Infinite regress

[Blue_Horizon]

I don’t know. The thread traces back to Aloysium post #67, not one or yours.

So perhaps reply to Aloysium rather than me .

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Each of us exists in a bubble of time and space that isn’t simultaneous in nature, but is in fact spatially and temporally unique to each individual’s own perspective.

There simply are NO temporally simultaneous causal chains. Just as events are necessarily spread out across space, they’re also spread out across time.

We know for example that when we look out at the stars, that we’re seeing them as they were in the past, not as they are now. And this is true not just for stars, but for every interaction that we ever have with the world around us…ever. Even your reading of this post is an interaction with the past. The firing of the neurons in your brain is the product of a series of events stretching back in time. From the signals traveling along your optic nerve, to the photons interacting with your retina, to those same photons being emitted by the computer screen. It’s all a temporal causal chain stretching ever further back in time. No causal chain that involves the interaction of physical objects is ever simultaneous. Not even the hand moving the stick, moving the rock. They’re all temporal causal chains.

So you’re going to have to rethink simultaneous causation, because there’s no such thing, at least in reality as you understand it to be. So either rethink your understanding of reality, or rethink your understanding of Aquinas’ First Cause. Simultaneous causation isn’t a defense of God, because there’s no such thing.

Have a reread og my questions, I think you will find you dont seem to be addressing any of them specifically. And no I dont believe in simultaneous per accidens causation - what made you think I do?

 

[Vico]

So perhaps reply to Aloysium rather than me .

I replied to you because your post was the one linked to my post, and I did not remember the start, so, why was your post linked to mine?

 

[Richca]

Yes I think we all know this as its been said numerous times.

But why is it important for the 1st argument to even talk about infinite per accidens regress if ultimately we have to go vertical causality rather than horizontal?

Why not just deal to the efficient cause per se of the final object in the per accidens series and forget about the temporal series.

Why is the whole per accidens series important at all for the proof?

As it has been said, Aquinas is not dealing with a per accidens series in the first or second proofs. He doesn’t talk about it in these proofs. The infinite regress mentioned in these proofs has to do with an infinite regress in the per se series. The ‘whole per accidens series’ has nothing at all to do with the proofs. In fact, it would destroy the proof because in Aquinas’ view it is at least theoretically possible for a per accidens series to regress to infinity. Again, in the first and second proofs, Aquinas is not concerned with finding a first unmoved mover or a first efficient cause sometime in the past such as yesterday, a year ago, a 100 years ago, or 10,000 years ago but right now in the present and at anytime anyone considers the arguments. This is why he doesn’t mention anything about the eternity or non-eternity of the world in these proofs. They are not proofs concerning the eternity or non-eternity of the world because he was of the opinion that the eternity or non-eternity of the world could not be philosophically demonstrated either way. That the world had a beginning is a matter of divine revelation and faith.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

If an object slows down over hundreds of years, the object is not its own motion

Well that is not self evident - can you prove it.

An object moving itself has inherent motion

Obviously. Is there any reason why it couldnt decide to slow itself down slowly over hundreds of years?
In which case this and the above case are indistinguishable… as I suggested below.

No change, no velocity, change is an inherent quality of velocity, rate of change of position in relation to time.

Well if we are using Aristotle’s definition of change (which always requires another separate efficient agent cause that is already in act) then this would not be true of constant velocity despite the fact it represents a change in position.
And whether we call it qualitative or quantitative doesn’t seem to matter.
To Aristotle its still change of position and therefore requires an outside mover.

That’s the problem, Aristotle’s principles do not seem to be wholly consistent with each other.

Which is why I suggested his principle of motion should be translated as “whatever begins to move (ie acceleration) is moved by another”. That’s a qualitative statement and it reconciles Newtonian Law (objects that do not accelerate have no external mover) with Aristotle.

However even this translation does not help Aristotle escape the charge of inconsistency - that all change (even a change of the accident called position) requires an outside agent.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

As it has been said, Aquinas is not dealing with a per accidens series in the first or second proofs. He doesn’t talk about it in these proofs.

Now we seem to be getting somewhere.
Do you have time to quote and exegete Aquinas’s First Way in SCG.
I believe you will find that your above is not the natural way of reading his starting propositions. They look inherently temporal and therefore start out referring to a per accidens (local motion) efficient causal series.

eg heres a typical explanation which is clearly starting with an aposteriori per accidens causal chain.

"The Argument From Motion
St. Thomas Aquinas, studying the works of the Greek philosopher Aristotle, concluded from common observation that an object that is in motion (e.g. the planets, a rolling stone) is put in motion by some other object or force.
From this, Aquinas believes that ultimately there must have been an UNMOVED MOVER (GOD) who first put things in motion. Follow the argument this way:
Nothing can move itself.
If every object in motion had a mover, then the first object in motion needed a mover.
Movement cannot go on for infinity.
This first mover is the Unmoved Mover, called God.
Aquinas is starting from an a posteriori position. "

In other words Aquinas has started with a per accidens series then by sleight of hand (ie logically invalid analogical predication from local motion to all change/motion) turns it into a per se series.

OR, this way was always intended by Aquinas to be based on a per accidens series but moderns have tried to make it per se in the light of Newton.

 

[inocente]

I am thinking as Aquinas or Aristotle would.

A cause always achieves its effect - unless another agency interferes and limits the actualising force of the first agent.

So when we see objects in space slowing down over hundreds of years there are two system ways we can understand the situation.

(a) the moving object is not being moved by another - but is encountering a hidden agency that is interfering with its inherent motion (which if not interfered with would continue forever).

(b) a moving object inherently slows to zero if left uninterfered with. So it will only remain in motion if another agent acts on it.

If Aristotle had the scientific knowledge concerning friction and space that we have today I have little doubt he would accept (a) above.

Then again if we considered friction as a “de-mover” then (a) is still consistent with “whatever is in motion is being moved by another” its just that we have a negative mover!

Perhaps it is better to say “whatever is changing is being changed by another”.
AND, constant velocity is not an example of change!

All that it somewhat awry.

Generally when you see objects in space speed up or slow down it’s because that’s what things do when in orbit (Kepler’s 2nd law). It’s got nothing to do with friction, objects move faster in the part of the orbit near the Sun and slower when further away. If Aristotle or Thomas saw objects in space slow down, they would also have seen objects which speed up.

The terms “de-mover” and “negative mover” don’t appear in the literature. An object in space may encounter dust particles which impart momentum which change its velocity. They may also speed it up or change its direction, not just slow it.

Aristotle believed that all objects have a desire to move to their “natural place”. He called motion in other directions “violent” or “unnatural” and believed force had to be applied continuously or such motion would stop. His physics was very wrong, and if he had modern scientific knowledge he would never have made his unmoved mover argument.

Constant velocity is the rate of change of position with respect to time. To move means “Change the place, position, or state of”. By definition, changing position is moving; by definition, changing position is change.

 

[Partinobodycula]

But why is it important for the 1st argument to even talk about infinite per accidens regress if ultimately we have to go vertical causality rather than horizontal?

Why not just deal to the efficient cause per se of the final object in the per accidens series and forget about the temporal series.

Have a reread og my questions, I think you will find you dont seem to be addressing any of them specifically. And no I dont believe in simultaneous per accidens causation - what made you think I do?

Your use of the terms vertical and horizontal causality made me think that you were suggesting that there could be a causal series that isn’t temporal in nature. But observation indicates that this simply isn’t the case. All “causal” series are temporal in nature. This includes things such as a hand moving a stick, moving a rock. Or a locomotive pulling a train. Or a chain hanging from a hook. Or falling dominoes. These are all examples of temporal causal series. In fact, in the physical world, every “causal” series is by the very nature of causation, a temporal series. Causation in the physical world is a process, and processes take time.

I realize that what you or I mean by the term “cause” may be very different from what a metaphysicist like Aquinas means by the word “cause”. So what I’ve learned through trial and error, is that in order to have a rational discussion about Aquinas’ first two ways, the parties must first agree on what constitutes a “per se” causal series, and what constitutes a “per accidens” causal series, and which type of series Aquinas is talking about.

To my eyes, Aquinas seems to be talking about a “per accidens” causal series in the First Way, and a “per se” causal series in the Second Way. But that makes the First Way a bit too problematic, and the Second Way a bit too metaphysical.

So what do you think? What’s Aquinas talking about? And just what are “per se” and “per accidens” causal series?

 

[ynotzap]

Blue Horizon:

(a) the moving object is not being moved by another - but is encountering a hidden agency that is interfering with its inherent motion (which if not interfered with would continue forever).

If an object is not being moved by another, then it is moving itself, movement is intrinsic to its nature. IOW, it is always moving(eternally) Now supposedly it is encountering a hidden power, or agency that’s interfering with its inherent motion. In order to do that the power or the agency would have to be irresistible to cause the inherent power of the moving object to slow down or stop. Now logically we can not have an unstoppable infinite power of motion, and a necessary irrresistible power or agent at the same time, either on is unstoppable, infinite in motion, and the opposing force is resistible, or the moving object is stoppable, therefore does not have infinite motion or inherent motion and the opposing force would inherently be irresistible. This amounts to a logical contradiction

 

[Vico]

Your use of the terms vertical and horizontal causality made me think that you were suggesting that there could be a causal series that isn’t temporal in nature. But observation indicates that this simply isn’t the case. All “causal” series are temporal in nature. This includes things such as a hand moving a stick, moving a rock. Or a locomotive pulling a train. Or a chain hanging from a hook. Or falling dominoes. These are all examples of temporal causal series. In fact, in the physical world, every “causal” series is by the very nature of causation, a temporal series. Causation in the physical world is a process, and processes take time.

I realize that what you or I mean by the term “cause” may be very different from what a metaphysicist like Aquinas means by the word “cause”. So what I’ve learned through trial and error, is that in order to have a rational discussion about Aquinas’ first two ways, the parties must first agree on what constitutes a “per se” causal series, and what constitutes a “per accidens” causal series, and which type of series Aquinas is talking about.

To my eyes, Aquinas seems to be talking about a “per accidens” causal series in the First Way, and a “per se” causal series in the Second Way. But that makes the First Way a bit too problematic, and the Second Way a bit too metaphysical.

So what do you think? What’s Aquinas talking about? And just what are “per se” and “per accidens” causal series?

I think the unmoved mover (First Way) and the uncaused first cause (Second Way) are pe se.

Except for the first cause, all causes are said to be ordered per se or essentially.

Causes ordered per accidens don’t depend essentially (for efficacy) on the earlier causes.

 

[Partinobodycula]

I think the unmoved mover (First Way) and the uncaused first cause (Second Way) are pe se.

Except for the first cause, all causes are said to be ordered per se or essentially.

Causes ordered per accidens don’t depend essentially (for efficacy) on the earlier causes.

Thank you Vico, but could you elaborate a bit. Is the hand pushing a stick, pushing a rock, a “per se” causal series, or a “per accidens” causal series? What about a father giving rise to a son, giving rise to a grandson? Which type of series is that, and why?

Can you give an example of each type of series?

 

[Vico]

Thank you Vico, but could you elaborate a bit. Is the hand pushing a stick, pushing a rock, a “per se” causal series, or a “per accidens” causal series? What about a father giving rise to a son, giving rise to a grandson? Which type of series is that, and why?

Can you give an example of each type of series?

• Per se series: mind moves the hand, to move a stick, to move a stone, – motion, is not intrinsic to any of them, but to the mind, the primary cause of the series.
• Per accidens series: father produces a son that produces a son etc. – each can beget a son.

 

[Partinobodycula]

• Per se series: mind moves the hand, to move a stick, to move a stone, – motion, is not intrinsic to any of them, but to the mind, the primary cause of the series.

Thanks again, but doesn’t this mean that the falling dominoes series is a “per se” series as well?

If not, why not?

If it is a “per se” series, then how do you explain this quote from Trent Horn:

“To this objection Aquinas makes a distinction between causes that are sequential and causes that are simultaneous. Sequential causation is like a chain of dominoes. After you knock over the first domino you start a chain reaction of dominoes hitting other dominoes. In fact, you could destroy the first domino after you’ve pushed it since it is no longer needed to keep the whole set of dominoes falling. Aquinas believed that sequential causes in the past, like a set of dominoes, could have occurred for all eternity.”

trenthorn.com/2013/01/28/answering-two-objections-to-aquinas/ Objection #2

This seems to infer that the series of falling dominoes must be a “per accidens” causal series, because it can be eternal.

Are the falling dominoes a “per se” series, or a “per accidens” series? If its a “per se” series, then why does Trent Horn imply differently. If its a “per accidens” series, then how is it different from the hand moving the stick, moving the stone?

 

[Vico]

Thanks again, but doesn’t this mean that the falling dominoes series is a “per se” series as well?

If not, why not?

If it is a “per se” series, then how do you explain this quote from Trent Horn:

“To this objection Aquinas makes a distinction between causes that are sequential and causes that are simultaneous. Sequential causation is like a chain of dominoes. After you knock over the first domino you start a chain reaction of dominoes hitting other dominoes. In fact, you could destroy the first domino after you’ve pushed it since it is no longer needed to keep the whole set of dominoes falling. Aquinas believed that sequential causes in the past, like a set of dominoes, could have occurred for all eternity.”

trenthorn.com/2013/01/28/answering-two-objections-to-aquinas/ Objection #2

This seems to infer that the series of falling dominoes must be a “per accidens” causal series, because it can be eternal.

Are the falling dominoes a “per se” series, or a “per accidens” series? If its a “per se” series, then why does Trent Horn imply differently. If its a “per accidens” series, then how is it different from the hand moving the stick, moving the stone?

St. Thomas Aquinas:
Simultaneous causation is per se and sequential is per accidens.

But note in the example of dominos that it is “After you knock over the first domino”, but in the previous post example of the per se series, the “mind moves the hand, to move a stick, to move a stone”, so the first cause is the mind in both examples. Do you think the dominos have the ability to knock over or are they like the stick, passive?

 

[lmelahn]

Concerning the efficient cause, I believe Aquinas finds it unintelligible to speak of efficient causes without also including the final cause.

Yes that is correct. I think it is hard to refute the Angelic Doctor on this one.

If x is the efficient cause of y, then y is automatically the final cause of x.

“Final cause”*is a general notion that covers every kind of end point (in Scholastic technical lingu: the terminus ad quem) for any kind change. A final cause does not have to be willed by an intelligent agent. It just has to be where a given movement or change ends up.

Hence, the floor (or, more precisely, lying on the floor) is the “final cause” of the dropped stone; in a different way, dropping the stone on the floor is the final cause of the person who drops it.

 

[Partinobodycula]

St. Thomas Aquinas:
Simultaneous causation is per se and sequential is per accidens.

But note in the example of dominos that it is “After you knock over the first domino”, but in the previous post example of the per se series, the “mind moves the hand, to move a stick, to move a stone”, so the first cause is the mind in both examples. Do you think the dominos have the ability to knock over or are they like the stick, passive?

Both series are sequential in nature, although in defense of Aquinas, that may be difficult to detect in the case of the mind moving the hand, moving the stick, moving the rock. The mind sends impulses to the muscles, which contract and move the hand. Which in turn moves the stick. This motion then travels down the stick at something less than the speed of light, and is imparted to the rock. The cause and effect aren’t simultaneous. At the time that the rock moves, the existence of the mind is irrelevant. Once in motion the series of sticks and rocks could be infinite, just like the series of dominoes. And just as with the dominoes, once in motion, the existence of the preceding causes become irrelevant.

From the perspective of causation, the process by which the dominoes fall, and the rocks move, is exactly the same. It’s a sequential series, not a simultaneous one.

In the physical world, there are no “per se” series, if “per se” equates to simultaneous causation. A causal series, is by its very nature, sequential.

This isn’t meant to be a refutation of either the First or Second Ways. I’m simply pointing out that differentiating a “per se” series from a “per accidens” series, isn’t as straight forward as it first appears.

If Trent Horn is correct, and the falling dominoes are a “per accidens” series, then all causal series are “per accidens” series.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

All that it somewhat awry.

Generally when you see objects in space speed up or slow down it’s because that’s what things do when in orbit (Kepler’s 2nd law). It’s got nothing to do with friction, objects move faster in the part of the orbit near the Sun and slower when further away. If Aristotle or Thomas saw objects in space slow down, they would also have seen objects which speed up.

The terms “de-mover” and “negative mover” don’t appear in the literature. An object in space may encounter dust particles which impart momentum which change its velocity. They may also speed it up or change its direction, not just slow it.

Aristotle believed that all objects have a desire to move to their “natural place”. He called motion in other directions “violent” or “unnatural” and believed force had to be applied continuously or such motion would stop. His physics was very wrong, and if he had modern scientific knowledge he would never have made his unmoved mover argument.

Constant velocity is the rate of change of position with respect to time. To move means “Change the place, position, or state of”. By definition, changing position is moving; by definition, changing position is change.

I don’t believe you have engaged the main philosophic points I was making though your review of Aristotle and Newton seems sound.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Your use of the terms vertical and horizontal causality made me think that you were suggesting that there could be a causal series that isn’t temporal in nature. But observation indicates that this simply isn’t the case. All “causal” series are temporal in nature. This includes things such as a hand moving a stick, moving a rock. Or a locomotive pulling a train. Or a chain hanging from a hook. Or falling dominoes. These are all examples of temporal causal series. In fact, in the physical world, every “causal” series is by the very nature of causation, a temporal series. Causation in the physical world is a process, and processes take time.

I realize that what you or I mean by the term “cause” may be very different from what a metaphysicist like Aquinas means by the word “cause”. So what I’ve learned through trial and error, is that in order to have a rational discussion about Aquinas’ first two ways, the parties must first agree on what constitutes a “per se” causal series, and what constitutes a “per accidens” causal series, and which type of series Aquinas is talking about.

To my eyes, Aquinas seems to be talking about a “per accidens” causal series in the First Way, and a “per se” causal series in the Second Way. But that makes the First Way a bit too problematic, and the Second Way a bit too metaphysical.

So what do you think? What’s Aquinas talking about? And just what are “per se” and “per accidens” causal series?

Don’t ask me, I am using the terms only because others here introduced them.
And it should be obvious your point is the one I was pretty making from getgo.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

If an object is not being moved by another, then it is moving itself, movement is intrinsic to its nature. IOW, it is always moving(eternally) Now supposedly it is encountering a hidden power, or agency that’s interfering with its inherent motion. In order to do that the power or the agency would have to be irresistible to cause the inherent power of the moving object to slow down or stop. Now logically we can not have an unstoppable infinite power of motion, and a necessary irrresistible power or agent at the same time, either on is unstoppable, infinite in motion, and the opposing force is resistible, or the moving object is stoppable, therefore does not have infinite motion or inherent motion and the opposing force would inherently be irresistible. This amounts to a logical contradiction

Last time I put my foot on both gas and brake pedals there was no logical contradiction.
Yes there was a sum of opposing forces, neither of which was irresistible.
If the sum total is positive the car keeps accelerating. If negative it decelerate. If balanced the car keeps to its original speed if tyre friction and hills are discounted.

Aquinas seems to be right, efficient causes always perfectly actuate and play out…unless thwarted by opposing causes. But there is nothing necessarily irresistible in the process. It’s a sort of homeostasis. Same with forms and the creative acts of God.
If there is imperfection in the world it is not because of a defect in God’s creative acts…it’s because other causes thwart His causes.

 

[ynotzap]

Well that is not self evident - can you prove it.

My statement: If an object slows down over hundreds of years, the object is not its own motion, My answer: If motion was the objects intrinsic nature it would always be in motion, there would be no potential for change in its motion, If it slows down, then there is a potential for change in its motion, that means the cause of its motion is extrinsic to the object, it is moved by another, not by itself.