Infinite regress

[Richca]

Both series are sequential in nature, although in defense of Aquinas, that may be difficult to detect in the case of the mind moving the hand, moving the stick, moving the rock. The mind sends impulses to the muscles, which contract and move the hand. Which in turn moves the stick. This motion then travels down the stick at something less than the speed of light, and is imparted to the rock. The cause and effect aren’t simultaneous. At the time that the rock moves, the existence of the mind is irrelevant. Once in motion the series of sticks and rocks could be infinite, just like the series of dominoes. And just as with the dominoes, once in motion, the existence of the preceding causes become irrelevant.

From the perspective of causation, the process by which the dominoes fall, and the rocks move, is exactly the same. It’s a sequential series, not a simultaneous one.

In the physical world, there are no “per se” series, if “per se” equates to simultaneous causation. A causal series, is by its very nature, sequential.

This isn’t meant to be a refutation of either the First or Second Ways. I’m simply pointing out that differentiating a “per se” series from a “per accidens” series, isn’t as straight forward as it first appears.

If Trent Horn is correct, and the falling dominoes are a “per accidens” series, then all causal series are “per accidens” series.

I’m just about to go to bed but a few quick comments for consideration. Simultaneous does not necessarily entail instantaneous. For example, a potter who molds a vase is the efficient cause of the vase but this event is not instantaneous. It is clear that cause and effect must simultaneously exist for if we eliminate the cause we eliminate the effect. In a per se series, the effect depends on the simultaneous existence of the causal members of the series. In the above example, we need a potter who is a human being with a mind, nerves, muscles, arms and hands to produce the effect. Every change involves time but time is not really the point of a per se series. What is more to the point for Aquinas, I believe, is being and what exists. A dead potter does not mold a vase. Cause and effect must exist simultaneously and in a per se series the effect exists simultaneously with all the causal members of the series whether the intermediate causes be one or several. This does not necessarily entail that the effect was produced instantaneously.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

The modern preference is derived from Hume. When I post about Aristotle and Aquinas I use there definitions or the conclusions will be wrong.

You actually haven’t really answered either of my questions I think?.
Newton is enough to find non simultaneous, why do you opine Hume?

 

[Blue_Horizon]

I don’t know what you are talking about and you seem to have no idea what I was getting at. How simply perfect for a philosophy forum.

Well what was your point then?

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Referring to Post #100: I used the word “extrinsic” when I really meant “external” But I used the word “intrinsic” correctly.

If an object slows down in its motion, there is a change in motion from one of a higher degree, to a lower degree, that means the object had the potential to move (change) in its speed. To do this it would have to be moved by another, a force, to cause the change. We are not talking about acceleration, we are talking about change. Change in this case has to do with the nature of the object, which is a metaphysical subject. Change is produced by a movement from potency to act, and thats in the nature of the universe. Acceleration is dealt with in physics, the mathematical measurement of local motion, distance covered in a certain measure of time. These two degrees of concepts must be kept separate to keep the proper relationship between the two. One involves the second degree of abstraction, the physical and mathematical, and the other involves the nature of motion, the causes, and effects of same.(metaphysical)the third degree of abstraction.

And I believe that this is causing much confusion in this thread. Intrinsic means that in an object that is moving itself, that motion is part of its nature, and if it is, then it has no potency to produce a change in motion, and this is a statement dealing with the things nature, and not with measurement as in acceleration. Physical (mathematical measurement)vs Metaphysical. Second degree of abstraction vs third degree of abstraction

When you used your gas pedal and brake pedal example, you were in the physical, mathematical degree of abstraction, the second degree. I was answering from the metaphysical degree, the nature of motion, and you presented a problem when you mentioned an object moving itself which entailed a metaphysical problem. A thing is moved by another,and not moved by itself, not directly involving physical friction, mechanical power, etc.

If a change in local motion is not to be called acceleration then I really don’t understand your point sorry. Acceleration is a change in the local motion called velocity.

My original statement:

(a) the moving object is not being moved by another - but is encountering a hidden agency that is interfering with its inherent motion (which if not interfered with would continue forever).

does not seem to need to be about two opposing irresistible forces??
Obviously the inherent motion above refers simply to the supposition that though the object moves at constant velocity there is no logical need to posit an extrinsic driving agent of that motion…we only need posit an extrinsic dedriving agent called friction.

 

[Vico]

You actually haven’t really answered either of my questions I think?.
Newton is enough to find non simultaneous, why do you opine Hume?

Your questions are:

1. Do you believe hand stick stone example is simultaneous?
2. Do you know of any real world example of a per se series caused effect?
3. Why Hume?

Answers:

1. Yes, as noted, using the definitions of Aristotle and Aquinas. A causal chain per se, the first cause must remain active in order for the causal chain to exist.
2. The hand stick stone example is* per se*.
3. For Hume, the empiricist, a true causal mechanism to nature is beyond mankind’s grasp (An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, P.2, S.7), contrary to:

• Aristotle: all events happen along a path to the ultimate good (from Ethics).
• Aquinas: all events happen along a path to the ultimate good to know God (Summa Contra Gentiles, 25).

Since Hume the most promising philosophy of causaility is that of Conserved Quantity theory by Dowe and Salmon.

 

[Partinobodycula]

Simultaneous does not necessarily entail instantaneous

I wholeheartedly agree. As I had alluded to in an earlier post, there’s a difference between the physicist’s understanding of “cause”, and the metaphysicist’s understanding of “cause”. A difference which is perfectly reasonable, and one which the analogy of the potter and the vase illustrates quite well. But a problem arises when one tries to reconcile these two disparate definitions of “cause”, with Aquinas’ First and Second Ways, and the idea of “per se” and “per accidens” causal series. The potter and the vase is a perfect example of a “per se” causal series, and seems to be what Aquinas is referring to in the Second Way. It’s reasonable to believe however that Aquinas’ First Way isn’t referring to the same type of “per se” causal series, both because it would be redundant, and because the First Way never uses the word “cause” at all. The First Way seems quite clear in describing a temporal causal series involving the process of changing potency to act. A process that is of necessity sequential in nature, whether it’s describing falling dominoes, or a stick moving a rock. And according to Trent Horn a sequential series is a “per accidens” series, and according to Aquinas, a “per accidens” series can be infinite.

So how does one reconcile this seeming paradox, that in his First Way Aquinas describes a sequential series…a series which according to Trent Horn can be infinite, and yet Aquinas’ whole argument rests upon the fact that such a series can’t be infinite. The two positions seem contradictory.

The First Way is describing a sequential series. Sequential series are “per accidens” series. “Per accidens” series can be infinite.

I would agree that there’s a counter-argument to this objection. That counter-argument being that the mind moving the hand, moving the stick, moving the rock, is exactly the same as the potter molding the vase. The intent is simultaneous, even if the result isn’t instantaneous. But then the question arises, why can the falling dominoes be a series without a first cause, while the moving rock can’t be?

 

[Aloysium]

. . . Aquinas is not speaking about a temporal order of causes. For Aquinas it is not events but causes. And events are not causes. . . all causes in a hierarchical series derive their causal power from the first cause. Similarly, if there is no first cause of our existence at any moment then we could not exist at any moment.

What is time anyway but a particular sequence of events, related to each other in some way as causes and effects.

Gazing into the weird and wacky world of quantum physics we find that what would be thought of as in the future can cause an effect on what we think of as past.
In the double-slit experiment, light passes through two narrow slits in a screen and we see an interference pattern. In this case the photons behave like a wave.
This pattern persists even if the photons are emitted one at a time. We therefore understand the light to be passing through not as a particle but as a wave, through both slits at once.
Now, if we incorporate a detector into the experiment to reveal through which slit a photon is passing, the interference pattern disappears. The detector transforms the behaviour of light from being wave-like to acting like a collection of particles. The context determines what happens.
If this weren’t puzzling enough, what is even more interesting is that if we set up the experiment to detect the path of the light, this time after it has passed through the slit, we find the same result. The pattern is that of individual particles and not of waves; there is no interference. In terms of a temporal sequence, the later measurement has an affect on the pattern that happens earlier. We could think of this as “retrocausality”. The are various explanations, but one that makes sense to me would be to consider events as holistic. The photon is in a sense pulled out of its “role” as a vibration in the whole which is now transformed by its detection. This occurs whether the detection takes place before or after the pattern appears. We can imagine there being a moment which includes the detection and the pattern and in which there is no temporal causality within itself. This event is a snippet of a larger sequence that we call time.

TLDNR: Here is a case of causes that are not temporal; an alteration in one element (the detection “later”) of what constitutes that minutest of moments affects another aspect (the absence of an interference pattern occurring “earlier”).

 

[Vico]

I wholeheartedly agree. As I had alluded to in an earlier post, there’s a difference between the physicist’s understanding of “cause”, and the metaphysicist’s understanding of “cause”. A difference which is perfectly reasonable, and one which the analogy of the potter and the vase illustrates quite well. But a problem arises when one tries to reconcile these two disparate definitions of “cause”, with Aquinas’ First and Second Ways, and the idea of “per se” and “per accidens” causal series. The potter and the vase is a perfect example of a “per se” causal series, and seems to be what Aquinas is referring to in the Second Way. It’s reasonable to believe however that Aquinas’ First Way isn’t referring to the same type of “per se” causal series, both because it would be redundant, and because the First Way never uses the word “cause” at all. The First Way seems quite clear in describing a temporal causal series involving the process of changing potency to act. A process that is of necessity sequential in nature, whether it’s describing falling dominoes, or a stick moving a rock. And according to Trent Horn a sequential series is a “per accidens” series, and according to Aquinas, a “per accidens” series can be infinite.

So how does one reconcile this seeming paradox, that in his First Way Aquinas describes a sequential series…a series which according to Trent Horn can be infinite, and yet Aquinas’ whole argument rests upon the fact that such a series can’t be infinite. The two positions seem contradictory.

The First Way is describing a sequential series. Sequential series are “per accidens” series. “Per accidens” series can be infinite.

Aristotle metaphysics is that the immediate efficient cause of an event is simultaneous with the event, not temporally prior to it, and immediate efficient causes imply a series of simultaneous causes and effects. So there is the notion of a substantial or per se series of causes. Aristotle and Aquinas say that this type of series must have a first uncaused cause. The accidental or per accidens series has no need for the first cause of the series to still exist at the time of the second cause, and applies to the father son example series.

 

[Partinobodycula]

Aristotle metaphysics is that the immediate efficient cause of an event is simultaneous with the event, not temporally prior to it, and immediate efficient causes imply a series of simultaneous causes and effects. So there is the notion of a substantial or per se series of causes. Aristotle and Aquinas say that this type of series must have a first uncaused cause. The accidental or per accidens series has no need for the first cause of the series to still exist at the time of the second cause, and applies to the father son example series.

But this leads me to the question of how you define a “per accidens” causal series? We know that in the example of the father and son, the existence of the father isn’t necessary for the son to give rise to his own son. We also know that in the example of the dominoes, the existence of the preceding dominoes isn’t necessary for the efficacy of the following dominoes. But isn’t the same true for the mind moving the hand, moving the stick, moving the rock. Once the mind has set the process in motion, its existence becomes unnecessary.

And if the falling dominoes don’t require a first cause, then why does the moving rock require a first cause? Why aren’t they both just the result of an infinite series?

 

[ynotzap]

How is it then this does not hold true for the motion we call constant velocity?

That is the issue under the microscope here I believe.

I have advanced a hypothesis that by the change Aristotle called local motion he may have really meant what we call “acceleration”.

That is a “setting in motion”.

Original statement by “I Want God” Every motion is an actualization of a potential

My answer: Because constant meaning “no change, stable” And velocity meaning change in localmotion It is an oxymoron: changeless change Constant velocity, as stated does not exist in the real objective world, it exists in subjective conceptual reality, not objective reality This was covered in post #80 How do you explain an object moving itself infinitely, if it didn’t have motion as part of its nature? Refer to posts # 47 & 80 Constant, is not an example of change, but velocity is Change in velocity exists because there is potential for that change When you say "constant " you eliminate “potential”. Velocity is not constant upon closer examination in the real objective world and never will be.

 

[Vico]

But this leads me to the question of how you define a “per accidens” causal series? We know that in the example of the father and son, the existence of the father isn’t necessary for the son to give rise to his own son. We also know that in the example of the dominoes, the existence of the preceding dominoes isn’t necessary for the efficacy of the following dominoes. But isn’t the same true for the mind moving the hand, moving the stick, moving the rock. Once the mind has set the process in motion, its existence becomes unnecessary.

And if the falling dominoes don’t require a first cause, then why does the moving rock require a first cause? Why aren’t they both just the result of an infinite series?

If the mind stops moving the stick, the rock stops also.
If the first domino falls, the next one falls, etc. The third domino does not require the first domino.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

I’m just about to go to bed but a few quick comments for consideration. Simultaneous does not necessarily entail instantaneous. For example, a potter who molds a vase is the efficient cause of the vase but this event is not instantaneous. It is clear that cause and effect must simultaneously exist for if we eliminate the cause we eliminate the effect. In a per se series, the effect depends on the simultaneous existence of the causal members of the series. In the above example, we need a potter who is a human being with a mind, nerves, muscles, arms and hands to produce the effect. Every change involves time but time is not really the point of a per se series. What is more to the point for Aquinas, I believe, is being and what exists. A dead potter does not mold a vase. Cause and effect must exist simultaneously and in a per se series the effect exists simultaneously with all the causal members of the series whether the intermediate causes be one or several. This does not necessarily entail that the effect was produced instantaneously.

This suggests an identified series can be Both per se And per accidens?

Would you agree this has to be the case for the First Way to make any sense…because it is certainly per accidens.

Though evden this works only because all the celestial spheres (which successively move from the outside inwards to earth) were considered eternally existant beyond the moon.

Yet it is now known that this cosmology is ridiculous, the interstellar bodies that gave rise to our sun have long gone. So in fact the First Way fails on the particular example held in mind because what the ancients thought was a per se simultaneous presence of all heavenly mediating bodies and the finale effect of motions on earth is not actually true. It was only ever a per accidens series re the heavenly bodies.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

If the mind stops moving the stick, the rock stops also.
If the first domino falls, the next one falls, etc. The third domino does not require the first domino.

This distinction is really just the difference between a single impulse down a series versus continuous motion delivered down a series.

Is that what you mean?

Is enduring causation with enduring effect, though acceptably with a time lag (a phase shift as they say), what per se series local motion is essentially about?

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Your questions are:

1. Do you believe hand stick stone example is simultaneous?
2. Do you know of any real world example of a per se series caused effect?
3. Why Hume?

Answers:

1. Yes, as noted, using the definitions of Aristotle and Aquinas. A causal chain per se, the first cause must remain active in order for the causal chain to exist.
2. The hand stick stone example is* per se*.
3. For Hume, the empiricist, a true causal mechanism to nature is beyond mankind’s grasp (An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, P.2, S.7), contrary to:

• Aristotle: all events happen along a path to the ultimate good (from Ethics).
• Aquinas: all events happen along a path to the ultimate good to know God (Summa Contra Gentiles, 25).

Since Hume the most promising philosophy of causaility is that of Conserved Quantity theory by Dowe and Salmon.

Now we’re getting a little clarity.

1. OK, the question was using the colloquial meaning of simultaneous, ie instantaneous. Do you still hold yes?
2. So can you provide a local motion example of such a per se series that cannot also be seen as per accidens at the same time? I believe this to be impossible.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Simultaneous does not necessarily entail instantaneous. For example, a potter who molds a vase is the efficient cause of the vase but this event is not instantaneous. It is clear that cause and effect must simultaneously exist for if we eliminate the cause we eliminate the effect. In a per se series, the effect depends on the simultaneous existence of the causal members of the series.

Still not quite sure of this.
I do not believe a per se series must have all involved agents existing simultaneously…for the ongoing motion effect to exist.

The series, at least in all temporal examples of motion, will always have a lag between final effect and that from the top of the series. In many cases (especially eternal series) that lag could be very long indeed.

If that is the case even if the originating cause ceased to exist the “ripple in the series” could take so long to propogate that the motion at the end could continue for quite a long time regardless.
We still see the motion of suns so many light years away that they may not even exist anymore!

Sure, you could simply define a “per se” series as one requiring simultaneous existence of all agents…but then you would never find any infinite regression examples of such motion series in the real Newtonian/Humean world - which Aquinas and Aristotle both say could exist.

So how can the First Way ever work as an aposteriori proof of God’s existence if that is the case?

Secondly, lets assume the simultaneous existence of all agents must hold for a series when an ongoing motion effect is observed in the final agent.

OK, but given that time lags (short or long we do not know) still hold for any series in a Newtonian world…how do we know whether this particular terminating but ongoing motion we observe comes from a per se series or a per accidens series? We might be observing just the flow of the remaining water in the pipe after the source has been disconnected long ago? Noone home. Its only per accidens.
Then again, maybe the time lag is very short and so the simultaneous existance of all agents actually is the case. Its likely per se.

In the end its very hard to know if a final effect is an ongoing motion or just the water left in the pipeline which will “soon” stop (whatever soon means).

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Original statement by “I Want God” Every motion is an actualization of a potential

Advancing an apriori proposition or principle to disprove an aposteriori observation sounds problematic to me.
Rather, if the observation is correct then the principle is proven faulty.
It only takes one non-conforming case to prove a theory/principle wrong.

Constant velocity motion does not seem to intrinsically require the object is being actualised (acted upon) by another…unless another (eg friction) is already slowing it down.

The issue is not so much “change” but whether or not all change requires an outside agent. Newton says no and I still agree.

My answer: Because constant meaning “no change, stable” And velocity meaning change in localmotion".

We do not speak the same language if that is how you define these words in the phrase “constant velocity”. BTW “change in local motion” and “velocity” are not univocal terms to me . Try “change in position”…not perfect but probably close enough.

Constant velocity, as stated does not exist in the real objective world,

It does well enough when I put my car on cruise control???

 

[Vico]

This distinction is really just the difference between a single impulse down a series versus continuous motion delivered down a series.

Is that what you mean?

Is enduring causation with enduring effect, though acceptably with a time lag (a phase shift as they say), what per se series local motion is essentially about?

In a causal chain per se, the first cause must remain active in order for the causal chain to exist.

 

[lmelahn]

I do not believe this is true.
Communicated motion ocurrs precisely because the contacting forces are not wholly balanced. The “moment” you speak of above only exists in pure maths…like a point being defined as having zero width. Obviously if a moment in time were truly zero duration then of course there is no motion because motion cannot exist in zero time.
Yes there is an extremely short initial contact time when the 2nd domino does not move. That is because the contact surfaces are molecularly compressing elasticly at the edge causing a minute delay in the motion transmission time.

I was simplifying, using the commonly accepted Newtonian mechanics.

My point is, thought, that no matter how finely one peers into the mechanical process that is occurring, one finds agents (things that act) that are acting on patients (other things that receive the action). (Generally, in the physical world, action and passion are reciprocal—agents generally interact with one another.) Those action-passion pairings are necessarily simultaneous.

(On the microscopic level, if you like, the mechanical transmission of momentum from one domino to another takes place because of electrostatic repulsion. This, in turn, depends on quantum phenomena. But the agents in an interaction of any kind, by definition, have to act on each other simultaneously.)

I think part of the difficulty here is thinking of time as if it were a sort of invisible matrix that is valid everywhere in equal measure—that is more or less how Newton thought of it. (And it is Newton’s notion that makes, say, the Theory of Relativity so counter-intuitive.) In Aristotle’s vision, time is strictly dependent on the changes that take place in things. For instance, if physical things stopped interacting altogether, time would also stop.

 

[ynotzap]

Advancing an apriori proposition or principle to disprove an aposteriori observation sounds problematic to me.
Rather, if the observation is correct then the principle is proven faulty.
It only takes one non-conforming case to prove a theory/principle wrong.

Constant velocity motion does not seem to intrinsically require the object is being actualised (acted upon) by another…unless another (eg friction) is already slowing it down.

The issue is not so much “change” but whether or not all change requires an outside agent. Newton says no and I still agree.

We do not speak the same language if that is how you define these words in the phrase “constant velocity”. BTW “change in local motion” and “velocity” are not univocal terms to me . Try “change in position”…not perfect but probably close enough.

It does well enough when I put my car on cruise control???

Yes, but there are a lot of changes taking place to give you the illusion that the speed is constant. When the car climbs a hill, there is a lag in speed that causes a reaction on the engine, and vacuum that causes other changes is mechanisms. As you said “close enough” but no constant speed.

If change can be had without an external agent (mover), then change must come from the internal, how would that be possible without being part of the nature of the thing is it not intrinsic? And if intrinsic, would not that thing always be moving And if it is always moving, how can it be stopped from moving? Friction? Friction would be an outside resistive force and only act when acted upon ,external,and not intrinsic The moving object does not depend on an outside force to move itself,to act, or to stop it, it has the power to move itself because motion is part of its nature, it couldn’t help but move If it can slow down, then it has the potential to slow down, meaning that it does not move itself but is moved by another The truth of the matter is that the universe is always experiencing changes, its in its nature, and that motion is not intrinsic to it, but external, acted upon. Name one thing in this universe that can move itself, and not be stopped It would have to be annihilated to stop it

 

[Blue_Horizon]

I was simplifying, using the commonly accepted Newtonian mechanics.

My point is, thought, that no matter how finely one peers into the mechanical process that is occurring, one finds agents (things that act) that are acting on patients (other things that receive the action). (Generally, in the physical world, action and passion are reciprocal—agents generally interact with one another.) Those action-passion pairings are necessarily simultaneous.

Can you define simultaneous in this context?

I believe you will find that the pairings are not of whole agents/patients but only of the partial contact areas. Essentially a force wave is being propagated across the widths of each object and the macro effect may not be active or discoverable until well after the admittedly simultaneous micro level cause/effect interface. So there is a partial disconnect between what happens at the micro level areas and what happens at the macro level re motion.
By the time the macro measurable effect is detected the causal agent may no longer be acting, may be fleeing or may not even be in contact with the effected object at micro level.

So we are dealing with different understandings of what cause and effect means. Aristotle’s definition is the inferential micro level one which cannot actually be observed. Modern science and Newton deal only to what is empirically detectable. For this view cause and effect at that macro level need not involve simulteneity I am thinking.

I think this explains why, even if we did accept that single pairings are simultaneously existant over a cause effect motion…this does not necessitate all agents in a series must be.

So it seems impossible to me to ever identify with certainty whether a given physical series is per se or per accidens or both.
Which means the First Way has no certitude.