Isnt it basic hylomorphism?
All change has four causes, one of them being an efficient cause.
If an object moves from one position to another then an accidental potential is being actualised. A thing changing from potency to act can only change so by another already in act.
Here, I think we need to be careful of terminology. It is true that a
being (
ens or
on) that is only potential cannot be brought into act without the agency of a (different) being that is already in act.
The agent need not be a separate (extrinsic) thing. For instance, most animals have an intrinsic principle of locomotion—they can, in a way, move themselves. In that case, the “agent” is the faculties (nervous and muscular system) that move the body.
Yet this is not actually true for a meteor - no agent is responsible for this continual change in position it seems to me.
No agent
extrinsic to the meteor, I grant you. But the meteor has an active quality that keeps it moving constantly in one direction.
Granted…but what part of a meteor causes it to keep moving forever.
Its active quality (which I think best corresponds to the physical property of momentum), just as the animal’s faculties cause it to change position and move.
I do not believe this is not Aristotelian philosophy sorry.
Change in the accident called “position” yes.
But no change in the accident of “quality” (specifically momentum)… I don’t think so.
I didn’t say that the momentum changes. In fact, that would make the velocity non-constant (i.e., be an acceleration), right?
I said that a certain active quality, which corresponds to the momentum, keeps the position (i.e., the objects spatial relations with other objects) in constant flux.
Aristotle had no such “quality”, let alone a concept thereof.
Such a concept would be impossible for him because it would necessitate he agree with you that rectilinear movement does not involve change…which for him it clearly does. Its a change in the accident called “position”.
I didn’t say that rectilinear movement does not involve change. I said it involves a constant change in position (which consists in the spatial relations with other bodies). It must make
some sort of change; otherwise velocity would not be measurable.
As far as Aristotle … naturally, he did not have a concept of momentum, as we do. (Remember that he did not have the instrumentation that we have, nor the scientific method, nor the mathematical instruments necessary to make such a concept.) But the concept of active qualities are all over his works. They are the “second species” of quality that Aristotle speaks about in the
Categories.
So I don’t believe this proposition can be used to resolve Aristotle’s inconsistencies with the true nature of the material world discovered since Newton/Hume.
I think that Aristotle’s philosophical notions can, with careful thought, be separated from his strictly “physical” theories.
Also, does Aristotle ever say that an accident of a substance (your alleged quality of momentum) can properly be called a “part” in this context.
I think Aquinas would say such a “part” has to be a primary part of the substance - and an accident doesnt look to qualify.
(I am not quite sure what you mean by “primary part;” that is certainly not Aquinas’ vocabulary.)
If the quality is in act (as is the case with the active qualities or “powers”), then it can move things. That is it’s job, so to speak. The heat of a stove can heat water; the nervous system of an animal can move its muscles; a person’s will can move him to action, etc. So yes, parts move other parts all the time, according to both Aristotle and Aquinas—and specifically, active qualities do a lot of that moving.
In fact motion is a change in an accident not an accident itself!
Motion is an “accidental change,” yes. But “action” (poiein) and “passion” (paschein) are listed among the categories. It seems to me that Aristotle considers them accidents.
I am not familiar with Aristotle speaking of an “accident” as an active agent of change in the same being. Can you provide a quote and reference it?
How about the
De anima, in which he talks about the different faculties of animals?
From memory he certainly did accept the possibility in SCG. He could not make up his mind between various options and throughout his whole Corpus he regularly switched from one preference to another.
In the SCG, anyway, he seems to discard that idea (which is Avicenna’s): I am looking at
Chapter 87. In any event, that idea is clearly outdated by what we know about the planets and similar objects nowadays. They are not organisms (and only organisms have souls), so they cannot have souls.
Not sure whence my inexactitude. I am clearly speaking of the element earth. For Aristotle it always moves downward until impeded. Therefore unending unaided motion by definition is not possible because such distances are finite.
Fair enough. But I think if we realize that his theory of elements constitutes his primitive “physics,” I still think his metaphysical notions remain valid.
Nor have I seen anyone clearly explain his “generating cause” which always ends up sounding like a philosophic singularity just to explain the unexplainable - gravity and inertia of which the ancients had no real grasp.
What “generating cause” do you mean? The Unmoved Mover? Or the notion of efficient cause?
[quite]An oxymoron methinks. If they could be made to understand the findings of modern science some of their Natural Philosophy would have to be jettisoned.
But I don’t think it need
all be jettisoned.