no logical way to do this, in other words, Ontology is just a philosopher’s dream world, with not substantial basis? You are good at throwing ideas around, and I have to make recourse to a dictionary to make sure I understand you, and I think that other might too. I don’t concern myself with all the history, and the problems ,reason and understandings that Aristotle had, or even all that St,Thomas had, even though he agreed, and disagreed with Aristotle on some points. I try to understand the bottom line, and its application to finding the truth. I am convinced that we can find reasonable certainty about the objective truth concerning God, and through using these universal metaphysical principles, and so does the Church. Somethings are not known through empirical science, and can only be known through the proper application of our principles governing reason. It seems to be the inability to see the tree for the forest, or to see the universal principle for the particulars Aristotle’s problems I I leave to St,Thomas, and I notice Aristotle is your focus. Like I said it makes no difference to me. God is the Uncaused Cause, the Unmoved Mover the result of logical reasoning based on empirical knowledge, and universal principles using apriori and aposteriori reasoning, from cause to effect, and from effect to cause. Now you can involve yourself in the particulars, that’s your prerogative.
 
To me you seem not to recognize the truth of universal principles in nature, in the cosmos. Yet you do, I assume recognize math principles in science and you recognize the ideal from the real in some circumstances. You do not recognize how using metaphysical principles are dealing with the ultimate causes and effects in the empirical world, and even in what you consider questionable, spiritual world, how these principles can be applied to both realities. How would you for example, prove the existence of God outside of faith? Are you saying that somehow Aquinas has missed the boat in using the Cosmological Argument ? Are you saying that there is no logical way to do this, in other words, Ontology is just a philosopher’s dream world, with not substantial basis? You are good at throwing ideas around, and I have to make recourse to a dictionary to make sure I understand you, and I think that other might too. I don’t concern myself with all the history, and the problems ,reason and understandings that Aristotle had, or even all that St,Thomas had, even though he agreed, and disagreed with Aristotle on some points. I try to understand the bottom line, and its application to finding the truth. I am convinced that we can find reasonable certainty about the objective truth concerning God, and through using these universal metaphysical principles, and so deoes the Church. Somethings are not known through empirical science, and can only be known through the proper application of our principles governing reason. It seems to be the inability to see the tree for the forest, or to see the universal principle for the particulars Aristotle’s problems I I leave to St,Thomas, and I notice Aristotle is your focus. Like I said it makes no difference to me. God is the Uncaused Cause, the Unmoved Mover the result of logical reasoning based on empirical knowledge, and universal principles using apriori and aposteriori reasoning, from cause to effect, and from effect to cause. Now you can involve yourself in the particulars, that’s your prerogative.
The Church teaches the existence of God can be known with certainty by reason alone.
However it does not teach that the 5 Ways achieve that.
Nor does certain knowledge of Gods existence through reason save.
Nor does certain knowledge by faith save either.
Of course the above provide very good opportunities for going further.

For these reasons I have no anxiety if my small lights cause me to deny current arguments for the existence of God or even the soul. Faith sees more than reason in these affairs.

If anything i do not see the pine forest because of the trees…thats because quite a few firs seem to be present as well that myopic metaphysicians somtimes cannot see from their mountain tops. I metaphysicate as much, but like to hike amongst the trees and feel the physic also.👍
To date Ive discovered many groves…but perfect forests are hard to find in an imperfect world that even you accept…in theory:eek:.

BTW my specialty is Aquinas not Aristotle.
But in recent years i realised the Church has over metaphysicated Aristotle due to pressures of Catholic dogma. Aristotle had very high regard for the power of the individual that has got lost somehow. It is more likely than not he held the human soul was not eternal beacause he saw no evidence that forms exist apart from matter. Yet the medieval Church interpretted him otherwise with very little textual evidence for doing so.
 
Sometimes one has to be tautological in order, one hopes, to get a point across, but if a blind spot is suspected, all the tautology in the world is useless to remove the problem
A meteor is experiencing all kinds of changes, in speed, in orbit, in resistance, and even existing as a meteor when it burns up in the atmosphere. It could not experience these changes if it didn’t have the potential to do so. The principle “that motion is the actualization of a potency” is a universal principle that involves all change, that’s why it is a universal truth At the foundation of this truth, there is the phenomenon of cause and effect found in the empirical world that give the principle validity.
By “tautology” I mean the error in a proposition (with alleged universal application) whereby the subject is defined so as to already contain the predicate.

eg “all good love lasts”, “an irresistible force can never be stopped”, “whatever is moved is moved by another”.

These are always true…but whether they say anything about actual reality is unknown.

Being tautological is something a robust metaphysician, I would think, wants to avoid at all costs.

I think “whatever is moving is being moved by another” is a far better translation of the principle in question here. However when put in this non tautological way…it hardly seems apriori self-evident.

If it is true it can only be induced from empirical observations.
And, as I believe, it is acceptably held to be denied by rectilinear motion.
 
By “tautology” I mean the error in a proposition (with alleged universal application) whereby the subject is defined so as to already contain the predicate
I used the first definition from Webster. (a) needless repetition of an idea in a different word. It was understood by me that you were criticizing the frequent use of this universal principle without any fore thought, or without any empirical explanation. I use these principals as a tool to discern some particular arguments to see if they are consistent with the truth of the principles with the strength of their universality. The principles themselves are the extraction (metaphysical) of the particulars (third degree) So you propose an hypothesis, I look for a possible contradiction in the hypothesis.

.
Blue Horizon:
These are always true…but whether they say anything about actual reality is unknown.
I have to disagree, yes they are always true, that’s their beauty. But they do say a lot abut actual reality. In the right application they can grant certitude in knowledge, in truth. Like every principle used in solving problems of an empirical nature. No advancement is possible without them. Scientists use these principles eg. of Math, or geometry. To determine what is or what isn’t , these principles are necessary. It also advances the knowledge that these truths have a source as Unchangeable of they are.
Blue Horizon:
Being tautological is something a robust metaphysician, I would think, wants to avoid at all costs.
Relying on total tautology, I agree is not robust, but this wasn’t the case, (and I hope I didn’t mislead anyone) I offered empirical evidence by example of cause and effect
Blue Horizon:
I think “whatever is moving is being moved by another” is a far better translation of the principle in question here. However when put in this non tautological way…it hardly seems apriori self-evident.

If it is true it can only be induced from empirical observations.
And, as I believe, it is acceptably held to be denied by rectilinear motion.
I do not understand your usage of the word induced, I always thought that universal principles were abstracted from objective empirical reality, when considered in the third degree. One needs to know what you mean by motion in a straight line. In the real world I have the conviction that nothing can travel in a straight line, since nothing in this physical world of ours that is physical can have a perfect relationship to another physical object, and there are also forces to disturb that relationship. Did I interpret your proposition in the right context, referring to physical motion, not motion as calculated by math principles, there is a difference, and we did cover that.?
 
I used the first definition from Webster. (a) needless repetition of an idea in a different word. It was understood by me that you were criticizing the frequent use of this universal principle without any fore thought, or without any empirical explanation. I use these principals as a tool to discern some particular arguments to see if they are consistent with the truth of the principles with the strength of their universality. The principles themselves are the extraction (metaphysical) of the particulars (third degree) So you propose an hypothesis, I look for a possible contradiction in the hypothesis.

.

I have to disagree, yes they are always true, that’s their beauty. But they do say a lot abut actual reality. In the right application they can grant certitude in knowledge, in truth. Like every principle used in solving problems of an empirical nature. No advancement is possible without them. Scientists use these principles eg. of Math, or geometry. To determine what is or what isn’t , these principles are necessary. It also advances the knowledge that these truths have a source as Unchangeable of they are.

Relying on total tautology, I agree is not robust, but this wasn’t the case, (and I hope I didn’t mislead anyone) I offered empirical evidence by example of cause and effect

I do not understand your usage of the word induced, I always thought that universal principles were abstracted from objective empirical reality, when considered in the third degree. One needs to know what you mean by motion in a straight line. In the real world I have the conviction that nothing can travel in a straight line, since nothing in this physical world of ours that is physical can have a perfect relationship to another physical object, and there are also forces to disturb that relationship. Did I interpret your proposition in the right context, referring to physical motion, not motion as calculated by math principles, there is a difference, and we did cover that.?
Unfortunately in none of your contributions did I find a robust non apriori, non tautological expression of WIMIMBA. As I say I too offered empirical evidence…that it is acceptably observed not to hold in the case of rectilinear motion. As I say, to prove a metaphysical principle with empirical application false one only needs one good counter example.
Obviously you disagree and use a Black Swan take down of Newton here.
I find your take down as very weak even on metaphysical grounds as you deny the intellectually coercive force of proven algorithms for predicting empirical results in particular (name removed by moderator)ut scenarios not yet able to be performed.
Maths is a form of reasoning that infers valid principles (via algorithms and formulae) revealed by experiments despitebehind the “interfering static” of an imperfectly observable world you keep going on about.

Yes universal principles can be derived from empirical reality but the way of the scholastics is far from coercive at times. Do you deny, re WIMIMBA, this is an inductive process (as opposed to deductive). The conundrum of the farmers chicken expresses well the difficulties of reasoning from many allegedly consistent particulars to a universal principle.
 
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