Infinite regress

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So a lot of St. Thomas Aquinas’s arguments for God’s existence are based in part on the principle that there can’t be an infinite backward line of causes.

Why not?
The phenomenon of the principle of cause and effects is based on the conditions found in the real objective world. eg. There is an empirical scientific principle that states " for every action there is a reaction" The cause is the action, the effect is the reaction. Another example; If a billiard ball strikes another ball, the first ball is the cause, and the movement of the second ball is the effect. eg If I study something, I learn something, studying is the cause and learning is the effect. The cause and effect principle is a universal truth. This principle is used also in conceptual relationship, logic, reasoning.

Now apply this principle to a real situation that can be found in reality such as a chain reaction, such as the “standing dominoes demonstration” the first domino is PUSHED, the pusher is not in the chain of events, but starts the events by pushing, the pusher then becomes the Primary Mover causing the first domino to fall against the second domino, and so on. When the falling domino strike another, it is called a "cause in the chain, when it strikes another and causes it to fall, that is called the effect. Now to get to the first domino through the chain of events, we have to regress from effect to cause, effect to cause until we reach the first domino. When we do, then what? The first domino didn’t move itself, we are left with a logical problem, how did it happen. Logically we know that the first domino couldn’t move itself, so we reason there had to be someone, or something outside of the series that caused the first domino to fall.

This same procedure is used to prove that there must be an uncaused cause. Now that we understand what a series of cause and effect is, we us reasoning and logic, not dominos, we are working with a universal principle of cause and effect found in the real world, that’s why we can say it is a fact, not a fiction, something we made up in our imagination.

When we come to the first cause in the series, in order to find the Primary cause that is not in the series, because we know that nothing in the series can move itself, but is moved by another. Logic dictates that the Primary Mover is outside of the series, and caused the first object, or thing to move. Also logic dictates, when proving the existence of God, that the Prime Mover to be the Prime Mover, can not be in a series of it’s own, iow, caused by another mover. Concerning God in the act of creation, th;at creation could not cause itself to exist, and the Prime Mover since He doesn’t have a cause, must have existed always, and such a Being would necessarily have existence as His Nature.

So creation had a beginning, and as an effect of the Divine Cause, or the Uncaused Cause could not be in an infinite series of causes, because an infinite series of causes, no beginning and no end, does not have a beginning. If creation had no beginning and no end it would be infinite, and always and necessarily existed. This is contrary to all human experience the criterion of all our knowledge. Now God when giving something existence as an attribute, He can sustain cause and effect eternally, because His act of giving existence to something is eternal
 
So a lot of St. Thomas Aquinas’s arguments for God’s existence are based in part on the principle that there can’t be an infinite backward line of causes.

Why not?
  1. The universe had a begining - although to be fair St. Thomas didn’t know that - so nothing can be an infinite regress.
  2. If you see a train box car moving down the track and you ask, "why is it moving?"you can conclude because it is attached to the moving train car infront of it. But why is that train car moving? Because it is attached to the moving train car in front of that one. If we had an infinite regress of train cars depending on the moving car it’s attached to, we have not explained the reason for the existence of the motion at all.
The only way the motion in all those train cars could exist is if there’s an engine pulling them all: something that is NOT dependant on something else for motion but is the source of the motion. Only then have we actually explained the motion in each of the train cars.

If we substitute “change” or “potential” for the motion in the train cars, we can see how if there’s an infinite regress we have not really explained the changes we see or the actulization of the potential in objects.

I hope this helps.
God Bless, :signofcross:
Poor Knight for Christ and His Church
 
  1. The universe had a begining - although to be fair St. Thomas didn’t know that - so nothing can be an infinite regress.
  2. If you see a train box car moving down the track and you ask, "why is it moving?"you can conclude because it is attached to the moving train car infront of it. But why is that train car moving? Because it is attached to the moving train car in front of that one. If we had an infinite regress of train cars depending on the moving car it’s attached to, we have not explained the reason for the existence of the motion at all.
The only way the motion in all those train cars could exist is if there’s an engine pulling them all: something that is NOT dependant on something else for motion but is the source of the motion. Only then have we actually explained the motion in each of the train cars.

If we substitute “change” or “potential” for the motion in the train cars, we can see how if there’s an infinite regress we have not really explained the changes we see or the actulization of the potential in objects.

I hope this helps.
God Bless, :signofcross:
Poor Knight for Christ and His Church
St. Thomas Aquinas,* Summa Theologica*, Part I, Q45
Article 2. Whether God can create anything?
I answer that, Not only is it not impossible that anything should be created by God, but it is necessary to say that all things were created by God, as appears from what has been said (44, 1). For when anyone makes one thing from another, this latter thing from which he makes is presupposed to his action, and is not produced by his action; thus the craftsman works from natural things, as wood or brass, which are caused not by the action of art, but by the action of nature. So also nature itself causes natural things as regards their form, but presupposes matter. If therefore God did only act from something presupposed, it would follow that the thing presupposed would not be caused by Him. Now it has been shown above (44, 1,2), that nothing can be, unless it is from God, Who is the universal cause of all being. Hence it is necessary to say that God brings things into being from nothing.
newadvent.org/summa/1045.htm#article2
 
I have no idea what you are talking about.
But, I am interested in what is meant by the accident called relation, seeing that everything is relational to my way of thinking. Wouldn’t all accidents be some aspect of a relationship? The Eucharist presents as bread although its reality is the body and blood of Jesus Christ.
Sorry if this is off topic.
A thing could be a substance or not; per Aristotle, things in the world are not beings because they stand under some genus, being, but rather because they all stand in a relation to the primary being, which is substance. Aristotle Metaphysics has ten categories of objects in the world to which words correspond (1) substance; (2) quantity; (3) quality; (4) relatives; (5) somewhere; (6) sometime; (7) being in a position; (8) having; (9) acting; and (10) being acted upon.
 
If you aren’t aware of the categories of Aristotle then I am sorry I don’t have time to bring you up to speed.
Every motion is an actualization of potential. This is what Aquinas has in mind when he argues for a first mover.
 
Every motion is an actualization of potential. This is what Aquinas has in mind when he argues for a first mover.
How is it then this does not hold true for the motion we call constant velocity?

That is the issue under the microscope here I believe.

I have advanced a hypothesis that by the change Aristotle called local motion he may have really meant what we call “acceleration”.

That is a “setting in motion”.
 
A thing could be a substance or not; per Aristotle, things in the world are not beings because they stand under some genus, being, but rather because they all stand in a relation to the primary being, which is substance. Aristotle Metaphysics has ten categories of objects in the world to which words correspond (1) substance; (2) quantity; (3) quality; (4) relatives; (5) somewhere; (6) sometime; (7) being in a position; (8) having; (9) acting; and (10) being acted upon.
Correct, though I note I probably meant a change in 7 rather than 4.
 
So a lot of St. Thomas Aquinas’s arguments for God’s existence are based in part on the principle that there can’t be an infinite backward line of causes.

Why not?
I believe you are referring to the first and second proofs for the existence of God in the Summa Theologica. As Imelahn pointed out earlier, it is important to note in scholastic philosophy the distinction between an order of efficient causes per se and an order of efficient causes per accidens. Aquinas’ second argument concerns an order of efficient causes per se in which some ultimate effect depends on the simultaneous existence of all the members of the series. It is about the present time, the here and now. An order of efficient causes per accidens looks back into the past in which all the members of the series do not have to be simultaneously existing for some present effect. For example, my great great -grandfather is a cause of my being alive today but he was dead even before I was born and my existing now does not simultaneously depend obviously on his present existence. In an order of efficient causes per se, some present effect depends on the existence in the here and now of all the members of the series. For example, If i move a stick with my hand which moves a ball, in order for the ball to move, the stick and my hand simultaneously exist with the movement of the ball.

Aquinas says that an order of efficient causes per se cannot regress to infinity while I believe he says that there is nothing philosophically repugnant for an order of efficient causes per accidens to regress to infinity. Some posters have already made some good remarks why an order of efficient causes per se cannot regress to infinity. For one thing, if one were to regress to infinity in cause and effect, it appears to me that we would have an infinite number of effects but no cause which is why we must posit a first cause. In the first argument concerning motion or change, we would have an infinite number of potentially movable things but no movement which is contrary to sense experience.

Another argument why we cannot regress to infinity in the first and second arguments concerns time I believe. Time is the measure of motion or change and every motion or change involves time whether it be just an instant or more. So in the example of my hand moving a stick which moves a ball, there are actually prior movers to my hand moving such as muscles and nerves and my will, etc. Now, if the movement of the ball depends on the movement of the stick which depends on the movement of my hand which depends on the movement of some muscles and we continue to regress to infinity, it would take an infinite amount of time to move the ball. But the infinite cannot be traversed and the ball would never move. However, the ball does move so we must posit a first unmoved mover.
 
How is it then this does not hold true for the motion we call constant velocity?

I do not see where you have demonstrated definitively where the principle that whatever is moved is moved by another does not hold for the idea of constant velocity which I’m assuming is about the local motion of some object (probably some heavenly object in space) and change of place. And I say this even though as one poster I believed mentioned that the idea of constant velocity concerning heavenly objects in space may be an imaginary construct and not real or actually observed.
 
I do not see where you have demonstrated definitively where the principle that whatever is moved is moved by another does not hold for the idea of constant velocity
Great, don’t hold us in suspense, this being a philosophy forum and all, how about providing a reasoned proposition for your interesting opinion.

BTW if youve been following my evolution of thought on this matter below I have come to the conclusion that of the many translations of the principle, the only valid one is:

“whatever is set in motion (ie starts to move) is such by another”.

Your version is actually more of an apriori tautology like “non-innocent killing is always wrong”.
 
I believe you are referring to the first and second proofs for the existence of God in the Summa Theologica. As Imelahn pointed out earlier, it is important to note in scholastic philosophy the distinction between an order of efficient causes per se and an order of efficient causes per accidens. Aquinas’ second argument concerns an order of efficient causes per se in which some ultimate effect depends on the simultaneous existence of all the members of the series. It is about the present time, the here and now. An order of efficient causes per accidens looks back into the past in which all the members of the series do not have to be simultaneously existing for some present effect. For example, my great great -grandfather is a cause of my being alive today but he was dead even before I was born and my existing now does not simultaneously depend obviously on his present existence. In an order of efficient causes per se, some present effect depends on the existence in the here and now of all the members of the series. For example, If i move a stick with my hand which moves a ball, in order for the ball to move, the stick and my hand simultaneously exist with the movement of the ball.

Aquinas says that an order of efficient causes per se cannot regress to infinity while I believe he says that there is nothing philosophically repugnant for an order of efficient causes per accidens to regress to infinity. Some posters have already made some good remarks why an order of efficient causes per se cannot regress to infinity. For one thing, if one were to regress to infinity in cause and effect, it appears to me that we would have an infinite number of effects but no cause which is why we must posit a first cause. In the first argument concerning motion or change, we would have an infinite number of potentially movable things but no movement which is contrary to sense experience.

Another argument why we cannot regress to infinity in the first and second arguments concerns time I believe. Time is the measure of motion or change and every motion or change involves time whether it be just an instant or more. So in the example of my hand moving a stick which moves a ball, there are actually prior movers to my hand moving such as muscles and nerves and my will, etc. Now, if the movement of the ball depends on the movement of the stick which depends on the movement of my hand which depends on the movement of some muscles and we continue to regress to infinity, it would take an infinite amount of time to move the ball. But the infinite cannot be traversed and the ball would never move. However, the ball does move so we must posit a first unmoved mover.
Concerning the efficient cause, I believe Aquinas finds it unintelligible to speak of efficient causes without also including the final cause. Infinite regress among an order of efficient causes per se entails then no first cause, intermediate cause or causes, or final cause or ultimate effect. For example, there are a number of causes in order for it to rain. Let’s say rain is the final cause or final effect of some order of efficient causes for the production of rain. Now if we were to regress to infinity for the efficient causes of rain, rain cannot be a final or ultimate effect because there is no first cause, intermediate cause or causes, or final cause or effect in an infinite series. There is no first, intermediate, or last in an infinite series. Thus, there is no reason why it rains. It could just as well rain cats and dogs for that matter. The principle that every agent acts for an end would be unintelligible. All this is plainly false. Without a first efficient cause, we cannot posit a final cause or ultimate effect whether such effect be of little or great account.
 
I believe you are referring to the first and second proofs for the existence of God in the Summa Theologica. As Imelahn pointed out earlier, it is important to note in scholastic philosophy the distinction between an order of efficient causes per se and an order of efficient causes per accidens. … An order of efficient causes per accidens looks back into the past in which all the members of the series do not have to be simultaneously existing for some present effect.
Yes I think we all know this as its been said numerous times.

But why is it important for the 1st argument to even talk about infinite per accidens regress if ultimately we have to go vertical causality rather than horizontal?

Why not just deal to the efficient cause per se of the final object in the per accidens series and forget about the temporal series.

Why is the whole per accidens series important at all for the proof?
 
What is the relevence for what I have been discussing exactly?
I don’t know. The thread traces back to Aloysium post #67, not one or yours.
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Aloysium:
I have no idea what you are talking about.
But, I am interested in what is meant by the accident called relation, seeing that everything is relational to my way of thinking. Wouldn’t all accidents be some aspect of a relationship? The Eucharist presents as bread although its reality is the body and blood of Jesus Christ.
Sorry if this is off topic.
 
But why is it important for the 1st argument to even talk about infinite per accidens regress if ultimately we have to go vertical causality rather than horizontal?

Why not just deal to the efficient cause per se of the final object in the per accidens series and forget about the temporal series.

Why is the whole per accidens series important at all for the proof?
Each of us exists in a bubble of time and space that isn’t simultaneous in nature, but is in fact spatially and temporally unique to each individual’s own perspective.

There simply are NO temporally simultaneous causal chains. Just as events are necessarily spread out across space, they’re also spread out across time.

We know for example that when we look out at the stars, that we’re seeing them as they were in the past, not as they are now. And this is true not just for stars, but for every interaction that we ever have with the world around us…ever. Even your reading of this post is an interaction with the past. The firing of the neurons in your brain is the product of a series of events stretching back in time. From the signals traveling along your optic nerve, to the photons interacting with your retina, to those same photons being emitted by the computer screen. It’s all a temporal causal chain stretching ever further back in time. No causal chain that involves the interaction of physical objects is ever simultaneous. Not even the hand moving the stick, moving the rock. They’re all temporal causal chains.

So you’re going to have to rethink simultaneous causation, because there’s no such thing, at least in reality as you understand it to be. So either rethink your understanding of reality, or rethink your understanding of Aquinas’ First Cause. Simultaneous causation isn’t a defense of God, because there’s no such thing.
 
I am thinking as Aquinas or Aristotle would.

A cause always achieves its effect - unless another agency interferes and limits the actualising force of the first agent.

So when we see objects in space slowing down over hundreds of years there are two system ways we can understand the situation.
If an object slows down over hundreds of years, the object is not its own motion, but subject to corrupting influence and time. Its own motion is not infinite, but limited If it is slowing down, its rate of motion (a quantitative reality, amount and degree) is in play, not a qualitative reality.
Blue Horizon:
(a) the moving object is not being moved by another - but is encountering a hidden agency that is interfering with its inherent motion (which if not interfered with would continue forever).
An object moving itself has inherent motion, a motion that continues to be motion regardless of any hidden interfering agency, and will continue to move forever ( a qualitative statement) I am inclined to believe that Aristotle might not agree
Blue Horizon:
(b) a moving object inherently slows to zero if left uninterfered with. So it will only remain in motion if another agent acts on it.
An object that can not sustain its own motion can inherently slow down to zero ( a qualitative statement)
Blue Horizon:
If Aristotle had the scientific knowledge concerning friction and space that we have today I have little doubt he would accept (a) above.

Then again if we considered friction as a “de-mover” then (a) is still consistent with “whatever is in motion is being moved by another” its just that we have a negative mover!

Perhaps it is better to say “whatever is changing is being changed by another”.
AND, constant velocity is not an example of change!
No change, no velocity, change is an inherent quality of velocity, rate of change of position in relation to time. This is a qualitative statement. But now we speak of the amount or degree of change, and the statement becomes quantitative, not qualitative A constant velocity is an unchanging degree, or amount of change. So constant velocity incorporates two truths, quality and degree, or quantitative(mathematical), and qualitative (metaphysical), Constant velocity is an example of change.
 
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